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Why do some refugee groups militarize while others do not?  Existing literature 
focuses on structural explanations and neglects factors related to refugee groups 
themselves.  While acknowledging the importance of exogenous factors in enabling 
militarization, I fill this gap by proposing a framework of refugee militarization including 
factors endogenous to refugee groups, which will help explain the motivation of refugees 
to militarize and the framing used to mobilize them.  In this framework, four conditions 
are necessary and sufficient to lead to refugee militarization in a particular host country at 
a particular time: a collective project to redeem the homeland from a clear enemy, 




This framework is applied to in-depth case studies of two refugee groups, 
Palestinians and Iraqis  in Jordan.  Why did Palestinians militarize from 1964 to 1970, 
but not earlier or later?   Why have Iraqis not militarized despite fears that they 
might?  What are the implications for the likelihood of militarization by either group in 
the near future, given the ongoing upheavals of the Arab Spring? 
From 2010 to 2011 I conducted 174 interviews of Palestinian and Iraqi 
households and local experts in Jordan.  The results of these interviews reveal that from 
1948 to 1963 there was a collective project among Palestinians in Jordan, but most 
refugees were waiting for powerful states to redeem the homeland on their behalf.  From 
1964 to 1970 all four conditions were met.  From 1971 to 2011 militarization has not 
occurred mainly due to lack of political opportunity.  This suggests that Palestinians 
would likely militarize again if political opportunity arose.  Among ordinary Iraqis, 
however, there is little collective project, despite the presence of militancy entrepreneurs, 
so it is unlikely that they would militarize even if given the opportunity. 
To extend the global applicability of this framework, I apply it also to cases of 
Rwandans and Afghans, using secondary literature.  I conclude with suggestions for 
future research, a projection of refugee militarization in the context of the new Middle 
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This project has gone through many evolutions, but the core concepts – refugees, 
the Middle East and ethnonationalist projects – came from three sources.  The first was 
my long-standing interest in the Levant.  At fourteen years old I somehow managed to 
convince my parents that I was mature enough to travel there alone and visit my older 
brother, who was studying abroad.  This was my first foray out of North America, and it 
was a powerful experience.  The ancient history and modern political struggles dazzled 
my teenage brain. 
The second formative experience was my work for the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) in Macedonia and Kosovo in 1999 and 2000.  For a reason which 
shall forever remain a mystery to me, IOM agreed to allow a random American college 
student help supervise the logistics of refugee departures and returns, then allowed him to 
come back the following summer in a position with even more authority.  Kosovo was 
my first post-conflict zone, and my first time interacting with refugees on a daily basis.  It 
disturbed me that refugees seemed to be stripped of agency and funneled into the position 
of dependent supplicants.  This concern as well as other aspects of the refugee experience 
continued to trouble me long after I left the Balkans. 
The third source of inspiration came from a discussion several years ago with my 
wife, Munita, who is from the Fiji Islands.  She is part of the population, constituting over 
one-third of the population
1
, whose ancestors immigrated from India under a British 
                                                          
1
 Weiner states that the Indo-Fijian proportion of the population was much higher before the 1987 
coup and subsequent anti-Indian riots in Fiji – in fact, slightly greater than the indigenous Fijian 
population, 48.6% to 46.2% – but the instability and targeting of Indo-Fijians led to substantial 
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scheme over a century ago  (now referred to as “Indo-Fijians”).  Although most Indo-
Fijians retained their religion and dominant social customs from India, they also 
integrated into Fiji over the generations.  Nowadays, few Indo-Fijians have family ties to 
India or feel any particular attachment to it. 
Fiji has experienced its own ethnic conflict, including four coups since 1987.  
Three of these coups aimed to decrease the rights and political influence of the Indo-
Fijians in favor of indigenous Fijians.  Following one such coup in 2000, Munita and her 
family left Fiji, as did thousands of other Indo-Fijians.  Yet, after three anti-Indo-Fijian 
coups, persecution, discrimination and civil unrest, Indo-Fijian refugees and emigrants 
have never taken up arms against their indigenous Fijian co-nationals.  Even the single 
coup supporting Indo-Fijian rights, in 2006, was led by indigenous Fijian Commodore 
Frank Bainimarama, not an Indo-Fijian.  When I asked Munita why Indo-Fijians had not 
organized to defend themselves and attack Fijians in response, she replied that Indo-
Fijians would rather focus on moving to places with better economic opportunities, such 
as Australia and New Zealand, than fighting for Fiji.  “Isn’t Fiji your home?” I asked.  
After all, she had grown up in Fiji, as had her ancestors dating back at least four 
generations.  She pondered and then replied, “Home?  No, I don’t think so.”
2
 
The confluence of interests in refugees, the Middle East, ethnonationalism and 
conflict coalesced into the present study of refugee militarization with a focus on the two 
major refugee populations in the Middle East region, Palestinians and Iraqis.  I was 
surprised to find that no one had yet written on the critical role of a collective project in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
emigration afterward. (1992/93, fn.  28; see also Williams 2003; Clad & Keith-Reid/Far Eastern 
Economic Review, June 1990) 
2
 This is a striking contrast from a case study of Fiji published in 1942: “Though linked to India 
by sentiment, religion, and tradition, [the Indo-Fijians] look upon Fiji as their only home and are 
almost as indigenous as the Fijians themselves.” (Coulter 1942, p. 3) 
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distinguishing those refugee groups who orient politically toward their country of origin, 
and even take up arms to fight and die for it, from those who orient instead toward a new 
life in their host country and third-party resettlement states.  I was even more surprised to 
find that, despite token references to Palestinians in the literature on refugee 
militarization, no one had yet conducted a detailed study on them in direct comparison to 
other cases worldwide.  Why Refugees Rebel – borrowing titular inspiration from Ted 
Gurr’s (1970) famous Why Men Rebel and Mohammed Hafez’s (2003) Why Muslims 
Rebel – was born. 
---------------- 
I wish to express my sincere thanks to the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) 
and the David L. Boren Fellowship for supporting my year of research in Jordan.  It is an 
honor and a privilege to be part of the USIP family; and the staff of the Institute of 
International Education (IIE), which administers the Boren Fellowship, were amazingly 
accommodating of all my unusual requests and super helpful in facilitating the post-Ph.D. 
job search. 
I am deeply indebted to the hundreds of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees and local 
experts who took time out of their day to sit down with an unknown American graduate 
student and answer intrusive, personal and politically sensitive questions.  For many of 
them, it wasn’t easy to dredge up memories of their homeland, their losses and the 
horrific events that forced them or their ancestors to leave.  Sometimes they wept.  It 
wasn’t easy to talk about their ongoing struggles and pain – emotional, political and 
physical – and their hope, or lack thereof, for the future.  It wasn’t easy to trust a stranger, 
when their statements could attract unwanted attention from the authorities.  Despite all 
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of that, they opened up to me, they shared with me, and I am honored and grateful.  I 
hope they find that this project faithfully represents the wide diversity of experiences, 
knowledge and opinions that they shared with me. 
Gratitude for supporting and facilitating this project are due to my dissertation 
advisor at the University of Maryland College Park, Shibley Telhami, whom I also 
consider a friend.  He has not only given me solid advice guiding the development of 
theoretical aspects of this project, but indispensable assistance in practical aspects of field 
research in the Middle East.  He also has written so many letters of recommendation for 
my fellowship applications that he probably has a template letter memorized. 
James Milner, one of the world’s most prolific experts on the topic of refugee 
militarization, has found the time to review my work repeatedly and give me detailed, 
constructive feedback.  He also drew from many years of field research experience 
worldwide to offer a wealth of helpful suggestions for my year in Jordan.  For that 
assistance, as well as leaving the Middle East region largely untouched for me throughout 
a decade of writing about refugee militarization, I am extremely grateful. 
Next, sincere thanks are owed to the other members of my dissertation committee, 
Paul Huth, Johanna Birnir, Kanisha Bond and Meyer Kestnbaum, each of whom 
approached my work from a different perspective and offered uniquely insightful – and, I 
thought, exciting – improvements to its development.  Extra thanks are due to Professor 
Huth for writing endless letters of recommendation for my fellowship applications. 
I also want to express my gratitude to those who have helped develop my inchoate 
ideas and hypotheses into the nearly respectable work that it is today.  Any brilliant 
flashes of insight and clarity which shine through in this project are probably theirs; the 
vi 
 
rest is entirely mine.  In addition to the worthy scholars already mentioned, they include 
Howard Adelman, Gary Goertz, Joshua Goldstein, Virginia Haufler, Mark Lichbach, 
Sarah Lischer, Idean Salehyan, Jillian Schwedler, my fellow students in the Government 
& Politics program at the University of Maryland and at the Institute for Qualitative and 
Multi-Method Research at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University, and my fellow 
USIP Peace Scholars. 
Next there is the long list of individuals who provided critical assistance during 
my work in Jordan.  First are my two interpreters/assistants, Ahmad and Aseel, whom I 
relied on not only to be my ears and voice during hundreds of hours of interviews, but 
also to help me navigate cultural and local customs as smoothly as the unmarked roads of 
cities, villages and refugee camps.  During some weeks they spent more time with me 
than with their own families.  Both of them explained to me hidden aspects of Jordanian, 
Palestinian and Islamic society which I probably would never have known or understood 
otherwise.  I owe them both a debt of gratitude. 
There are many people and organizations in Jordan who facilitated my work in 
ways large and small, including: Nawaf Tell and the Center for Strategic Studies at the 
University of Jordan; Mater Saqer, Lex Takkenberg and UNRWA; Jamal Arafat and 
UNHCR; the Jordan River Foundation; the International Organization for Migration; Seth 
Wikas and the American Embassy; the Department of Palestinian Affairs for permission 
to visit the refugee camps; Mohammed Amer; Fusayo Irikura and Wisam Alkhafaji; and 
the fountains of wisdom on all things Palestinian in Jordan, Jalal Al Husseini, and all 
things Iraqi in Jordan, Géraldine Chatelard.  There are so many other people in Jordan to 
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whom I owe thanks that I cannot list them all here, and I apologize for that, but please 
know that I am grateful for your help.  
On the home front, I wish to express gratitude to my parents for helping us take 
care of our domestic affairs back home each time we went traipsing off to the Middle 
East for a summer or a year.  They made our travels logistically possible by dealing with 
all sorts of unforeseen circumstances on our behalf, allowing us to complete our trips in 
the Middle East as planned. 
Finally, none of this would have been possible without the support of my loving 
wife, Munita.  I have been in graduate school for seven years, the entirety of our married 
life to date.  She has allowed me to retreat into my cave for countless hours to read, 
research, plan lessons, grade exams and write fellowship proposals, papers and this 
dissertation – and also reminded me when it’s time to come out to eat dinner or spend 
time with the family.  She joined me on trips to academic conferences all over the United 
States, and even let me abandon her one Thanksgiving to attend a conference in 
Switzerland.  She came with me to Egypt and Israel for a summer of Arabic study, and to 
Jordan for a year of research.  She suspended her own Master’s degree studies to take 
care of our children while I wrote my dissertation.  That kind of sacrifice and support can 
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Note on Anonymity of Interviewees 
 
Most of the expert interviews for this project were conducted from October, 2010, 
to January, 2011, and the refugee interviews were conducted from January to May, 2011.  
The latter period coincided almost exactly with beginning of the turbulence in the Middle 
East which has come to be known as the Arab Spring, including weekly protests in 
Jordan.  While I did not ask questions in my interviews directly related to the popular 
uprisings, many interviewees perceived my work in the context of those historic events.  
Given the long-standing pervasiveness and fear of the domestic intelligence services 
(mukhabarat) in Jordan, the unpredictability of the Arab Spring, and the sudden 
appearance of a foreigner asking politically sensitive questions, it is not surprising that 
many declined to be interviewed, and even some of those who did agree were afraid to 
speak openly.  This is not an uncommon problem in research on refugees. (Gerdes 2006; 
Mestheneos 2006)  On the other hand, most refugees who agreed to be interviewed did 
seem eager to share their personal and family history and opinions, which is also a 
common finding by researchers. (e.g., Harrell-Bond 1986) 
One step I took to try to put interviewees at ease was explaining at the beginning 
of every interview the extensive precautions I was taking to ensure their anonymity, and 
promising that they will in no way be personally identifiable in anything that I write.  
Therefore, quotes from most refugee interviewees identify only their age and sex.  Quotes 
from non-refugee experts are also anonymized, except when the interviewee gave me 
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Map 1.  Jordan (showing Palestinian refugee camps) 
 








CHAPTER 1: Why Refugee Militarization Matters 
 
 
Since the beginning of 2011, the Middle East and North Africa have been roiled 
by popular protests and revolutions, following decades-long dictatorships.  Inspired and 
emboldened by the popular uprisings, Palestinian refugees
3
 in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, 
Gaza and the West Bank marched to their respective borders with Israel in May and June 
to mark their 1948 and 1967 exoduses and attempted to breach the barriers to their 
country of origin (CoO).  In the ensuing clashes, Israel killed six Palestinians on the 
Lebanese border, one at the Gaza border and twenty-three on the Syrian border.
4
  At the 
border with Jordan, six thousand Palestinian refugees protested: 
“We have been waiting in Jordan, in Lebanon, in Syria, in Iraq,” said Abdullah Abu 
Jared, a 22-year-old resident of Baqaa, the Hashemite Kingdom's largest refugee camp. 
“After watching what happened in Egypt and throughout the Arab world, we are no 
longer willing to wait.” (CNN, “Amid talk of intifada, Jordan’s Palestinians demand right 
of return”, 5/13/11) 
Meanwhile, despite the abundance of available weapons, the vast majority of Iraqi 
refugees seem wholly uninterested in the idea of mobilizing to fight their persecutors in 
Iraq.  What is the relevance of the Arab Spring to political mobilization and militarization 
by the two major refugee populations in the region, Palestinians and Iraqis?  As I will 
discuss in Chapter 10, this research project suggests that a chaotic transition period may 
provide an opportunity for militarization by both groups, but only Palestinians are likely 
to take advantage of that opportunity. 
Most scholars theorizing that refugees can pose a security threat to their host 
                                                          
3
 The label “refugee” is fraught with confusion and even contention.  I will explore and define the 
term “refugee” as I use it in this project in Chapter 2. 
4
 AP, “Palestinians cancel Naksa Day march to Israel-Lebanon border”, 6/3/11; AP, “Syria warns 




states include early in their work a disclaimer emphasizing that the vast majority of 
refugees are peaceful and desperately in need of humanitarian assistance; and they 
strongly recommend that those in the policy world should not interpret their research as a 
reason to refuse or limit asylum to refugees.
5
  While echoing those reminders, I would 
also add that although endogenous characteristics may increase the likelihood of conflict, 
selectively refusing entry to refugees on the basis of those characteristics would 
constitute a human rights violation with potentially devastating consequences.  
Policymakers could view such characteristics as an increased risk factor in the aggregate 
rather than deterministic on an individual basis – warranting proactive policies and 
increased attention rather than discrimination or exclusion. 
Why do some refugee groups militarize while others do not, or at some periods of 
their exile but not others?  I propose a framework to improve our understanding of the 
circumstances under which refugees militarize against their CoO.  This framework 
integrates: the presence of a collective project to redeem the homeland; militancy 
entrepreneurs; political opportunity; and conflict resources.  I will apply this framework 
to in-depth case studies of Palestinians and Iraqis in Jordan, exploring why Palestinians 
militarized from the mid-1960s until 1970, but not before or since; and why Iraqis in the 
country have not militarized despite fears that they might do so
6
.  Interviews I conducted 
in Jordan from 2010-11 with hundreds of refugees and local experts revealed that the 
resources are available for both groups to militarize, but political opportunity is 
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(currently) available to neither.  There are many willing Palestinian militancy 
entrepreneurs present in Jordan and one such group of Iraqi leaders.  However, the main 
difference between the groups is the presence or absence of a collective project to redeem 
the homeland from a clear enemy: There is little such collective project among ordinary 
Iraqi refugees, while the collective project among Palestinian refugees in Jordan has 
mostly continued unabated since their period of militarization four decades ago; and the 
Arab Spring breathed new life into Palestinian militancy entrepreneurs’ hope for a 
resumption of “resistance”. 
Why does it matter?  Practical concerns 
Militarization by a refugee group can have problematic outcomes beyond the 
security threat it poses to the CoO.  First, even if it occurs with the support of the host 
state, the militarization nevertheless constitutes a challenge to its sovereignty.  The armed 
group is a non-state militant organization exercising political will more or less 
independently, possibly securing funding and weapons outside the control of the host 
government, and engaging in its own international relations with every attack on the CoO 
and every irregular movement of weapons, money and fighters across borders.  In the 
most dramatic cases, like those of the Palestinians in Jordan and Lebanon, the militarized 
refugee organization can take over territory in the host state, including levying taxes and 
providing social services, effectively becoming a state within a state. 
Militarization can also undermine the stability of the host state in a variety of 
ways.  Raids on the CoO by the militant group often bring retaliatory raids onto host state 
territory, even when the host state and CoO are not in a state of conflict.  For example, 
Turkey has repeatedly entered northern Iraq to attack Kurdish camps which they accuse 
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of supporting or harboring militants of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).  Soviet-
controlled Afghanistan attacked targets over the border in Pakistan, where militarized 
refugees were launching deadly raids on the Communists.  Other examples include 
attacks by South Africa on refugee camps in Angola, Botswana, Zambia and Lesotho; the 
Vietnamese military attacking Cambodian refugee camps in Thailand; Guatemalan 
attacks on refugee camps in Mexico; Ethiopian attacks on refugee camps in Sudan; and 
Angolan attacks on refugees in Zambia and Zaire. (Loescher 1992; Lischer 2005; 
Salehyan 2009; Gerdes 2006; Mogire 2011; Weiner & Munz 1997; Tavernise & 
Arsu/New York Times, 2/22/08; Reuters, “Kurdish rebel supporters seek a way back to 
Turkey”, 9/9/09; Yavuz/Today’s Zaman, 12/24/09)  Such conflict can draw the host state 
directly into a (transnational) civil conflict, effectively widening the conflict to 
neighboring states; or it can lead to armed conflict between the host state and refugee 
group, as happened in 1970 in Jordan. 
Third, militarization by a refugee group can perpetuate the conflict in the CoO 
and obstruct international efforts to resolve it.  Diaspora constituencies often hold more 
extreme positions regarding a conflict in their ethnic homeland. (Carmet, James & 
Taydas 2009; cf. Sayigh 1977)  Thus, even a peace agreement which is signed by all 
parties in a civil conflict may fail if a refugee militant group refuses to recognize it, as has 
occurred in West Africa, the Great Lakes region, Afghanistan/Pakistan and 
Nicaragua/Honduras (Betts & Loescher 2011; Loescher 1992)  Likewise, there is a 
difference between the opinions of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and those in 
the diaspora in regard to negotiations with Israel, with those in the diaspora generally 
more in favor of armed conflict and opposed to negotiations than those in the Palestinian 
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territories.  As one of my Palestinian interviewees in Jordan stated: 
The Jews don’t deserve to live in Palestine, they have to go.  And the only way for them 
to go is… because they use weapons on us, we have to use weapons on them.  But 
[Palestinians] in Palestine will disagree with me because they want to live in peace.  
Maybe because I don’t live there, so I don’t feel the need for peace… All the time [we] 
watch the news and see the killings, and we just want the Jews to go. (Female, 22) 
Finally, from the perspective of international organizations such as the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and international humanitarian 
NGOs, militarization prolongs a refugee situation and complicates the provision of 
humanitarian assistance to needy populations.  It presents a legal obstacle to the efforts of 
UNHCR, which is prohibited from registering active combatants as refugees, and makes 
the international effort to find durable solutions more difficult (Zolberg, Suhrke & 
Aguayo 1989); UNHCR will even be unable to find resettlement opportunities for the 
families of combatants and former combatants, as resettlement countries fear the future 
immigration of a combatant on family reunification grounds.
7
 (Interview, senior UNHCR 
official, 11/14/10)  Militarization also presents an ethical quandary for organizations 
whose mission is to protect victims of conflict, by raising questions of participation and 
guilt, as occurred most famously in the case of Rwandan refugees in the mid-1990s. 
Given the above concerns, should refugee militarization always be discouraged?  
To put the issue in layman’s terms, refugees who take up arms are not always the bad 
guys.  For example, opponents of communism may say that the militarization of Afghan 
refugees in Pakistan and support for anti-leftist refugee militant groups in Honduras and 
Thailand was the correct course of action.  Adelman (1998) offers an answer to this 
normative question: 
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Different warrior communities are evaluated [normatively] in different ways by different 
groups.  But refugee warriors always come into conflict with those whose priority is the 
peaceful resolution of conflict, regional stability, and the provision of humanitarian aid 
exclusively to [non-combatant] refugees. 
Why does it matter?  Conceptual issues 
In addition to the practical difficulties presented by refugee militarization, the 
phenomenon poses several conceptual challenges in the study of international relations 
and comparative politics.  First, as suggested above, it provides a route for the expansion 
of civil war into neighboring states.  This offers a bridge between the study of civil and 
international war, crossing a conceptual line which has become increasingly blurred in 
the post-World War II period.  So far-reaching are the effects of refugee militarization 
that civil war should no longer be studied as domestic affairs when it occurs.  The 
relationship between the host and CoO states becomes a central factor affecting the fate 
of the militarization.  Does the host state support attacks against their neighbor?  Are they 
opposed but too weak to prevent it?  Can the CoO use diplomacy or coercion on the host 
state to affect their tolerance/support of militant activity?  Or will the CoO use the attacks 
as a justification to take control of a “buffer zone”, as Israel did in southern Lebanon in 
1982?  Furthermore, as noted above, even peace agreements become more complicated: 
States hosting armed (or formerly armed) refugee groups may adopt an important role in 
erstwhile bilateral negotiations, as Jordan has in the case of Israeli-Palestinian 
negotiations.  More actors can mean more veto players, and more opportunities for the 
failure of negotiations or their implementation. 
Second, there are important implications of refugee militarization to the study of 
armed conflict, challenging concepts of sovereignty, international law and domestic law.  
What is the bearing of refugee militarization to our understanding of borders and 
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sovereignty?  What is the difference between shooting at an enemy standing one meter 
east or west of an international border?  What are the legal implications when the border 
is not a clearly demarcated line but a “border zone”, and what if the border is nominally 
demilitarized?  Is it necessary to reconceptualize the border itself?  Some academic works 
have attempted to open the “black box” of the  international border, investigating the 
meaning and implications of the border frontier, particularly in reference to refugees. (For 
example: Lang 2002; Rajaram & Grundy-Warr 2007) 
Third, violence perpetuated by those who have fled persecution constitutes a 
challenge to the academic study of refugees.  In international legal standing, the 1951 UN 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees excludes active combatants; yet in cases of 
militarization, which are often only semi-formal organizations, it becomes difficult to 
establish who is a combatant, who is involved in a militant organization but not an active 
combatant, who is benefitting from or supporting combatant activity but not directly 
involved, and who is completely uninvolved.  What does this mean for the international 
refugee regime, which is built around the concepts of protection and durable solutions? 
Finally, refugee militarization bears upon the study of ethnic relations, diasporas 
and transnationalism.  Relations between ethnic groups can have an important effect on 
transnational rebel activity.  For example, the minority Albanian population in 
Macedonia supported the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) during its conflict with 
Serbian forces; and links with the KLA even helped establish the Macedonian Albanians’ 
own rebel group, the National Liberation Army (NLA) in 2001. (Salehyan 2009)  
Concerns about ethnic balance and irredentist claims for a greater Pashtunistan led in part 
to the decision by Pakistan’s government to support a refugee-based low intensity war 
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against Soviet-controlled Afghanistan. (Grare 2003)  A co-ethnic population in the host 
state is a likely source of material support for refugee militant organizations; while the 
relationship between the global diaspora and a refugee community adjacent to the CoO 
may differ in material ways from their relationship with co-ethnics in the CoO itself.  For 
instance, a hardline refugee militant group may be seen by the diaspora as the “real” or 
“pure” resistance to the enemy in the CoO, in contrast to a co-ethnic rebel group 
engaging in negotiations inside the CoO.  Scenarios such as these differ from the standard 
conceptualizations of transnational ethnic groups, in which the CoO is situated at the 
center of a diaspora web. 
In order to help place the in-depth case studies of Palestinians and Iraqis detailed 
in this project into a global context, in this chapter I will briefly summarize several cases 
of refugee militarization worldwide, followed by an overview of the puzzle and gap in 
the existing literature which my framework addresses.  Finally, I will offer an outline of 
the remaining chapters. 
Refugee militarization worldwide 
The Palestinians famously militarized in Jordan, but refugee militarization is not a 
uniquely Palestinian phenomenon, nor one limited to the Middle East.  While it is 
important to note that the vast majority of refugee groups around the world do not take up 
arms, engage in conflict or otherwise pose an explicit security challenge to their host 
state
8
, studies have provided qualitative and quantitative evidence that refugees can 
increase the chance of engagement in conflict by the host state (e.g., Loescher & 
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10 
 
Monahan 1989; Loescher & Milner 2005; Muggah & Mogire 2006; Salehyan & 
Gleditsch 2006), and have found that political violence involving refugees occurs in 
about 15% of states hosting refugee populations of 2,000 or more
9
. 
Some of the most recent examples include recruiting and attacks by the Taliban 
from refugee camps in the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan (Parker 2008; US 
News & World Report, “Taliban finds fertile recruiting ground in Pakistan’s tribal 
refugee camps”, 2/9/09), and by the Somali government from refugee camps in Kenya 
(Lischer 2010; Houreld/AP, 11/16/09).  As of this writing, similar activity is taking place 
on the Turkish-Syrian border, where Turkey is hosting and guarding a refugee camp 
containing a rebel organization fighting the forces of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, 
the Free Syrian Army, which uses the camp as a base from which to conduct raids on 
targets inside Syria (Stack/New York Times, 10/27/11); while the newly Shi’ite-led 
regime of Iraq is trying to strengthen its ties with Iran by closing a refugee camp which 
has housed the armed Iranian opposition militant group People’s Mujahedeen 
Organization of Iran since the era of Saddam Hussein. (Washington Post, “Iraq extends 
deadline for Iranian exiles to leave refugee camp”, 12/21/11) 
In the following pages I will summarize four cases of militarization outside of 
Jordan, including three outside the Middle East, to demonstrate the global scope of this 
phenomenon.  Two of the most famous cases of refugee militarization outside the Middle 
East, Afghans in Pakistan and Rwandans in Zaire, will be covered in Chapter 9. 
In Chapters 2 and 3, I will make the argument that a collective project to redeem 
the homeland is a necessary prerequisite of militarization.  As I will demonstrate, in each 
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of the following cases, a collective project was present on the part of the refugees. 
WEST AFRICA: SIERRA LEONEANS AND LIBERIANS IN GUINEA 
The first case in this introductory survey concerns exiles from Sierra Leone and 
Liberia in Guinea in the 1990s, stemming from the civil wars which began in Liberia in 
1989 and Sierra Leone in 1991.  At its peak during that decade, Guinea hosted 670,000 
refugees from those two states, which was equivalent to a nearly 9% increase in Guinea’s 
population.  The refugees took up residence in camps, co-ethnic border settlements and 
cities, including the Guinean capital. (Loescher & Milner 2005; Milner & Christoffersen-
Deb 2006) 
By the late 1990s, asylum had become a highly politicized aspect of the conflicts, 
when two parties, the Sierra Leonean pro-government Kamajors and Liberian anti-
government United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), “assisted 
Guinea’s military to patrol its borders and screen those seeking asylum in Guinea and 
assistance intended for refugees was allegedly diverted to support Kamajor and ULIMO 
campaigns in Sierra Leone and Liberia” (Loescher & Milner 2005, p. 52), resulting in the 
militarization of the camps.  Many fighters in ULIMO were either refugees themselves or 
had close relatives in the refugee communities.  Contrary to the typical portrayal of 
refugee militarization, in which camps are loci of mobilization while urban refugees, if 
acknowledged at all, are bystanders, ULIMO was drawing refugee recruits from the cities 
of N’Zérékoré and Macenta as well. (Milner & Christoffersen-Deb 2006) 
Attacks on refugee camps occurred in September 1998, when RUF fighters 
crossed into Guinea to attack two camps housing militants, killing seven refugees and 
three others.  In the summer of 2000, incursions and attacks on refugee camps in Guinea 
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by Sierra Leonean rebels forced UNHCR to relocate the Sierra Leonean refugee camps 
farther from the border with their CoO.
10
 (Andrews 2003; Loescher & Milner 2008a)  
Meanwhile, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), a militant 
group which emerged from ULIMO, had established itself with the support of the 
Guinean government in the town of Macenta and the Kouankan refugee camp, where 
fighters “used the camp as a base for their families, as a destination for rest and 
relaxation, and as a source for supplies, especially food and medicine.” (Milner 2005, p. 
152)  The Liberian refugee camps had in fact been suspected of hosting militants opposed 
to the Liberian government since the beginning of the civil war. (Gerdes 2006)  LURD 
conducted strikes on Liberia from Guinea, leading the Liberian military and pro-
government paramilitaries to retaliate in September 2000, attacking multiple border 
towns in Guinean territory and killing at least 80 Guinean nationals.  In response, the 
Guinean army mobilized ULIMO, including its constituent Liberian refugees, to 
counterattack.  The violence continued until April 2001, with devastating impacts on both 
Guineans and the refugee settlements. (Loescher & Milner 2005)  Even after the conflict 
ended, LURD militants roamed freely in the refugee camps that remained. (Milner & 
Christoffersen-Deb 2006) 
In both cases, there was a collective project on the part of the refugee group to 
redeem the homeland from a clear enemy.  In the case of the Liberians, it was mostly 
ethnic Krahn refugees, sympathetic to the overthrown government of President Samuel 
Doe, who formed ULIMO in opposition to the government of Charles Taylor, who was 
supported by the Gio and Mano tribes.  Among the Sierra Leoneans, the Kamajors were 
                                                          
10
 UNHCR has likewise moved camps away from borders in other cases due to incursions by 
armed groups from the CoO, such as the camps in Kenya near Somalia. (Agier 2008) 
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formed by ethnic Mendes, who supported the government, in opposition to the rebel RUF 
controlling most of the country’s territory. 
LATIN AMERICA: NICARAGUANS IN HONDURAS 
Following the Sandinistas revolution in Nicaragua, various groups opposing the 
revolution, collectively called the contras, took up arms in a low-intensity conflict 
beginning in the early 1980s.  As in the case of Afghanistan during the same period, the 
war in Nicaragua between the Sandinistas and the contras became a proxy battlefield 
between American and Soviet clients. (Salehyan 2009)  The contras operated in part from 
Honduras, where 14,000 Nicaraguan refugees (primarily indigenous Miskitus) had fled 
by 1983, and at least 25,000 (including non-Miskitus) by 1988. (Ferris 1985; Hammond 
1993)  However, unlike the Honduran government’s restrictive approach to Salvadoran 
refugees, who were treated with suspicion as sympathizers of the enemy Farabundo Martí 
National Liberation Front (FMLN), subject to refoulement and even massacred in at least 
one incident (Hartigan 1992), the Nicaraguan refugees were treated as allies, allowed 
gainful employment and freedom of movement.  The contras were able to use the 
Nicaraguans’ refugee camps for sanctuary, supply and recruitment (Salehyan 2009), 
although the level of political mobilization, broadly defined, among Nicaraguan refugees 
was lower than among Salvadorans in similar camps.
11
 (Hammond 1993)  The presence 
of 7,000 contras operating from Honduras led to retaliatory strikes by the Nicaraguan 
military on Honduran territory, sometimes killing Honduran soldiers and leading to tense 
relations and occasional border skirmishes between the two states. (Salehyan 2009) 
The United States gave substantial – and controversial – aid to the contras in their 
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and partly due to ongoing perception of threat by the Salvadorans. 
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fight against the socialist Sandinistas, as did the right-wing governments of Argentina 
and Honduras itself. (Salehyan 2009)  Likewise, the refugees, who largely supported the 
contras, were labeled “freedom fighters” by the American government, “and as such 
[were] encouraged to wage a war of resistance in Nicaragua.” (Loescher 1989, p. 14; see 
also Ferris 1985)  Support for militarization of the refugees also arrived from 
conservative non-governmental organizations with ties to fundamentalist church groups, 
who provided aid “along the Honduras-Nicaragua border, in areas dominated by rebel 
activity, [drawing] some refugees out of the relative protection of the UNHCR camps and 
[making] it possible for them to join the military forces of the contras.” (Ferris 1989, p. 
162, emphasis in original; see also Zolberg et al. 1989) 
In this case, the refugees strongly supported the contras’ collective project to 
redeem their homeland from the socialist Sandinistas who had taken power in a 1979 
revolution. 
SOUTHEAST ASIA: BURMESE IN THAILAND 
Refugees from Burma (Myanmar) did not arrive to Thailand as a large wave due 
to a single high-intensity conflict, but more gradually over time.  The conflict dates back 
to the independence of the country in 1948, after which multiple ethnic minorities along 
the border with Thailand began a low-intensity conflict for autonomy. (Brees 2008)  
From less than 10,000 registered camp residents in Thailand along the border in 1984, the 
number grew to over 92,000 by 1995, and over 150,000 by 2008.
12
  The Burmese 
refugees comprised multiple ethnic groups, including Karens, Karennis, Mons and Shans, 
among others.  In addition to those in Thai border camps, there were also at least 300,000 
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outside the camps, most of them ethnically Shan. (Loescher & Milner 2008a)  Finally, 
thousands of Burmese “students” migrated to urban areas in Thailand, primarily 
Bangkok, after the military junta in Burma nullified the 1990 elections and began 
persecuting members of the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu 
Kyi. (Loescher & Milner 2005; Loescher & Milner 2008a; Lang 2002) 
The Burmese ethnic minority refugees in Thailand have posed security threats to 
their CoO.  The students have in the past hijacked airplanes (1989 and 1990) and seized 
the embassy of Myanmar in Bangkok (1999), while ethnic Karen militants held civilians 
hostage in a Thai hospital (2000). (Loescher & Milner 2005)  The ethnic minorities have 
used the refugee camps – which were de facto exempted from Thai law – for supply, 
diversion of humanitarian aid, sanctuary, a source of recruitment, and bases for militant 
rebels, leading to retaliatory attacks on Thai soil by Myanmar’s military and its proxy 
militias. (Loescher & Milner 2008a; “Bringing the law to Burmese refugee camps”, 
IRIN, 4/23/09)  Starting in 1995, the military began to target refugee camps to not only 
“destroy potential sources of supply and bases for insurgent forces but also [as] a means 
of obtaining forced labor for their military operations.” (Loescher & Milner 2005, pp. 58-
59)  The Thai government was not a bystander in this conflict but took advantage of the 
militants and refugees to contain Myanmar and create a de facto buffer zone along the 
border, including covertly supplying weapons to the rebels and allowing the rebel ethnic 
groups to administer some territory.  These conditions even led to border skirmishes 
between the militaries of Thailand and Myanmar in 1995 and 2001. (Lang 2002; 
Loescher & Milner 2008a) 
In 1997, Thai policy regarding the refugees and the militant groups they 
16 
 
supported changed significantly in an effort to improve relations with the Myanmar 
government.  The Thais consolidated some two dozen rural camps into nine securitized 
and fortified locations, enforcing strict limitations on the free movement and employment 
of over 100,000 refugees who lived there.
13
  After 2001 the Thai government took further 
steps when it began pressuring the Burmese rebel groups, their former clients, to reach 
ceasefire agreements with the Myanmar government.  In 2002, due to politically-related 
security concerns as well as other economic and security issues, Thailand began 
instituting stricter border controls and started moving refugees, including the students, 
from the cities back to camps near the border; some students were forcibly repatriated to 
Burma. (Loescher & Milner 2008a; Loescher & Milner 2005; Lang 2002)  In November 
2005 the Thai government suspended new refugee registrations. (Brees 2008) 
In the case of Burmese in Thailand, there is a clear collective project on the part 
of several refugee ethnic groups to gain autonomy from the military-led government. 
MIDDLE EAST: PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON 
Palestinian civilians fled their CoO in two major waves, as a result of the wars in 
1948 and 1967.  According to the roster of the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), 
the UN agency responsible for the welfare of Palestinian refugees, 127,600 Palestinians
14
 
had entered Lebanon by 1950. (Schiff 1995, p. 7)  In the early years, there was little 
political activism among the refugees, and the Maronite-dominated Lebanese government 
kept close tabs on them through the military intelligence service, the “second bureau”. 
(ICG 2009)  Their early lack of political activity contrasts sharply with their later 
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militarization: “Initially impoverished, fragmented, dispirited and without adequate 
leadership to address their concerns, the Palestinian refugee community [in Lebanon] was 
quiescent until the mid-1960s.” (Haddad 2003, p. 30)  At that time, according to Hudson, 
they were “uniquely situated to energize the emerging Palestinian resistance movement: 
they possessed discontented, youthful ‘masses’ ready to be mobilized, and a sophisticated 
middle-class political elite ready to lead.” (1997, p. 249)  In 1964, sixteen years after 
their initial exodus, the refugees began to militarize, led by the Fatah movement, which 
had begun its political operations in the region in 1959.  Starting in 1965, Fatah 
repeatedly crossed the border from Lebanon to strike at targets inside Israel, leading to 
retaliatory strikes which contributed to the destabilization of Lebanon. (Gerdes 2006; 
ICG 2009) 
The 1967 War not only led to another influx of 100,000 Palestinians into 
Lebanon, it also marked a turning point for the political mobilization of Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon and throughout the Levant, as they realized that they could no longer 
hope for an Arab-led campaign to recover their homeland.  The heady days of Egyptian 
President Gamal Abd al-Nasser trumpeting the Palestinian cause as the rallying cry of 
Pan-Arabism were over.  Palestinian militant groups themselves took up the banner with 
fervor, with attacks conducted not only by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), 
which had regionally recognized authority over the Palestinians in Lebanon as a result of 
the 1969 Cairo Agreement, but also independently by other Palestinian militant 
organizations, such as Marxist groups (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, 
PFLP; Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine; PFLP-General Command) and 
those sponsored by the Ba’ath parties in Syria and Iraq (Saiqa and Arab Liberation Front, 
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respectively). (Haddad 2003; Hudson 1997)  The Palestinian Resistance Movement 
(PRM) fulfilled basic state functions for the refugees, including “civil, economic, 
political, administrative, and military institutions…. [and] development of factories 
(producing clothing, furniture, leather goods, ironwork, some arms, and handicrafts), 
printing and publishing, filmmaking, and other industries…. all in an effort to provide 
jobs” for Palestinian refugees. (Farsoun & Aruri 2006, p. 137)  In 1968-69 Lebanon 
“gradually became a de facto confrontation state with Israel, though by default and not by 
a decision made by the Lebanese government.” (El Khazen 1997, p. 277) 
Following the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan in 1970-71, the militant 
organization moved its headquarters and base of operations, including tens of thousands 
of militants
15
, to Lebanon under the leadership of Yasser Arafat. (Hudson 1997)  
Especially after the cessation of active hostilities between Israel and its other neighbors 
following the 1973 War, Lebanon became the next active arena on which the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict played out. (El Khazen 1997)  Unlike Jordan, Lebanon was unable to 
control or crush the Palestinian militant groups due  to its weak central authority (Dumper 
2008), the state’s democratic restrictions and heterogeneous society, which meant that it 
“could not resort to those instruments of control that are at the disposal of the 
authoritarian state system.” (El Khazen 1997, p. 278; Hudson 1997)  As a result, the PLO 
was able to become a quasi-state within a state in southern Lebanon (Dumper 2008), and 
it constituted one of the largest armed groups in the morass of Lebanon’s civil war 
beginning in 1975, surpassing even the Lebanese army (El Khazen 1997, p. 284).  By the 
late 1970s they were appropriating UNRWA resources, such as vocational training 
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centers, for recruitment, training, weapons repair and storage, and communications. 
(Schiff 1995)  Their cross-border attacks led to Israel seizing a buffer zone inside 
southern Lebanon in 1982, expelling the PLO from the country, and maintaining the 
buffer zone for the next eighteen years.  The Palestinians remaining in Lebanon after 
1982, numbering over a quarter million, “were reduced to a dazed, defeated, and 
unprotected minority in besieged camps.” (Farsoun & Aruri 2006, p. 138) 
A key characteristic of the Palestinian militarization in Lebanon which 
distinguishes it from that in Jordan is the relationship of the refugee group to the sectarian 
composition of the host state.  Whereas East Bank Jordanians and Palestinians are both 
Sunni with only a tiny percentage of minority sects, in Lebanon a delicate balance – or 
imbalance – is maintained between Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims and Shi’ite 
Muslims.  According to the terms of Lebanon’s 1943 National Pact, Maronites held the 
greater share of power, including 55% of seats in Parliament.  Therefore, the influx of 
hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, and especially the militarization of that group, was 
perceived as a serious threat by the Maronite Christians.  In the late 1960s, prior to the 
Cairo Agreement, the Lebanese army attempted to reign in the Palestinian militias, but it 
was opposed in this effort by the Lebanese Muslim political leadership: 
[The] PLO gained political and military power in Lebanon, and it increasingly 
touched off a resonance of sympathy from Sunni Muslims, who among all 
Lebanese confessions were the most enthusiastic about the existence of 
Palestinian resistance on Lebanese soil.  Sunni Muslim support was a 
consequence of the inadequacy of their own recruitment into the Lebanese 
political system….  [Right-wing Christians] resented the Palestinians as a new 
community of Muslims and especially their “state within a state,” which 
threatened to overthrow the Maronite-dominated political system.  The Maronites 
reacted by establishing and training their own militias to counter the Palestinians. 
(Haddad 2003, p. 31; see also Hudson 1997) 
 
Although the PLO was forced out of the country following Israel’s 1982 invasion, 
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and despite the withdrawal of most Palestinian militants into the refugee camps and their 
surrendering of heavy and medium weaponry following the end of the civil war (Haddad 
2003), Palestinian militants still retained a dozen outposts and bases outside of the 
refugee camps nearly a quarter century after the PLO’s departure. (Blanford/Christian 
Science Monitor, 10/20/05)  The Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon are still 
militarized today, and still constitute a lingering dilemma for the state.
16
  The 
International Crisis Group writes: 
Marginalised, deprived of basic political and economic rights, trapped in the camps, 
bereft of realistic prospects, heavily armed and standing atop multiple fault lines – inter-
Lebanese, inter-Palestinian and inter-Arab – the refugee population constitutes a time 
bomb….  The notion of armed struggle in particular remains sacrosanct and is used as a 
reason for the existence of multiple paramilitary groups.  In the wake of the civil war, 
manifestation of this right to armed resistance increasingly has lost its meaning: 
Palestinians can bear arms, but only in their camps and on a few training grounds; these 
in turn become zones of lawlessness that Lebanese authorities cannot enter; and their 
weapons are aimed not at Israel, the purported rationale for continued armed status, but 
inward. (ICG 2009, p. ii)  
The refugee camps in Lebanon also became bases for some jihadist groups operating 
outside the country, particularly in Iraq. (ibid.) 
As in the previous cases, this case of refugee militarization stemmed from the 
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 For example, in 2007 a conflict between the militant group Fatah al-Islam, which had 
established itself in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp, and the Lebanese army led to a three-month 
siege in which more than 400 people died, including 168 soldiers, and 95% of buildings and 
infrastructure were damaged beyond repair.  Plans in 2009 to rebuild the camp and place it under 
Lebanese government control for the first time were resisted by Palestinians.  In addition, 
following the Fatah-Hamas conflict in Gaza and the West Bank that year, the Lebanese refugee 
camps became an arena for clashes between supporters of the two groups, including the public 
display in the Ain al-Hilweh camp of nearly 400 Fatah fighters carrying automatic weapons and 
rocket-propelled grenades, as well as larger weapons such as anti-aircraft guns for the first time 
since the end of the Lebanese civil war.  Some Palestinian militant groups still operate outside the 
camps, such as the PFLP-General Command, which has bases in the eastern Bekaa Valley and 
possesses Katyusha rockets and light weapons. (“Armed groups operating in South Lebanon”, 
Reuters, 1/8/09; “Fatah stages show of force in Lebanon refugee camp”, AFP, 11/9/08; “Lebanon 
refugees bitter over camp rebuilding plans”, AFP, 2/9/09; Cook 2008; UNRWA 2011)  In Ain al-
Hilweh, the largest refugee camp in Lebanon, “gunmen hanging out on street corners keep an eye 
on their faction's turf — some openly clutching guns, some with pistols tucked to their waists, 
others sporting Islamic fundamentalist beards.  Wall graffiti and pictures of ‘martyrs’ also give 
evidence of which territory is whose." (Ghattas/AP, 2/7/09) 
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collective project held by Palestinian refugees to redeem their homeland from a clear 
enemy, Israel. 
 
The above cases, in addition to those which will be covered in Chapter 9, are only 
a sampling of refugee militarization worldwide.  There are many others, such as: the 
refugee camps of Turkish Kurds, which served as bases for rebels of the PKK; Western 
Sahara refugee camps in Algeria operated by the Polisario resistance; Algerian refugee 
militants in Tunisia and Morocco in the 1950s opposed to the French colonial occupation; 
Namibian refugees who supported the South-West African People’s Organization 
militants in Angola; South African refugees who were recruited by the African National 
Congress (ANC) in states bordering South Africa; Rhodesian refugees in Zambia and 
Mozambique who supported rebels from the ZANU and ZAPU militant groups; refugees 
from Chad who mingled with militants in Libya; Libyan refugees who were trained by 
the CIA to fight the Qaddafi government; Mauritanian refugees who were recruited for 
the anti-Mauritanian government group FLAM in Senegal; Darfuri Sudanese refugees in 
Chad who supported militant groups fighting in their CoO; Ugandan refugees who allied 
with the government of Tanzania to invade Uganda and depose Idi Amin in 1979; Somali 
refugee camps in Kenya which acted as a sanctuary for some of the militant groups 
fighting in Somalia in the early 1990s; possibly Somali refugees who are vulnerable to 
radicalization by agents of al-Shabab or al-Qaeda in Yemen today; refugees from the 
Tigray region of Ethiopia in Sudan, who were loyal to the militant Tigray People’s 
Liberation Front (TPLF); refugees from Burundi who attacked their CoO from Tanzania; 
East Pakistani (Bangladeshi) refugees in India, who received support, training and 
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equipment to fight Pakistan in 1971; ethnic Nepalese refugees stripped of their 
citizenship and expelled from Bhutan to Nepal in 1991; Sri Lankan Tamil refugees, who 
received military assistance from their host state, India, in their fight against their CoO; 
Tibetan refugees, who were trained by the CIA to engage in guerrilla warfare against 
China; Laotian and Cambodian refugees in Thailand, who received training from the 
Chinese (for the Khmer Rouge) and the CIA to fight their respective home governments; 
Papuan refugee camps in Indonesia, which occasionally served as a sanctuary for Free 
Papua Movement fighters; East Timorese refugees in West Timor, whose camps 
sheltered Indonesian militants; Cuban refugees who were trained by the US to invade 
Cuba at the infamous Bay of Pigs; and Nicaraguan refugees in Costa Rica, in addition to 
the example of Nicaraguans in Honduras described above. (Terry 2002; Lischer 2005; 
Mtango 1989; Adelman 1998; Mogire 2011; Salehyan 2009; Salehyan 2007; Gerdes 
2006; Helsing 2004; Loescher & Milner 2008c; Loescher 1992; Weiner 1992/93; 
Hammond 2004; Joly 1996; Pini 2007; Duncan/San Francisco Chronicle, 4/19/09; 
Raghavan/Washington Post, 1/12/10)
17
  There were also Jewish refugees who joined the 
partisans fighting in Europe during World War II. 
The Missing Piece of the Puzzle 
Most refugees do not participate in violent political activity.  For instance, 
Rohingya Burmese refugees in Bangladesh have not militarized despite severely 
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 Gerdes (2006, fn. 7) refers to an additional, rare case in which refugees attacked their CoO 
from a non-bordering state: In 1970 Portugal led an invasion of Guinea by Guinean refugees 
based in France.  In addition, Adelman (1998) makes a compelling case to stretch the definition 
of “refugee warriors” to encompass Jewish refugees from Europe who took up arms in Palestine 
post-World War II, even though they were not fighting to regain the country that they or their 
parents or grandparents had fled.  Adelman writes: “First, they were recruited as warriors from 
outside the country, many from refugee camps in Europe.  Second, they used violence to attempt 





 (Loescher & Milner 2008a); Palestinians in Syria have 
not organized militarily within Syria, with some rare exceptions; and in the 1980s 
millions of Afghans hosted in Iran and almost a million Mozambicans in Malawi did not 
take up arms (Lischer, 2005; Salehyan 2009).  There are currently estimated to be over 11 
million refugees worldwide living in host states bordering their CoO
19
, and the vast 
majority of them have never engaged in any category of militarization. 
The positive cases discussed in the previous section, while demonstrating the 
importance of studying the phenomenon of refugee militarization and its global 
relevance, do not explain why it happens, nor do they explain the majority of cases 
around the world which are negative.  The puzzle which this dissertation addresses is: 
Why do some refugee groups militarize while others with seemingly similar 
characteristics do not, or during some periods of their exile but not others?  As I will 
discuss in the next chapter, the relatively few studies of refugee militarization which have 
been conducted to date have offered some clues, but none have yet proposed a clear and 
parsimonious hypothesis to explain this puzzle.
20
 
Existing literature has focused almost exclusively on structural factors, those 
outside the purview of refugee groups themselves, while neglecting their collective 
projects to redeem the homeland and their economic orientations.  While acknowledging 
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 In Thailand, however, the status of Burmese Rohingya refugees is somewhat murkier.  At the 
end of 2008 and beginning of 2009 revelations of abuse by the Thai military, including towing 
them back out to international waters, stemmed from accusations that the ethnic Rohingya 
refugees, who are Muslim, are linked to insurgent Muslim separatists in Thailand’s south. 
(Montlake/Christian Science Monitor, 1/23/09)  However, this may have merely been an excuse 
for the appalling treatment of the refugees by Thai authorities. 
19
 Calculated from population statistics taken from the websites of UNHCR (2011) and UNRWA 
(2011) 
20
 Lawrence & Chenoweth (2010) challenge theories of ethnic and nationalist violence to explain 
temporal variation: Why, given the relative stability over time of explanatory variables such as 
grievances, ethnic heterogeneity and regime type, does violence occur only at certain times? 
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the importance of structural factors such as political opportunity and available resources 
in facilitating the possibility of militarization, I aim to fill this gap by proposing a 
framework to approach refugee militarization which will help explain the motivation of 
some refugee groups to militarize, and the framing used by militancy entrepreneurs to 
mobilize them.  This project seeks to build on existing literature by asking not only how 
refugees militarize, but why. 
The proposed framework attempts to explain why refugee militarization may 
occur in a particular host country at a particular time by considering the following 
variables: 
1) Collective project – Some refugee groups maintain a collective project to redeem 
their homeland, while others maintain no such collective project and seek 
individual, rather than group, solutions; 
2) Socioeconomic integration to the host state – Some refugee groups, and some 
refugees within a given group, experience higher levels of socioeconomic 
integration to the host state, which makes them less likely to personally take up 
arms even though they may hold equally militant attitudes as those who are more 
socioeconomically marginalized; 
3) Militancy entrepreneurs – Among the refugees, there may be present individuals 
and organization(s) who are willing and capable of organizing, mobilizing and 
leading militant activity against the CoO; and  
4) Political opportunity –  Refugees do not constitute a sovereign entity, so there 
must be a structure of political opportunities, including political space, which 
permits the militarization to occur.  This primarily, but not exclusively, depends 
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on policies of the host state.  If political opportunities are available, militancy 
entrepreneurs will be able to obtain necessary conflict resources, including 
weapons, financing, training grounds, bases, etc. 
Overview 
This introductory chapter has demonstrated the scope, necessity and urgency of 
improving our understanding of refugee militarization.  In Chapter 2 I will review the 
existing literature on refugee militarization, and the lessons on this topic which can be 
drawn from scholarly works on ethnic conflict, contentious politics and the sociology of 
group violence.  The third chapter will set forth a new framework to approach the study 
of refugee militarization, as outlined above.  Chapter 4 will explain the methodology for 
my field research case studies of Palestinians and Iraqis in Jordan.  In Chapters 5 to 7 I 
will use the results of that research to explore why Palestinians did not militarize in 
Jordan from 1948 to 1963, the changes which led to their militarization from 1964 to 
1970, and why Palestinians have not taken up arms in Jordan since 1971, respectively.  In 
Chapter 8 I will turn to the Iraqis in Jordan, who have not militarized despite fears that 
they may do so.  Next, in order to begin extending the generalizability of the proposed 
framework outside the Middle East, Chapter 9 will apply it to two additional matched 
pairs of case studies, in which large-scale militarization occurred in one case but not the 
other: Rwandans in Zaire vs. Rwandans in Tanzania; and Afghans in Pakistan vs. 
Afghans in Iran.  Finally, Chapter 10 will conclude with a discussion of prospects for 
Palestinian and Iraqi militarization in the new Middle East, recommendations to 
policymakers on reducing the risk of militarization, and directions for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2: Literature Review  
 
This chapter begins with discussions and working definitions of key terms used in 
this project.  Next I discuss the shortcomings of the sparse refugee militarization 
literature, and turn to related fields of study, including ethnic conflict and the sociology 
of group violence, to draw theoretical lessons from those fields.  Finally, I review the 
literature on contentious politics and social movements to discuss the core concepts of 
grievance and opportunity, which will form the nucleus of the framework to be outlined 
in Chapter 3. 
Definitions 
As Harry Eckstein noted, even concepts which are widely used in political science 
are not uniformly understood, so the reader “must therefore bear with me for a while as I 
clarify some basic terminology.” (1975, pp. 80-81) 
REFUGEE 
First, it is necessary to define the contentious term “refugee”, which is popularly 
used to refer to people in a wide variety of circumstances who have fled their home, 
including those who have not crossed an international border.  While refugees have 
existed as long as humans have engaged in war, and the word “refugee” is recorded as far 
back as 1573 in Europe (Zolberg et al. 1989), an internationally recognized official 
definition and its accorded legal status is relatively recent.  Some scholars argue for a 
subjectivist interpretation of the term
21
, but most scholars prefer to use objective criteria 
in defining refugees, and practitioners must have measurable criteria.  For the past sixty 
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 For example, Joly states that the “actual self-perception of the move is crucial for an adequate 
definition of refugee and in no way can the objective circumstances deemed to cause flight be 
sufficient….” (2002, p. 6) 
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years, granting or withholding the label has held potentially life-or-death consequences 
for individuals in need of protection and assistance. 
The relatively narrow definition set forth by the United Nations, as outlined in the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the corresponding 1967 
Protocol, is: 
A person who is outside his or her country of nationality or habitual residence; 
has a well-founded fear of persecution because of his or her race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and is 
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country, or 
to return there, for fear of persecution. (Article I, section A(2)) 
 
This definition excludes large groups with similar characteristics, such as those 
who have fled their homes due to political persecution but not crossed an international 
border (internally displaced persons, IDPs)
22
 and those who left their country for non-
political reasons, such as natural disasters or economic opportunity.  Of course, many 
people who are experiencing political persecution which may not be severe enough to 
force them to leave might nonetheless choose to leave if they also face a second pressure, 
such as economic hardship. This is called mixed migration, in which it is often difficult to 
disentangle the multiple reasons for flight. (Salehyan 2007; Lischer 2007)  In addition, 
the definition does not explicitly state that it is applicable to the descendants of refugees 
nor those fleeing general violent conflict in which they are not persecuted on the basis of 
a particular group membership
23
, but UNHCR has operationalized it to apply to 
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 Lischer (2007) argues that refugees and IDPs should be studied under the same rubric of 
“conflict-induced displacement”, but most scholars and practitioners draw a practical and 
analytical separation between the two groups, in large part because refugees are subject to the 
international legal standing and protection offered by the 1951 Convention. 
23
 The definition offered by the Organization of African Unity in their Convention Governing the 
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969) repeats the 1951 Convention definition 
above, then adds the following expansion: “The term ‘refugee’ shall also apply to every person 
who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing 
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dependents of a refugee head of household and those fleeing due to a well-founded fear 
of general violent conflict. 
More directly, the Convention explicitly excludes those who are eligible for 
assistance from another UN agency
24
, whether or not they choose to accept it, as well as 
those who hold the citizenship of a host country or a third-party country, who could 
therefore avail themselves of the protection of that state.  For the first reason, the 
UNHCR definition does not apply to Palestinians in the Levant, and for the second 
reason, it does not apply to Palestinians in Jordan in particular, most of whom hold 
Jordanian citizenship. Finally, the definition excludes active combatants, certain high-
ranking military officials and those responsible for war crimes and other gross violations 
of human rights, despite the fact that enforcement of this distinction is minimal. 
(Adelman 1998; Gerdes 2006; Mogire 2011)  Nonetheless, this exclusion makes the topic 
of this project, refugee militarization – or any related terms, such as “refugee warrior”, 
which was popular in the academic literature through the 1990s – an oxymoron. 
It is clear that a definition which excludes one of the largest and longest-standing 
refugee groups in the world, and which constitutes an archetypal example of refugee 
militarization, will not work for the purposes of this project.  Therefore, the definition of 
“refugee” used herein is:  A person, including his/her dependents and future 
                                                                                                                                                                             
public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to 
leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country 
of origin or nationality.” (Article I, para.  2)  This additional allowance explicitly encompasses 
those fleeing general conflict without having been persecuted on the basis of some group 
membership. 
24
 The text of the treaty states, “This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present 
receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance.” (Article I, section D)  In 1948, the 
Palestinians were the first non-European group to be afforded assistance by the United Nations 




descendants, who left and/or is unable to return to his/her country of origin 
primarily due to a well-founded fear of political violence, drawing from the broader 
definitions utilized by Zolberg et al. (1989), Mtango (1989), Ager (1999) and Gerdes 
(2006).
25
  This is a wider definition than that used by UNHCR, since it includes 
Palestinians, combatants and those with dual citizenship, and it more explicitly allows for 
refuge based on fear of general violence rather than only based on persecution.  However, 
it still requires crossing an international border and excludes emigrants who left and 
refuse to return for non-political reasons. 
REFUGEE MILITARIZATION 
Next, what is “refugee militarization”?  Muggah & Mogire (2006, pp. 7-8) 
distinguish this term from refugee camp militarization, but their two definitions overlap 
to a significant degree; furthermore, not only do many refugees live in urban areas, and 
militant activities undertaken in camps can also be accomplished in urban and other non-
camp areas (Harpviken 2008, p. 8), but a sharp distinction between camp and self-settled 
(usually urban) refugees may be misleading as a starting point, since “[in] many 
situations, refugees move out of their camps periodically to visit their homeland or to 
take advantage of wage-earning, trading or faming opportunities that exist in their 
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 Zolberg et al. define refugees as “persons whose presence abroad is attributable to a well-
founded fear of violence, as might be established by impartial experts with adequate information.  
In cases of persecution covered by the statutory definition, the violence is initiated by some 
recognizable internal agent, such as the government, and directed against dissenters or a specified 
target group. But flight-inducing violence may also be an incidental consequence of external or 
internal conflict, or some combination of both, and affect groups that are not even parties to that 
conflict.  Violence may also be inflicted indirectly, through imposed conditions that make normal 
life impossible.” (1989, p. 33)  Mtango includes “not only those refugees covered by the 1951 
Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol, but also those covered by the 1969 OAU Convention, 
Palestinian refugees, and any refugee recognized as such under relevant international instruments 
or under the national legislation of the state of refuge or state of residence.” (1989, p. 91)  Ager 
defines refugees as “all classes of forced migrants (i.e., excluding economic and other ‘voluntary’ 
migrants’).” (1999, p. 2)  Finally, Gerdes defines refugees as “those who have crossed an 
international border because of real threats to their physical integrity.” (2006, p. 11) 
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country of asylum.  In this respect the crude distinction… should itself be subjected to 
greater scrutiny.” (Crisp & Jacobsen 1998, p. 28; see also Jacobsen 2000, p. 18) 
Therefore, it is unnecessary to separate the two terms, and I combine them as 
follows: Refugee militarization is the involvement of groups of refugees in militaristic 
activities, including political violence, armed resistance, military training, explicit 
support for combatants, storage and diffusion of weapons, and/or military 
recruitment.
26
  Non-political violence such as criminal activity involving refugees is 
excluded from the definition. (Lischer 2005)  Furthermore, this study is specifically 
investigating cases in which the militarized refugees live in states bordering their CoO 
and their primary aim to is undermine and/or overthrow an enemy in the CoO, who is 
usually but not necessarily the government in power, following the lead of Adelman 
(1998) and Gerdes (2006).
27
 
Under this definition, refugee militarization can occur in three ways, listed here in 
order of increasing proximity to the actual militant activity: 1) refugees can provide 
material support for a non-refugee militant group, including food, clothing, money, care 
for militants’ dependents, intelligence and other non-weapon materials; 2) they can serve 
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 This definition is very similar to that offered by Mogire: “Refugee militarization describes non-
civilian attributes of refugee populations and refugee camps, including such things as refugee 
participation in and support of armed rebellion, the use of refugee camps for arms storage and 
trafficking, military training of refugees and in refugee camps, recruitment of refugees by rebels, 
and the use of refugee camps by rebels as bases for military operations, rest, recuperation, food 
and medical treatment.” (2011, p. 29)  The main difference is that my definition requires active 
participation by refugees rather than merely the use of refugee camps by rebels. 
27
 Lischer (2005) outlines five types of refugee-related violence: 1) attacks between the CoO and 
refugees; 2) attacks between the host state and refugees; 3) intra-refugee violence; 4) civil conflict 
in the host state involving refugees; and 5) inter-state war involving refugees.  The scope of this 
project is limited to the first type, in which attacks occur between the CoO and refugees; and the 
last type, inter-state war involving refugees, assuming that the CoO and refugees are on opposing 
sides of the conflict.  The reason for this limitation is because the mechanisms which I theorize to 
be at play in leading to militarization assume that the militarized refugees’ enemy is the 
perpetrator of their exile – an assumption which would not hold true if the refugee-related 
violence was not directed at the CoO. 
31 
 
as a source of recruitment for a militant group, such that recruits leave the refugee camp 
or community to fight for the militants; and 3) the camps or communities themselves can 
militarize, such that they serve as a base for militants, maintain arms caches, and/or the 
refugees themselves take up arms or initiate an active militant group within the camps or 
communities, directed against the CoO. 
How much of such activity is enough to conclude that militarization has occurred?  
It is impossible to set a quantitative threshold – for example, “x quantities of food, 
clothing or money contributed to militants”, “x recruits provided to a militant group” or 
“x percent of camps serving as bases for a militant group”; and the number of cross-
border attacks would be an operationalization with poor construct validity because 
ordinary refugees may hold only supporting roles for a militant organization, particularly 
a pre-existing one, yet still be militarized under the broad definition provided above.  
However, following the lead of Lischer (2000), I am referring to instances of refugee 
militancy which are “persistent” (occurring over consecutive years) and/or “intense” 
(based on narrative descriptions). 
ETHNICITY, NATION AND ETHNONATIONALISM 
Finally, a definition is needed for the term “ethnonationalism”, which I will later 
propose as a potentially significant factor leading to a collective project for redemption of 
the homeland by refugee groups.  The concept of nation is challenging to define, ranging 
from the objective – possessing discrete shared features such as language, culture, history 
and homeland – to subjective, as in Anderson’s (1991) imagined communities, which are 
based primarily on affect and belief.  I distinguish between nation and ethnicity using the 
definitions offered by Anthony Smith, as follows: A nation is “a named human 
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community residing in a perceived homeland, and having common myths and a 
shared history, a distinct public culture, and common laws and customs for all 
members.” (2010, p. 13)  This definition does not presuppose any claim to an ancestral 
bond.  By contrast, ethnicities
28
 (or as ethnicity scholars call it, ethnie) are “relatively 
large, culturally distinctive groupings in which membership is conferred by birth in 
a group claiming a common origin.” (Williams 2003, p. 17)  Ethnic identities are not 
rational, conscious beliefs but “intuitive convictions of the ancientness and purity of [the] 
group’s existence.” (Connor 2004, p. 31)  Ethnicities themselves, however, may be 
constructed and their “origins may be mythical, but they can nevertheless attract powerful 
loyalties and commitments as political elites mobilize ethnic kin for action.” (Lake & 
Rothchild 1998, p. 4; see also Brubaker 2004)  Furthermore, membership in ethnic 
groups is almost always based on descent (Williams 2003; Fearon & Laitin 2000), 
whereas a nation may or may not allow voluntary membership (see discussion of 
“illiberal nationalism” below). 
An ethnicity includes myths of common ancestry and various elements of a shared 
culture, such as a shared language, religion or customs
29
 (see also: Williams 1994; 
Williams 2003; Lee et al. 2004; Eller 1999; Verkuyten 2005; Spickard & Burroughs 
2000), among people not necessarily living in their claimed homeland, but who may have 
a symbolic connection to a homeland, as opposed to a more clearly standardized common 
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 Confusingly, in the literature on ethnic groups and ethnic conflict, the term “ethnic” is often 
conflated with groups that seek political autonomy or independence on an ethnic basis, who are 
better classified as “ethnonationalist”, as defined below.  For example, De Vos (2006) muddles an 
attempt to disentangle “ethnicity” from “nation”, and Helbling (1997) uses the term “national” 
interchangeably with “ethnonational”. 
29
 Since the relevant characteristics of group differentiation differ from case to case (for example, 
race in South Africa, language in Canada and religion in Bosnia), ethnicity is used here as “an 
umbrella term that includes race, religion, language… as the case may be.” (Bookman 2002, p. 
23; see also Eller 1999) 
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national history and shared public culture among the nation, which usually is located in 
its claimed homeland.  The constitution of the ethnic group is based on primordial claims, 
whereas the nation is not necessarily so. 
Having established working definitions of nation and ethnicity, let us turn to 
nationalism.  Nationalist partisans make the argument that their nationalism actually pre-
dates industrialism and is primordial, but most scholars disagree: Nationalism “is not the 
awakening of an old, latent, dormant force, though that is how it does indeed present 
itself.” (Gellner 1983, p. 48, emphasis in original)  Ancient Biblical “nations”, for 
example, bear little resemblance to state-aspiring nationalist movements of today.  
Nevertheless, the nation is often “ethno-symbolic” in that nationalist movements often 
make use of earlier ethnic histories, myths and symbols. (Smith 2001)  Those scholars 
who espouse a primordial basis of the nation are usually referring to its ethnic variant, as 
will be discussed shortly. 
According to Smith’s definition of “nation” given above, self-determination, or 
even autonomy, is not a necessary condition of nationhood.
30
  That is one reason why 
nationalism is important.  Nationalism as it is known now is a political animal
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inextricably intertwined with the idea of territory and the state. (Lawrence 2010)  
Nationalism is the movement which corresponds to the nation’s (or its elites’) aspirations 
for autonomy: As Smith defines it, an “ideological movement for attaining and 
maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its 
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 Other scholars, such as Greenfeld (1992), have included sovereignty as a necessary component 
of a nation, but this would exclude, for example, newly expelled refugee groups.  It is not logical 
that a nation, socially constructed, existed prior to expulsion but disappeared upon being 
expelled; therefore this requirement will not be adopted here. 
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 Plamenatz (1976, p. 25) writes that it was in fact the expansion of Napoleonic France which 




members deem to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’.” (2010, p. 9) 
Having defined these three terms, it is possible at last to combine “ethnicity” and 
“nationalism” to offer a definition of “ethnonationalism”
32
 as a nationalist movement 
for attainment or recovery of a homeland based on claimed ethnic bonds of common 
ancestry and culture.  There are only about 200 states in the world today and thousands 
of ethnic groups, many of which maintain an ethnonationalist project for autonomous 
control over a homeland of their own. (Stavenhagen 1996)  Ethnonationalism has also 
been called illiberal nationalism.
33,34
 (For discussion see, for example: Brown 1999; 
Williams 1994; Williams 2003; Clark 2011) 
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 Gurr (2000) defines ethnonationalists as “Regionally concentrated peoples with a history of 
organized political autonomy with their own state, traditional ruler, or regional government who 
have supported political movements for autonomy at some time since 1945.” Gurr’s definition is 
not used in this project because it is apparently tautological – a group is not ethnonationalist 
unless it has been ethnonationalist in the past (a history of autonomy) – and because of its 
chronological restriction to the post-World War II period. 
33
 The terms liberal and illiberal are used in the academic literature synonymously with a division 
between civic and cultural nationalisms, respectively.  Yet as Brown (1999) rightly points out, 
this dichotomy is not necessarily so.  In almost all real-life cases of nationalism both ideal-types 
are found; and sometimes “cultural” national identities, supposedly ascribed and primordial, can 
change.  Brown proposes an alternative explanation for the rise of liberal and illiberal variants of 
nationalism, based on feelings of security and insecurity – by elites, a class, and masses, in regard 
to an external other. 
34
 There are a number of important assumptions implied by the modern, liberal formulation: first, 
that societies were divided, possibly tribal or clannish, prior to the rise of integrating forces of 
national identity; second, that nationalism is intimately and positively related to state capacity; 
third, that nationalism is based on an identity which resonates and endures but can be voluntarily 
acquired; and fourth, that nationalism, like modernity, is an inevitable process given forces of 
political globalization and the spread of global norms such as democracy, human rights and 
liberal individualism.  Partisans of the illiberal variant would agree with the first assumption, 
prior division, but would not necessarily claim an association with state capacity; they believe 
that national identity is ascribed, denying the possibility of voluntary membership; and they 
usually reject association with most Western liberal political values.  Some scholars, such as 
Connor (2004), state that ethnonationalism is not technically different from nationalism since the 
nation is based on a claimed ethnic bond, but this is inaccurate.  There are examples of loyalty to 
a nation which are not based on ethnic identity, most famously the American nation, which is 
based on common ideals rather than a shared blood-bond of ethnicity.  Connor (2004) disregards 
American nationhood as a “misnomer” since it does not appeal to a common ancestry, but he 
does not offer an alternative description for the shared American identity. 
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COLLECTIVE PROJECT FOR REDEMPTION OF THE HOMELAND 
The significant lacuna in the literature which I aim to address concerns a refugee 
group’s collective project to redeem the homeland from a clear enemy, which I will 
propose is a necessary (but not sufficient) variable leading to militarization.  As will be 
discussed in the following sections, significant attention has been devoted to structural 
conditions which establish the parameters for action by refugee groups; yet little attention 
has been paid to the question of their motivations. 
There are many examples of the exercise of a collective project by refugees which 
are outside the scope of this study.  For instance, refugees can persist in teaching their 
children of their heritage, and celebrating it with their expatriate community.  They can 
lobby the host state to change a policy regarding relations with the CoO.  They can 
engage in protests, strikes and a variety of other nonviolent forms of political activity, if 
allowed by the host state.  This study, however, is limited to militarization, the most high-
profile and dangerous means by which a collective project can be expressed, and the one 
which seeks most directly to achieve the goals of the project by reversing the 
circumstances which led to their exile in the first place. 
The refugee militarization literature  
Despite the fact that refugee warriors have existed at least since the Burmese 
ethnic minority groups and Palestinians took up arms, awareness among scholars of the 
politically active and potentially militant role played by refugees is relatively recent.  
Ferris noted in 1985 that failure to integrate and assimilate refugees into the host state, in 
situations in which return to the CoO is not available, has led to instances of refugees 
engaging in militant activity, citing the examples of Afghans in Pakistan, Khmers in 
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Thailand, and Miskitu Indians from Nicaragua in Honduras.  In 1986 and 1989 Zolberg et 
al. were the first refer to such groups as “refugee-warrior communities”, while Loescher 
noted that “refugees often live on, or very near, disputed borders; they either reside 
among combatants in an ongoing conflict, or are perceived to be materially assisting 
guerrilla forces attempting to overthrow the government from which they have fled.” 
(1989, p. 3)  Nonetheless, academic interest in the topic was not strongly stimulated until 
after the realization that international humanitarian relief actually supported the 
perpetrators of the Rwanda genocide in the 1990s. (Harpviken 2008; Mogire 2011; 
Stedman 2003) 
Most scholars seeking to explain refugee militarization have focused on structural 
and environmental variables exogenous to the refugees.  This is curious given that some 
of these same scholars challenge the traditional portrayal of refugees as passive, decrying 
“the striking absence of political ‘voice’ or agency on the part of refugees,” (Nyers 2006, 
p. xiv).  It appears that a template for explanations of refugee militarization has 
developed whereby scholars broadly suggest that militarization constitutes a 
demonstration of refugees’ agency, then slide inexorably back to explanations which are 
predominantly exogenous.  Adelman (1998), for instance, writes that “refugee warriors 
do indeed attempt to take history in their own hands, and are not simply tools used by 
neighbouring states in their antagonistic relationship” with the CoO.  Yet he goes on to 
reject the argument that refugees militarize due to the experiences which led to their 
flight.  In other words, the refugees’ political motivation is not an explanatory factor.  
Instead, Adelman focuses on states and the international system, and proposes a structural 
explanation centered on “failures – sometimes deliberate – in the management of 
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conflicts and, more specifically, the management of the plight of the refugees themselves, 
whatever the original causes.” 
A number of scholars subsume explanation for refugee militarization under a 
rubric of  manipulation by militants, host states or great power states.  One of the earliest 
attempts to address the issue in depth is presented by Myron Weiner (1992/93), who 
incorporates refugee militarization into a broader theoretical framework on the migration-
security nexus, offered as an alternative to the standard economic analyses of mass 
migrations.  Like later scholars, he implies political motivation with a tangential remark: 
“A diaspora made up primarily of refugees is, of course, likely to be hostile to the regime 
of the country from which they fled.” (p. 107)  But he, too, sees refugee militarization 
primarily as a “potential tool in inter-state conflict” (p. 107),  listing examples where 
refugee militants received support and assistance from their host or other state sponsor(s), 
rather than as independent actors in their own right. 
In a similar vein, Stedman & Tanner (2003) constructed their entire edited 
volume, including its title, around “refugee manipulation”, which by definition is a 
condition of passivity.  They first acknowledge an endogenous element by referring to 
refugees militarizing in camps as “disaffected individuals, who – with the assistance of 
overseas diasporas, host governments, and interested states – equip themselves for battle 
to retrieve an idealized, mythical lost community.” (p. 3)  However, this perspective is 
quickly minimized as they turn to their main thesis, in which refugees are utilized as an 
objectified resource and militarization is a tactic used by states and rebel groups to take 
advantage of refugees and their attendant aid. 
While on the topic of manipulation, it is important to recognize the fact that, as 
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Morris & Stedman (2008) briefly note, refugee militarization is sometimes less than 
voluntary, as they are coerced or forced to support or participate in violent political 
activity by militancy entrepreneurs.  However, this does not mean that their interests, 
orientation and perceptions are irrelevant, nor that they are ignored as framing devices by 
militancy entrepreneurs; rather that the relative weight of those dimensions in affecting 
their militarization may be diminished in such cases. 
A few works have put forth explanations of refugee militarization which include 
consideration of refugees as independent political actors.  One example is that of 
Salehyan (2009), whose study of transnational rebels includes a discussion of refugees as 
a vector for the spread of civil war.  Salehyan’s broader theoretical framework 
acknowledges the importance of a collective project, briefly summarizing grievance and 
greed, but minimizes such explanations by stating that there will always be some subset 
of any population which is disgruntled enough to take up arms and some resource 
available to be plundered; therefore he privileges explanatory factors based on 
opportunity.  In regard to refugees specifically, Salehyan recognizes that they are more 
likely to bear personal and group grievances against the ruling regime in the CoO than an 
ordinary transnational rebel group not based in refugees, since in most cases traumatic 
experiences are precisely what led to their exodus in the first place.  He adds that 
destitute living conditions lower their opportunity costs for participating in militant 
activity (see also Salehyan 2007), whereas access to employment and economic 
integration can raise their opportunity costs.  But rather than theorizing this motivation to 
explain in part the phenomenon of refugee militarization, he focuses on the transnational 
rebel group as the primary actor, with refugee militarization just one of many resources 
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potentially available to it. 
Another one of the few scholars to discuss the importance of a refugee group’s 
collective project, including ethnicity and nationalism, in affecting refugees’ engagement 
in conflict is Milica Bookman (2002).  Her focus is on the political-economic factors 
which lead to nationalism in relation to interethnic competition and conflict between 
refugees and the CoO as well as the host state.  These factors include competition for 
resources, economic niches and power.  However, her study is limited to protracted 
refugee situations
35
, placing them within regime-differentiated economic frameworks of 
their host states and the globalized international arena.  Conflict is only tangential to that 
broader focus, and includes more analysis of criminal activity than political violence 
directed toward the CoO.  She does not seek to explain conflict catalyzed by refugees nor 
the spread of civil war across borders. 
Joly (2002) comes close to addressing the importance of refugees’ collective 
political project in her ideal-type dichotomy of refugee experiences in the land of exile.  
According to Joly, refugees belong to either an Odyssean or a Rubicon typology.  
Odyssean refugees are those who “were positively committed to the political struggle and 
to a project of society in their homeland; they also brought this project with them into 
exile… Return is their objective with the aim of continuing the project.” (p. 9)  At the 
other extreme, Rubicon refugees maintain “no collective project of society….  Return for 
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 UNHCR defines protracted refugee situations as those involving populations of at least 25,000 
refugees living in a developing country for at least five years.  Most refugees in the world today 
live in such situations. (Loescher & Milner 2008c; Derouen & Barutciski 2007)  But these cut-off 
points are admittedly arbitrary.  The US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants uses a cut-off 
of ten-years to define a “warehoused” refugee situation. (Smith 2004)  Bookman offers a different 
approach, defining “permanent encampments” as situations in which the refugees’ basic needs are 
met, employment is sought and found, adults in the camp have never lived elsewhere (which 
implies a minimum passage of 18 years from the date of exile), and funding sources for the camp 
have changed. (2002, p. 20) 
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the purpose of settling back home is not envisaged within the framework of options for 
the future and exile is perceived as definitive.” (p. 16)  There are important differences in 
the way the two ideal-types integrate into host countries, including their patterns of social 
organization and sources of meaning.  However, her work is targeted toward explication 
of refugee experiences in developed third-country resettlement states rather than states of 
first refuge.  The vast majority (three-fourths) of refugees are hosted in a state bordering 
their CoO, and 80% are located in the developing world. (UNHCR 2011)  This research 
project focuses on the processes at work in countries of first refuge which share a land 
border with the CoO, and where opportunities for engagement in direct militarized 
conflict with the CoO are far more likely. (Salehyan & Gleditsch 2006) 
Like Joly, an ethnographic study by Malkki (1995) on Burundian Hutu refugees 
investigated different constructions of identity, meaning and symbology among those 
residing in a camp and those in an urban setting in Tanzania.  Her study revealed stark 
differences between the two groups: camp residents held more militant and polarized 
attitudes constructed around displacement, had adopted the refugee label, and identified 
themselves as Hutu first; while those in the urban setting had mostly assimilated into 
Tanzanian society, rejected the refugee label, and identified first as Burundian (a national 
identity) or even Tanzanian (the host state identity) rather than as Hutu (an ethnic 
identity).  While her work is an important contribution to understanding identity 
construction among refugees, it is mostly descriptive rather than theoretical, focusing 
primarily on the camp/urban distinction with little explanation for the differences, and it 
does not address political violence or militarization explicitly.  Nonetheless, it does 
highlight an intersection between endogenous and exogenous factors not addressed by the 
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literature on refugee militarization: the relationship between residential environment and 
identity construction.  On the other hand, inferring causality from this relationship may 
be subject to an endogeneity problem, as the urban refugees in Malkki’s study were self-
settled, suggesting that those inclined toward “cosmopolitan” perceptions may have self-
selected to move to the urban setting. 
Harpviken’s (2008) study of “refugee warriors” in the context of return to the 
CoO offers three important points regarding refugees’ collective project: First, an 
ideology and narrative of exile and resistance can polarize and even calcify in refugee 
settings, particularly protracted situations.  Second, both the act of fleeing and residence 
in exile are often carried out in groups, with the result that refugee camps and 
communities are often “composed of numerous tightly knit groups.  Flight collectives 
may be based on groups that were already politically mobilized and became subject to 
government countermeasures,” or may only militarize after taking up residence in the 
host state. (p. 9)  Third, positions of community leadership are often affected by refugee 
status in camps, as “influence over aid distribution is key, and… young, educated, 
English-speaking men fare much better than the traditional notables.” (p. 10)  I will return 
to the role of leadership and humanitarian aid in the next chapter. 
MOGIRE’S VICTIMS AS SECURITY THREATS 
The most recent acknowledgment of the importance of a collective project in the 
literature on refugee militarization comes in a discussion of the agency-structure debate 
by Mogire (2011).  He refers to the social and economic value presented by militarization 
to refugees, offering the example of Burundian refugees in western Tanzania.  First, 
Mogire states that the cause of flight is an important variable affecting refugees’ 
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motivation: those who were expelled or persecuted on the basis of their identity, or 
subject to ethnic cleansing, are more likely to militarize, especially as they may fear 
continuing attacks from the CoO and therefore see militarization as a necessary defense; 
as are those whose CoO prevents return, and those languishing in protracted refugee 
situations, leading to their turn toward force as a last resort.  Although he does not discuss 
the rational cognitive implications of the “force as a last resort” option, it is a worthy 
avenue for exploration.
36
  Mogire is also one of the very few scholars to mention the 
interplay between refugees’ motivations and the framing used by militancy entrepreneurs: 
“[In] many instances refugee or rebel leaders draw on the experience of persecution – and 
often exaggerate it – in order to rally support for military activity.” (p. 42)  The last 
motivation that he mentions is poor living conditions in the context of a protracted 
refugee situation; by itself this is an unlikely explanation, however, since there are far 
more refugees worldwide who live in conditions of poverty than those who militarize. 
Mogire discusses structural factors as well, including the host state’s willingness 
and capability to demilitarize and securitize refugee camps.  In Tanzania and Kenya, for 
example, the host governments, both of which had the capacity to enforce 
demilitarization, chose instead to allow and even facilitate militarization of their refugee 
populations due to those host governments’ political alliances and sympathies; while the 
international community refused to attempt to separate combatants from civilians.  His 
review of these cases also suggests that proximity of camps to the border with the CoO, a 
structural factor commonly cited especially in policy circles, is less predictive of 
militarization than the extent of government control over that territory.  Likewise, the size 
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 Hafez (2003) also explains militant activity in part by the absence or closing off of nonviolent 
avenues of contention. 
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of refugee camps is less important than the overall magnitude of the refugee population in 
the host state.  Finally, drawing on the work of Lischer (2005), Mogire rejects the “bored 
young men” hypothesis proposed by policymakers and some scholars (for example, 
Harrington 1976) because it does not take into account political motivations. 
GERDES’ FORCED MIGRATION AND ARMED CONFLICT 
One of the most serious attempts to tackle the topic of refugee militarization with 
theoretical rigor is a monograph by Felix Gerdes (2006).  He asks, “Which of these 
factors, i.e.  refugee motivations, humanitarian aid, and the host country, is the most 
important [in explaining militarization]?” (p. 2)  Gerdes explains that a conflict begins in 
the CoO when a particular subset of the population is excluded from security, a newly 
privatized public good.  Violence sharpens the contradiction between those included and 
excluded from the polity; the subsequent migration by those excluded across an 
international border in search of safety can be described as a physical expression of the 
political exclusion which had already occurred. 
However, upon arriving in the host state (Gerdes’ work is limited to host states 
neighboring the CoO in the developing world), the refugees discover that the 
contradiction of their exclusion is not resolved by their flight but for the most part 
recreated and repeated.  Although they may recover benefit of the public good of 
security, they usually remain marginalized and excluded politically, economically and 
socially from the host state.  The refugees then come to decide that militarization is the 
most rational course of action to maximize their utility: 
In essence, the refugee status represents a substantial demotion compared to habitual life 
as far as access to patronage, political authorities and participation in (local) decision-
making are concerned.  Refugees will try to improve their social position in the host 
country.  The more social ascendancy is blocked, the more expectations remain centred 
on return to the home country and the resumption of habitual life.  This often seems to 
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depend on political change in the country of origin, change which is already pursued by 
violent means [by militant groups].  Refugees may therefore consider supporting one of 
the warring parties an appropriate response to their situation. (2006, p. 20) 
Of the scholarly works reviewed so far, this is the first to offer a deeper consideration of 
refugees’ motivations to militarize.  The logic can be summarized as follows: Refugees 
make a rational (economic, but not only financial) assessment of their access to patronage 
and authority in the host state compared to such access in the CoO prior to the crisis.  
They conclude that they were better off in the CoO – or at least, could have a better 
situation there if the cause of their departure (i.e., the CoO government, occupying 
military or other enemy) were nullified.  As a result, they choose to support a pre-existing 
armed group which is already fighting their enemy in the CoO. 
Another contributing motivation which develops in refugee situations is a shared 
identity.  Gerdes applies Anderson’s (1991) famous “imagined communities” theory of 
nationalism to the development of a common identity within a refugee group, which is 
facilitated by the nature of camps and the class-leveling circumstances of exile: 
People… are then propelled into refugee camps assembling thousands and often tens of 
thousands of individuals from different regions and social backgrounds.  Many of them 
had to flee or were expelled because of their group identity, and contacts and 
communication in refugee camps makes them experience that they indeed do have a 
common fate.  Flight and its circumstances become symbols through which the 
community is imagined….  Flight has the effect of levelling traditional stratifications: 
strongly differentiated people become refugees, have to deal with the same problems and 
tend to adopt similar strategies of survival, while the importance of the traditional social 
standing is diminished.  Accordingly, the vertical social mobility associated with flight is 
primarily downward social mobility.  It can nevertheless be as effective as upward 
mobility [in Anderson’s theory] in creating a common identity….  Under these 
circumstances, a “refugee” identity often symbolises a degree of upward social mobility 
and becomes part of the wider group identity…. (2006, pp. 32-33) 
Gerdes adds that this common identity must be spread by leaders, who are generally 
middle- and upper-class elites.  He does not discuss these leaders in depth except to 
indicate that they are often associated with either the civilian or military wing of a rebel 
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group, and they take advantage of the camp situation to reach, communicate with and 
control masses of refugees lacking social mobility, a process which is much more 
difficult in situations of rural and urban self-settlement. 
Finally, Gerdes considers structural factors, foremost of which is the relationship 
with the host state.  The host state usually has the means to enforce demilitarization of 
refugee communities, should it choose to do so.  To forestall this possibility, the refugees 
attempt to cultivate a symbiotic relationship with the host government: They need a 
powerful patron, and the most powerful one available is usually the host government; 
while the ruler of the host state may see the refugees as valuable clients whose loyalty to 
him, should he empower them with the resources and authority to use violence, is more 
reliable than that offered by host state nationals because the refugees’ outsider status 
makes them more vulnerable and thus more dependent on his patronage. 
The second cluster of structural factors which Gerdes describes in leading to 
militarization, though he does not use the term specifically, is conflict resources.  He 
focuses on the resources which are facilitated by the presence of refugee camps, namely 
organizational capacity, ease of recruitment, diversion of humanitarian aid, and 
(stretching the definition of a conflict resource) increased legitimacy.  He does not 
address the acquisition of more specific military resources such as weaponry and  
equipment, but presumably those were obtained prior to the refugees’ militarization since 
he theorizes that refugees join a pre-existing militant organization rather than creating 
one of their own.  He also refers, as discussed above, to the possibility of inclusion in the 
security forces of the host government, which could provide a source of materiel. 
Gerdes’ analysis is the closest approximation in the literature to a comprehensive 
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framework of refugee militarization.  It includes consideration of refugees’ motivation, 
leadership, political opportunity and conflict resources.  Nonetheless, his exploration of 
these constructs is incomplete.  First, the motivation that Gerdes describes seems to be 
primarily a microeconomic one, based on relative deprivation, and he does not discuss a 
political project except for the development of a common refugee identity.  
Epistemologically, Gerdes’ framework falls short in its failure to clearly explain negative 
cases as well as positive ones. 
LISCHER’S DANGEROUS SANCTUARIES 
The study which laid the methodological foundation for this project is Sarah 
Lischer’s (2005) Dangerous Sanctuaries.  The most important scholarly contribution 
made by her study is a rigorous scientific approach to refugee militarization in both 
theory and methodology, utilizing a Most Similar Systems (Mill 1843) qualitative 
research design to compare the presence and absence of militarization by refugees in 
seemingly similar situations.  Her study maintains strong internal and construct validity, 
and incorporates some advantages of the experimental design by investigating these 
natural field experiments.  She offers solid evidence of broader generalizability by 
investigating three very different regions: the Indian subcontinent, Balkans and sub-
Saharan Africa.  However, her hypothesis does not extend to protracted refugee 
situations. (Eichensehr 2005) 
Lischer theorizes that the likelihood of war diffusion across borders through 
refugees is most affected by: 1) circumstances surrounding the origins of the refugee 
crisis – whether from war and chaos, group persecution, or defeat in civil war; 2) the 
capability and will of the host state to provide security and demilitarize refugee camps; 
47 
 
and 3) the presence of undifferentiated international humanitarian aid, which could be 
used to assist and support rebel movements.  She rejects earlier dominant socioeconomic 
explanations which suggested that the risk of political violence increases when: camps 
are large; camps are located near the border with the CoO; there are a lot of bored young 
men; and living conditions are poor.  The first of these three factors is only one to 
consider refugees’ political motivations. 
Lessons from the study of contentious politics 
It is surprising that the literature on refugee militarization has not yet drawn 
explicitly from the analytical toolbox offered by the field of contentious politics, 
considering that refugee militarization would logically fall under its rubric.
37
  Even 
though most works in the study of contentious politics works refer to activity that is 
wholly or mostly domestic, there is no reason that it cannot be extended to transnational 
militant activity.
38
  McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly define contentious politics as: “episodic, 
public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least 
one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the 
claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants.” (2001, p. 5)  
This is applicable to the phenomenon of refugee militarization, assuming that the CoO 
government is the target of the militants, as is usually the case.  Collective action is not 
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 Contentious politics offers common analytical tools, vocabularies and models to explain the 
span of “revolutions, social movements, industrial conflict, war, interest group politics, 
nationalism, democratization”, etc. (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly 2001, p. 6) 
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 For example, writing from a contentious politics approach, Schock (2005) explains the rise in 
popularity of nonviolent tactics by opposition social movements in recent decades in part by 
noting that increasingly monopolistic control over new technologies of repression and violence, 
and the extensiveness of state control over territory, makes violent tactics unlikely, as rebel 
militants “need sanctuaries for bases of operation, rest from combat, the provision of food, 
rearmament, and military training.” (2005, p. 17)  This analysis is valid as far as it goes, but it 
does not consider the increased potential for militant activity presented by rebel bases and 
supporting populations located outside the territory in question. 
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necessarily contentious; it becomes contentious when “it is used by people who lack 
regular access to institutions, who act in the name of new or unaccepted claims, and who 
behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others or authorities.” (Tarrow 1998, p. 3)  
Again, there is clear relevance to refugees who take up arms to challenge an opponent, 
usually the ruling regime, in the CoO. 
One organized expression of contentious politics is a social movement, which 
Tarrow & Tilly define as “a sustained challenge to power holders in the name of a 
population living under the jurisdiction of those power holders by means of public 
displays of that population’s worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment.”
39
 (2007, p. 
442)  The exception here in extending applicability to refugee situations is, of course, that 
refugees by definition are no longer under the jurisdiction of the CoO opponents whom 
they are challenging.
40
  Nonetheless, given the unique circumstances of refugee situations 
in regard to the issue of jurisdiction – namely, that they were forced from their homes in 
the CoO; they generally lay claim to, and are expected by others to return to, their CoO; 
and refugee camps, like border zones, are often “zones of exception” in regard to 
sovereignty (Agamben 2004; Rajaram & Grundy-Warr 2007) – I propose that lessons 
drawn from scholarship on social movements are relevant as well.   
The most significant contributions which can be applied to refugee militarization 
from the study of contentious politics stem from the field’s explanations of the factors 
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 Tarrow defines it more broadly, and without the requirement of territorial jurisdiction of the 
target of contention: “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in 
sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities.” (1998, p. 4) 
40
 There certainly are many examples of social movements by refugees challenging the host state, 
but the scope of this project is limited to refugee militarization targeting the CoO.  Also, Tarrow 
(1998) devotes a chapter of his monograph exploring “transnational social movements”, but these 
are organizations that aggregate and integrate collective action by groups across multiple 
countries, such as Amnesty International, in contrast to the phenomenon of refugee militarization 
in which militants act across borders but there is no expectation of colleagues based in the CoO. 
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which lead to growth and maintenance of social movements.  These variables include: 
motivating factors such as common interests or claims among the mass of participants, as 
well as feelings of solidarity and identity based on ethnicity and nationality; structural 
factors such as political opportunities and availability of resources which make such 
action possible; political entrepreneurs who are able to make use of discursive 
interpretations and culturally relevant symbols to frame their arguments in ways which 
resonate with the target public; and the participation of non-elite masses, in addition to 
leaders, in opposing structures of authority.  Although social movements can and do 
sometimes work through existing institutions, they are more characteristically defined by 
means outside of the system due to lack of inside-track resources such as access to the 
state.
41
 (Tarrow 1998)  Likewise, refugee militarization clearly works from outside of 
normal institutionalized forms of opposition. 
Williams (2003) refers to two types of political opportunity specific to 
mobilization and violence directed toward ethnic conflicts.  The first is unilateral foreign 
aid inbound to the ethnopolitical opposition (see also Hanlon 2009), which I will discuss 
in Chapter 3 as an example of available conflict resources rather than political 
opportunity.  The second type of political opportunity, which is highly relevant to the 
question posed at the beginning of this work regarding the Arab Spring, is “periods of 
rapid sociopolitical transitions.  In such periods, violent collective insurgency will be 
favored by state weakness and vacillating policies in the context of a high level of 
collective grievances felt by solidarity ethnies….” (pp. 178-179; see also Ryan 2007)  
In regard to conflict resources, militancy entrepreneurs who would seek to not 
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 cf. McAdam Tarrow & Tilly’s (2001) “transgressive contention”, in which at least some of the 
involved claimants are new political actors, and their expressions of collective action are either 
new or illegal in the existing regime. 
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only instigate sporadic acts of violence but sustain a low-intensity conflict against a well-
armed state opponent must secure reliable sources of ammunition, weapons, spare parts 
and technical expertise in guerrilla warfare.  The most reliable and common source for 
these conflict resources in ethnopolitical conflicts remain state suppliers, but groups in 
conflict can also draw from the black market, including transnational links with other 
non-state rebel groups around the world
42
, arms dealers and criminal enterprises. (Hanlon 
2009; see also Chenoweth & Stephan 2010)  State suppliers operate through legal 
transfers or the “grey market”.  The grey market, which originates from the sending state 
but does not go directly to the government of the receiving state, is the most relevant 
source of arms for non-state militant groups like those of interest in this project. (Bourne 
2007) 
The next major hurdle is financing, which can come from co-ethnic diasporas, 
exploitation of natural resources such as diamond mining
43
, criminal activity, supporting 
states or a combination thereof. (Hanlon 2009)  In addition, the ethnonationalist militancy 
entrepreneurs must establish reliable training grounds, diplomatic support and a steady 
supply of recruits. 
Hafez’s (2003) Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic 
World attempts to explain Islamist militant action in the context of contentious politics, 
but minimizes the importance of actual grievances, focusing instead on the political 
process by which organizations adapt to exclusion and repression, their exclusive 
mobilization tactics, and the antisystem ideological frames used by Islamist entrepreneurs 
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 For example, Hizbollah, the PLO and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, or Tamil 
Tigers) are alleged to have had links in training and expertise. (Bhattacharji 2009) 
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 Fearon (2004) found that civil conflicts in which a rebel group has financing from a natural 




to motivate collective action and violence.  I propose that grievances are not a constant 
and therefore empty of explanatory power, as he implies, but rather a necessary variable; 
in fact, political exclusion, which he portrays as a structural constraint forcing Islamists 
to turn to militant activity as a last resort, can also contribute to development of a 
collective project. (Ryan 1995)  This is especially true in regard to refugees, whose 
common identity is, by definition, based on exclusion. 
FRAMING 
The contentious politics literature highlights the process by which political 
entrepreneurs frame events in a conflict rhetorically and symbolically for their 
constituents. (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly 2001; McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly 1997; Tarrow 
1998; Brysk 1995; Tarrow 1992; Hafez 2003)  Snow & Benford define a frame as “an 
interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively 
punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of 
actions within one’s present or past environment.” (1992, p. 137)  Frames are often 
constructed around arguments of injustice, and deliberately draw on familiar symbols, 
including those of religion and nation, to evoke emotions such as love, loyalty and anger. 
(Tarrow 1998)  Some might argue that this is evidence of manipulation by elites.  I 
suggest that it should be viewed instead as persuasion of the potential to achieve their 
collective project through direct action: “For the oppressed to engage in collective action, 
there must first be… a diminution of fatalism coupled with a perception that conditions 
are unjust, yet subject to change through collective action….” (Schock 2005, p. 27; see 
also Toft 2003) 
Violence is an instrument utilized toward specific goals; a means in need of 
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justification. (Arendt 1969, p. 51; Gude 1971 [1967]; Dodd 2009)  When militancy 
entrepreneurs seek to frame arguments in a way which will not only mobilize constituents 
to collective action but motivate and justify violence, they must first dehumanize the 
opponent and demonstrate their threat to the in-group, depicting the other as “terrorists, 
bandits, thugs, rapists, arsonists, murderers, demons, beasts; they are rats, lice, 
cockroaches, pigs, snakes – in all, not human and fearfully menacing.” (Williams 2003, 
pp. 186-187; cf. Neal 1976)  They are sometimes described as a disease, such as lepers, a 
cancer, or a plague. (Ryan 2007, p. 71)  Second, militancy entrepreneurs are likely to use 
antisystem ideological frames: 
Antisystem ideological frames… are polarizing.  They represent the relationship 
between the movement and its opponents as a conflict between two antithetical 
opposites – us versus them, just versus unjust, faithful versus impious.  The sharp 
dividing lines drawn by such frames depict the opponent as a monolithic entity 
that is incapable of adjustment due to intrinsic characteristics that preclude 
reform; the opponent must be displaced. (Hafez 2003, pp. 156-157, emphasis in 
original; cf. Ryan 2007) 
Hafez explains that the rebel organizations rationalize violent acts through ethical 
explanation of its necessity and/or justice, comparison with the enemy whose actions are 
portrayed as much worse, and displacing responsibility for the violence onto the enemy 
or victims
44
.  This kind of justification is likely to be easily accomplished in refugee 
situations. 
Lessons from the study of groups, ethnic conflict and violence 
Before proceeding, it is necessary first to recognize that mobilization is led, and in 
most cases acts of violence are actually committed, by organized entities (claiming that 
they are) acting on behalf of a particular civilian group. (Gude 1971 [1967])  These 
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 Such framing is apparently effective.  For example, perpetrators of ethnic riots usually show no 
remorse, stating that “they had it coming”. (Kaufman 2011) 
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organizing entities can be states, militaries, paramilitaries, terrorists, political parties
45
, 
ethnic associations, etc.  The more organized and spectacular the act, the more likely it 
was actually committed by an organization rather than an unaffiliated member of the 
larger group on whose behalf such organizations claim to act.  At the other extreme, the 
type of violent activity which is least organized and over which an organization has the 
least control is mass riots. (Brubaker 2004)  The link between civilians and militancy 
entrepreneurs may be more appropriately characterized as an invitation than detachment 
or coercion: 
[If] communities feel themselves under attack, and especially when [they] feel 
they cannot rely on state agencies to protect them, they will turn to groups who 
can offer them security and can exact revenge on the other side for the harm 
inflicted….  For many who live in situations of extreme insecurity where inter-
communal violence has already broken out, the militarization of the state and/or 
communities might appear to be both sensible and comforting….  Often the 
demand for protection – for militarization – will come from within a community 
under threat and so it would be quite wrong to see militarists as people who 
impose themselves on a community against its wishes. (Ryan 2007, pp. 61-62) 
Thus, in some instances the militant organization can be best described as an agent of the 
people.  Therefore, to those critics who argue that acts of violence and mass participation 
are unrelated phenomena, and militancy entrepreneurs and ordinary civilians are 
completely distinct actors, I would reply that they are not mutually exclusive; in fact, the 
successful revolutions in the twentieth century which were violent also included mass 
participation. (Chenoweth & Stephan 2010) 
GROUPS AND VIOLENCE 
Although most sociological studies of dynamics of group engagement in 
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 Political parties are one of the most common sources of ethnopolitical mobilization: “When the 
major constituency of a political party is a specific ethnic population, then political competition 
can easily become ethnic confrontation.” (Stavenhagen 1996, p. 63) 
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aggression and violence refer primarily to non-political variants
46
 such as crime, 
hooliganism and “legitimate” aggression like sports (for example, Harrington 1976; 
Shupilov 1981), it can also offer important insights to the study of refugee militarization.  
First, a group is most likely to become a “conflict group”, one ideologically oriented 
toward and able to engage in organized conflict, when it achieves conflict solidarity – 
that is, “members not only recognize that their goals are incompatible with those of their 
opponents, but also have many grievances against them and are frustrated” – in addition 
to sufficient conflict resources. (Bartos & Wehr 2001, p. 81)  In other words, there exists 
the motivation and resources for violence (see Figure 1).  Both of those conditions could 
be met in refugee camps and communities in host states bordering the CoO.  Next, 
identities are fluid, multiple and constructed (Goff & Dunn 2004; Brubaker 2004; Schlee 
2008; Schlee 2002), and camps and communities full of refugees who were expelled due 
to persecution or participation in a civil war – circumstances in which a single common 
identity was an important element in the conflict – also facilitate other conditions for 
transformation of a group to a conflict group: increased interactions, similarity of culture 
and shared identity (Bartos & Wehr 2001), and collective memory of conflict (Cairns & 
Roe 2003), which are further reified and made more salient by the presence of a 
threatening external enemy (Woehrle & Coy 2000; Cuhadar & Dayton 2011; cf. 
Harrington 1976). 
Sociological study of political violence
47
 has also produced relevant theorizing on 
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 Hobsbawm (1959) offers an intriguing perspective on group violence which was “pre-political” 
or “primitively” political, such as banditry of the Robin Hood type, and Mafia. 
47
 Gude 1971 [1967] defines violence as follows: “a physical act carried out by an individual or 
individuals against another individual or individuals and/or property with the intent to cause 
injury or death to persons and/or damage or destruction to property.  For violence to be political, 




Figure 1. Conflict Theory: A sociological approach to explaining group conflict 
(reproduced from Bartos & Wehr 2001, p. 81) 
typologies and causes of violence in civil conflicts.  Violence is relatively rare across the 
span of human political conflict, it is costly, and it poses formidable barriers to mass 
participation (Chenoweth & Stephan 2010), so why does it occur?  As I will address in 
the discussion of instrumental and expressive functions of violence below, Lawrence 
(2010) challenges the widespread assumption that violence escalates naturally out of 
nonviolent conflict which is unresolved (see, for example, Gude 1971 [1967]), proposing 
instead that violence is a specific set of tactics adopted for specific reasons, such as: it is 
seen as more effective than nonviolent means; in response to repression (i.e., violence by 
the state); because its morality is increasingly seen as justified in response to the actions 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the identity of the perpetrator, state or non-state, and the perception of the act by the target(s) and 
observers are not relevant to the definition. (cf. Campbell 1976, Galtung 1981; Stewart & 
Strathern 2002)  Honderich adds that an act must be illegal to qualify as political violence, and 
the goal is “a change in the policies, personnel, or system of government.” (1974, p. 102)  
Classifying an act as political violence or not depending on its legality seems unsound, and that 
requirement is not used here. (See also Tutt 1976)  There is a broader conceptualization of 
violence which subsumes “structural violence” (for example: Jacoby 2008; Joxe 1981), but that is 










Pearlman (2010), in the same edited volume, suggests that the answer may lie in 
unpacking the group to reveal elites, aspirants (political entrepreneurs) and masses.  
Similarly, Harrington (1976, p. 186), writes that in a mass of people, or mob, there are 
three categories of people: the leader, an active minority and a passive majority.  Those 
who constitute the “masses” who participate in violent activity can be further unpacked: 
…when a society supposedly reaches the boiling point, it is not the society as a whole 
that does so, but a minority who because of atypical circumstances are free to react with 
vigor to sensed injustice, since vigorous reaction is less likely to harm these individuals 
in their home, property, or income.  The majority of the society may sympathize with or 
after the deed support the rebellious minority, but it will not itself man the barricades or 
shout ‘Down with the King.’ It is not alone the existence of intolerable social 
circumstances which makes people rise in protest.  It is perhaps at least as much the 
existence of individual, private circumstances that make it possible not to tolerate the 
intolerable. (Wada & Davies 1957, p. 874) 
This early sociological observation demonstrates the importance of understanding the 
varying economic motivations faced by subsets of a group.  I will incorporate this 
consideration into the proposed framework in the next chapter when discussing who 
among the refugee group is likely to take up arms and who is likely to support 
militarization but not take up arms themselves. 
A groundbreaking work on political violence is Kalyvas’ (2006) The Logic of 
Violence in Civil War.  He unpacks the black box of violence, demonstrating that there 
are many categories of political violence in war, utilized in different circumstances, 
toward varying ends, including local and private interests. (See also: Wilkinson 2004; 
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 See discussion on framing, above. 
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 Lawrence acknowledges the many difficulties with theorizing emotions and frustration as a 
cause, especially the fact that such feelings are far more prevalent worldwide than instances 
violence.  She proposes that these emotions may constitute a base of motivations from which 
other factors operate. 
50
 Gude (1971 [1967]) adds that violence can be an effective form of political communication 
when nonviolent avenues are not available. 
57 
 
Lawrence & Chenoweth 2010)  Lischer (2007) adapts Kalyvas’ work to the causes of 
conflict-induced displacement, suggesting that difference in the type of violence, 
including the intent of its perpetrator – whether to (continue to) govern the population 
targeted for violence or not – can affect not only characteristics of its commission but 
also the later development of a collective project on the part of the refugees.  I will 
incorporate this observation into my discussion of a “war of exclusion”, in Chapter 3. 
Besides sociology, the disciplines of psychology and anthropology have made 
worthy contributions to the understanding of violence.  For instance, studies of memories 
of violence, and their intergenerational transmission, have shown that individual and 
collective memories of manmade trauma can be quite divergent.  Individual memories are 
often fragmentary, emotionally detached or even suppressed, and often have substantial 
variations and discrepancies, but collective memories of injury tend to be evocative and 
tell a coherent, intact narrative. (Argenti & Schramm 2010)  Individual memories of 
violence may or may not be conveyed explicitly to the next generation (Filippucci 2010), 
but collective memories of violence are deliberately transmitted, including through 
performances and reenactments. (Kidron 2010)  While individual memories are 
(mis)constructed by a single (fallible) recall and subject to retrospective interpretation, 
collective memories are formed by the intersubjective construction of meaning – and 
sometimes used as justification for action by political entrepreneurs. (Lindgren 2005; 
Argenti & Schramm 2010) 
ETHNIC CONFLICTS, ETHNONATIONALISM AND VIOLENCE 
In the decades of the post-World War II era, ethnic conflicts – mostly civil and 
anti-colonial conflicts rather than inter-state wars – have emerged as the most frequent 
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form of political armed violence, claiming between 11-20 million lives worldwide, with a 
spike of ethnic conflicts at the beginning of the post-Cold War period in the early 
1990s.
51
  (Wimmer 2004; Eller 1999; Williams 1994; Stavenhagen 1996; Ryan 1995; 
Lobell & Mauceri 2004; Toft 2003; Fearon & Laitin 2011; Hewitt, Wilkenfeld & Gurr 
2012)  These conflicts dividing populations on the basis of their ascribed identities “have 
the appearance of unusual ferocity and resistance to termination” (Williams 2003, p. 5; 
see also Ross 2007), and many explanations for this bloody history have been proposed.
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Drawing a connection between nationalist movements – with or without the 
“ethno” prefix – and violent conflict is not a novel idea.
53
 (See, for example: Brown et al. 
2001; Williams 2003; Varshney 2003; Varshney 2002; Brubaker & Laitin 1998; Harff & 
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 Fearon & Laitin (2011), for example, find that 57% of the civil wars from 1945-2008 were 
ethnically based, and another 17% were ambiguously based on ethnicity. 
52
 According to one hypothesis, without the power balance and security imposed by colonial 
powers, ethnic group identities became increasingly salient as a function of information failures 
and credible commitment problems in upholding intergroup agreements. (Fearon 1998; Lake & 
Rothchild 1996; Wimmer 2004; Fearon & Laitin 2011)  Cordell & Wolff (2009) subsume this 
sort of explanation under a broader category of rational choice theories to explain ethnic conflicts, 
which also include security dilemma-style threats as well as explanations based on “greed” or 
economic gain. (For example: Collier & Hoeffler 1998; Collier & Hoeffler 2004; see also Jacoby 
2008, Ch. 8)  Alternatively, political economy explanations focus on challenges to ethnic 
inequalities, disproportionate access to resources, and racially ordered systems, as could be 
brought about by modernization and globalization. (Bookman 2002; Olzak 2006; Wimmer 2004; 
Stavenhagen 1996)  Still others have explained the rise of ethnic conflict as a function of: the 
refusal of multiethnic states to recognize their plurality (Stavenhagen 1996); incompatibility of 
culture and identity (Ross 2007); the “loosening of cold war ideological straitjackets [which] has 
given greater salience to ethnic factors in many political conflicts” (Stavenhagen 1996, p. 13); 
neighborhood effects and the wave of democratization that spread across Eastern Europe; 
“alienation from increasingly impersonal, bureaucratic, and centralized states; [the] declining 
importance of class-based political parties and movements” (Danforth 1995, p. 11; see also 
Wimmer 2004); the concept of the nation-state itself (Otterbein 2009); “improvements in mass 
communication [which] have enabled states to impose dominant national cultures and symbols 
more effectively on the private lives of members of minority groups” (Danforth 1995, p. 11); and 
a combination of human nature, state-level and systemic variables (Hanlon 2009).  Finally, 
Huntington’s (1993) famous clash of civilizations hypothesis suggests that ethnonationalist 
conflicts are drawn along the fault lines of nine global “civilizations”. (Wimmer 2004) 
53
 Williams classifies such conflict into three categories: “(i) turmoil (strikes, demonstrations, 
mutinies…, protests, sabotage, communal rioting, and terrorism); (ii) internal war (coups d’état, 
secessionistic rebellions, civil wars and revolutions); (iii) genocide.” (1994, p. 54) 
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Gurr 2004; Lake & Rothchild 1998; Bookman 2002; Williams 1994; Danforth 1995)  In 
the following pages I will first discuss scholarly work which has linked ethnicity to 
mobilization and group violence.  Next I will turn to ethnonationalism in particular to 
observe the additional factors which can stimulate those movements to violence.  In the 
next chapter I will suggest that ethnonationalism can provide a source of political 
attachment to land in the CoO, contributing to a collective project for its redemption by a 
refugee group. 
Studies of ethnic conflict have demonstrated that mobilizing a group to support 
and engage in violence is a multi-step process, in which political entrepreneurs first reify 
the in-group, establish and sharpen boundaries from the out-group, squelch other 
identities in the in-group, and clarify collective grievances; next, violence is committed 
due to its specific instrumental and expressive functions. 
Reification of the in-group / Distinction from the out-group 
The first step in the construction of any social group is the reification of the group 
itself.  This means, before any mobilization can begin, defining membership rules which 
establish an in-group (“us”) and out-group (“not us”) and demarcate the borders of 
identity.
54
  The second step is establishing the content of that group, in other words, “sets 
of characteristics (such as beliefs, desires, moral commitments, and physical attributes) 
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 The field of social psychology has done considerable research on the construction of in-group 
bias, relating it to the maintenance of self-esteem by degrading perceptions of out-groups. 
(Cuhadar & Dayton 2011; see also Verkuyten 2005; Harrington 1976)  Williams (2003) outlines 
eight factors leading to salient ethnic identification, including: “An ethnie preceded the territorial 
state into which it has been incorporated, and the basis of incorporation emphasized ethnicity; 
There are only a few large ethnies within the claimed jurisdiction of the state; The population of 
the ethny is geographically concentrated; The ethny’s members are concentrated in a few salient 
occupations; There is a history of recent ethnic conflict; There are many cultural differences with 
other nearby ethnies; Social closure, including in-group marriages, in strong; Discrimination is 
prevalent.” (pp. 14-15)  
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thought to be typical of members of the category, or behaviors expected or obliged of 
members in certain situations (roles),” as well as “the social valuation of members of this 
category relative to others (contestation over which is often called ‘identity politics’).” 
(Fearon & Laitin 2000, p. 848)  A number of scholars have noted that nationalism is 
defined in large part by distinction from the “other” and competition with the out-
group(s) for power and resources (for example: Lake & Rothchild 1998; Bookman 2002), 
and the same is true of ethnonationalism – perhaps even more so, since the claims of “us” 
and “them” are based on supposedly unbreakable ancestral lineage.  One mechanism by 
which this can lead to violence is as a result of the discursive reification of the group 
itself.  Salient identification into “us” and “them” is usually founded in part on perception 
(or construction) of threat from “them” (Fearon & Laitin 2000; Williams 2003; Ross 
2007; Helbling 1997; Cuhadar & Dayton 2011; Kaufman 2011), whether the threat is 
physical, economic, political, moral, national or some combination thereof.  Since the 
alleged blood bonds of ethnicity confer immortality to the individual through 
deindividuation and installation into a tree of ancestors, successors and distant cousins 
dating back to the primordial ooze, the disappearance of the group would be “a form of 
killing inflicted on one’s progenitors, including one’s parents, who still ‘live’ as long as 
some symbols of their culture are carried forth in into the present and future, out of the 
past.” (de Vos 2006, p. 12)  Thus, by binding the individual to the group, the construction 
of threat to one’s ethnic identity taps into nature’s most powerful instinct, that of survival. 
As Connor writes, “convictions concerning one’s ethnic identity are predicated 
not upon chronological or factual history but upon sentient or felt history.  And because 
its roots lie in the subconscious, rather than in reason, … [rational awareness of evidence 
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to the contrary] need not alter the subconscious conviction that one’s nation has been 
ethnically hermetical.” (2004, p. 30)  The reification of the group is an entirely social 
enterprise led by “ethnopolitical entrepreneurs” who seek to utilize the group in order to 
achieve political ends.  “Their categories are for doing – designed to stir, summon, 
justify, kindle, and energize.” (Brubaker 2004, p. 37, emphasis in original)  However, a 
reified identity does not mean that it is an illusory or an empty one.  Indeed, it is precisely 
the reification which leads to real and powerful political activity by a group on the basis 
of that identity. (Brubaker 2004; Williams 1994) 
Furthermore, once an ethnonational identity has been successfully reified, most 
members of that group see and believe it to be as real and important, or perhaps more so, 
than any other identity.  It becomes part of everyday discourse and is recreated in private 
and public social practice.  Countless “common people”, non-elites, have voluntarily
55
 
put their lives on the line, and died, in defense of their ethnonational identity.  They 
believed they would be martyrs, and their community discursively interpreted their act of 
violence as heroism in defense of the ethnic nation
56
. (See, for example, Fuglerud 2011; 
Stewart & Strathern 2002; cf. Tutt 1976)  They believe the group exists, regardless of its 
constructed genesis and ethnopolitically entrepreneurial advocates, and therefore their 
actions represent not passive manipulation but active attempts to achieve their collective 
project. 
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 Of course, it is also necessary to recognize that there are also those who have fought and died 
in the name of an ethnopolitical project who were not participating voluntarily, but were forced to 
do so, such as child soldiers in Africa and southeast Asia. 
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Suppressing other identities among the in-group 
The second step is to make the reified identity the most salient identity, replacing 
other possible loyalties such as class, tribe or state.  In other words, besides establishing 
membership boundaries of the ethnic nation, the movement must promote solidarity 
within the group, suppressing other identities.  This can lead to intra-group conflict and 
violence, such as monitoring and sanctioning processes (Laitin 1995 [in Brubaker 2004]), 
violence by non-elites to prevent blurring of group boundaries (Fearon & Laitin 2000), or 
at the very least indoctrination, to elevate the common identity above other cross-cutting 
identities (Williams 2003).
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Next, there must be a perceived serious grievance.  A variant of grievance was the 
central variable posited in Gurr’s (1970) famous text Why Men Rebel, namely, that 
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 See also Williams (2003) for discussion of intra-group conflict especially as regards relations 
between the ethnonationalist group and the state. 
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 The Jews in pre-1948 Palestine were from a variety of countries, mostly spanning Europe and 
the Middle East.  Zionism as an ethnonationalist ideology rejects cultural, linguistic and ethnic 
differences among Jews, claiming that immigrants’ countries of “origin” were in fact temporary 
(one- or two-millennia) residences while Palestine/Israel is the true origin.  “The continuing 
distinctiveness of ethnicity among Jews in Israel is perceived, therefore, as temporary….  Zionist 
ideology constructs the obvious evidence of Jewish ethnic differences in Israel as… largely 
irrelevant to the longer term goals of national Jewish integration and nation-building.” 
(Goldscheider 2006, p. 4; see also Mitchell 2000)  Since 1948, differences among Jews have 
successfully been minimized, though not eliminated, through a project of assimilation which all 
new immigrants must complete.  This process includes learning Hebrew, Israeli culture, and 
introduction to civic and political life in Israel.  Mandatory participation in national institutions, 
school for children and the military for adults, are strong reinforcements to Israeli identity.  
Because the project of Jewish nationalism is an example of ethnonationalism (Greenfeld & 
Eastwood 2007), the assimilation process has been more formal and intrusive than immigration 
into other countries which accept large numbers of newcomers but maintain civic nationalism, 
such as Australia and the United States. 
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relative deprivation leads to frustration, which in turn leads to aggression.
59
  Although it 
was an important step toward understanding that perception matters – and therefore social 
construction matters – in ethnic conflicts, the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Dollard 
et al. 1939; cf. Harrington 1976; Klineberg 1981) has been largely debunked since its 
publication.  Variables frequently associated with minority status, such as oppression, 
discrimination and limited opportunity, have been shown to be ubiquitous and therefore 
unconvincing as standalone explanations of violence.  In fact, some scholars disregard the 
grievance variable altogether. (See, for instance, the discussion of Hafez’s (2003) work, 
above.)  However, other scholars of ethnic conflict disagree, and take this requirement 
seriously as a sine qua non of mobilization.  For example, Williams writes that 
genuine grievances… are not merely deprivations or dissatisfactions.  Rather, they 
always involve some sense of violation of norms, some wrongfulness, some illegitimacy, 
some breach of rules of proper conduct, some essential injustice.  Indeed, many people 
over long periods endure deprivations and frustrations without protest; some substantial 
level of chronic discontent probably can be expected in any collective arrangement.  
What is crucial is that poverty or inequality or social exclusion come to be seen by a 
whole collectivity as wrong, and that a shared ideology develops in which the 
wrongfulness is seen as being categorically imposed.  Violent ethnic conflicts occur when 
a cohesive grouping infused with such a systematic view encounters resistance that seems 
to preclude peaceful resolution.  Protesters and rebels in these circumstances believe that 
they are fighting for things that they deserve. (2003, pp. 184-185, emphasis in original) 
Grievances based particularly on collective feelings of injustice are crucial for 
mobilization toward violent conflict, and this feeling is relatively easy to access when 
refugees have been expelled from their CoO on the basis of their shared identity, as is 
generally the case (Bookman 2002). 
The instrumental use of violence and its framing 
Once boundaries between the in-group and out-group have been established and 
serious grievances exist, there are several mechanisms leading to violence.  One such 
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 For an in-depth discussion of theories of violence that are predominantly grievance-based, see 
Jacoby (2008, Ch. 7) 
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mechanism is that violence can be a tactic deliberately selected for its instrumentality to 
achieve a specific end (Marković 1974; Klineberg 1981), as von Clausewitz famously 
suggested nearly two centuries ago.  For instance, violence is sometimes used as a highly 
effective cause leading to the establishment and sharpening of group membership 
boundaries, rather than only an effect of it. (Wilkinson 2004; see also Lawrence & 
Chenoweth 2010; Jacoby 2008; Ryan 2007; Gude 1971 [1967]; Harrington 1976)  
Brubaker (2004) refers to the example of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which 
increased attacks on Serb targets in 1998 in order to draw massive reprisals by the Serb 
authorities targeting Kosovo Albanian civilians, leading to deeper division between 
Kosovo’s Albanians and Serbs.  This in turn led to increased funding, recruitment and 
legitimacy for the KLA among the Albanian population in Kosovo and the diaspora.
60
  
Basque separatists committed similar acts when faced with ambiguous membership 
boundaries between Basques and Spaniards. (Fearon & Laitin 2000)  Besides being used 
to sharpen in-group/out-group identities, violence may also be used instrumentally to gain 
attention to grievances and bring them into the public domain (Arendt 1969; Chenoweth 
& Stephan 2010) and to empower, stimulate and mobilize the masses
61
 (Fanon 1963). 
But a given act of violence is not inherently political or ethnopolitical.  In order 
for the violence to be linked to a collective project, and therefore become effective in 
sharpening the divide between (reified) groups, it must be framed in the context of that 
conflict ex post facto.  This framing is done by the perpetrator(s), victims, observers, 
politicians, reporters, academics, etc.  Whether an act of violence is coded in the public 
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 The KLA is also reported to have used violence against moderates within the Kosovar-
Albanian leadership who advocated a reformist agenda with Serbia rather than a violent approach. 
(Ryan 2007) 
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 For a summary of Marxist perspectives on the utility of violence, see Khan (1981). 
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discourse as ethnopolitically motivated, crime, terrorism, or some other attribute is often 
subject to fierce rhetorical framing contests. (Brubaker 2004; see also Richards 2005)  
Framing an ambiguous act of violence in the context of a collective project, which 
political actors may have private incentives to do, can in turn have violent repercussions. 
(Fearon & Laitin 2000) 
The expressive use of violence and self-perpetuation 
Finally, violence can have an expressive, emotional or cathartic function, such as 
fulfilling a desire for revenge which is perceived by the recent victim as legitimate. 
(Stewart & Strathern 2002)  In this sense violence can become self-perpetuating, both 
because a rising toll of “martyrs” increases individual and collective pain, and demands 
that their deaths should not be in vain
62
 (Toft 2003; Hanlon 2009) and because violence 
increases cohesion and emotional bonds among in-group perpetrators (Arendt 1969).  
Violence can also become self-perpetuating as it instigates or catalyzes a security 
dilemma with the enemy. (Ryan 2007) 
Ethnonationalism: Territory and “sons of the soil” 
Movements that are ethnonationalist, like “sons of the soil” movements
63
, are 
particularly prone to violence. (Stewart & Strathern 2002)  This is due in large part to the 
additional motivation presented by the perception of victimization and loss of territory: 
The special intensity so evident in many ethnic conflicts frequently arises from a sense of 
victimization… arising from loss of autonomy, loss of historically claimed territory, 
infringement of prior rights, or generally treatment thought to be unfairly 
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 The same mechanism operates when states go to war and face mounting casualties.  Ryan 
(2007) refers to this as “entrapment” and offers the text of the Gettysburg Address as an example.   
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 Derouen & Barutciski describe “sons of the soil” movements as “a peripheral ethnic group that 
is fighting for autonomy or secession on the basis that the territory they occupy is inextricably 
tied to the group. Tensions mount  if there is a valuable resource in the territory (e.g., oil in 
Cabinda or Sudan) and if the government adopts a policy of transmigration into the territory.” 
(2007, p. 221; see also Weiner 1978; Fearon & Laitin 2011; Toft 2003) 
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discriminatory….  The more nearly indivisible the goods and the less the access of the 
‘disadvantaged,’ the greater is the resentment and the more likely is ethnic mobilization, 
followed by overt conflict…. (Williams 1994, p. 59, emphasis added; see also Williams 
2003)   
In other words, violence is especially likely when the putative group has lost an 
indivisible good that it once possessed.
64
 (See also: Gurr 1993)  Obviously, this is highly 
relevant to the situation of refugees with an collective project, who have lost not only 
their homes and land (possibly recompensable) but their homeland (irreplaceable and 
indivisible). 
As discussed earlier, the reification of a sharp us/them divide is the first step 
leading toward ethnic mobilization.  In Chapter 3 I will explore the link to territory in 
reference to refugees specifically
65
, but indigenousness to the territory is usually one of 
the central points of distinction from “them” in ethnonationalist conflicts, especially 
when “they” are settlers or colonizers, or viewed as such by the in-group – even though 
“they” may perceive themselves as the legitimate natives rather than part of a foreign 
colonization project, as in Palestine/Israel and Northern Ireland. (Mitchell 2000; see also 
Fanon 1963; Lawrence 2010) 
Since territory is one of the most common sources of contention leading to armed 
conflicts worldwide (Huth & Allee 2002; see also Stavenhagen 1996), it should not be a 
surprise that it is a common element in ethnonationalist constructions of threat.  Fearon & 
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 Cordell & Wolff (2009) categorize theories of ethnic conflict like this one as social-
psychological approaches.  This category sees ethnic conflict arising as a function of unmet 
expectations of entitlement or the threat of loss of existing privileges. 
65
 Allen & Turton (1996) contest this characterization as reflecting European-centric notions of 
nationalism, in which “the world is naturally made up of clearly bounded politico-territorial 
entities – sovereign states.” (p. 11)  They give examples to support their assertion that not all 
ethnic groups lay claim to the territory of the CoO, even when they are indigenous to it. (See also 
De Vos 2006)  In response, I would suggest that refugee ethnic groups like those they describe 
dovetail well with my proposed framework, as examples of refugees without a collective project, 
who are unlikely to be motivated to militarize. 
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Laitin found that groups claiming to be sons of the soil are more likely to rebel than those 
who do not claim indigenousness, which they suggest could be a function of “more 
severe grievances”, among other possibilities. (2011, p. 201; see also Fearon 2004)  The 
seeming intractability of ethnonationalist conflicts (Hanlon 2009) could be explained in 
part by this extra severity of grievances. 
A homeland can be attributed far more value in symbolic terms than its material 
value, becoming “not an object to be exchanged but an indivisible component of a 
group’s identity.” (Toft 2003, p. 1; see also Williams 2003)
66
  Ethnonationalist 
movements are linked rhetorically to the territory of the ethnic group’s ancestry and 
identity, using familiar symbology and discursive constructions to frame the modern 
movement in the language of primordial kinship bonds.  Given the familial basis of 
ethnic nationalism, “their” threat to the motherland/fatherland (cf. Williams 1994; Ryan 
1995; Verkuyten 2005) is described in the ethnonationalist construction as an insufferable 
travesty of family honor.  In such framing, is not uncommon to hear the threat of, or 
actual, occupation and control of the homeland by the “other” portrayed in the incendiary 
language of rape.  For example, the Tamil Tigers’ ideology and songs anthropomorphized 
the Tamiltay (“motherland”) as a married woman or mother in danger of sexual violation. 
(Fuglerud 2011) 
It must also be noted that there are practical reasons, too, that ethnonationalists 
see the homeland as necessary for the survival and perpetuation of the group: 
Homeland ownership means that groups can enact language and education policies to 
ensure that future generations continue to identify themselves as members of the group. It 
also protects place names and historic sites and secures land ownership such that land can 
be passed or sold [only] to members of the group. Finally, homeland ownership ensures 
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 Toft (2003) suggests that ethnic groups who do not see the territory as indivisible are more 
often those groups who are geographically dispersed and urban. 
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that the ethnic group will retain its link to the homeland even if the group declines in size 
relative to ethnic strangers….  Homeland ownership guards against the erosion of group 
identity and protects the existence of the group. (Hanlon 2009, p. 14) 
Thus, contention over a homeland is likely to lead to violence (Arendt 1969) for both 
symbolic and practical reasons. 
INTEGRATING EXOGENOUS AND ENDOGENOUS FACTORS 
The study of ethnic conflict, much further developed than that of refugee 
militarization, has tended toward explanations which incorporate both structural variables 
and factors endogenous to the group.  For example, in the founding text on ethnic 
conflict, Horowitz’s Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985), the author acknowledges 
explanations based primarily on broader structural factors such as modernization theory 
but finds them lacking; instead he focuses on attributes of the groups themselves, 
including their affiliation, organization, and centralization, in the context of institutions of 
governance.  Likewise, Williams (1994) draws extensively on discussions of grievances 
and fears as well as political structures, political opportunities and class relations.  Gurr 
(2000) outlines four criteria leading to ethnic mobilization and violent conflict, including: 
1. The salience of ethnocultural identity for members and leaders of the group.  
2. The extent to which the group has collective incentives for political action.   
3. The extent of the group’s capacities for collective action.   
4. The availability of opportunities in the group’s political environment that 
increase its chances of attaining group objectives through political action. 
(2000, pp. 65-66, emphasis in original) 
Other studies of ethnic conflict have emphasized the importance of elites’ and 
masses’ perspectives on “comparative group worth and legitimacy” based on traditions, 
symbols and historical experiences, while also acknowledging structural causes such as 
the security dilemma, and the catalyzing presence of “political entrepreneurs” to take 
advantage of ripe circumstances. (Wolff 2006)  The scholars whose theoretical 
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framework integrates endogenous and exogenous variables most succinctly, and who 
seek to explain both positive and negative cases, are Cordell & Wolff (2009): 
The first conceptual element of our framework is the set of motives that drive people to 
opt for conflict.  Motive alone, however, is insufficient to account for the occurrence of 
ethnic conflict….  [Participants] need to have both the means and the opportunity….  
Importantly, if our framework is to be viable, these relationships need to be able to 
explain both the occurrence of conflict and its absence. (2009, pp. 44-45)  
As demonstrated here, scholarly attention to ethnic conflict and group violence – 
and the literature on contentious politics and social movements, as shown earlier – has 
included significant consideration of factors endogenous to the groups involved, such as 
nationalism, ethnicity, identity, and economic interests, in addition to structural factors 
such as political opportunities and available resources.  Yet, surprisingly, such integrative 
approaches have not yet been applied to the study of refugee militarization.  This is likely 
due to three factors: the focus in the refugee literature on the victimization and 
humanitarian needs of refugees (Morris & Stedman 2008; Derouen & Barutciski 2007); 
the tendency in the field of conflict studies, and the discipline of international relations 
more broadly, to privilege security perspectives and state actors (ibid.); and the 
institutionalization of the refugee regime since the adoption of the UN Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1951.  All three of these factors prejudice scholarly 
focus toward structural and environmental explanations rather than grievance-based 
collective projects, and none of them expect refugees to take important independent 
action. 
Conclusion: Back to the future with Zolberg et al. 
This chapter concludes with a return, ironically, to the earliest attempt in the 
literature to explain refugee militarization, offered in a brief paragraph by Zolberg et al., 
which resembles the framework described in the next chapter:  
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Individuals in exile find that the most socially meaningful and economically rewarding 
activity is to join the warriors, and consequently move from the category of mere 
displaced persons into that of the politically active and conscious….  [The refugee 
situation] also offers a new set of resources in a new situation which can be used by 
innovative political entrepreneurs to establish themselves. (1986:166)  
Several variables here are noteworthy.  First, the authors do not elaborate on what makes 
militarization “socially meaningful”, but it is related to a collective project; second, there 
is an economic calculation; third, there are militancy entrepreneurs who facilitate 
bridging the gap between motivation and action; and fourth, there is a new and unique set 
of resources available to be mobilized toward militant ends.  The only major element of 
contentious political activity added in this paper to this insightful summary by Zolberg et 
al. is the existence of political opportunities for militant activity.  I will explore each of 
these factors in detail in Chapter 3.  
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CHAPTER 3: A New Framework to Approach Refugee Militarization 
 
In this chapter I will begin with brief discussions of: the original theoretical 
contribution offered by this project; levels of analysis; and challenges in applying the 
contentious politics toolbox to refugee situations.  Next I will draw on the bodies of 
knowledge reviewed in the previous chapter to propose a new framework to approaching 
the question: Why do some refugee groups militarize while others do not, or during 
some periods of their exile but not others? 
The value added 
The original contribution which this framework makes to the existing body of 
knowledge about refugee militarization is four-fold: 1) It gives a collective project to 
redeem the homeland the theoretical weight which it is due, and which is mostly missing 
from the literature; 2) It accounts both for cases which are positive and those which are 
negative in the dependent variable, and offers alternative outcomes if only some 
conditions are met; 3) It begins to unpack the “refugee group”; and 4) It offers a truly 
multi-disciplinary approach to the topic.  Although many scholars have noted that the 
very category of refugees blurs conceptual divides, none have yet proposed an 
explanation for this phenomenon which likewise bridges such divides.  My framework 
applies a multi-disciplinary approach, drawing from studies of contentious politics, 
rational choice and constructivist approaches, civil and international war, domestic and 
international law, economic and forced migration, and more broadly, the disciplines of 
political science, sociology, geography and economics.  It borrows from all three major 
categories of explanations for group violence: group identity; psychological theories 
based on relative deprivation; and structural theories. (Homer-Dixon 1999) 
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A brief note on levels of analysis 
The unit of analysis in this framework is the refugee group in a given host state in 
a given period of time.  A large body of sociological and political science literature has 
established that groups are real entities, more than the sum of their constituent 
individuals; and group dynamics matter in the political arena, particularly in conflict 
situations.  In the previous chapter I summarized the sociological literature on group 
dynamics relating to violent conflict.  Here I will offer a framework to connect the 
relationships between the refugee group and external actors – including the host state, 
CoO, superpowers, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and international NGOs – 
with political dynamics within the refugee group, such as the evolution of leadership in 
exile; and between refugee civilians and refugee militants.  I will also suggest who within 
the group is likely to actually take up arms and who is likely to support militarization but 
not take up arms. 
However, this group (meso level) focus is not exclusive.  The individual is the 
common denominator to all decision-making, and some argue that the sum of refugees’ 
individual psychologies create group sentiment
67
, which in turn raises issues of individual 
and group rationality
68
.  Most scholarly literature on the collective action problem, 
including game theoretic approaches, argues that individual rational calculations lead to 
individual participation or non-participation in a group, but more recent works have 
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 For example, Ferris (1985) writes that “[although] the refugee is initially appreciative of all 
those who aided and supported him or her, in time the refugee becomes hostile as the aid is never 
sufficient to make up for the suffering experienced.  In the end, the refugee emerges from the 
experience as a more aggressive person and one more prone to physical violence.” (18)  Her 
claim is strangely deterministic, and it is unclear whether she is referring to political or non-
political (i.e., familial or criminal) violence. 
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 Hechter (2004), for instance, rejects claims that ethnonationalist partisans are irrational; see 
also the work of Schlee (2008) for a rationalist treatment of ethnic conflict. 
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introduced less strictly rational factors, such as interpersonal trust. (Ostrom 2007)  In this 
project, rationalist (micro level) and structural (macros level) explanations are also 
incorporated, as will be demonstrated below. 
Challenges in applying lessons from contentious politics 
Refugee militarization is a type of contentious politics but not technically a social 
movement, though the study of both topics offer valuable insights.  There are several 
important distinctions of refugee militarization from social movements: First, social 
movements are usually domestic phenomena while refugee situations are inherently 
transnational and international; second, refugee militarization involves violence or the 
threat of violence by the disenfranchised, while most of the literature on social 
movements does not; and third, for those seeking to militarize refugees, there is no need 
for active politicization prior to mobilization and militarization since the acts of war, 
expulsion and exile are inherently politicizing.  By seeking asylum in a foreign country, 
individuals and groups are engaging in political acts and become political entities, even if 
they do not have a collective project to redeem the homeland.  However, this does not 
suggest that all refugees seek to engage in militarization; as we have already seen, most 
refugee groups do not militarize, and most probably do not seek to do so. 
As stated above, most literature on contentious politics studies domestic conflict.  
What makes the study of refugee militarization distinct from the study of domestic group 
conflicts?  There are two important differences: first, conflicts involving refugees always 
include territory as an important point of contention, whereas domestic conflicts may or 
may not concern territory.  The very concept of “refugee” necessitates consideration of 
territory as an issue of conflict, as it is only by fleeing homes, land and property and 
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crossing an international border that the dispossessed become refugees.  As shown in the 
previous chapter, contention over territory increases the risk of armed conflict, and such 
conflicts may be more intractable and “ferocious” than other types of violent conflict. 
Secondly, international factors, which are often only tangentially involved in a 
domestic conflict, are of central importance in a refugee situation.  One such set of 
international factors includes those which relate to the host state, including policies on 
accommodation, assimilation and securitization; economic variables relating to the host; 
minority-state relations; and the relationship between the host state and CoO.  The second 
important set of international factors which becomes salient in refugee situations is the 
UN-centered refugee regime, including protections afforded by international law (for 
example, if the host is a signatory to the 1951 Convention and follow-up 1967 Protocol), 
the use of international humanitarian aid to support a war economy, and the typical 
humanitarian conceptualization of refugees as passive, needy objects.  Refugees can also 
engage in political activity which blurs the domestic/international divide, such as 
pressuring the government which is sovereign over the area where they reside (domestic 
activity) to change a policy regarding a neighboring state
69
 (international activity) with 
the intent to affect their home territory (transnational activity). 
Do the international and transnational dimensions of refugee situations undermine 
the applicability of a contentious politics approach?  I argue that it does not.  The 
categories of factors borrowed from that approach – grievances, political/militancy 
entrepreneurs, political opportunity and conflict resources – are relevant particularly to 
non-state actors, whether within or outside the jurisdiction of the target of their claims. 
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 This can be a sort of two-level game (Putnam 1988), depending on the political dynamics 




The framework proposed in this project is summarized in Figure 2.  I will discuss 
each of these factors in turn: a war of exclusion; an economic or political attachment to 
land in the CoO; the degree of socioeconomic integration or marginalization in the host 
state; militancy entrepreneurs; hope of resolution by external actors; permissive political 
opportunities; and conflict resources (not shown in Figure 2, as I will explain shortly).  
Following the suggestions of George & Bennett (2005) for developing typological 
theories
70
, I propose likely alternative outcomes if only some of the following conditions 
are met. 
The first variables I will discuss below are those affecting the presence or absence 
of a collective project to redeem the homeland by the refugee group.  It is not an 
overgeneralization to state that every refugee group desires to end its condition of 
displacement and transience.  Refugees typically “reject their marginalization as stateless 
and homeless citizens” and they “desire to return to their homelands or find a permanent 
home elsewhere.” (Bookman 2002, p. 184)  But who seeks the homeland and who aims 
to move elsewhere?  Of those who wish to return, do they seek to do so as individuals or 
as part of a collective project of redemption?  Of those who do not wish to personally 
return, do they see themselves as part of a collective project or seek to start a new life?  
To borrow Hirschman’s (1970) famous terminology, the refugees’ option of loyalty to the 
authorities in the CoO has been nullified by expulsion; the only choices remaining are 
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 They define a typological theory as one which “provides not only hypotheses on how [the 
independent] variables operate individually, but also contingent generalizations on how and under 
what conditions they behave in specified conjunctions or configurations to produce effects on 
specified dependent variables.” (p. 235) 
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exit – psychosocially rather than geographically this time, as they effectively abandon 
claims to membership and property left behind in the CoO, and seek integration to the 
 
Figure 2. Proposed framework of refugee militarization 
 
host state or resettlement
71
 – or voice, which represents indefinite perpetuation of the 
                                                          
71
 It is important to note at this point that options for resettlement are usually far beyond the 
political agency available to refugee groups.  Those who choose resettlement may be quickly 
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collective project of return through diplomatic channels, violent means, or both. (cf. 
Salehyan 2009, p. 35)  While loyalty and exit are passive options (take it or leave it, 
respectively), voice indicates an active attempt to change the status quo. 
1. COLLECTIVE PROJECT TO REDEEM THE HOMELAND? 
Bariagaber (2006, p. 9) refers to theoretical incorporation of all stages of the 
refugee experience and their path-dependence as an “holistic approach”, which is critical 
to understanding later refugee actions.  I propose that two factors relating to the CoO 
affect whether or not there is a collective project on the part of the refugees to redeem the 
homeland.  The first is a war of exclusion with a clear enemy, and the second is an 
economic or political attachment to land in the CoO.  Both factors provide the basis for 
grievances around which militancy entrepreneurs will later be able to frame mobilizing 
arguments and shape reality for potential supporters.  In particular, in such refugee 
situations it is easy to frame arguments around injustice and identity, while militarization 
offers hope of agency
72
 – in this case, defeating their oppressors in the CoO, redeeming 
the homeland and reclaiming their homes and property. 
War of exclusion with a clear enemy 
The reason for flight may be an important factor affecting refugees’ later 
perception of the conflict in the CoO.  Lischer (2005) specifies this variable with three 
possible values: situational, persecution or state-in-exile.  The difficulty with Lischer’s 
categorization scheme is that her definition of situational refugees – the only ones not 
expected to militarize – is distinguished from the other categories primarily by their lack 
                                                                                                                                                                             
resettled or they may languish in camps for years while political considerations prevent both their 
onward migration and their permanent settlement in the country of first refuge. 
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of political interest and involvement.  Lischer does not explain how these refugees differ 
from the other categories except by their political activity, which creates a tautological 
problem since Lischer’s dependent variable, refugee militarization, is also a type of 
political activity. 
I use the terminology employed by Morris and Stedman (2008, pp. 74-75) to ask 
whether the conditions under which civilians fled the CoO were a “war of exclusion”.  
Like Morris and Stedman, I believe that a two-category scheme is more clear as it isolates 
the war itself as a distinct variable.  Was one central purpose of the war to displace a 
population, as in cases of ethnic cleansing?  If so, then the effect may be that refugees are 
more likely to develop a collective project to redeem the homeland.  Contrast this with 
Lischer’s trichotomous variable, which is measurable not by objective accounts of the 
war but rather by the refugees’ active politicization and the circumstances under which 
they are willing to return. 
In order for a war of exclusion to lead to a collective project, however, there must 
also be a clear enemy who is responsible (or perceived to be responsible) for the violence 
and exile.  As discussed in the previous chapter, a group identity usually develops in 
contrast to a threatening “other”.  When the vast majority of a refugee group can attribute 
their personal exile to a direct or indirect threat from an enemy “other”, it is much easier 
to develop a group identity in opposition to them. 
Economically or politically attached to land in CoO 
The second variable concerns whether the group is economically or politically 
attached to land in the CoO.  I will discuss three ways in which the group could be 
attached: an ethnonationalist project; an agricultural economic base; or a rent-producing 
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resource such as oil or diamonds.  The first is a political attachment, while the second and 
third are economic attachments.  I propose that any one of these three can be sufficient to 
establish an attachment to land in the CoO.  However, while these are the most common 
types of attachment, they are not the only types.  Other types of attachment are relevant 
as well, as in the case of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran, which will be discussed in 
Chapter 9. 
Ethnonationalist movement 
An ethnonationalist movement can be pre-existing or it can develop in exile.  The 
reason that an ethnonationalist movement can generate a collective project to redeem the 
homeland is that acquisition of an independent state is “used to complete the process of 
constructing the nation.” (Danforth 1995, p. 17)  Refugees who see themselves as 
relatively recent immigrants
73
 to the CoO are less likely to take up arms in an effort to 
return there; while those with the ethnonationalist connection, who see themselves as 
“sons of the soil” torn from their ancestral homeland, are more likely to militarize. 
In Malkki’s (1995) study, the militant camp-dwelling refugees strongly identified 
not only as refugees but as Hutu, their ethnic identity, first.  Adopting the refugee label is 
important because it emphasizes the group’s status as temporary, dispossessed, and 
belonging to another place; but the ethnonationalist movement is a powerful motivating 
factor for refugees.  A politicized ethnic group which has constructed an historical 
narrative and symbology of nationhood connected to their territory of (prior) residence 
has already established the foundations for nationalist aspirations toward self-
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 What “relatively recent” means is, of course, open to subjective interpretation.  For example, a 
fifth-generation American could feel that the US is their homeland as strongly as a Native 
American; whereas a fifth-generation Indo-Fijian may feel that they will never be “native” to Fiji. 
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sovereignty.  The acts of persecution and expulsion which resulted in them becoming 
refugees then serve to solidify processes of intergroup conflict and intragroup unity 
which further consolidate their national identity.  Like other conflict-generated diasporas, 
such refugees maintain and perpetuate identities centered around “a very specific, 
symbolically [rather than instrumentally] important, and territorially defined 
‘homeland’”. (Lyons 2006, p. 115) Groups maintaining such movements map onto Joly’s 
(2002) Odyssean refugees, a category which includes “territorially based national and 
ethnic groups.” (Joly 1996, p. 155) 
Thus, as described in the previous chapter, a CoO lacking a tangible incentive 
such as a rent-producing resource but which is identified as a national homeland can 
become equally precious in the eyes of exiles – and equally worth fighting for – as a non-
homeland CoO possessing such resources.  At the core of this distinction is the concept of 
a land’s replacement value: substitute land or sources of revenue might be found 
elsewhere, bitter though the change may be, but the emotional attachment of a national 
homeland can never be substituted.  The dominant group in the CoO is often well aware 
of this dynamic.  They see refugees’ intent to return as a potential source of conflict and 
future instability: 
In most cases of involuntary migration, cleansing the country of target minorities (i.e., 
ethnic cleansing) was an explicit or implicit goal of the authorities.  Involuntary 
displacement was usually followed by the state-sanctioned destruction of homes and 
villages in order to eliminate the economic or emotional pull they might exert on the 
migrants (this formula was applied to the Kurds in Turkey, they Mayan peasants in 
Guatemala, and the Karen in Myanmar, among others).  Needless to say, such 
displacement and concomitant destruction fosters anger and frustration coupled with a 
sense of injustice and a desire for revenge.  When properly harnessed by ethnic political 
leaders, these feelings are a potent source of nationalistic sentiment that can be used to 
develop a cadre of refugee-warriors. (Bookman 2002, pp. 186-87) 
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Why do I refer to an ethnonationalist project specifically, rather than a non-ethnic 
nationalist one?  Because the ethnonationalist project lays claim to a homeland on the 
basis of primordial ties, an (allegedly) ancient link with the homeland.  As discussed in 
Chapter 2, a nationalist movement does not necessarily lay claim to primordial 
connections, whereas an ethnonationalist movement does.  This connection generates a 
collective project to redeem the homeland due to the nature of the refugee experience and 
identity, in which ethnic claims and contestation over territory are usually the basis 
around which the trauma of “refugeeness” revolves.
74
  Discursive and symbolic 
constructions of refugees’ ethnic attachment to their homeland create or reinforce the 
ethnonationalist project. 
Agricultural economic base 
The refugees’ former economic base in the CoO can also affect their attachment 
to the land and assessment of its value relative to their current situation in the host state.  
For a variety of reasons, rural areas tend to be more prone to initiating civil wars than 
urban areas (Kalyvas 2007), and some of those reasons are applicable to the situation of 
erstwhile rural residents dislocated to a neighboring state.  Groups whose property and 
skills are easily transferable have less binding them to the CoO and consequently less to 
fight for; whereas refugee groups whose property and skills are less transferable, like 
those in the agriculture sector and especially small farmers, are more likely to maintain a 
collective project to redeem their land.  In many cases, this factor intertwines with – 
providing further justification and basis for – an ethnonationalist movement. 
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particular identity, rather than Lischer’s (2005) “situational refugees”, who fled a general fear of 




Another factor which must be considered in a discussion of refugees’ economic 
attachment to the CoO is the “greed” motivation: If the CoO, and especially the region 
from which the refugees fled, relies on an economic base of a rent-producing natural 
resource such as oil, diamonds or minerals, refugees may have greater cause to fight for 
their home country.  Collier & Hoeffler (2004) make the case that economic arguments 
such as these are the most persuasive predictors of civil war, and the same logic could 
apply to the motivations of refugees, who in many cases are a product of civil war. 
 
Above I discussed one political factor and two economic factors which can lead a 
refugee group to maintain a collective project to redeem the homeland.  However, some 
refugee groups (during some periods of their exile) have no ethnonationalist movement 
and no such economic attachments.  In such cases, even if they were expelled on the basis 
of a shared identity by a clear enemy, individual households assess the situation and 
make the most rational decision possible to maximize their own security, stability, 
employment and perhaps education.  This could be accomplished by returning to the CoO 
once safety is assured; integrating and assimilating to the host state; or seeking 
resettlement in a third country.  Regardless of whether they seek to return or not, they do 
not see themselves as part of a cohesive refugee group, they do not adopt a refugee 
identity, and they maintain no collective project to redeem the homeland.  Such cases 
map onto Joly’s Rubicon refugees.  Examples of these dynamics can be found in the 
cases of Palestinian refugees – well known for their militant activities directed at Israel – 
expelled from their long-time residences in Kuwait in 1990-91 and Iraq since 2003.  In 
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neither of the latter cases did they militarize in exile. (Lebson 2009)  Other examples can 
be seen in the cases of ethnic Indians who fled Fiji following the anti-Indian coups there 
and those who were expelled from Uganda under Idi Amin. 
2. SOCIOECONOMIC INTEGRATION OR MARGINALIZATION? 
Those groups who have experienced a war of exclusion with a clear enemy and 
are politically or economically attached to land in the CoO have a collective project to 
redeem the homeland.  I propose that whether or not they seek to achieve that project 
with force, however, depends on whether they are more or less socioeconomically 
marginalized in the host state. 
Until now, I have discussed the refugee group as a coherent unit.  At this point, 
however, the group may be disaggregated, as it is possible that some (especially urban) 
refugees are more integrated, while others (especially camp) refugees are more 
marginalized.  Both segments may support, even strongly support, the collective project 
in their attitudes.  However, socioeconomically integrated refugees, who have more to 
lose in the host state, will be less likely to personally take up arms, even though they may 
actively support their militarized brethren with money, arms and supplies.  In the event 
that the homeland is actually redeemed in the future, and practical return becomes a 
viable option, they are likely to personally choose to stay in the host state even while they 
support the idea and right of return by the group.  On the other hand, the segment which 
is socioeconomically marginalized has less to lose in the host state.  They are more 
focused on practical return in the event that the CoO is redeemed, and are more likely to 
personally take up arms. 
What factors affect whether an individual household is socioeconomically 
84 
 
integrated or marginalized?  I will discuss three factors: rights, employment opportunities 
and ethnic consanguinity.  As in the discussion of economic or political attachment, 
above, this is not an exhaustive list, although I suggest that these are the three most 
important factors affecting refugees’ socioeconomic integration. 
Rights 
Looking at the host state, refugees consider whether they are able to lead a 
“normal” existence: Do they have legal access to courts, citizenship, free movement and 
residence?  Do they have legal access to employment?  Such policies may be affected by 
whether the host state is a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and follow-up 1967 Protocol.  Increased rights, and especially citizenship in the 
host state, are likely to increase integration in the host state, including making long-term 
business and personal investments such as land and property. (Bookman 2002)  Refugees 
who are able to move freely – and, very importantly, self-settle – might also be better 
able to integrate and assimilate into the host state, and are less likely to be concentrated in 
camps which reinforce group identity and collective consciousness on the basis of 
expulsion from, and conflict with, the CoO.
75
 
On the other hand, exclusion and repression are factors known to increase 
motivation for militancy domestically (Hafez 2003)
76
 , and the same logic could apply to 
refugees if socioeconomic integration is not available in the host state.  However, in a 
twist to the usual mechanism, under such circumstances, they will not target the host 
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government but rather the CoO government because they will not perceive the host state 
as a potential home, and therefore remain focused on practical return.  A number of host 
states, including Lebanon, have used this logic rhetorically to justify highly restrictive 
policies toward refugees. 
Finally, if the refugees have access to political institutions of the host state, they 
may feel more integrated.  The freedom to publicly and peacefully articulate grievances, 
and demand their resolution by the state without fear of repression, is a strength of the 
democratic process.  However, most countries of first asylum are not democracies; even 
those that are often exclude refugees from the polity through lack of citizenship, at least 
in the initial years.  But such institutions for expression of grievance need not be formal, 
such as voting and legislative representation.  Even informal avenues, such as protests, 
media appearances, petitioning governmental bodies, and other forms of nonviolent 
political activity outside of the mainstream political system, which are usually not 
restricted on the basis of citizenship, can be effective avenues of expression.  Such 
informal mechanisms are less certain in non-democratic regimes.  Regardless of the 
regime type, however, if formal and/or informal institutions are available to the refugees 
to address grievances, they may experience more integration to the host state. 
Employment opportunities 
Besides rights, refugees also consider whether employment opportunities are 
available in the host state.  If opportunities are not available, or if there are barriers to 
employment based on education and certification – which is more likely when the 
economic base of the CoO is agricultural while the host is not – the refugees may remain 
socioeconomically marginalized despite having rights.  Such obstacles to employment are 
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more likely in the first generation, as later generations who have rights to education will 
gain the necessary education and certifications.  Even if there are no such barriers, 
however, a refugee group with rights may remain socioeconomically marginalized if 
there are few employment opportunities for anyone in the host state, national or refugee. 
Without employment opportunities, refugees are likely to compare their situation 
to that in the CoO, or more precisely, to conditions in the CoO as they are remembered – 
and in protracted refugee situations, to the memories which are transmitted down the 
generations.  Clearly, this is highly subjective, especially when a refugee tries to compare 
current conditions with ancestors’ romanticized recollections of the CoO.
77
  If 
employment opportunities are believed to be significantly better in the CoO than in the 
host – or were and could be again – the group will orient economically toward the CoO.  
In situations which are not protracted, it is not unusual for refugee families to send a 
member back to the CoO periodically to check on security, living conditions and the 
status of their property, when travel to the CoO is possible, or to inquire as to 
circumstances among relatives still living in the CoO. 
Ethnic consanguinity 
Besides economic and legal standing in the host state, ethnic consanguinity can 
affect refugees’ social integration to the host state.  In bordering countries there are often 
ethnic linkages across borders, so it is not uncommon for an ethnic group in the host state 
to sympathize with either the refugee group or the persecuting group in the CoO.  When 
the refugee group is ethnically similar to the dominant ethnic group in the host state, 
refugees are more likely to be accepted and integrated in the host state (Milner 2011; 
Loescher & Milner 2005) and have denser social network ties. 
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As stated earlier, the items listed above are not an exhaustive list of factors which 
can affect socioeconomic integration or marginalization in the host state, but they are 
some of the most important factors.  Since this assessment is made by individual 
households, there is no standard formula by which to calculate the relative importance of 
these factors to determine whether the household is socioeconomically integrated or 
marginalized; each household may approach that question differently.  It should be 
viewed as a continuum rather than a dichotomous question.  Therefore, rather than an 
objective “yes or no” as portrayed in Figure 2, these factors can be viewed as increasing 
or decreasing the likelihood that an individual (household) would consider themselves 
integrated or marginalized. 
In sum, if a refugee household is socioeconomically integrated to the host state, 
they are unlikely to personally take up arms, even if they actively support the collective 
project to redeem the homeland, including the provision of aid and supplies to those who 
do take up arms.  In the American context, an analogy could be made to Jewish American 
Zionists, who strongly support the collective project of Zionism, but very few of whom 
seek to personally move to Israel and join the Israeli military.  Refugee examples of this 
scenario include: Tibetans in India; Afghans in Iran from 1979-1989; and wealthy, urban 
Palestinians in Jordan from 1948 until today. 
3. MILITANCY ENTREPRENEURS? 
At this point, we are referring to a (sub)set of refugees who have a collective 
project to redeem the homeland, are more likely to seek practical return, and are open to 
using force to attempt to achieve their project because they have less attachments and 
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socioeconomic integration to the host state. 
There is often some small vanguard of the refugee group which sees the potential 
to mobilize refugees to support or physically engage in militant activity.  These could be 
a pre-existing rebel organization which retreated with the refugees from the CoO, or 
leaders who emerge later in exile.  (In some exceptional cases pre-existing leaders and 
organizations may arrive later in exile, as in the case of Palestinians in Lebanon, which 
received the PLO after it was expelled from Jordan in 1970-71.)  I refer to such leaders 
and organizers as “militancy entrepreneurs”.  Militancy entrepreneurs are often able to 
make use of collective action frames based on the perceived injustice faced by refugees 
due to their persecution and exile, their right to land in the CoO as justified by their 
ethnonationalist historical narrative, and the potential to gain agency and reclaim what 
they perceive is rightfully theirs through militarization.  It is necessary to remain 
cognizant, as mentioned earlier, that the relationship between militancy entrepreneurs and 
ordinary refugees could be one of coercion, consensus or a combination thereof; yet even 
in cases of coercion, militancy entrepreneurs utilize discursive framing on the bases 
described above to justify their actions, motivate their “constituency”, and foreclose 
internal opposition. 
Pre-existing militancy entrepreneurs 
If a militant organization which [claimed to have] acted on behalf of the refugee 
group prior to expulsion retreats into the host state along with ordinary refugees, they are 
already organized and mobilized toward initiating militant activity against the enemy in 
the CoO with the intent of achieving the collective project.  It is highly likely that they 
will seek to continue their efforts in exile, and at that point their ability to do so will 
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depend primarily on political opportunities.  On the other hand, it is conceivable, but 
highly unlikely, that a group of pre-existing militancy entrepreneurs would abandon their 
militant efforts in the hopes that a powerful actor will take up the banner on their behalf.  
In most cases, if there is such a powerful actor, pre-existing militancy entrepreneurs 
would seek to ally with them rather than adopt a wait-and-see approach. 
Emerging in exile 
If there are few or no pre-existing militancy entrepreneurs, then such leaders 
could emerge from the refugees masses during their exile.  This is more likely to occur in 
protracted refugee situations than new situations not only because building such an 
organization takes time, but because in the initial months and years most refugee 
populations have hope that powerful international actors – whether the host state, 
regional power, superpower or the United Nations – will right the wrongs which they 
perceive were committed against them, punish their enemy in the CoO and redeem the 
homeland on their behalf.  As long as this expectation holds, they are likely to be content 
to wait for those external actors to achieve their (perceived) redemption and justice, and it 
is unlikely that militancy entrepreneurs will emerge from the refugee masses. 
In protracted refugee situations, the group is neither repatriated to the CoO nor 
assimilated into the host state or a third-party resettlement state.  The direct causes of 
protracted refugee situations are political: the persistence of persecution and/or 
government policies in the CoO which led to their exile and preclude their return; 
resistance of the host state to integrating and assimilating them; reluctance of third-party 
resettlement countries to accept large numbers of refugees; and in some cases, threats by 
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external militant groups who derive legitimacy from the continuing refugee presence 
(Morris & Stedman 2008; Loescher & Milner 2008c). 
Over time, the situation becomes the status quo rather than an urgent one 
demanding political and international attention.  Especially as a new generation is raised 
knowing only life as a refugee, a subset of the group may realize that hope for a 
resolution facilitated by regional and international actors has faded, and they must take 
action on their own behalf – if not in hopes of victory over the CoO government then at 
least to restore the urgency of the conflict on the international agenda and within the 
refugee community itself.  In protracted refugee situations, in which refugees are in a 
state of perpetual limbo and/or constitute a recurring and unresolved condition, they are 
more likely to militarize, provide a source of rebel soldier recruitment, create tension 
with locals in the host state, and contribute to regional instability. (Loescher & Milner 
2005)  The reasons are partly related to identity construction, as “the longer a conflict 
goes unresolved the more likely identity-related issues will emerge, since the conflict 
becomes part of disputant self-understanding and part of how they are viewed by other 
parties.” (Woehrle & Coy 2000, p. 6) A prime example of these processes can be found 
in the case of Palestinian refugees in Jordan, who did not militarize until sixteen years 
after they fled their CoO, as I will discuss in Chapters 5 and 6. 
4. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES? 
The last two factors, political opportunities and conflict resources – I did not list 
conflict resources as an separate variable in Figure 2 for a reason which I will explain 
below – are well known to students of social movements (e.g., Tarrow 1998; McAdam, 
McCarthy & Zald 1996), rebellions and insurgencies.  The first is the degree of 
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permissiveness of political opportunities, which is affected by factors primarily in the 
host state but also in the international domain.  Lemarchand refers to the receptivity of 
the host state to the goals and political organization of refugees as “the single most 
important conditioning factor” in determining the success or failure of a refugee group’s 
political mobilization. (2004, p. 68; see also Joly 1996, pp. 28-30)  Of the factors 
affecting the opening or closing of political opportunity which are listed below, I propose 
that only the first two, lack of securitization and political space to organize, are 
necessary for militarization to occur.  The remaining factors listed below can serve to 
increase or decrease the likelihood of political opportunity, but are not necessary factors. 
Securitization 
There are two important host state policies which are not mentioned in the 1951 
Convention, but which must be included here: physical protection and camp 
demilitarization.  First, when refugees are physically protected from attack, such as raids 
by military or paramilitary forces from the CoO, they have less political opportunity 
(understood loosely in this instance as opportunity for justification by militants) to 
organize their own self-defense.  Likewise, host states which proactively securitize and 
demilitarize the refugee camps and border areas, as Lischer (2005) emphasized, decrease 
the opportunity for organized armed activity as well as voluntary or involuntary provision 
of goods to external militants.  As discussed in the previous chapter, however, 
securitization and demilitarization by the host state presupposes both the will among host 
state policymakers as well as their capacity to do so. 
Space to organize and mobilize 
Other host state decisions which can affect political opportunities for 
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militarization include policies on allowance for political space for refugees and refugee 
organizations to freely move, communicate, organize and assemble within and between 
camps or communities.  Freedom of movement and assembly, through which refugees 
have opportunities to organize political activity, are necessary to conduct militant actions 
related to the CoO.  Note, however, that freedom of movement was discussed earlier as a 
factor increasing socioeconomic integration in the host state and consequently decreasing 
the likelihood of actual militarization.  Thus, policies providing for freedom of movement 
can serve to decrease (for those who are integrated) and increase (for those who are 
marginalized) the likelihood of militarization. 
Whether or not a host state allows such physical and political space can be 
affected by its regime type.  Democracies are usually more restricted in their capacity for 
repression and internal security, limiting their ability to squelch opportunities for 
militarization or provision of material support for cross-border militants; while 
authoritarian states are not bound by liberal ideals and restrictions and therefore have 
more capacity to enforce security, reducing opportunities for militarization. 
Tolerance by humanitarian organizations 
Next, UNHCR and NGOs on the ground in refugee camps can create permissive 
political opportunities by ignoring evidence of militant recruitment, training, and 
diversion of humanitarian aid toward militant purposes, as they struggle to maintain 
missions of humanitarianism and neutrality.  This dynamic was famously demonstrated in 
the case of Rwandan refugees.  Because of the direct connection to western donor 
governments, this has been one of the factors most disturbing to western scholars and 
policymakers, and the one which has attracted the most attention.  The alternative course 
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of action, which helps prevent political opportunity, is when humanitarian aid 
organizations actively oppose politicization of their activities, refusing to continue 
operating as long as they perceive that their assistance is being diverted toward militancy 
or supporting a war economy. 
Minority-majority ethnic relations in the host state 
Another factor potentially affecting political opportunity is ethnic relations within 
the host state.  When the refugee group is ethnically similar to a minority group in the 
host state, they are more likely to be perceived by the dominant ethnic group as a threat, 
especially if the refugee population is large enough to upset a delicate ethnic composition 
in the host state (Loescher & Milner 2005), as has occurred in Lebanon and Macedonia, 
among other places.  This threat perception may make the host state vigilant in 
suppressing any attempts at political organization by the refugees, resulting in decreased 
opportunity for violent political activity. 
CoO defense capability 
So far the political opportunities discussed have all been located in the host state.  
However, factors in the CoO can also create or prevent political opportunities for 
guerrilla-style attacks.  These factors are related to the capacity of the CoO government 
to defend against cross-border raids.  As Salehyan writes, “conditions such as rough 
terrain, regime transitions, and poor infrastructure, which reduce the state’s ability to 
repress challengers effectively, provide strategic opportunities for insurgent groups to 
emerge.” (2009, p. 36)  Additional factors can be added to this list, including the 
porousness of the border, strength of border defenses, and whether a conflict in the CoO, 
such as a civil war, is still ongoing.  Indirectly, defensive capabilities may be affected by 
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whether the CoO government receives military support from a powerful patron. 
Host-CoO relations 
An international factor which could potentially affect political opportunities is the 
relationship between the host state and CoO.  If their political relationship is one of 
opposition then the host will be unlikely to repress refugee militarization, creating a more 
permissive opportunity environment.  On the other hand, if the host and CoO are 
significant allies and trade partners, the host will be less likely to support, and more likely 
to repress, violent actions by refugee groups which could disrupt the host’s close 
relationship with the CoO. 
International engagement 
Finally, if international actors, including the UN and regional IGOs such as the 
Arab League or the African Union, are actively engaged in working toward resolution of 
a conflict, they could apply political, economic and diplomatic tools to facilitate conflict 
management, decreasing political opportunities for militarization, although in some cases 
only temporarily as peace agreements break down.  In many refugee situations, however, 
particularly protracted ones, there is a distinct lack of political will and engagement by 
international actors, increasing political opportunity for refugee militarization. 
5. CONFLICT RESOURCES 
The last element in this framework is the potential to mobilize conflict resources, 
which is a necessary component of any contentious, and particularly violent, political 
action.  I do not refer to this as a “variable”, and did not include it in Figure 2, because I 
propose that it is in fact a constant.  That is, conflict resources are always available 
somewhere; where there’s a will and a political opportunity, there’s a way.  Acquisition of 
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conflict resources depends on permissive political opportunities.  In the following 
paragraphs I will describe some likely suppliers of conflict resources. 
Host state 
The most likely, and easiest, source of conflict resources is the host state itself.  If 
the host state has an interest in funding militancy by refugees as a proxy against its 
neighbor, it is likely to supply them.  Gerdes (2006) finds this latter factor to be the most 
important in predicting whether a host state will allow (political opportunity) and 
facilitate (conflict resources) the presence of refugee warriors. 
International actors 
Internationally, do other powerful states in the region or the world have an interest 
in supporting militant action by refugees?  If a regional great power or a superpower has 
aggressive or deterrent security interests related to the CoO and/or host state, it may 
support the refugees in waging an active militant campaign.  As will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 9, an example of this dynamic can be found in the case of 
Afghan refugees in Pakistan, who were materially supported by the United States and 
other countries in their fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan; and in the case of 
Bosnian refugees in Croatia, who were supported in militarizing during their first exile by 
“the receiving ‘state’, the Republic of Serb Krajina, [which] was hostile to the sending 
state and had the means to arm the refugees”, but not during their second exile the 
following year. (Lischer 1999, p. 20)  
Although it is less common and usually on a much small scale than military 
assistance provided by states, conflict resources could also be forthcoming from a co-
ethnic diaspora population supporting militant action, both in the host state and around 
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the world.  The most likely conflict resources they could provide would be money, 
humanitarian supplies and political lobbying in their own states rather than weapons and 
military hardware.  This type of support from a co-ethnic population occurred in 
Macedonia in 1999-2001, when there were leadership and material links between 
minority ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, Kosovar Albanian refugees in Macedonia, and 
the rebel Kosovo Liberation Army. 
Humanitarian aid 
As noted above, another international factor affecting the capacity for resource 
mobilization is whether international humanitarian aid to the group is differentiated and 
closely monitored.  If not (i.e., the political opportunity is permissive), it can constitute an 
important conflict resource.  International aid intended to meet the humanitarian needs of 
refugees could be diverted to support militants – by providing them with food, relieving 
them of responsibility for their dependents and supporters, supporting their war economy 
or legitimizing their presence (Lischer 2005), or by adopting quasi-state functions
78
.  This 
has occurred in the Rwandan camps in Zaire and western Tanzania, Sudanese camps in 
Kenya and Uganda, Burundian camps in Tanzania, Salvadoran refugee camps in 
Honduras and Cambodian camps in Thailand, among other places. (Muggah & Mogire 
2006; Stedman & Tanner 2003; Terry 2002) 
Conclusion 
In the preceding pages I have outlined a new framework to explain when 
militarization is likely to occur among refugees – and, beginning to unpack the refugee 
group, I have suggested who within the group is likely to actually take up arms, who is 
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likely to organize and lead militarization, and who is likely to support the collective 
project, even with material donations, but not actually militarize themselves.  The 
framework described in this chapter contributes to the existing scholarly literature by 
bringing together a diverse set of explanations from the study of contentious politics, 
ethnic politics, sociology and economics to explain the politically important phenomenon 
of refugee militarization.  In sum: A refugee group maintaining a collective project to 
redeem the CoO from the enemy which displaced it is likely to be led by militancy 
entrepreneurs – a pre-existing organization or one which emerges in exile after the group 
has lost hope of redemption by powerful external actors – who mobilize the refugees to 
take advantage of existing political opportunities and available conflict resources to 
militarize against their CoO. 
It is worth noting that, as defined in the previous chapter, the dependent variable 
being studied in this project is militarization by a refugee group, not by a small militant 
organization of refugees lacking mass support.  An alternative scenario like this is 
possible if a small militant group of refugees is isolated from the larger population and 
independently supported, freeing them from dependence on the refugee community and 
its associated resources.  Al-Qaeda-linked cells fit such a profile.  While this sort of 
scenario is possible
79
, it is easily distinguishable from the popular militant organizations 
with widespread support from, and integration into, refugee camps and communities 
which are the focus of this research project and the refugee militarization literature at 
large.  
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CHAPTER 4: Case Study and Interview Methodology 
 
 In the following chapters I will apply the framework described in the previous 
chapter to case studies of Palestinians in Jordan from 1948-1963, 1964-1970, and 1971 to 
2011
80
, and Iraqis in Jordan from 2003 to the present, drawing from extensive interviews 
I conducted there with hundreds of refugees and local experts.  In Chapter 9 I will apply 
the framework to two additional pairs of case studies in Africa and Asia to begin to 
expand its generalizability outside the Middle East context.  Before embarking on those 
case studies, however, I will address in this chapter the methodological advantages and 
drawbacks of my selected approach, why I selected Jordan for in-depth field research, 
and how I addressed issues such as trust-building with such a large and diverse sample of 
interviewees. 
Why case studies? 
Case studies are the most appropriate method for this research project for a 
number of reasons.  First, the question posed in this project seeks to understand how 
(capacities, opportunities, resources) and why (collective projects, economic 
considerations, framing, leadership) refugee militarization is likely to occur.  These 
questions are best addressed with case studies.  Second, rather than simply frequencies or 
incidence of militarization, I seek to trace the process of its evolution, including how 
evolving political factors affected the emergence (or non-emergence) of militarization 
over time.  Third, refugee militarization is a relatively contemporary phenomenon – the 
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concept of refugee was only formalized after World War II, codified in the 1951 UN 
Convention – and the oldest case of refugee militarization dates back only to Burmese 
Kareni refugees in Thailand in 1949.  Case studies, including interviews of former 
militants and actual refugees, are therefore more valuable than archival analysis.  Fourth, 
they can provide direct observation by the researcher of ongoing processes rather than 
second-hand accounts.  Fifth, case studies encompass a wide variety of evidence, 
including interviews, observations and documents, which can help triangulate and 
support narratives.  Sixth, it is difficult to distinguish the phenomenon of interest, 
militarization, from the surrounding context.  Such distinctions, which are central to the 
framework in this project, are best achieved from in-depth observation and study.  
Finally, and related to the latter point, I seek to model and assess complex causal 
relations, including issues of identity, economic orientations and broader structural 
factors, which can only be discerned with confidence from case studies. (Yin 2009; see 
also Devine 1995) 
STRUCTURED AND FOCUSED CASE STUDIES 
More specifically, the following chapters will offer “structured and focused case 
studies”, which can provide empirically supported evidence of causal inference. (George 
& Bennett 2005; King, Keohane & Verba 1994)  Such case studies systematically 
investigate the same variables across all observations.  In this project I will apply the 
framework proposed in the previous chapter by investigating, for each observation, the 
variables which I proposed are necessary and sufficient to lead to refugee militarization.  
Comparative case studies cannot establish that an independent variable(s) is either 
necessary or sufficient to lead to the dependent variable due to the small-n problem. 
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(George & Bennett 2005)  Therefore, results of the case studies in the following chapters 
will be qualified as “consistent with the expectations” of the proposed framework. 
MATCHED-CASE COMPARATIVE DESIGN 
I follow the advice of King, Keohane and Verba (1994) to maximize the number 
of observations from a limited number of cases by disaggregating the Palestinian case 
into three observations of their tenure in Jordan: before, during and after the period 1964-
1970.  Most research on refugee militarization refers (briefly) to Palestinians in Jordan as 
a positive case, even an archetypal one, of refugee militarization, without considering 
why they did not militarize earlier than 1964 or later than 1970.  Therefore, it is important 
to investigate this single case as three distinct observations. 
The validity of my study is increased by using a matched-case comparative 
design.  I chose these cases using the method recommended by King, Keohane and Verba 
of selecting cases with distinct variance in the dependent variable, without regard to the 
values of the independent variable. (1994, pp. 141-142; see also Van Evera 1997, pp. 46-
47)  First, the case of Palestinians in Jordan is compared over distinct time periods, one of 
which led to militarization (Chapter 6) and two which did not (Chapters 5 and 7).  This is 
not a perfect comparison, of course – developments and changes over time could 
introduce an omitted variable into the analysis – but it is generally a closer match than a 
contemporaneous cross-group comparison. 
Next, to increase external validity, I compare the Palestinians with an in-depth 
study of the Iraqi case (Chapter 8), still within the same host state, which likewise 
provides for increased control over untheorized variables.  The presence in one country of 
two significant refugee populations creates ideal conditions for a comparative study.  
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Finally, I will expand the external validity still further by applying it to two pairs of 
additional cases in Africa and Central Asia (Chapter 9).  All of these case study 
comparisons use the matched-case comparative design, also called controlled comparison 
(George & Bennett 2005; Van Evera 1997; Mackie & Marsh 1995) or Most Similar 
Systems (Mill 1843), in which two similar cases, or two observations in the same case, 
resulted in different outcomes on the dependent variable: Palestinians in Jordan 
militarized from 1964-1970 but not earlier or later, nor did Iraqis in Jordan; Rwandans 
militarized in Zaire but much less in Tanzania; and Afghans militarized in Pakistan but 
not Iran.  Matched-case comparative design is particularly well suited to investigating 
necessary and sufficient causes. (Mahoney & Villegas 2007) 
UNIVERSE OF POTENTIAL CASES 
Nomothetically inclined scholars state that good case study research clearly 
specifies the universe of cases from which the sample is drawn and to which it is alleged 
to be generalizable (George & Bennett 2005), and that the very purpose of the case study 
is “understanding a larger class of cases (a population).” (Gerring 2007, p. 95)  For this 
project, the universe from which the samples were drawn are instances in which political 
violence was perpetrated in one state, leading to a mass outflow of refugees to a 
neighboring state.  This excludes cases in which refugees live in host states not bordering 
their CoO (whether they flew there directly from the CoO or were resettled later). 
I do not specify a minimum number of refugees to constitute a “mass outflow”, 
but it is reasonable to suggest that the theorized mechanisms would be substantially 
different, if not altogether irrelevant, in situations of less than 5,000 refugees.  On the 
other hand, situations with more than 100,000 refugees which fit the criteria above are 
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certainly included.  An exact minimum threshold between those two parameters would be 
arbitrary. 
CRITICISMS OF CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY 
As with all methodologies, small-n comparative case studies have disadvantages.  
Foremost among these is the limited generalizability of case studies in contrast to the 
strong correlations potentially available from large-n statistical analysis.  Although – 
unlike the sui generis approach with which many Middle East scholars view the 
Palestinian refugee issue – I attempt to buffer this shortcoming by including matched 
cases from other regions of the world, the grand total of eight observations which I 
review in this project is insufficiently large to conclude with confidence that the 
mechanisms I propose are consistently predictive of the presence and absence of 
militarization worldwide.  In the final chapter of this text I will make recommendations 
on conducting a quantitative study to further assess the generalizability of the proposed 
framework. 
The second significant shortcoming of small-n case studies is the possibility of 
equifinality, or multiple causal pathways to the same outcome. (George & Bennett 2005)  
In this project equifinality would mean that militarization can occur from an alternative 
pathway to the one I proposed.  For example, if refugees spontaneously took up arms and 
attacked their CoO without apparent leadership, mobilizing rhetoric or organization – like 
a mass riot – then we might say that militarization occurred without militancy 
entrepreneurs.  This may occur domestically, but it is hard to imagine refugees 
“spontaneously” crossing an international border to attack.  A more likely scenario is if 
refugees are subjected to forced recruitment and/or forced material support of a militant 
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organization attacking the CoO despite their lack of motive to do so, then we might say 
that militarization occurred without a collective project.  Forced recruitment and support 
has occurred in some refugee situations.  Whereas voluntary recruitment and support 
clearly stems from motivation, the difficulty in cases of forced recruitment and support 
will be in distinguishing the motivations of the group, whether supporting the collective 
project or not, separately from their actions. 
Third, all research, both qualitative and quantitative, must beware of the threat of 
endogeneity to empirical inference. (Franzese 2007)  I suggest that this is not a problem 
in the Palestinian case because the only observation in which one might argue that 
endogeneity occurred was the third period, beginning 1971, in which there was decreased 
political opportunity (an independent variable) as a response to the militarization 
(dependent variable) which occurred in the prior observation (1964-1970).  However, 
dividing the Palestinian case into three distinct observations resolves this problem 
because the alleged endogeneity occurred across observations rather than within one. 
Why the Middle East? 
I selected case studies in the Middle East for in-depth field research, and 
Palestinians and Iraqis in particular, for several reasons.  First, as of 2009, these two 
groups combined accounted for three-quarters of all refugees in the Middle East and 
North Africa region (Palestinians, 52%; Iraqis, 23%), and sixty percent of all refugees 
around the world residing in a country bordering their CoO (Palestinians, 42%; Iraqis, 
18%).
81
  Secondly, the refugee militarization literature addresses many cases in Africa, 
Asia and a scattering of other cases around the world, but almost none have studied the 
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 in particular.  As Leenders writes, “No 
serious researcher posing the question ‘under what conditions do refugee crises lead to 
the spread of civil war across borders?’ can afford to ignore this part of the world.” 
(2009, p. 353)  The Palestinian case is often considered sui generis, but putting it in 
comparative perspective to other refugee situations can be valuable. (Dumper 2003; 
Chatty & Hundt 2005)  Lischer (2005) referred to the Palestinians as an archetypal case 
of refugee militarization, but did not include them as one of her in-depth case studies. 
Third, both populations are overwhelmingly urban, and there is a dearth of 
scholarly literature on urban refugee populations (Pavanello, Elhawary & Pantuliano 
2010; Sommers 2001; Jacobsen & Landau 2003), especially in the topic of refugee 
militarization.  Finally, issues of conflict and stability in the Middle East are very 
important for American and other Western policymakers, and will likely continue to be 
central foreign policy issues in the decades to come.  Therefore, greater understanding of 
the dynamics of refugee politics and militarization in the Middle East is of significant 
policy value. 
On a personal note, the Middle East was a logical choice for me because it is my 
regional specialization and I speak Arabic.  While I did not gain sufficient fluency in the 
Palestinian and Iraqi dialects to conduct in-depth interviews in Arabic, it was nonetheless 
a significant advantage during fieldwork. 
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 I refer to the “traditional” Middle East, extending east only as far as Iran.  There have, of 
course, been studies of refugee militarization in the extended Middle East which encompasses 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
83
 There is a substantial historical literature about the Palestinians refugees and their militarization 
in Jordan in the 1960s and in Lebanon during the civil war, but very few of these works consider 
refugee militarization as a standalone phenomenon, nor attempt to study the Palestinians in 
comparison to other cases worldwide.  Gerdes (2006) is a notable exception. 
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Palestinian and Iraqi refugees are also present in significant numbers in Syria, and 
Palestinians in Lebanon, so why Jordan?  I selected Jordan for a combination of 
methodological and practical reasons.  Methodologically, there has never been significant 
militarization by refugees in Syria
85
 like there has been in Jordan and Lebanon, so a 
comparative study there would have been a study solely of non-militarization, with little 
variation on the dependent variable.  A study in Lebanon would have excluded Iraqis
86
, 
or attempted to compare Palestinians in Lebanon with Iraqis in another country, which 
reduces control over host-state variables. 
Practically, conducting research in Syria, and politically sensitive research in 
particular, is more challenging than in Jordan.  Even before the murderous events of the 
Arab Spring began in Syria, the domestic intelligence services there were far more 
intrusive than the Jordanian domestic intelligence, and much more likely to interfere in 
academic research.  Such interference could have included trailing or even accompanying 
the researcher to interviews, which would have drastically reduced the willingness of 
interviewees to talk, compromised their anonymity, and possibly led to serious negative 
repercussions for those who chose to speak openly.  Even acquiring official permission to 
conduct research in the country may have been a challenge. 
In Jordan, by contrast, I had very little interaction with the government and 
domestic intelligence services.  There was no special permission required to conduct 
research in the country except in the Palestinian refugee camps, which I obtained 
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 Thousands of Palestinians from Syria fought with the fedayeen (Palestinian resistance) 
movements in Jordan and Lebanon from the 1960s to the 1980s. (Chatty & Hundt 2005) 
86
 According to UNHCR, there are only about 7,000 Iraqi refugees in Lebanon; and the scope of 
this study is limited to countries of first asylum sharing a border with the CoO. 
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relatively easily.  To the best of my knowledge I was not followed, the anonymity of my 
interviews was not breached, and there have been no negative repercussions for any of 
my interviewees as a result of speaking with me.  Whereas academic freedom is heavily 
restricted in Syria, it is generally respected in Jordan. (Freedom House 2011) 
Why interviews? 
The data collected from Jordan were overwhelmingly drawn from interviews with 
hundreds of Iraqi refugees, Palestinian refugees and local experts.  I chose to focus my 
limited time and resources on semi-structured interviews because macro-historical 
information about most structural factors in my framework, such as conflict resources 
and political opportunities, as well as details of the headline-grabbing dependent variable, 
militarization, are readily available from an extensive literature on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and some relatively new literature on Iraqi refugees.  What is minimally available 
in existing secondary sources is information about the factor most neglected in studies on 
refugee militarization, motivation among ordinary refugees, including their perceptions, 
worldviews, political attitudes, economic orientations and feelings of integration or 
exclusion from the Jordanian state and society, which are precisely the sort of data for 
which intensive interviews are well suited (Devine 1995; see also Wood 2007). 
This factor, motivation, is highly subjective and open to personal interpretation.  
Most public opinion polls which have been conducted on Palestinian refugees in Jordan 
only scratch the surface of these issues with narrow questions; and the in-depth case 
studies of Palestinian refugees that have been conducted are usually ethnographic studies 
limited to one or two refugee camps (Chatty & Hundt 2005), and do not attempt to 
describe the diversity of views present among Palestinians in Jordan (more than 80% of 
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the Palestinian refugee population in Jordan does not live in camps).  The lack of existing 
literature on the motivation factor, and the collective project in particular, might also be 
due in part to the fact that it is one of the most politically sensitive topics in Jordan, and 
unofficially taboo; a senior American diplomat there referred to my research topic as “the 
third rail of Jordanian politics”.  Finally, a body of psychological and political science 
literature has demonstrated that attitudes and actions are not well correlated.  This makes 
field research and interviews valuable, in order to clarify relationships between 
motivation and action or inaction. (Wood 2007)    
Another category of data which is available in Jordan is information about 
government repression.  Besides summary references to the Jordanian government’s 
extensive and highly effective domestic intelligence service, these data are very difficult 
to find in existing literature.  For example, it is common knowledge that the Palestinians 
have not militarized in Jordan since 1970, but it is critical to this project to know if 
refugees tried to militarize but were stopped by Jordanian security forces, or if they 
abandoned their collective project and have not tried at all since 1970.  That kind of 
information is not readily available in existing literature – nor from the Jordanian 
government – but Palestinians in Jordan could address that question, and some were 
willing to share that knowledge with me. 
INTERVIEW STRUCTURE AND QUESTION TYPES 
Semi-structured interviews 
My semi-structured interviews included open-ended questions, close-ended 
questions, and multiple-choice questions.  For the most part, I asked the same questions 
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of all refugee interviewees.
87
  But since these were semi-formal interviews rather than 
tightly scripted questionnaires, I used my discretion to modify or skip some open-ended 
questions, for example, if the interviewee was short on time, misunderstood the question, 
stonewalled or declined to answer on a particular topic
88
, or had already answered a 
question in the course of addressing a previous question.  I also added follow-up probes 
when elaboration was warranted. (Devine 1995)  The results drawn from these interview 
questions will be exhibited in a mixed-methods format, including both qualitative and 
quantitative data from the interviews, reflecting the different types of questions. (Yin 
2009) 
Focus groups 
In addition to personal or household interviews, at the beginning of my research 
on Iraqi refugees I conducted three focus groups: one of women, one of men and one of 
out-of-school youth (male and female).  While it was a useful starting point, I did not 
repeat this exercise for several reasons: First, because of the loss of diversity of responses 
due to social pressure between participants, which led to converging responses and one-
upsmanship, rather than independent perspectives and privately held opinions which may 
be less socially acceptable among Iraqis
89
; secondly, because of the local custom of not 
contradicting an elder, which stifled opposing viewpoints; and third, because my time 
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 There are some exceptions, such as a question on identity ranking, which I only added to the 
question set after two-thirds of the Palestinian interviews were already completed.  (I ended up 
discarding those results for Palestinians due to the small sample size.) 
88
 For example, some interviewees answered repeatedly “I don’t know” to questions about details 
of their ancestors’ departure from Palestine and arrival in Jordan.  After several such answers, or 
if the interviewee was exhibiting increasing frustration with questions that they could not answer, 
I would skip the remaining questions in that section. 
89
 For example, many Iraqis confided privately that they don’t associate with other Iraqis because 
they don’t trust them and want nothing to do with them.  This would be difficult to reveal in a 
room full of Iraqis. 
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with the group was limited and I was only able to ask a few questions, each of which 
stimulated lengthy discussion, rather than my full set of in-depth and survey questions 
which generate richer data. 
A TYPICAL REFUGEE INTERVIEW FROM SOUP TO NUTS 
Initial contact with 88% of Palestinian interviewee households and 77% of Iraqi 
interviewee households was made by telephone.
90
  My interpreter explained who I am, 
briefly explained my research and asked if we could interview him/her; if s/he was not 
personally available, we asked to interview another person in the household.  If the 
respondent agreed, we set a date and time within one week, and allowed him/her to 
choose the location.  The day before the interview we called again to confirm.  On the 
day of the appointment, I drove with the interpreter to the agreed meeting place and we 
called again to announce our presence.
91
  Most of the interviews (72% of Palestinians; 
88% of Iraqis) were conducted in their home.  The remainder were conducted at their 
workplace, a public location or another place.  Interviews began as early as 8:00 AM and 
as late as 8:00 PM. 
We sat down on a sofa or floor mats, and our hosts invariably brought coffee, tea 
or juice (sometimes all three).  I began in Arabic by thanking them for participating in my 
research, and introducing myself and the interpreter.  Then, in English (with translation), 
I summarized my research, the types of questions I would ask, and the steps I would take 
to protect their privacy.  I asked if it would be okay to type notes on my laptop (all 
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 Initial contact was made through email for 3% of Palestinians and 10% of Iraqis, and in person 
for 9% of Palestinians and 13% of Iraqis. 
91
  The meeting place was usually a local landmark, and once we arrived we asked for turn-by-
turn directions from that point, since most people in Jordan don’t know the road names and many 




interviewees agreed).  I began with demographic questions, then their family history prior 
to leaving the CoO, the circumstances of their departure, their journey and transition to 
Jordan, the effect of major historical events in Jordan and the CoO on their family, and 
finally, their opinions about the present and future of themselves and of their refugee 
group.  When we finished the interview I thanked them for their time and we left.  If I 
had their email address, I sent a follow-up note within a few days, thanking them again 
for their participation. 
I conducted between one to five interviews per day.  Most interviews lasted 45 to 
90 minutes; the longest lasted 3½ hours.  I did my best to type every word they said when 
it was relevant to my research.  Sometimes, at the end of the interview, they would 
request something from me, such as assistance with UNRWA, UNHCR, resettlement (in 
the case of Iraqis) or employment.  This occurred in 9% of Palestinian interviews and 
25% of Iraqi interviews.  I did my best to assist when I could, but in most cases it was 
impossible. 
Most of the interviews were conducted in Arabic (86% of Palestinian interviews, 
79% of Iraqi interviews), and the remainder in English.  The male interpreter translated 
31% of the Palestinian interviews.  The female interpreter translated 55% of the 
Palestinian interviews and 81% of the Iraqi interviews.  She was also present at another 
3% of Palestinian interviews and 6% of Iraqi interviews, which were conducted in 
English.  Another 9% of Palestinian interviews and 13% of Iraqi interviews were 
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 I went alone if I knew beforehand that the interviewee is comfortable speaking English. 
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CRITICISMS OF INTERVIEW DATA  
Sampling bias 
A frequent methodological criticism leveled at interviews is that the sample of 
interviewees is selected in a non-random, non-representative way, raising concerns about 
the generalizability of results. (Devine 1995)  I attempted to overcome this objection by 
conducting nearly 80% of the Palestinian interviews with households drawn randomly 
from the register of the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which I used as a 
sampling frame.  UNRWA’s list of registered refugees in Jordan totaled 1,999,466 
individuals in 2011.  No reliable statistics are available on the percentage of Palestinians 
in Jordan who are not registered
93
, nor on the percentage of the entire population of 
Jordan who are Palestinian
94
, which makes assessment of generalizability to the wider 
Palestinian population in Jordan more challenging (Wood 2007, p. 124).  However, most 
estimates refer to the Palestinian population as “at least half” of the total population.
95
  A 
range of 51-60% of the population would place the estimate of the entire Palestinian 
population at between 3,064,218 – 3,604,962 people.
96
  Using these figures, it is 
reasonable to estimate that registered refugees constitute between 55-65% of all 
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 Dumper (2008, p. 195) summarizes why UNRWA’s register is not a record of all Palestinian 
refugees. 
94
 Refusing to collect or publish statistics on this elephant-in-the-room demographic characteristic 
of their population is the overt policy of the Jordanian government (Chatty & Hundt 2005; Abu-
Odeh 1999), although in 2002, Prime Minister Ali Abu al-Ragheb stated that Palestinians 
constitute 43% of the population (Al-Quds Center 2009).  As I will discuss in Chapter 7, the 
government sees division between Palestinians and Jordanians as one of the biggest threats to the 
state, and which has made extensive public campaigns such as “One Jordan” and “Jordan First” 
since the early 2000s to promote a state-national identity over East Bank/West Bank division (Al 
Husseini & Bocco 2009). 
95
 See, for example: “Assessment for Palestinians in Jordan”, Minorities at Risk, 12/31/06; Chatty 
& Hundt (2005) 
96
 The CIA World Factbook estimates the population of Jordan in 2011 at 6,508,271, but this 
includes an estimate of 500,000 Iraqi refugees, who I removed from the calculation. 
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Palestinians in Jordan, and 33% of the entire population of Jordan.
97
  
The remaining interviewees were selected through the snowball technique and 
interception (Gomm 2009, p. 354) in order to balance out the sample with 
underrepresented demographics, namely naazihiin (lit., “displaced people”, those who 
fled their homes in the West Bank for the first time in 1967), and wealthy Palestinians.  
Naazihiin are not eligible for inclusion in the UNRWA register (Chatty & Hundt 2005; 
Dumper 2008), but it is unclear why few wealthy individuals were successfully contacted 
through the UNRWA register.  There are two possible explanations: either they are less 
likely to be on the register or less likely to agree to an interview. 
The first reason is plausible because UNRWA is primarily a social services 
organization, so wealthy people would have no economic need for it.  The wealthy also 
were not eligible to register with UNRWA until a change in the rules in 1993 which 
opened it to anyone whose father or grandfather was born in Palestine.
98
  On the other 
hand, many Palestinians see inclusion in UNRWA’s register as an identity statement: 
Even if you are not using UNRWA’s social services, you must remain on the register to 
be part of the Palestinian refugees.
99
 (Al Husseini & Bocco 2009)  For example, one 
interviewee stated, “My father was really sick and dying.  Some people wanted to buy his 
UNRWA refugee paper for 6,000 JD (US$8,475) but he refused to sell it, because it 
proves he’s a refugee.” (Female, 47)  It is also commonly rumored that UNRWA’s 
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 This is consistent with the estimate of the Jordanian population who are registered mentioned 
by Chatty & Hundt (2005); but it contrasts with the estimate by UNRWA that “maybe 5% of 
refugees in Jordan are not registered.” (Mater Saqer, UNRWA spokesman, personal interview, 
10/25/10)  
98
 Judith van Raalten, personal interview, 11/30/10 
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 The perception of UNRWA primarily as proof of refugee status rather than provider of 




register will be the basis for claims to compensation once the refugee issue is resolved 
with Israel: 
Until now they are telling us that they are going to give us money to make it up to us, but 
nothing happens….  If you have a card from 1948, then UNRWA and the Jordanian 
government is planning to offer money to give up Palestine.  That’s what we heard. 
(Male, 27) 
So, if wealthy people are on the register, and the sample from the register was 
random, then they were contacted but declined to participate more frequently than the 
lower and middle classes.  This raises a theoretically pertinent question: Do wealthy 
Palestinians feel less inclined to agree to an interview because they are more integrated 
into Jordanian society and less interested in issues related to Palestinian refugees?  This 
seems unlikely, if they deliberately chose to remain on the register as a political 
statement.
100
  Are they simply more busy?  Or perhaps they are more reluctant to meddle 
in political issues, since they have more (economically) to lose?  It is impossible to 
answer these questions, but I attempted to correct for the selection bias by using other 
means, as mentioned above, to find wealthy interviewees as well as naazihiin. 
There is no comparable register of Iraqi refugees in Jordan.  Whereas Palestinians 
are likely to remain registered with UNRWA even if they do not utilize its social 
services, the register maintained by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
lists only about 30,000 Iraqis who have sought their assistance with living expenses 
and/or resettlement.  Therefore, I was forced to locate Iraqi interviewees primarily 
through networking and the snowball technique (88%), but also other venues such as 
social media. 
The total sample size is shown in Table 1.  Within each refugee household there 
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 It is possible that a parent registered a child when s/he was young, but when the child grows 
up s/he feels detached from Palestinian issues or identity. 
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was sometimes more than one person actively participating, so the number of households 
and total participants are shown separately.
101
 
 Palestinians Iraqis Experts TOTAL 
Refugee 
households 
96* 48 n/a 144 
Individual 
participants 
134* 55 26 213 
 * Includes two Palestinian scholars (experts) 
Table 1. Sample size (n) for refugee and expert interviews in Jordan 
 
The experts included employees of UNRWA, UNHCR and NGOs, clergy, media, the 
Jordanian government and foreign diplomats. 
Response rate 
From the sample drawn randomly from the UNRWA register, I attempted to 
contact 371 households using their associated phone numbers.  Of these, I could not reach 
144.  Out of the 227 whom I was able to contact, 87 (38%) refused to be interviewed, and 
27 (12%) gave a socially gentle refusal such as neglecting to call back or asking me to 
call again another time.  Another 20 (9%) made an appointment to be interviewed, but 
either cancelled, did not answer their phone on the day of the interview, or did not come 
to the agreed meeting place.  I declined to interview another 18 (8%) because of their 
location far from Amman or another characteristic which disqualified them from the 
sample.  I successfully interviewed 75 households (33%) from the UNRWA sample. 
Because it is impossible to ask demographic questions of people who refuse to be 
interviewed, it is unclear whether there is any non-random variable(s) associated with 
unsuccessful attempts to interview households from the list.  The limited information 
                                                          
101
 Not included in Table 1 are one Palestinian interview which was discarded because of strong 
evidence that the family was not actually Palestinian, and one Iraqi interview which was 
discarded because the family did not meet the definition of refugee used in this project. 
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included in the list itself did not suggest any such pattern.  Of the 87 who clearly refused 
to be interviewed, 34 (39%) indicated that it was due to lack of time, while 10 (11%) 
implied that it was due to an identity issue.  For example, some denied that they are 
refugees or even Palestinian; others acknowledged that they are refugees but also 
Jordanian (i.e., loyal and integrated to Jordan).
102
  Two (2%) refused because they “don’t 
know much about the subject”.  Three (3%) refused because no monetary compensation 
was available, and the remaining 42 (44%) either gave an excuse (e.g., “I’m traveling 
now”, or “My job doesn’t allow me to do interviews without permission”) or refused 
without a reason (e.g., “I’m not interested”, “I can’t”, or “It’s difficult”). 
Out of these refusals, only the 10 who gave an excuse related to identity suggest a 
reason to suspect selection bias: Those who are completely integrated into Jordanian 
society and detached from a Palestinian identity, or so afraid of the mukhabarat 
(domestic intelligence forces) that they pretend to be so, were more likely to refuse an 
interview.  Of course, it is likely that the number who actually refused for these reasons is 
higher; i.e., that a portion of the other types of refusals, even the culturally gentle ones, 
were in fact for the same reason of identity and/or fear.  What does this mean for the 
generalizability of results?  It suggests that they may reflect the opinions only of those 
who still maintain a Palestinian identity and have not wholly assimilated into the host 
state, and also are not excessively afraid of the mukhabarat. 
The Iraqi interviewees were sampled almost exclusively through networking and 
the snowball technique rather than a sampling frame, so it is not possible to calculate a 
response rate. 
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 One woman insisted, “We are Jordanian, there is nothing to ask, we are satisfied with 
everything.”  Another said, “I won’t be useful because I was born here.  I have a Jordanian 




 Among Palestinians, I interviewed 33 refugee households (34%) across seven of the 
thirteen refugee camps in the country.  Another 13 households (14%) were located 





Finally, 49 households (51%) were neither in a camp nor camp-centered.  I 
deliberately over-sampled from refugee camps (only 18% of registered refugees in 
Jordan live in camps, but camp residents constitute 34% of my sample) due to the 
strong emphasis in the literature on the relevance of refugee camps to factors leading 
to militarization, and the more militant views held by its members (Malkki 1995).  
When summarizing results for the entire sample of Palestinians in the following 
chapters, I will weight the percentages by camp/non-camp residence. 
 There are no refugee camps for Iraqis. 
Urban/rural residence 
 There are no data available on the percentage of Palestinians in Jordan who live in 
urban or rural settings, but it is generally acknowledged that Palestinians are more 
clustered in urban and suburban areas, while East Banker (non-Palestinian) 
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 For example, they recently moved out of the camp, live near it, work in it, visit it frequently, 
and/or their family and friends live there.  As an elderly Palestinian refugee stated, “I live on the 
outskirts of the camp now, but I imagine myself still in the camp.  I shall never forget my camp 
years.  In fact, look, this is my signature: mukhayam al-Hussein [‘Hussein Camp’].  I can never 
forget.” (Abu Ma’an, in Matar 2011, p. 69)  A report by the Al-Quds Center noted that “a 
growing number of refugees have moved out of camps… [but] generally remain attached to the 
camps’ community.” (2009, p. 8) 
104
 The largest contingent of camp and camp-centered households came from Wihdat Camp in 
Amman (19 / 41%); followed by Husn Camp, 80 kilometers (50 miles) north of Amman (7 / 
15%); Jerash Camp (5 / 11%); Baqa’a (4 / 9%); Talbiyah (3 / 7%); Irbid (2 / 4%); Hussein (2 / 
4%); Prince Hasan (2 / 4%); Zarqa (1 / 2%) and Madaba (1 / 2%).  The households in Irbid, Zarqa 
and Madaba were camp-centered.  This sampling distribution over-represents Wihdat Camp, but 
the specific camp is not as theoretically important as the camp/non-camp distinction, and 
therefore I will not weight statistics to reflect the actual camp populations when reporting results 
in the following chapters. 
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Jordanians are more frequently rural.  In my Palestinian sample, 52 (54%) of 
interviewed households were in urban areas, 35 (36%) in suburban areas, and 7 (7%) 
in rural areas.
105
  There is no reason to believe that this distribution differs 
significantly from the wider Palestinian population in Jordan. 
 Iraqis in Jordan are known to be almost entirely urban and suburban, and this was 
reflected in my sample: 38 (79%) of households were urban, 8 (17%) were suburban, 
and only 2 (4%) were rural. 
Demographics 
The complete demographic variables are reported in Appendix I for the single 
participant who dominated the conversation (talked most) in each refugee interview – 
who was usually, but not always, the head of household – as well as all participants 
within each refugee group (including the dominant speakers).  A person was coded as a 
“participant” if they volunteered substantive additional information during the interview, 
or an alternate opinion, rather than simply echoing the elder’s response as is the local 
custom.  I will summarize the demographic variables here. 
 SEX:  Palestinian males interviewees outnumbered females, 2:1.  Iraqi males also 
outnumbered females but not as drastically, 6:5.  Even when an interview had been 
arranged with a female, her husband or father, if available, was often the one who 
answered the questions.  I allowed each household to decide for themselves who 
would be interviewed.  However, I was able to increase female participation, and 
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 These figures do not add up to the total number of Palestinian households interviewed (96) 
because two Palestinian scholars were interviewed in public locations using the question set for 
experts, which did not include all the demographic questions, such as place of residence. 
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conduct interviews even when a female was alone in her house
106
, by using a female 
interpreter. 
 AGE:  The mean age for both Palestinians and Iraqis was similar (Palestinians, 39; 
Iraqis, 42). 
 MARITAL STATUS:  Palestinian interviewees were more likely to be married (76%, 
including those with two or more wives) than Iraqis (58%), while Iraqis in the sample 
were more likely to be separated or divorced (17%) than Palestinians (2%).  Also, it is 
possible that the “random” selection of refugees from UNRWA’s register was 
actually skewed toward recently updated registrations: Significantly more 
Palestinians (18%)
107
 than Iraqis (4%) had been married two years or less. 
 CHILDREN:  Among those who are married or previously married, Palestinian 
interviewees had a higher mean number of children (4.4) than Iraqis (3.1). 
 ARAB/KURD:  All Palestinian interviewees and 95% of Iraqis were Arab; 5% of 
Iraqis interviewed were Kurd.  Few Iraqi Kurds fled to Jordan, but it is unknown 
whether this percentage was typical of the broader Iraqi refugee population in Jordan. 
 RELIGION:  Almost all (98%) of the Palestinian interviewees were Sunni Muslim, 
which is similar to the Palestinian population at large.  Half of Iraqis were Sunni, 
24% Shi’ite, 13% Christian, 5% Sabean (Mandean), and 7% inter-faith.  Again, there 
are no data available on the religious makeup of the broader Iraqi refugee population 
in Jordan, but it is generally believed that mostly Sunnis came to Jordan. 
 EDUCATION:  Iraqi refugees were generally more educated.  Three-fifths of Iraqis 
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 Jordan is a very conservative society, and it would be socially taboo to allow one or two males 
into a house when only one female (who is not their relative) is home. 
107
 The actual percentage may be even higher, since this number does not include households in 
which the register sample listed a young person’s name but I met with his/her parent instead, 
which was common. 
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had completed at least some university education, compared to only 35% of 
Palestinians. 
 EMPLOYMENT:  Nearly half of Palestinian interviewees were employed outside the 
home, but only 31% of Iraqis were.  Among males, 67% of Palestinians and 38% of 
Iraqis were employed. 
 HOUSEHOLD INCOME:  Despite a lower rate of employment, the Iraqis have 
nearly double the mean monthly income (JD 1,095 / US$1,547) of Palestinians (JD 
597 / US$843).  I will discuss Iraqis’ multiple sources of income in Chapter 8. 
 OWN/RENT:  The right to own land and property is a politically loaded issue in 
Jordan.  Palestinians, most of whom are citizens, are far more likely to own their 
residence (54%)
108
 than Iraqi refugees (11%). 
 INTERNET ACCESS:  Palestinians (38%) and Iraqis (37%) were about equally 
likely to say that they have access to the internet at home or elsewhere. 
 ENGLISH:  Two-thirds of Iraqis said that they speak at least some English, and 
slightly fewer Palestinians (58%). 
 HOUSEHOLD SIZE:  Not surprisingly, given the higher number of children, 
Palestinians’ mean household size was greater (5.2) than Iraqis’ (3.8). 
 HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS EMPLOYED:  A higher mean percentage of Palestinian 
household members were employed (29%) than in Iraqi households (20%). 
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 Property inside refugee camps holds a complicated and ambiguous status regarding ownership: 
“The camps were built on property either owned or leased by the government to UNRWA to 
build shelter units for those displaced after the wars of 1948 and 1967.  Over time residents have 
come to regard the units as their property, adding floors, renting, or even selling.  Both the 
government and UNRWA turn a blind eye to such practices, although it is known that the original 
residents do not own these properties.” (Al-Quds Center 2009, p. 29) 
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 CITY/AREA OF ORIGIN109:  The families of most Palestinian interviewees came 
from the environs of Ramleh (16%), Jaffa (15%), Jerusalem (14%), Beer Seba (9%), 
Tulkarm (8%), Khalil (7%), Lydda (7%), and Haifa (6%), among other places.  
Slightly over one-third of the Palestinian interviewees reported that their family were 
second-time (double) refugees, i.e., they fled to the West Bank or Gaza in 1948, then 
again to Jordan in 1967.  The vast majority of Iraqi refugees came from Baghdad 
(76%), and a few from Mosul (7%), among other places. 
 IRAQIS’ YEAR OF DEPARTURE:  The majority of Iraqis interviewed arrived in 
2005 or later (61%); only 17% left Iraq in 2003 or 2004.  I also interviewed 12 Iraqis 
(22%) who had left Iraq between 1992-2002, for comparison purposes.  Because of 
their very different circumstances – fleeing individual persecution or economic 
hardship, rather than war – those who left Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s rule are not 
included in the statistics on Iraqis cited in Chapter 8. 
 JOB IN CoO:  Nearly two-thirds of Palestinians reported that their ancestors in 
Palestine were farmers (felaheen) pre-1948.  Of the remainder, 10% were shepherds 
(bedouin), and others were merchants, professionals or manual laborers. Among 
Iraqis, by contrast, nearly half held professional jobs in Iraq, 20% were merchants, 
and only 6% were farmers. 
 RESIDENCY STATUS:  Ninety percent of Palestinian interviewees held Jordanian 
citizenship, and 10% were Gazans, a special category of residence reserved for 
Palestinians who fled from Gaza to Jordan, usually as second-time refugees, in 1967.  
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 “City/area of origin” refers to a Palestinian family’s origin pre-1948 (or pre-1967, for 
naazihiin).  Unless there is a common English name for a city, such as Jerusalem, I am using here 
the Arabic names of the cities as they were used by the interviewees, such as Beer Seba. 
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There are almost 140,000 Gazans in Jordan (UNRWA 2011), constituting 7% of the 
registered refugee population, and 4-5% of the entire Palestinian population in 
Jordan.  Gazans were slightly oversampled because of their unique circumstances, in 
which they enjoy distinctly less rights than non-Gazans, and are less integrated into 
the Jordanian economy, society and polity.  In all other relevant ways – their family 
histories and experiences in the CoO, host state variables – they are identical to non-
Gazan Palestinians, which makes a comparison between the two groups a rare natural 
field experiment, as I will discuss in Chapter 6.  Among Iraqis, nearly one-third had 
no legal residency status, 30% held refugee status, 19% had residency (iqama) 
through an investor visa
110
, 9% had iqama on different grounds
111
,  and 6% held a 
three-month visitor visa. 
Verbal reports 
Verbal reports of all varieties are subject to particular shortcomings, including 
interviewee bias, faulty recall and the desire to give socially acceptable answers. (Yin 
2009; Devine 1995)  Therefore, whenever possible, the case studies in the following 
chapters do not rely solely on interview and focus group data, but triangulate evidence 
with data from secondary literature as well.  I will discuss memory and intergenerational 
transmission of family narratives further in Chapter 5 (see “A note of caution”). 
Reactivity 
The presence of the researcher him/herself can also affect the interview in a way 
that good quantitative data collection, such as a survey, is designed to prevent.  In 
qualitative research such as semi-structured interviews reactivity is inherent to the 
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 The investor visa is a one-year renewable residence permit, including the right to work, upon 
investment of a large sum in a Jordanian bank. 
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 Usually through marriage to a Jordanian citizen. 
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method, and therefore it is better to acknowledge and discuss its impact rather than 
attempt to minimize it. (Devine 1995; Jacobsen & Landau 2003)  In this project 
interviewees were affected by the presence of an American male graduate student in his 
early 30s and one of two Palestinian-Jordanian interpreters, male or female, who was a 
college student in his/her early 20s. 
The researcher 
The presence of an American may have led some interviewees to attempt to shape 
their responses in a way that they would like an American, or western, audience to hear, 
such as expressing anger at US support for Israel; on the other hand, most interviewees 
actually seemed to deliberately avoid offering negative opinions about the US out of 
respect for their interlocutor, which is another result of reactivity.  In fact, Palestinians in 
particular were likely to express gratitude to me as an American who came to Jordan in 
order to hear the Palestinian perspective.  Respect for me as an American was prevalent 
among Iraqi interviewees as well, who, given the circumstances, expressed surprisingly 
little anger at the US.  Most of those who did express blame or resentment prefaced it 
with a request to me not to take offense. 
Being interviewed by relatively young people may have made interviewees more 
willing to talk, as they felt less intimidated or restricted than they would have in the 
presence of an elder, given social norms in Jordan and Iraq.  On the other hand, 
mukhabarat field agents are usually males in their 20s-40s, so my age and gender may 
have added to suspicion that I am an undercover agent (see section on trust, below). 
The interpreter 
Although I conducted training and practice interviews for the two interpreters to 
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improve the reliability and neutrality of both their verbal and non-verbal communication 
during interviews, both are themselves part of the Palestinian refugee community in 
Jordan, which invariably affected the interviewees. (cf. Jacobsen & Landau 2003)  For 
example, it may have caused some Palestinian interviewees to modify their responses to 
match the dominant narrative of the Palestinian cause which is socially acceptable within 
Palestinian milieux.  Sometimes interviewees addressed the interpreter directly to ask 
about his/her family background, neighborhood or opinions; sometimes they made a 
statement and asked him/her not to share it with me.  In general, the fact that the 
interpreters are themselves Palestinian seemed to help put most Palestinian interviewees 
at ease.  The interpreters come from educated middle and upper-middle class 
backgrounds, however, so occasionally geographic/class differences were assumed by 
interviewees with lower socioeconomic status, particularly in camps.  It is possible that 
this led some to emphasize their interwoven Palestinian camp identities and criticize 
wealthy urbanite Palestinians as having less Palestinian refugee identity.
112
 
The Palestinian female interpreter was used for the Iraqi interviews, on the advice 
of prior researchers who suggested that there is such little trust between Iraqi refugees 
that they would be more comfortable and speak more openly with a non-Iraqi interpreter 
present than an Iraqi one.  The fact that the interpreter was visibly Muslim, however, and 
Palestinian (and therefore Sunni), may have caused Christian, Sabean and Shi’ite 
interviewees to be reluctant to express any negative opinion about Muslims or Sunnis. 
The interpreters were also personally affected by their experiences of participating 
in many interviews with Palestinian and Iraqi refugees from a wide variety of 
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reject such assumptions and insinuations by camp residents. 
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backgrounds and circumstances.  Each interpreter told me on his/her own initiative the 
lessons they had learned about their own community, and the ways in which they had 




In any situation it is a challenge to quickly gain the trust of a stranger.  This is 
even more true in refugee situations, where “pervasive distrust… hangs like cloud over 
all relationships.” (Harrell-Bond 1986, p. 378, emphasis in original; cf. Omidian 1994, 
El-Abed 2009, Jacobsen & Landau 2003)  When the refugees reside in a host state where 
there is widespread fear of the domestic intelligence services and few guarantees of 
personal liberty, and where the community is rife with conspiracy theories large and 
small, it can seem like a nearly impossible task to convince a refugee to talk openly with 
a stranger about politically sensitive topics.  There was an initial assumption among some 
Palestinian interviewees that I was an undercover agent for the CIA, Jordanian 
mukhabarat, or another intelligence agency.
114
  Likewise, an unknown number of Iraqi 
refugees assumed that I was an undercover agent of UNHCR or the American Embassy 
sent to assess their living conditions and/or suitability for resettlement.  Overcoming 
issues of trust and authenticity is an advantage which ethnographic research has over 
efforts like those in this project to obtain a representative and mostly random (for the 
Palestinians) sample.  Nonetheless, the majority of refugees who agreed to be interviewed 
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 Mestheneos (2006) and Harrell-Bond (1986) reported similar effects on refugees conducting 
interviews of other refugees. 
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 Compare the work of Harrell-Bond, whose study of Ugandan refugees in the Sudan led her to 
write that some refugees believed “that I was a ‘spy’ either for the British, Obote, or both!” 
(1986, p. 378) 
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exhibited at least a medium degree of trust.
115
 
I took steps to increase the comfort level of my interviewees and allay their fears 
and suspicions.  First, I used a Palestinian interpreter for both the Palestinian and Iraqi 
interviews (see discussion of reactivity, above), which lent credibility to my presence.  
Second, I built a strong relationship, rapport and open communication with each 
interpreter, such that our mutual trust would set a positive example by a fellow 
Palestinian/Arab during the interview.  Third, I gave a truthful introduction of myself and 
a very broad summary of my research, explaining that there is a stereotype of refugees as 
passive and helpless, and that I believe refugees have opinions and voices which need to 
be heard; but, like other field research on refugee militarization (for example, Gerdes 
2006), I did not directly refer to militancy or militarization, nor did the informed consent 
form which I used.
116
  (The informed consent form had been translated into Arabic and 
back-translated into English to test for linguistic equivalency.  In the few cases where the 
interviewee was illiterate, the interpreter offered to read it aloud.)  Fourth, at the 
beginning of the interview I asked many questions about their family history and life in 
the CoO, some of which were not directly relevant to my research, to demonstrate 
understanding of their family’s plight and “warm up” the interviewee.  Finally, I asked 
sensitive questions in a sympathetic and culturally appropriate circuitous way, allowing 
them to avoid the question if they so chose.  For example, rather than asking, “Do you 
support militarization by Palestinian refugees against Israel?”, I asked related questions, 
such as, “What do you believe is the best way for the Palestinian people to achieve the 
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 There was probably a selection bias, as those with the lowest levels of trust refused to be 
interviewed. 
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 Likewise, Harrell-Bond (1986), in her research on refugees, introduced her research topic very 
broadly without explaining that she was studying the impact of aid on refugee settlements. 
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rights that they lost by being forced to leave their homeland?”, and “Who do you believe 
will best help the Palestinians achieve those rights?” 
I did not attempt to explain or justify the policy of any government unless I was 
specifically asked to do so.
117
  When asked what was the benefit to the refugees for 
participating in my interview, I explained that, while there is no direct economic benefit, 
I hope that the research will benefit the community as a whole by sharing their voices and 
showing the diversity of their opinions. 
When coding the interviews, I included a measure of the interviewee’s level of 
trust, based on their responses and my subjective impression.  The interviews included 
questions on some of the most politically sensitive issues, such as a Palestinian family’s 
involvement in the 1970 War between fedayeen (Palestinian guerrillas) and the Jordanian 
military, a taboo topic, to assess their degree of trust.  Sensitive issues which I did not 
directly raise, but which helped me measure their level of trust if the interviewee raised or 
avoided it, included discrimination, Gazans’ rights, lack of legal status and illegal 
employment (for Iraqis), attempts at militarization, and the weekly Arab Spring protests 
in Jordan. 
I coded each participant as having low, medium or high trust, as summarized in 
Table 2, below.  Only 20 Palestinian interviewees (16%) and 3 Iraqis (5%) exhibited low 
levels of trust, while the overwhelming majority (84% of Palestinians; 94% of Iraqis) 
exhibited medium or high levels of trust. 
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Table 2. Degree of trust exhibited by interviewees 
 
  
Low 20 16% 3 5%
Medium 70 55% 37 67%
High 37 29% 15 27%
TOTAL 127 100% 55 100%




CHAPTER 5: Palestinians in Jordan, 1948 to 1963 
 
This chapter will apply the framework developed in Chapter 3 to the first of three 
periods of the Palestinians’ stay in Jordan, from 1948 to 1963.  The following chapters 
will apply it to the periods 1964-1970 and 1971-2011.  During only one of these periods, 
1964-1970, was there substantial militarization among the Palestinian refugee 
community.  During the first and third periods there was almost no militarization, 
although for different reasons.  In each chapter I will apply the proposed framework of 
refugee militarization to explain the outcome which occurred. 
 
An extensive literature exists on the history of the Israeli-Arab conflict, including 
the Palestinian refugee issue, and that history will not be repeated here except in brief 
summary.  Jewish and Arab populations had coexisted in Palestine under the Ottoman 
Empire, which ended after World War I.  In the late 19
th
 century a new political 
movement, Zionism, began among European Jews calling for the “restoration” of Jews to 
Palestine.  According to the dominant Zionist discourse, the existing population in the 
territory was neither to be expelled nor treated as equals, but rather were not considered 
at all; a popular motto of the movement was “A land without a people for a people 
without a land”. (Matar 2011)  Around the same time, Arab nationalism was on the rise, 
as a function of a spreading global norm of self-determination and the gradual decline of 
the Ottoman Empire
118
, but a more specific Palestinian Arab nationalism was also 
developing in response to the perceived growing threat of Zionism. (Brand 1988)  In the 
interwar period Palestinian national political organizations began to cohere, holding the 
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first All-Palestine Congress in 1919
  
(Hassassian 1990), although Palestinian nationalism 
was still intertwined at that time with growing pan-Arab nationalism and pan-Islamism 
(Khalidi 1997, ch. 7).  The first official organization claiming to represent the Palestinian 
nation, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), did not emerge until nearly a half-
century later. 
In the 1920s and 1930s there were violent uprisings by Palestinian Arabs against 
Jews, further reifying the narrative of a native “us” in opposition to a foreign “them”.  
The two nationalist movements clashed in Palestine due to a complex interplay of factors, 
including: waves of Jewish immigration and increasing purchases of land by Jews, which 
local Palestinian leaders saw as a threat; intra-Palestinian contests for leadership; 
increasing consensus among Zionist leaders on the need to gain an independent state, 
especially during and after the Holocaust; and the actions of the British, which had a 
mandate for Palestine from the League of Nations post-World War I, including its 
conflicting promises to each side (Sicker 1989).  The Arab revolt in Palestine of 1936-39 
targeting two foreign enemies, the British and the Jews, was a turning point for 
Palestinian/Arab nationalism. (Abu-Odeh 1999)  Seeing the futility of further 
administering the territory, and facing increasing pressure at home to withdraw, Britain 
returned the mandate for Palestine to the newly constituted United Nations.  In 1947 the 
UN put forward a plan to partition the territory into two states, one for the Jews and one 
for the Palestinian Arabs. 
The Zionist leadership accepted the UN plan but the Arab states and the 
Palestinian Higher Arab Committee, against the wishes of moderate Palestinians and 
King Abdullah I, rejected it. (Abu-Odeh 1999)  They declared war against the Jews, who 
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declared independence as the State of Israel in May 1948.  The precise mechanisms by 
which the war led to the Palestinian exile are contested, but centrist historians, making 
use of newly released documents from that era, are beginning to converge on a narrative 
in which there were some local expulsions by Israeli military commanders, some 
Palestinians fled due to general fear, and some left following calls by Arab leaders for the 
Arab population to take a temporary absence from their homes in order for the Arab 
militaries to more easily crush the enemy.  My interviews reflected these multiple causes: 
We heard the news that there are Arab armies, and of course we have to evacuate the 
houses… Some well-known people said that Arab armies are coming for three months.  
After three months they will kick the Jews out.  And the cannon does not distinguish 
between Arabs and Jews…. There were fights, Jews were attacking villages and killing 
people.  Because of that we left.... Some people on the shore wanted all the Arabs on the 
shore to leave, so all the [Arab armies] could attack and make the Jews from outside 
leave because they were attacking Palestinian people…. They were killing people at 
night.... They were saying that the Haganah (Jewish militant group) came and didn’t 
distinguish between anyone.  They killed women, children, they didn’t care.  This is what 
made them leave…. (Male, 72) 
The new Israelis won the war, and the refugees were stranded in Gaza, the West 
Bank, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan
119
, waiting expectantly for the Arab militaries to bring 
them home in victory. 
I will demonstrate in the following sections that the Palestinian refugees in Jordan 
during this period maintained a collective project to redeem their homeland as a result of 
the war of exclusion they had experienced and their economic attachments to land in the 
CoO.  However, despite the presence of a permissive political opportunity structure, this 
project did not result in militarization due to their high degree of socioeconomic 
integration to Jordan (wealthy, urban Palestinians) and their expectation that powerful 
                                                          
119
 By June 30, 1950, the newly displaced Palestinians registered with UNRWA in Transjordan 
(the combined West and East Banks) numbered 506,200; Lebanon 127,600; Syria 82,194; and the 
Gaza Strip 198,227. (UNRWA 2009)  This brought the total Palestinian population under 
Jordanian control, including non-refugees living in the West Bank, to 800,000-900,000, double 
that of East Bank Jordanians. (Abu-Odeh 1999; Alon 2007) 
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regional actors would redeem the homeland on their behalf. 
A note of caution 
As discussed in Chapter 2, memories and narratives, especially when they are 
passed down orally from generation to generation, are notoriously subject to 
embellishment, re-interpretation, and fabrication to fill in the missing pieces.  Historians 
are careful to record the word of original participants as a memory of an event rather than 
an actual event when collecting oral testimony years later; they are even more wary when 
recording testimony second- or third-hand.  In the case of Palestinians relating their 
ancestors’ experiences in 1948 and 1967, it is very likely that their knowledge of those 
events has been influenced not only by the changes, omissions and embellishments 
inherent in transmission of any oral history across the generations, but also by the public 
narrative of the Palestinians’ exodus, including songs, poetry, media portrayals and 
reenactments. (Matar 2011; Chatty 2010)  As Randa Farah writes in her study of 
Palestinians in Jordan: 
Palestinians learned their histories and trajectories at home, in [neighborhoods], at school 
(through Palestinian teachers who believed it their duty to teach them their history and 
beyond what the curricula required), in political organisations and social and cultural 
centres.  As adults narrated, children listened, imbibing the stories and reminiscences of 
their elders, drawing images of villages, lands, or agricultural cycles, imagining heroes 
and victims and in turn reproducing these images in their own creative ways. (2005, p. 
95) 
Relatively few original 1948 refugees are still alive today, so younger Palestinians have 
only heard stories second-hand.120  Several interviewees referred me to a popular 
television dramatization of the nakba (lit. “catastrophe”, the Arabic term for the 1948 
War), especially when they seemed embarrassed to admit their own limited knowledge of 
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their family’s experiences in these seminal events.  Does that mean that testimony of later 
generations of refugees is worthless?  Not at all.  It is as important to know what later 
generations believe occurred – which is the basis for the collective project and the 
rhetoric used to mobilize refugees – as the actual historical record.  However, as stated in 
the previous chapter, I will also draw on the secondary literature of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict to triangulate data. 
Collective project 
WAR OF EXCLUSION WITH A CLEAR ENEMY 
Regardless of whether historians expose evidence of a coherent plan for ethnic 
cleansing by the Jews/Israelis in 1947-49, the Palestinians perceived that the war which 
led to the their exodus was a war of exclusion, and they had a clear enemy: “Thinking of 
it now, they must have planned it for a while, because they wanted to make the area 
predominantly Jewish.” (Khalil Jindawi, in Matar 2011, p. 71)  It was a domestic conflict 
in which the two sides were identified and fought according to their ethnicity, Jewish or 
Arab, and the war was fought for territorial control along those ethnic lines.  There were 
few reliable sources of information available to Palestinian civilians during the war, and 
most civilians relied on word-of-mouth in their decision-making process: 
They did not have a good education at that time, and there were no media, not like we 
have nowadays.  Now if anything happens around the world we can see it immediately.  
Then it was just [word of mouth].... (Male, 42) 
The reasons for departure were coded as “direct threat” if they (the interviewee or his/her 
ancestors), their home or their village were attacked, for example: 
They came and killed people in the village in 1948 and people left.  My father and 
grandfather said the [Jewish] gangs came to the village and killed everybody. (Male, 57) 




A Jew came and wanted to survey our land and he kicked my father and grandfather and 
said, “This is my land.”  My father and grandfather said, “No, this is our land, it belongs 
to our ancestors.”  [Was the Jew/Israeli armed?]  No, he came without a weapon.  After 
one week the Israeli soldiers attacked the camels belonging to my family and relatives.  
They killed 100 camels.  This was their source of income.  So that’s why they left Beer 
Seba and went to Gaza.
121
 (Male, 53) 
Word of the massacre of Palestinians by Jewish militants in the village of Deir 
Yassin near Jerusalem, and other attacks against civilians, spread quickly. (Glubb 1954)  
They were taken as a warning to Palestinian villagers to depart or risk becoming the next 
victims.  The reason for departure was coded as “indirect threat” if they left upon hearing 
of attacks on people or nearby villages like their own, but did not personally experience 
an attack by enemy soldiers: 
From what I heard from my fathers, there were massacres, Deir Yassin was the reason.  
Killing people inside their houses.  And shooting people inside their rooms. (Male, 47) 
The Jewish gangs, they let some people from a massacred village live, in order to 
announce to others… (Male, 26) 
They were looking at the neighbor[ing] village.  The Israeli Stern Gang came to that 
village and killed women, old people, and this made them afraid.  All the people, when 
they see the neighbors killed, the women and old people and children, they moved to the 
[east] side of the Green Line, four kilometers from our land, stayed there for a few 
months to wait and see if they can return back to their home or not. (Male, 42) 
The vast majority of Palestinian households
122
 (83%) who fled in 1948 reported 
that they left due to direct and/or indirect threats.  The fact that so many of the refugee 
households perceived a threat to their personal safety from the Jewish/Israeli soldiers is 
evidence that the conflict, in their perception, was a war of exclusion with a clear enemy.  
The widespread sense of injustice and catastrophe (al-nakbah) of the Palestinian exile, 
and the consequent shared experiences and refugee identity, helped to catalyze the 
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from the entire sample of Palestinians. 
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development of Palestinian identity, and later Palestinian nationalism, in Jordan. 
ETHNONATIONALIST MOVEMENT 
Palestinian nationalism was still in its formative stages at the time of the 1948 
War and throughout the 1950s.  In contrast to the Jordanians, elite Palestinians had more 
experience in oppositional politics as a result of their experiences with the British and 
Zionists/Israelis.  They were “more urban, more educated, more experienced in political 
participation, and more exposed to the mass media….”
123
 (Bacik 2008, p. 147; see also 
Brand 1988; Aruri 1972)  But the Palestinian national identity was more established 
among the urban elites than the general refugee population.
124
  The non-elite masses were 
still mostly incohesive as a nation; in Palestine pre-1948, identities had mostly been local 
rather than national (Pederson 1997), and Palestinian leadership had been divided 
between two prominent families, the Nashashibi in Nablus and the Husseini in Jerusalem 
(Haddad 2001).  Furthermore, “because of Palestine’s recent dismemberment and the 
resulting scattering and degradation of its people, some Palestinians felt ashamed of their 
identity… [and] found it easier or more natural to identify themselves as Jordanians.”
125
 
(Brand 1988, p. 165) 
During this period, overt efforts were made to “develop further and extend the 
sense of loyalty based on identity by mobilizing more members of the various 
communities and by asserting exclusivity of allegiance through expanding existing 
popular organizations,” similar to the process of nation-building going on in many Arab 
states at that time – but without the advantage of an independent territory or indeed even 
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 Jordanian scholar, personal interview, 8/19/10 
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 This was also suggested by Palestinian scholar Riad al Khouri. (Personal interview, 4/27/11) 
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a single territory within which to operate (Brand 1988, p. 4); and furthermore forced to 
compete on the international stage with another successful nationalist project, Zionism, 
for the claim of indigenousness to a piece of territory
126
.  Palestinian nationalism was 
therefore buffeted by the idiosyncrasies and developments not only within each host 
state, but of wider regional events and interactions involving their respective host states. 
(Brand 1988) 
All over the Arab world, state nationalisms (al-wataniyya) were in competition 
with Arab nationalist (al-qawmiyya) and pan-Islamic movements which had been 
developing since the nineteenth and earlier in the twentieth centuries.  This was the case 
among Palestinians as well, and most Palestinians in the late 1940s and 1950s had less 
loyalty to a Palestinian nation than an Arab nation. (Brand 1988; Alon 2007; see also 
Matar 2011, p. 37)  In fact, there were no political parties based on Palestinian 
nationalism anywhere in the region.  This was reinforced by the pan-Arab movement, 
particularly under the leadership of Gamal Abd al-Nasser, who took control of Egypt in a 
1952 coup, and whose powerful radio-transmitted oratory inspired millions across the 
Arab world.  Especially after his “victory” in the 1956 Suez Crisis against Britain, France 
and Israel, Nasser’s speeches resonated with the Palestinian refugees, whose cause he 
championed and for whom he demanded redemption. (Abu-Odeh 1999)  As a result, the 
pan-Arab movement, which was ideologically opposed to state nationalist movements – 
including Palestinian nationalism – was strongly supported by most Palestinians. 
In addition, the Hashemite monarchy was viewed during this period as the 
protector of the West Bank and a buffer against Israeli aggression, even though the 
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Palestinians widely blamed Jordan for losing Lydda and Ramleh during the war.  The 
official discourse of the state, even including the language of the Unity Resolution which 
merged the East and West Banks under the Hashemite monarchy, was perceived as 
continuing to seek redemption of the Palestinian homeland; and since the Palestinians in 
Jordan – unlike those in Gaza – already had citizenship in a state, they had less incentive 
to challenge it by pursuing an alternative nation. (Abu-Odeh 1999) 
While there was, as I will describe shortly, strong attachment to the land among 
the Palestinian refugees, this did not equate to an extant ethnonationalist movement.  
Rather, it was the foundation on which a strong Palestinian ethnonationalist movement 
could take root.  In fact, it would likely have emerged earlier if not for the competing 
“isms” which drew Palestinians’ national attachments to supranational identities.  
Palestinian nationalism started to gain prominence among the general refugee population 
with the decline of pan-Arabism, which received its first major setback when the flagship 
United Arab Republic, the merging of Egypt and Syria, disintegrated in 1961. 
Attachment to a Palestinian identity grew gradually over the course of the 1950s.  
Although referring to his experiences in Lebanon, a famous quote from author Fawaz 
Turki gives an indication of the formation of nationalism-in-exile which was occurring 
throughout the region: 
If I was not a Palestinian when I left Haifa as a child, I am one now.  Living in Beirut as a 
stateless person for most of my growing up years, many of them in a refugee camp, I did 
not feel I was living among my ‘Arab brothers’.  I did not feel I was an Arab….  I was a 
Palestinian.  And that meant I was an outsider, an alien, a refugee, burden.  To be that, for 
us, for my generation, meant to look inward, to draw closer, to be part of a minority that 
has its own way of doing and seeing and feeling and reacting. (Turki 1972 [in Schulz 
2003, p. 113]) 
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC BASE 
As is common in refugee situations, the classes of Palestinians migrated at 
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different times: First came the wealthy, those with the most economic and migration 
options at their disposal, from November 1947 to March 1948; next came the educated, 
but not necessarily wealthy, urbanites, from March to May 1948; and finally the peasants, 
the vast majority of the refugees, who were dependent on the land regardless of whether 
they owned it or not.
127
 
Most Palestinian households’ ancestors (62%) were felaheen
128
, small farmers, in 
Palestine prior to 1948.  Jordan is mostly desert, and in 1948 most East Bank Jordanians 
were nomadic and semi-nomadic.  The area of arable land in the East Bank was far 
exceeded by the number of immigrant felaheen (Aruri 1972), some of whom had owned 
hundreds or even thousands of dunams of land in Palestine.  Therefore, when the 
Palestinians came to the East Bank, there were few opportunities to engage in farming; 
and due to the imminent expectation of return, few refugees were interested in buying 
land anyway.  For most refugees in the early years, therefore, there was a significant 
economic dislocation from an agriculture-based economy in their CoO to what would 
eventually become a manufacturing, construction and mercantile-based economy in their 
host.  In addition, whereas a traditional agricultural lifestyle did not require much formal 
education, the new economy would.  This wholesale change was a difficult adjustment 
for many Palestinian families: 
Palestine was better, of course, because they were living in their own lands.  They had 
their own business, they didn’t work for anybody else.  When you are working for other 
people, compared to what you had, it’s an insult….  It’s like an insult for them to leave 
their lands behind.  My father was very wealthy, and when he came here to Jordan he was 
working in construction, housecleaning, things that take physical effort.  It’s like an insult 
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to him to do that. (Male, 51) 
When interviewees were asked to describe their family’s life in Palestine prior to 1948, 
45% of households gave answers which were vague and glorified the rustic lifestyle: 
Their life was very normal and happy and peaceful, and their financial situation was very 
good. (Female, 22) 
It’s like a paradise, there were farms, they had their own land, it’s on the shore of the 
Mediterranean. (Male, 65) 
They were farmers, they didn’t buy anything because they had food and drink from their 
own lands.  They had cattle, they did simple things, but their life was excellent.  From 
what I hear from my grandfather and grandmother, the conditions were very, very good. 
(Male, 24) 
A few interviewees (4%) gave detailed descriptions of the felaheen lifestyle: 
They were living in their own lands, they woke up for dawn prayer, there was just one 
mosque in the village.  They had lands, they were farmers, they worked in their own 
lands, olive trees… They planted different crops.  They had camels and sheep… They 
milked the cows.  And the coast is near their village, so they would go fishing.  Children 
went to school, there was just one school in the village, teaching Islam.  Women cooked 
all the fish and food and they go to have lunch in the farm, outside the house.  They spent 
the whole day in the farm, and returned home in the evening.  There was a big field in the 
village and they gathered in the evening.  They hosted people from other villages.  There 
was a moonless night, a black day, the Jews came and took everything, the land, even 
their air. (Male, 36) 
Still others (29%) referred to the felaheen lifestyle as a simple life, but did not glorify it: 
The life was simple at that time.  They had some cows, chickens… and this supported 
them. (Male, 26) 
We had farms, we were planting olives and vegetables there, and we had cattle and sheep. 
(Male, 45) 
Ordinary, primitive life.  My father was not educated and my mother is not educated too, 
and they had sheep, and they didn’t work, didn’t have much money. (Female, 47) 
With a few exceptions, detailed knowledge of actual conditions in Palestine pre-
1948 appeared to be limited, and awareness of the hardships of rural life were minimized 
in favor of (in most cases) a romanticized ideal of the felaheen lifestyle.  This 
romanticization did not begin with exile, though exile increased it.  The life of the 
felaheen had begun to be transformed “into a symbolic representative of the cultural and 
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historical continuity of the Palestinian people” with the Arab Revolt of 1936-39, in which 
thousands of felaheen were mobilized against the British and Zionists. (Matar 2011, p. 
22)  This idealized vision of the felaheen, which is also the dominant Palestinian 
narrative of life pre-1948 (Farah 2005), became the basis against which the hardships of 
refugee life in Jordan were compared in the public discourse. 
When asked what their ancestors brought with them to Jordan, almost all refugee 




They didn’t take anything, they left everything behind….  And even the new clothes, my 
grandmother took all the clothes, and the Jews were attacking us, she left the clothes in a 
cave with my cousin so we can go back, but we left the cave and weren’t able to go back. 
(Male, 65) 
He lost his land and his source of living, and in that journey he lost his goats and sheep, 
lost everything. (Male, 42) 
My mother told me that we left everything behind, clothes, jewelry.… They were like 
beggars when they came here.  They were barefoot. (Female, 47) 
In addition, the overwhelming majority (86%) of households who fled in 1948 indicated 
that they had abandoned their land and house, which were no longer under their family’s 
control: 
Everything they owned they left behind.  They didn’t take anything with them.  The 
sheep, money, nothing.  My father and uncle had 100 dunams [25 acres] there.  They 
didn’t take anything. (Male, 57) 
When asked what their family’s primary concerns were at the time of departure, 
the most common responses were family and children (35%), survival (32%) and their 
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land and property (41%)
130
, which was often tied to their occupation as farmers: 
Their houses, their lands, their work.  Especially their land.  They were farmers, and I’m 
proud that we were farmers. (Male, 27) 
The land.  It’s the most important thing because if their land is lost, they are lost.  The 
situation shouldn’t be like this, because if we had stayed in our land, it would have been 
better.  We’re not used to living in crowded places, we’re not used to this life. (Male, 37) 
My family had many lands and many houses and they lost everything.… The figs and 
vegetables are still there, until now.  The houses were torn down but the trees are still the 
same. (Female, 48) 
They were concerned about the lands, because they loved the lands more than they loved 
their own sons….  Our land is as precious as our souls. (Male, 46) 
The idea of the family’s land was often intertwined with the idea of the country.  Both 
were highly valued because they of their irreplaceability: 
The land itself.  For example, the crops we can plant again….  Even if they tore [houses] 
down, we can build them again.  If the cattle were killed, we can buy them again. (Male, 
24) 
Their land…. Because you can have more than one child, but you cannot have more than 
one land.  Land is irreplaceable. (Male, 26) 
Their lands.  It’s our most valuable asset.  There’s a song, if you [lose] someone you 
love, you can bear it; if you lose your money, you can bear it; but if you lose your 
country, it’s unbearable. (Male, 63) 
Others went further, de-emphasizing the importance of their personal family’s land in 
favor of the country as a whole: 
It’s not just our house, it’s all Palestine. (Female, 21) 
They just wanted to return to their own country… They didn’t care about their house or 
land – just wanted their own country… Land was cheap – when they return, they can buy 
new land… (Male, 38) 
As I will show in Chapter 8, this attachment to the land represents a stark difference from 
the Iraqi refugees, none of whom mentioned concern over land or property as a primary 
concern when departing Iraq. 
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On the whole, given most Palestinian refugees’ attachment to the land, the 
economic dislocation imposed by moving to a country where they would need to acquire 
new skills and alter their economic base, and the lack of economic development in 
Jordan, it is not surprising that the overwhelming majority of households (83%) stated 
that the living conditions were better in Palestine before 1948 than after their arrival in 
Jordan.  When asked why Palestine was better, 70% indicated that it was because they 
had easy access to a livelihood, farming or employment opportunities. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, in refugee situations in which the border to the CoO is 
open, it is not uncommon for families to send a member back periodically to check 
whether conditions are conducive to return.  This allows them to update their assessment 
of the comparison of living conditions between the CoO and host.  In the case of 
Palestinian refugees in the 1950s, the borders were closed, and communications between 
refugees and their relatives (if any) remaining in the CoO were limited.
131
  As a result, for 
most people, their memories of the CoO prior to departure were the sole basis for 
comparison.  Over time these memories grew further and further removed from 
contemporaneous reality, and evolved into the romanticized rural portrayal which is the 
dominant Palestinian narrative today. 
GREED 
There were no significant rent-producing resources available in Palestine such as 
diamonds or oil, so this factor is not relevant. 
 
In sum, from 1948-1963 there was a definite collective project on the part of the 
Palestinian refugees to redeem their homeland following their perceived expulsion by the 
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Jewish/Israeli enemy.  Their attachment to the land was strongly rooted in a mostly 
agricultural economic base in the CoO, which became the dominant narrative of life in 
Palestine pre-1948. 
Socioeconomic integration and marginalization 
RIGHTS IN THE HOST STATE 
Unlike in Lebanon and Syria, Palestinians in Jordan were quickly offered nearly 
equal rights with Jordanians.  In 1950 King Abdullah I annexed the West Bank and, 
overriding the opposition of his government and the Arab League
132
, offered citizenship 
(codified into law in 1954) to all Palestinians living there, including the refugees who had 
fled to the West and East Banks during the war.  He did this due to his Hashemite pan-
Arab territorial aspirations for a Greater Syria and because he saw in the Palestinians 
potential for the economic development of his country, including the guarantee of foreign 
aid. (Abu-Odeh 1999)  However, the government also enshrined the right of return; this 
contradiction created a “‘temporary-citizen’ formally endowed with citizenship rights and 
duties pending the day when they would be given the right to choose to return to 
Palestine or to stay in Jordan as permanent citizens.” (Al Husseini & Bocco 2009, p. 263; 
cf. Al-Quds Center 2009) 
Palestinians were integrated into the government – albeit as a minority to East 
Bank Jordanians – and gradually into the military (Abu-Odeh 1999), and grew to 
dominate the private sector.  Jordan was largely rural at that time, and Amman more of a 
town than a city; many Palestinians take pride and credit for building Amman and Jordan 
up to the level of development seen today: 
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Before 1948 the Jordanians themselves were going to Palestine to work, because there 
was nothing here in Jordan.  Jordan was like a desert, but when Palestinians came… they 
improved Jordan a lot. (Male, 46) 
There was a high level of economic integration in Jordan.
133
  However, when 
asked whether obtaining Jordanian citizenship changed their ancestors’ identity, only 
25% of households said “yes”, while 56% said “no”.
134
  Those who said “no” explained 




No [it didn't change], no, the opposite, we just use it as something practical, as a tool. 
(Male, 40) 
We felt that we are Palestinians having the Jordanian citizenship.  Like we have rights, 
and freedom, like if we want to travel or get educated, it’s helpful to have the citizenship. 
(Male, 60) 
When we obtained the Jordanian citizenship we were more relaxed because we can work 
and have jobs.… We took the Jordanian passports and identities and settled officially in 
Jordan, but we will never forget Palestine, it’s our origin. (Male, 65) 
Those who answered “yes” usually reported that it caused their ancestors to feel more 
Jordanian: 
Yes, a lot.  At the beginning they were in Palestine, then they left for the Jordanian 
Kingdom, so their life has been changed.  They had Palestinian citizenship, but now they 
have the Jordanian citizenship and ID.  They were Palestinian, now they are Jordanian. 
(Female, 65) 
Of course….  Taking Jordanian citizenship… they were able to get rights here in 
Jordan… People lost the feeling that they are Palestinian because they have this…. 
(Female, 22) 
One interviewee reported that the Jordanian citizenship increased, not decreased, her 
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family’s attachment to Palestine: 
They felt more Palestinian… because they were far away from Palestine, and they were 
afraid that this would make them forget Palestine, so they did the opposite and attached 
themselves more to Palestine. (Female, 23) 
Some reported that gaining the citizenship led to a dual identity, a dichotomy between 




Internally, no.  But outside they felt Jordanian.  They agreed that they are Jordanian now, 
but inside their hearts they were Palestinian. (Male, 29) 
As with building a house and buying land, however (which I will discuss shortly), 
accepting Jordanian citizenship was a politically loaded act in the 1950s.  There was an 
undercurrent of fear that it would undermine their claim to return to Palestine, which led 
to opposition among Palestinians
137
: 
It was very easy for them to get the Jordanian citizenship.  But some people didn’t want 
[it].  They were very stubborn because they thought… I don’t know for how many years 
after the nakba, but they didn’t want the Jordanian citizenship. (Male, 24) 
As of 1987, there were still some 250,000 refugees living in camps who refused 
Jordanian citizenship. (Samha 1987)  For most Palestinians, however, acquisition of 
citizenship and rights in their host state facilitated their socioeconomic integration even if 
they rejected the notion that it infringed on their collective project. 
Institutions to address grievances through the host state 
The Jordanian state in the early 1950s was an authoritarian monarchy, and offered 
no guarantee of rights to protest, assembly and speech, with the exception of the 
constitutional reforms promulgated under King Talal’s brief rule and implemented in the 
first years of King Hussein’s reign.  It swung away from the democratic reforms and into 
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martial law after King Hussein preemptively squelched a leftist coup in 1957, including 
the imprisonment or expulsion of some leftist Palestinian political figures, ending an 
experiment with liberal multi-party politics. (Robins 2004) 
However, there were some institutions providing an outlet for expression of 
political grievances: Locally, there were mukhtars (traditional notables) who “become 
quasi governmental employees in the Ministry of Interior.  Camp dwellers can apply for 
this job and then the DPA conducts an investigation among the camp dwellers to ensure 
that the applicant is acceptable to the population they will represent.” (Hanafi 2010, p. 
18)  Nationally, from the first parliamentary election in 1950, Palestinian candidates ran 
for office: 
The Palestinian contenders thought it would be better for their cause if they participated 
actively in the political life of Jordan.  They hoped to influence the decision-making 
process through the established Jordanian institutions.  Their first and most salient slogan 
for their intended political action was stated during the election campaign: “Yes to the 
union, no to the peace with Israel.”  This platform, on which the Palestinian activists 
predicated their political partnership, eventually constrained King Abdullah’s plan to 
reach a separate peace agreement with Israel, a fact that defined Jordanian-Israeli 
relations for almost half a century to come. (Abu-Odeh 1999, p. 51) 
Thus, the regime of their host state did effectively provide an institutionalized 
route through which to voice their concerns and influence policy – not directly, by 
electing representatives with the power to change policy, but indirectly, through their 
representatives’ political platform. 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
As discussed earlier, felaheen found the transition to Jordan economically 
difficult, particularly the lack of employment opportunities which compounded their 
dislocation from the land in the CoO.  Non-felaheen refugees had less economic 
attachment to the land, and their economic lives in Jordan were not necessarily 
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dramatically different from the way they lived in Palestine.  Even merchants who lost all 
their assets had to start from scratch, but they were able to do so within the same 
economic sector, unlike the felaheen: 
My grandfather… used to work in the junk business, he was one of the people who 
bought the British camps when they were leaving, their tents and utensils and chairs, and 
put them all in this huge warehouse, then the Israelis came and he left, he had to leave 
without any cash because all his assets were in inventory.  He came here and my 
grandmother used to cook these little sweet things and he would go out and try to sell 
them.  From somebody who owned his own business to… a street vendor.  Then he 
developed himself….  He started his own business… (Male, 43) 
However, even for non-felaheen refugees, Jordan was less economically developed and 
offered significantly fewer economic advantages than Palestine: 
[Before 1948] Palestinians had factories, major farms, a big coast with the Mediterranean 
Sea, and Jaffa was a main port not just for Palestine but for many countries.  And Haifa 
was a big port for petrol. They had ships coming from all around the world.  And in Gaza 
they had weaving factories….  But after [1948]... Jordan was poorer than Palestine, and it 
was a Bedouin society.  [The Palestinian influx] started the kingdom.  And everything 
that starts, it’s not easy.  [Hundreds of thousands] of people came in one year to a poor 
society, with no ports, factories, [or] big farms; no economy. (Male, 42) 
Twelve percent of households indicated their ancestors were shepherds (bedouin), whose 
nomadic lifestyle also sometimes afforded them pre-existing connections in Jordan: 
They didn’t necessarily leave as a group.  My grandfather had a good relation with Karak 
village so he went there.  [My relative]’s father had a good relation with Hebron village 
so he went there. (Male, 42) 
My grandfather was a shepherd.  He used to give milk to Jordanians and Palestinians. [He 
had the] same job after migration. (Male, 25) 
Jordan in 1948 and throughout the 1950s was a poor country with limited 
infrastructure and resources.  Many refugees lived in UNRWA-provided tent 
encampments upon arrival or after quickly exhausting their savings (in 1955-56 the tents 
were upgraded to tin-roof shacks, and finally concrete structures). (Brand 1988)  
Interviewees related that their family faced significant hardships in the early years, 
surviving on meager assistance from UNRWA: 
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So now we were living with the help of UNRWA, taking supplies, rice and sugar, that’s 
it.  They used to distribute an omelet and a glass of milk at the UNRWA school. (Male, 
70) 
On the other hand, without a means to support themselves, many of the poorer class of 
refugees turned to education, primarily through UNRWA schools, as “the best 
opportunity for upward mobility and increasing economic security in a situation where 
political security was virtually unachievable.” (Brand 1988, p. 13; see also Ramzoun 
2001) 
Financially they were really weak. But [my father] went to vocational college… cheaper 
than university.  After that he got a job and also studied in Beirut….  He opened a library. 
He did a Master’s, then a Ph.D. (Male, 38) 
This focus on education as an asset – and even a weapon – has had far-reaching effects 
down the generations: 
We do have this hidden sense of insecurity, of not having your country and your need for 
something to hold on to, and education is like your weapon… to provide for yourself and 
your family anywhere you went.  I guess that was at the back of our minds…. Education 
is something that nobody can never take away from you.  They can take your house, your 
[property]… it’s more of survival, not a luxury… This is like your shield, no matter 
[what happens]. (Male, 43) 
All Palestinian families focused on education….  It was the only investment possible.  
[They had] no ownership, no land ….  As Palestinians [who] live in Jordan, our only 
weapon is education.  I wanted to be educated and to go to university because I want to 
build myself, to prove to everyone that Palestinians are able to do something even though 
their circumstances are bad.  So the things that we aren’t able to do with our hands, we 
can do with our education. (Female, 21) 
Interviewees described with pride the way that their family and community pulled 
themselves up out of misery and poverty to become educated, economically productive 
and successful over the years and generations (cf. Farah 2005): 
My father, he was smart, once he came to Jordan he made a supermarket in his tent in the 
camp.  Then this tent converted to a big store….  By their hands, they changed [their 
living situation]… nobody helped them, they depended on themselves. (Male, 50) 
[My grandmothers] lived in Wast al-Balad [downtown Amman].  They didn’t have any 
work so their father opened a workshop and their mother was a seamstress.  My 
grandmother... worked from age 10 or 12.  At 18 they started to work as teachers....  They 
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[didn’t want] to ask for any money.  Then they bought a new house, and they felt relieved 
after a while.  Some of them went to the Gulf to work.  They sacrificed a lot. (Female, 
20) 
My father was practical, he worked in a place [which] employed refugees, he was 
working in construction with them.  His wage was 5 qirsh (US$0.07) [per day], he didn’t 
want to take the assistance from UNRWA, he wanted to work and support his family, us. 
(Male, 64) 
The Palestinian economic activity was needed and encouraged by the Jordanian 
government, which was one reason why Jordan offered citizenship to the refugees.
138
  
The Palestinian refugees who fled to Jordan were upwardly mobile not only in Jordan, 
but hundreds of thousands moved to the Gulf states, beginning in the 1950s, for labor. 
(Brand 1988; Abu-Odeh 1999)  Most of them sent home remittances which eventually 
grew to constitute a substantial portion of the Jordanian GDP.
139
 
The refugees’ early political passivity – waiting for the Arab armies to bring them 
home in victory – stands in contrast, at least in the popular narrative, with their economic 
agency.  Rather than remain in poverty and live off the aid and social services provided 
by UNRWA while waiting for the redemption of their homeland, many Palestinian 
households chose to make the difficult adjustment of adapting economically and 
contributing productively to their host state.  While some aspects of this economic 
orientation, such as buying a land and building a house, as will be described shortly, were 
politically controversial for decades, in other ways an economic orientation toward the 
host state was far more socially acceptable, even laudable, than a comparable political 
orientation (i.e., abandoning claims to Palestine).  Of course, some refugees (Joly’s 
“Rubicon refugees”) saw the two as intertwined: As Palestinians gradually became 
convinced that they will not be able to return to their CoO, they thought, “We need to 
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build up this country, start over, build up our education.”
140
  This contradiction was, and 
still is, a tension in the Palestinian community in Jordan: How to integrate to Jordan 




The ethnic similarity to East Bank Jordanians did help ease the transition to life in 
the host state.  East Bank Jordanians are Arab and Sunni Muslim, like the Palestinians, 
and certainly were more sympathetic to them than to their enemy in the CoO.  The East 
Bankers identified strongly by their tribes, however, which were mostly different from 
the Palestinian tribes; and they were mostly bedouin, so in lifestyle they were different 
from the largely felaheen, and some urban, Palestinians. 
 
Thus, from the beginning of their stay in Jordan, there was an economic 
segmentation within the Palestinian refugee community.  Wealthy, urban, non-felaheen 
refugees established businesses, became involved in Jordanian politics and government, 
and adapted relatively quickly to their host state.  Some poorer felaheen also managed to 
build themselves up through hard work in various low-level jobs, although it took many 
more years – sometimes even the next generations’ higher levels of education and access 
to professional jobs – to approach the degree of socioeconomic integration enjoyed by 
wealthy elites from the beginning.  Finally, there were poorer refugees, particularly those 
who remained in camps.  Despite legal rights, they had fewer and lower-paying 
employment opportunities, and were significantly less socioeconomically integrated to 
Jordan. 
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There were poorly trained and equipped Palestinian irregulars who fought in the 
1948 War, such as the Army of the Holy War (Abu-Odeh 1999), but interviewees 
contradicted each other on whether armed Palestinians fought against the Jews/Israelis 
before fleeing to Jordan.  According to some refugees, the fighting in 1947-49 was 
primarily between the Arab states and the Jewish/Israeli military, while the Palestinian 
civilians were unarmed: 
They had to leave their country… They didn’t have weapons or anything.  The best thing 
they could do was to run away. (Male, 25) 
In 1948, the Jews… had so many weapons, they attacked the villages and killed the 
civilians there.  So when the Bedouins in Beer Seba heard that, they were afraid and ran 
away.  They didn’t have any weapons, they were civilians, but the Jews had so many 
weapons, so when they attacked [a] village they killed people there – old women, 
children, they didn’t care.  The civilians just wanted to save their own lives, so they ran 
away. (Male, 51) 
Others stated that the Palestinians in villages were armed prior to 1948: 
They attacked the town and took weapons from us….  They were just hiding their gold, 
jewelry, weapons, underground, [with the intent] that they will come back soon and take 
it. (Female, 65) 
The Jews were sabotaging and killing and terrifying people… The young people, they 
had weapons, they bought it with their own money, to defend their country. (Male, 64) 
Even if there were armed individuals and groups in Palestine, it is clear that there 
were no organized Palestinian militant groups which withdrew across the border into 
Jordan as a result of the war, a pre-existing faction which could have acted as militancy 
entrepreneurs in the early years. 
WAITING FOR POWERFUL STATES: FEW DEVELOPING IN EXILE 
Likewise, while there were surely individuals who could and would have 
volunteered to take on such roles, few such militant leaders emerged in exile during the 
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1950s.  Those who had an inclination to fight against the enemy in the CoO joined the 
Jordanian military or another Arab army, or operated at the direction of Arab 
governments.  The community was relying on Arab states during this early period to 
resolve the issue on behalf of the refugees: 
They thought that the Arab armies will help them.  The Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi armies 
will help them.  Maximum, many months, and then they will win and return to their 
homes. (Male, 45) 
They were relying on the Arab governments and the leaders.  They were relying on the 
leaders to give them their lands back.  Because we were scattered, homeless, we didn’t 
have any weapons. (Male, 51) 
They just wanted to go back.  They were expecting to hear on the news that everything 
was back to normal so they could go back. (Male, 24) 
Three-quarters of interviewee households which left in 1948 reported that in the early 
years, their families were not aware of political organizations representing the interests 
and rights of Palestinian refugees. 
In the early months and years of their exile, by definition, the refugees’ stay was 
not yet protracted.  Most maintained expectation of imminent return.  Just over 70% of 
households stated that their family believed they would return home in less than a month 
(36%) or less than a year (35%). (cf. Samha 1987)  This expectation gradually evolved 
into an absolute faith in return despite evidence to the contrary.  This became a sacred 
tenet of the Palestinian narrative even while the practical reality of a new life in Jordan 
sank in over the years and decades. 
They were hoping, just hoping…. [Now] they have died without ever going back to 
Palestine.  When they turned 80 or 85, they had no chance to go back.  It was like Satan’s 
dream of going to heaven. (Male, 53) 
They are still hoping to go back.…  My father says that the end is near and the Jews are 
going to leave Palestine, so they are still hoping. (Female, 21) 
Actually at the beginning they didn’t want to buy or own anything.  They had this idea 
because of the promises they were told.  So regardless [whether the promise was] from 
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the UN, Arab governments or European countries… that’s why they didn’t want to own 
any [property].  After a while, they saw that the living conditions in the refugee camp 
didn’t cover their needs.  So they just started to accept the reality.  But they didn’t lose 
the hope to go back. (Male, 28) 
As in the latter household, even though they had the right to buy land or build property in 
Jordan, and land was cheap, many Palestinians refused to do so on principle.  They 
equated purchasing land and property in Jordan as setting down roots and abandoning the 
collective project to return to Palestine, just as many saw King Abdullah’s policies on 
resettling the refugees in Jordan, and the American-led push for UNRWA to develop 
economic integration projects, as directed at protection of Israel through elimination of 
Palestinian rights (Abu-Odeh 1999).  Nearly a quarter of households voluntarily 
mentioned their ancestors’ refusal to put down economic roots: 
We used to ask our dad to buy a land and settle.  He refused because he said we are 
coming back to our land, according to the promises that we used to hear in the news. 
(Female, 54) 
They thought, everybody thought that it’s going to be short-lived, a few months, they’ll 
be back to their houses, their homes… I heard so many stories about other people telling 
them to buy property here in Jordan, and they said, “Why should we?  We’re going back 
to Palestine.” (Male, 43) 
My grandfather was offered to buy this land in Jordan for one cow… but he refused 
because he thought he would go back. (Male, 25) 
Some younger Palestinians today resent what they see as their parents’ and grandparents’ 
stubborn standing on principle to the detriment of their long-term economic welfare.  In 
retrospect, they see such decisions as “living in a dream”.  Some who still don’t own 
property in Jordan blame their ancestors for the poor conditions in which they live today: 
From the 1970s they decided that there was no return.  They woke up and bought land 
and built houses. (Male, 50) 
Lands here were very cheap, but they didn’t buy any land…. But they haven’t gotten 
back to Palestine, so we were affected, because if they had bought lands, our situation 
would have been better….  Other areas in Jordan [were] desert….  People used to think 
that those who bought lands in Shmeisani or Derekh Barr [now the wealthy 
neighborhoods of Amman] are crazy.... (Male, 26) 
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A minority of households contradicted the standard narrative, however, stating that their 
family had no qualms putting down roots in Jordan:  
For me, because my salary was good and I was able to support my family and have a new 
house for me and my family.  So we accepted the reality. (Male, 68) 
I built this house in 1979 or 1980 because I have to settle down.…  I don’t want my 
children to live in camps, this is the reason that I built this house….  This is considered as 
our country, we had to settle… (Male, 64) 
As noted in the previous section, this may have been more common among wealthy 
refugees, including those with the means to meet the property ownership requirement for 
citizenship in Jordan soon after arrival (Brand 1988): 
Really, to tell you the truth, when they first left, a big part of them, people from the 
village who had money bought lands here… and started to build their houses here.  And 
they thought that they’re not going back ever. (Male, 57) 
But to resolve the contradiction, or deny apostasy against the Palestinian narrative, as it 
were, they needed to reconcile the contradiction to themselves and the community.  For 
example, a woman in her 40s related that her mother finally convinced her father that 
“it’s good to believe, but there’s no harm in building in Jordan.  We can come back [to 
Jordan] in the summers.”  Interviewees were often quick to add that they still believe in 
return: 
If I have the money I can buy the house but that does not mean I lost hope.  I still will tell 
my son.  I will write a book about the land.  We are still speaking at occasions about the 
past. (Male, 42) 
If you’re talking about the family ID book or national number, is that against the right to 
go back?  If I build a house here and live in dignity, does that mean I give up the right to 
go back?  If I wear good clothes, does that mean I cannot go back to Palestine?  Haifa, 
Bethlehem, Jerusalem, Tulkarm, all the cities of Palestine are in our hearts from 
generation to generation. (Palestinian activist, male, 30) 
With no local face of Western government on whom to target their demands for 
sustained urgency, many Palestinians projected those demands and fears on the closest 
available alternative, UNRWA.  The aid agency was suspected of being an invention of 
154 
 
the West to keep Palestinians quiescent
142
, which was not far from the original American-
led objective and financing. (Schiff 1995)  Therefore, ironically, beginning in the 1950s, 
every significant attempt by UNRWA to improve living conditions in the camps by 
providing more permanent structures and development projects faced resistance from 
Palestinians, and have sometimes been prevented by their opposition
143
 – even as 
Palestinian refugees became dependent on the aid provided by UNRWA
144
 – because the 
improvement programs were feared to represent a nail in the coffin of the Palestinian 
right of return, further reducing the urgency of their cause.
145
 (Buehrig 1971; Schiff 1995; 
Al Husseini & Bocco 2009)  This suspicion could also be related to the lack of rights 
among refugees, which may explain why the hostility to UNRWA was less severe in 
Jordan, where they enjoy more rights, than in Lebanon: 
Because they have no access to the West, they believe sometimes psychologically that 
UNRWA is the West….  It represents a microcosm of the West, which is responsible for 
their tragedy.  When we introduced the human rights program, they were very skeptical, 
[saying,] “It will damage our traditions and our culture,” [but] later on with some 
clarification of the benefits of the program, things began to settle.  In Lebanon in 
particular, there is the most critical community of UNRWA.  And sometimes in the West 
Bank and Gaza.  These are the most difficult hubs for suffering of the Palestinians.  They 
cannot fight Israel, they can't fight the occupiers, so....  There has not been any violence 
against UNRWA, but they are skeptical of anything that UNRWA does….  There is 
nothing taken in good faith, but [they assume] there must be a political [agenda]: “The 
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 “The Americans decided to make a sort of Marshall Plan for the Middle East… and created 
UNRWA with this dual mandate to, on the one hand, to provide direct relief and on the other 
hand to carry out public works….  That second part of UNRWA’s mission was met with a lot of 
suspicion by the refugees [and] the host countries…  [They saw it as an attempt] to settle them…. 
[The] US is still one of the principle donors of UNRWA… so it’s still seen as in league with US 
foreign policy agendas… in which the US’s strong support for Israel is a well-known fact.  Then, 
there has been over the years always, that sort of concern about how different UNRWA programs 
and activities would be seen in light of the right of refugees to return home eventually….  These 
debates have come up when UNRWA replaced tents in the late 1950s with mud-brick or cement-
brick sheds… again when they were replacing the sub-standard housing units for better shelters 
with a concrete roof; and it came up again when we were involved in a lot of camp reconstruction 
and development programs.  It’s come [up] whenever we’ve had more of a development 
orientation in our work….” (Lex Takkenberg, personal interview, 11/10/10) 
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Westerners do not want to give us anything useful, [so] there must be something behind 




These feelings were also expressed in interviews with some refugees: 
We don’t believe in the UN.  UNRWA was created to keep Israel alive, keep them 
safe….  Since that time, they are the keepers of Israel. (Palestinian activist, male, 36) 
One interviewee even expressed a sentiment that the services provided by UNRWA were 
suspiciously too good for refugees: 
The only one who stood with us was UNRWA.  I believe that this was a creation of the 
Jews to make us patient and make us forget Palestine.  I remember the sweet taste of the 
bread and the kashkawane cheese….  They opened a restaurant for us to eat every day 
and schools for us….  They opened a theater for us, for refugees! (Male, 65) 
 
The relative newness of the refugee situation, the swirling rumors and promises of 
imminent return, the Nasser-led ideology calling for Arab unity to bring the Palestinians 
home in victory and glory, and the ongoing state of conflict and occasional skirmishes 
(and the Suez War) between the Arab states and Israel throughout the 1950s led to a 
feeling among the refugees that their plight is only temporary, an aberration, and 
powerful actors were soon going to restore normality – a feeling which was codified by 
the pledge of the Arab League in 1948 to liberate Palestine. (Abu-Odeh 1999)  There was 
little feeling that their residence in Jordan was the status quo, or that they needed to 
refresh the tree of hope (of the collective project to redeem Palestine) with their own 
independent action.  This sense of anticipation, of waiting for something to happen 
outside of their own initiative, lasted for years.  Although it receded at different times for 
different people, by the early 1960s it was being replaced by a cynicism of Arab 
governments and a growing belief in their own efficacy, as I will discuss in the next 
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East Bank Jordanians began to view Palestinians with wariness and suspect 
loyalty after a Palestinian assassinated King Abdullah I in 1951.  In addition, the 
government declared martial law in 1957, and the mukhabarat intensified their operations 
in Amman, Irbid and the West Bank. (Abu-Odeh 1999)  Nonetheless, there was 
substantial political opportunity for militarization during this first period of the 
Palestinians’ exile in Jordan.  The refugee camps and communities were not securitized 
by the host state, and the Jordanian internal state security apparatus was still relatively 
weak.
147
  The refugees had freedom of movement and assembly, and ample political 
space to organize, if they so chose, except for a brief period from 1957-58, when some 
Palestinian leaders were imprisoned and political organizations shut down
148
 as part of 
the monarchy’s crackdown following an alleged
149
 foiled coup.  In addition, despite 
overtures by the Jordanian monarchy in the late 1940s and 1950s to make a separate 
peace with Israel (Abu-Odeh 1999), the host state and CoO remained officially in a state 
of war.  Israel’s border defenses in the early years were still weak and porous – even an 
“open frontier” (Sicker 1989, p. 110) – especially given that they were drawn artificially 
along a land border without a natural geographic divide such as the Jordan River, as 
would occur in 1967; and international engagement was directed at peacemaking between 
state governments, not non-state groups such as the Palestinians. 
The only explanation policymakers and scholars usually mention (often with 
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 Aruri (1972) states that evidence of the coup was never demonstrated by the Jordanian 
authorities, but was a convenient justification for shutting down the leftist opposition and 
instituting martial law. 
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condescension) to explain the lack of militarization among Palestinians since 1971 is 
Black September, i.e., lack of opportunity.  Yet this one-dimensional explanation fails to 
explain why Palestinians did not militarize from 1948 to 1963, when political opportunity 
was mostly available. 
Conflict resources 
It is impossible to answer a counterfactual question – if they had attempted to 
militarize, would they have found available conflict resources? – but some indicators are 
available.  First, some of the sources of military equipment which would later supply the 
Palestinian guerrillas in the late 1960s, including many neighboring Arab states, were 
also present in the 1950s, though in different form.  It was not until 1963 that both Syria 
and Iraq experienced Ba’athist coups; but throughout the 1950s they were antagonistic to 
Israel, and both had fought Israel in the 1948 War; they may have been willing to provide 
military supplies to Palestinians.  It is unknown whether Nasser, who sought to project 
Egypt as the champion of the Palestinian cause, would have supported a non-state actor 
in Jordan to undertake a role which he saw as his own; on the other hand, relations were 
strained between Jordan and Egypt, so it is quite possible that a Palestinian client in 
Jordan would have suited Nasser well.  The Soviet Union began supporting Arab states in 
the 1950s, and it too may have been willing to send arms and supplies to Palestinians. 
Although they may not have had the capability to prevent militarization in the 
1950s, it is doubtful that the Jordanian government itself would have actively supported a 
Palestinian militant organization in that period, when King Abdullah, and later King 
Hussein, were making clandestine efforts to smooth relations and some speculate even 
broker a peace treaty with Israel.  The monarchy saw itself as the leader of the Palestinian 
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people, so it is unlikely they would have abetted militarization. 
Finally, humanitarian aid was available through UNRWA, which could have 
relieved militants of caring for their dependents; militants also could probably have 
diverted at least some of UNRWA’s resources, including food, medicines and 
organizational supplies, to their purposes.  On the other hand, this may not have been as 
easy as it sounds, since UNRWA’s western donors were wary even in those early years of 
their aid being diverted for non-humanitarian purposes and used against Israel; the 
agency was bound “by its UN status not to participate in or contribute to any military 
activities.” (Schiff 1995, p. 103) 
Little militarization 
During the 1950s there were scattered, uncoordinated border raids from Jordan 
(the West Bank) into Israel (Glubb 1954), but they were “for the most part unstable and 
ineffective.” (Sicker 1989, p. 111)  There was a distinct impression among Palestinian 
interviewees that their elders were politically naïve and passive when they left Palestine.  
Some added a normative dimension to this observation, blaming elders for their 
cowardice and naiveté, and declared that they would have made better decisions if they 
had been in that situation: 
If I had been in Jerusalem [with my family] I would have fought until I died. (Male, 68) 
As a young generation, we blame our grandparents’ generation, that they shouldn’t have 
left, they should have stayed there.  But they say, “If you had been there, you would have 
done the same.”  That… the Israeli gangs, they used to kill and rape women, and to 
destroy lands and shoot people there in Palestine…. (Palestinian activist, male, 30) 
The best way [for my grandparents to achieve their rights]?  The best way was that they 
didn’t leave in the first place. (Female, 22) 
More interviewees mentioned the passivity, ignorance and naivety of their elders, but did 
not go so far as to blame them: 
159 
 
When the Jews came to Palestine, people were very simple, so they didn’t know what to 
do.  Even after that, to talk about politics, they didn’t know how to do that, or who to 
represent them, they didn’t know. (Male, 27) 
My father and grandfather were uneducated.  There was ignorance, but now, in this time, 
the Palestinians are the most educated people in the world.  So if we were educated, we 
wouldn't have left. (Male, 72) 
They didn’t [even] know that they had lost something in Palestine.  They were just 
waiting to go back…. (Male, 26) 
The ignorance and passivity of the older generation, and – as seen through the eyes of 
later generations – the lack of attachment to Palestine which is suggested by their 
perceived meek departure, is seen as a stain which must be counterbalanced by fervent 
attachment to Palestine now.
150
  This sometimes leads to contradictions even within one 
family: 
(Husband:)  They were illiterate, uneducated. 
(Wife:)  They had a hope that one day they would be able to go back to their country. And 
maybe some of the other countries could help them do that. 
(Husband:)  They didn’t know anything about politics. 
(Wife:)  They told their children about their country, that’s why [the later generations] 
love it. 
(Husband:)  My son doesn’t know anything about Palestine, except a few stories I told 
him. 
(Wife:)  So the children love it, even though they haven’t seen it.... My young sons... have 
objectives to go back to Palestine, see Palestine…  
(Male, 53; Female, 47) 
 
The refugees’ top priority in the early years was to return to the land through 
reliance on Arab leaders, with less regard for how it was achieved, i.e., through war or 
negotiations.  When asked, as an open-ended question, to describe what their ancestors 
believed at that time was the best way to address their grievances and achieve their rights, 
only 28% said they believed that fighting was the best way.  One-third said simply to 
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return home, and 23% said it was impossible to address their grievances.
151
  Even among 
those who said “fight”, they appeared to be referring to war by the Arab states, not 
necessarily the refugees themselves.  Overall, there was a feeling of political passivity: 
They were just waiting for the governments or organizations to help them go back to their 
country in negotiations. (Male, 29) 
They had no power, what could they do?  They couldn’t do anything. (Female, 60) 
There was a big hope to come back because it’s their country, their homeland.  The 
media… were telling lies about being able to return.  The radio stations were telling lies.  
The UN sent mediators to tell us we are coming back.  It’s like anesthesia. (Male, 65) 
They were very sad but they were still hoping to return to Palestine after 1 month or 
maximum 1 year.  They believed and had big hope in the Arab army, their “saviors”.  But 
the Arabs are the ones who let the Palestinians down.  If Palestinians had depended on 
themselves, the Zionists would not have won.... (Male, 53) 
Within Jordan, there was little intent to militarize; the focus was on return under 
the banner of the victorious Arab armies: 
I just wanted to go back.  There was no resistance, nothing.  Now the resistance is 
something new.  Before that, there was no resistance.  They used to distract us with the 
supplies and the clothes, so we were just hoping to go back. (Male, 70) 
Conclusion 
During the first fifteen years of the Palestinians’ exile in Jordan, there was almost 
no militarization by the refugees.  As summarized in Figure 3 below, the refugees had a 
collective project to redeem the homeland, but some of the refugees were 
socioeconomically integrated to Jordan and therefore less inclined to actually militarize; 
while even those who were less integrated did not militarize because there were few 
militancy entrepreneurs: no pre-existing group withdrew into exile together with 
civilians, and few such entrepreneurs emerged in exile due to the fact that most 
Palestinians were waiting expectantly for the Arab states to bring them home in victory.  
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Therefore, it was irrelevant that political opportunities (as well as conflict resources) 
were available for militarization. 
 
 





CHAPTER 6: Palestinians in Jordan, 1964 to 1970 
 
The Palestinian refugees in Jordan began militarizing in 1964 and gained 
significant momentum following the 1967 War, culminating in the civil war and Black 
September in 1970, and the expulsion of the Palestinian militants from Jordan in 1970-
71.  There also was a fresh influx of Palestinian refugees to Jordan in 1967 from the West 
Bank and Gaza, part of them having experienced their second expulsion.  In this chapter I 
will demonstrate that all variables in the proposed framework were present during this 
period, although their attachment to land in the CoO, which had been mostly economic in 
the earlier period, shifted toward a political attachment with the rise of Palestinian 
nationalism. 
Collective project 
WAR OF EXCLUSION WITH A CLEAR ENEMY 
Those who arrived in 1967 or shortly thereafter, either as first-time or second-
time refugees (n = 39 households), were again fleeing a war of exclusion from the same 
clearly defined enemy.  They related stories of threat similar to those told of the 1948 
War, fleeing both from direct threats… 
[In 1948] we left Jaffa and went to Qalqilya, they followed us there, they were attacking 
Qalqilya, too, and they tore half of it down in 1967… because they wanted people to 
leave.... I remember, the battle of 1967 started… they were attacking us with cannon, so 
the people ran away to the mountains near Qalqilya, and there were trees there, we stayed 
for two to three weeks in the mountains. (Male, 65) 
Of course, they were attacked and their house was torn down, and they were hiding in 
holes underground, and after that they came to Jordan. (Female, 20) 
and indirect threats… 




The Israeli occupation expanded to Gaza, Golan, Sinai…. The terror that had happened in 
1948 stayed in people’s minds, so they were very afraid that it will happen again, so they 
left and went to Amman.  We heard that the Jews were coming to Gaza. (Male, 65) 
and like the wealthy in 1947-48, some left due to a general fear of the impending conflict: 
They didn’t leave because of force, when the situation was really bad; no, [they left] 
when they felt that the situation was going to get bad… as normal travel. (Female, 21) 
When we were leaving we didn’t know anything, we thought we were going on a picnic.  
But after that we began to understand what happened to us.  We were going on a picnic 
with sheep and with our friends.  As a [thirteen-year-old] kid, this is what I thought. 
(Male, 57) 
They felt that Jericho won’t be safe because of the war, so that’s why they left to Jordan. 
(Male, 32) 
Like those who had arrived in 1948, 81%
152
 of those who arrived in 1967 or shortly 
thereafter reported that they fled due to a direct or indirect threat.  Almost all blamed 
Israel for their exile and suffering, but, as in 1948, some also blamed their elders for their 
passivity and naiveté: 
People were very passive, they didn’t know the Jews were coming and would take our 
country.  In 1948 and 1967, it’s the same tragedy repeating itself. (Female, 38) 
Among the refugees who arrived in 1948, the 1967 War and the new influx of 
refugees eastward across the Jordan River rekindled memories of suffering during their 
own exodus, which was perceived to be on the basis of their shared group identity, 
refreshing their shared sense of injustice and the collective project. 
ETHNONATIONALIST MOVEMENT 
The Palestinian national movement gained traction throughout the 1960s, as the 
pan-Arabist movement was declining in momentum and popularity, starting with the 
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founding of Fatah by Palestinians (ex Gaza) in Kuwait in 1959.
153
  The first Palestinian 
National Congress, a creation of Nasser’s, led to the founding of the PLO in 1964.  This 
followed a crucial formative period of national identity development in exile in the 1950s 
(Brand 1988), as discussed in the previous chapter.  In Jordan, the establishment of the 
PLO “confused” those who were already sentimentally attached to the Hashemite regime, 
and prevented the development of identity-based attachment to the Jordanian state in 
others. (Abu-Odeh 1999, p. 112)  Palestinian nationalism received a further boost from 
the Arab League’s 1965 passage of the Casablanca Protocol, which offered (nominally) 




The spectacular failure of the Arab militaries in the 1967 War, including Jordan’s, 
led to not only a feeling of ethnonationalist self-help, as I will discuss below, but a strong 
feeling of Palestinian identity which spread among the refugees, coinciding with a 
decrease in Jordanian identity: 
There were fedayeen here in this camp.  [My family] was helping them.  Because back in 
Palestine they weren’t able to do anything to defend their lands, so here they wanted to 
help the fedayeen….  They were thinking that they’re Palestinians, not Jordanians, and 
they wanted to help Palestinians so they could go back to Palestine.  During the war they 
just wanted to help by any means, so they can get back to Palestine because this is not 
their country. (Male, 32) 
This was the case even among Palestinians who had migrated out of the region: Those in 
the upper and upper-middle classes who had migrated to wealthy western countries after 
1948 had squelched their Palestinian origins, then experienced a surge of identity and 
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political activism following the 1967 War.
155
 
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC BASE 
Those who arrived to Jordan in 1967 and were living in camps experienced a 
marked decrease in their standard of living from where they had been living prior to the 
1967 War.  Like those who arrived in 1948, almost two-thirds of the refugees who came 
to Jordan in 1967 were felaheen before their first expulsion.  Naazihiin who had stayed 
on their land and continued to work as felaheen after the 1948 War experienced the same 
dislocation from an agricultural economic base to a non-agricultural base (cf. Samha 
1987) as had those who arrived in 1948: 
Because they were felaheen, they had their own land and business.  Maybe some people 
were working in the security or army, but very few.  I think they didn’t work as 
employees in companies or government [in Palestine] because most of them had land and 
they worked in the land.  So now we [became] employees, we have jobs. (Female, 21) 
They told me that they were very poor, deprived….  They were felaheen.  When they 
came to Jordan they worked in construction – quarry. (Female, 38) 
Also like those who arrived in 1948, 44% of households who arrived to the East 
Bank in 1967 gave descriptions of life in Palestine prior to departure which were vague 
and glorified the felaheen lifestyle.  Another 3% were likewise glorified but detailed, and 
33% described it as a simple agricultural life, without glorification.  Also like their 
brethren who crossed the Jordan River nearly two decades earlier, the new arrivals 
brought little or nothing with them (90%), and about the same proportion reported that 
their family abandoned their land and house in the CoO.  Approximately the same 
proportion also cited land and property as their family’s primary concern at the time of 
departure. 
Gazans have unique considerations when comparing their living conditions to 
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Living conditions were better in Gaza – because Gaza is in southern Palestine.  It’s better 
because it’s on the shore, there is trade, fishing, and there is good agriculture, and there 
are food and vegetables everywhere.  There was trade between Gaza and Egypt.  But here 
it’s like – surrounded by mountains and the resources are limited.  It was a very good life 
in Gaza, we had a very good life. (Male, 65) 
… but even their life in Jordan relative to a certain non-Gazan Palestinian neighbor with 
their life in Palestine relative to the same neighbor: 
In Gaza, it’s normal, you’re a citizen there, you can work, be a policeman, engineer, 
teacher, lawyer, whatever you want….  I see the Jordanian citizens [of Palestinian origin] 
living in their own lands… and they have money and can work,  and I don’t have 
anything compared to them.  In Palestine I used to be more rich than him: He has 20 or 
30 dunams (5-7 acres) and in Palestine I used to have 200 dunams (49 acres). (Male, 63) 
For the refugees who arrived to the East Bank in 1948, however, who continued 
to constitute the overwhelming majority of the Palestinian population even after 1967, the 
practical importance of the agricultural economic base in the CoO had begun to fade in 
the 15-20 years since they arrived.  Most had adjusted to the new economic situation, and 
the second generation had been educated in Jordan.  For the families who arrived in 1948, 
therefore, their attachment to the land of Palestine had begun to shift from a practical 
economic one to a political one.  Along with the marked increase in Palestinian identity 
and nationalism after the 1967 War, as discussed in the previous section, the portrayals of 
the felaheen lifestyle in Palestine pre-1948 became even more romanticized: 
This is a joke among the Palestinians: An old person is talking to a young person in a 
refugee camp.  He says, “Back in Palestine I was [in such a good condition] and now I’m 
[in such a poor condition]…”  The young person asks, “Was that cat a tiger in Palestine?”  
After '67 this [romanticization] really took off. (Riad al Khouri, personal interview, 
4/27/11) 
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This variable did not change from the 1948-1963 period. 
 
In sum, during this second period of the Palestinians’ exile in Jordan, there was 
still a widespread collective project to redeem the homeland.  However, unlike in the first 
period, the refugees’ attachment to the land of the CoO had begun to shift from a 
primarily economic attachment to a political one (except for nazihiin, who were newly 
displaced from their land after 1967).  The political attachment was reflected in the rise of 
Palestinian nationalism and collapse of pan-Arabism, especially after the dismal failure 
by the armies of Jordan, Egypt and Syria in the 1967 War. 
Socioeconomic integration and marginalization 
RIGHTS IN THE HOST STATE 
The rights and citizenship status of those refugees who arrived in 1948 remained 
unchanged in the 1964-1970 period, leading to most Palestinians’ growing integration 
into the Jordanian economy and polity.  In fact, by the late 1960s, some Palestinians had 
risen to high ranks in the Jordanian military. (Abu-Odeh 1999)  The 265,000
157
 naazihiin 
and double refugees who fled from the West Bank to the East Bank in 1967 and shortly 
thereafter continued to enjoy the rights and citizenship which they had obtained while the 
West Bank was under Jordanian control.  However, in the broader picture, the project of 
socioeconomic integration was put on hold with the emergence of the PLO in 1964, 
which led to a period of confusion regarding representation of the Palestinian people. (Al-
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Quds Center 2009) 
Gazans 
The significant exception to the increasing integration was the Gazans, those 
Palestinians who had fled to Gaza in 1948, while it was under Egyptian control, then to 
Jordan in 1967 or soon thereafter.  The number of Gazans who arrived in 1967 is 
unknown
158
, but they (including the children of Gazan males) are currently estimated at 
120,000 - 200,000.  Due to the resistance of East Bank tribes to granting citizenship to 
more Palestinians, and the interest of the PLO in preventing integration of refugees to 
host states, the Gazans were placed into a special residence regime in which they 
received “temporary” passports (now two years’ duration) without citizenship.  The 
Gazans had limited rights after they arrived in 1967, but at least maintained parity with 
non-Gazan refugees in terms of social services, including competitive access to tertiary 
education, until Jordan’s disengagement from the West Bank in 1988. (Al-Quds Center 
2009) 
Like other foreigners in Jordan, Gazans are not eligible for nationals’ tuition rates 
at public universities – which are half the rate charged to foreigners – nor national health 
insurance.  They cannot own real property, and are officially limited to owning one 
private and two business vehicles; if they wish to buy a house or more vehicles, it must 
be registered in the name of a waqil, a trusted friend or relative who has Jordanian 
citizenship. They cannot open a bank account in their own name.  They are barred from 
government employment.  They are not allowed to work in a number of professional 
capacities such as doctors, lawyers, accountants and pharmacists, and even some menial 
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occupations like drivers.  As one Gazan stated in a 2007 focus group, “Ironically, the 
Gazan, with his temporary passport can apply and work abroad as a Jordanian but cannot 
enjoy this luxury in Jordan itself!” (Quoted in Al-Quds Center 2009, p. 55)  Even as of 
2011, the main camp for Gazans, Jerash Camp, lacked a sewage system, and many 
houses in the camp still had a tin roof rather than concrete.  Internet was connected to the 
camp for the first time in 2011.  For males, these policies can make it difficult to find a 
bride
159
, since, due to the patrilineal system in Jordan, Gazan females can acquire 
citizenship through their husband but not vice versa. 
Gazans don’t have any rights, they can’t work, can’t own anything. But with Jordanian 
citizenship, it’s different….  I’m telling the truth, people from Gaza… don’t have any 
rights.  For example, [my wife's] sister is married to a Gazan guy.  He doesn’t have 
anything.  But if he wants to buy anything, it’s under my sister’s name.  The car, house, 
everything.  Even the electricity bill. (Male, 53) 
We are not allowed to work in government offices, hotels, tourism institutions, 
municipalities… accounting… even as a nurse….  We cannot study in public 
universities….  I studied in Iraq….  My sister’s average is 99.7% and she couldn’t study 
anything [in a university] here….  The people who have cancer can’t be treated for free at 
the cancer center.  As I said, we can’t own anything.  That’s why I’m renting.  I can’t 
have anything in my name....  They just want to put more restrictions on us.  It affects 
people psychologically….  There are no services here in the camp.  No sewage, no 
hospital; we [only] have the UNRWA clinic.  There’s not enough medicine for 
everyone….  It has affected education.  From 7 to 17 years old, the school dropout rate is 
6.5% in Amman, but 14% here....  We just want the simplest rights….  We want to be 
treated as other Jordanians, as other citizens. We wish that we will be able to have rights 
like other people. (Male, 36) 
When a Gazan publicly engages in political activity in Jordan, they are subject to even 
more restrictions: 
None of my children have a [Jordanian] ID, and the reason is that I have political 
attachment.  This is their “crime”.  When they went to the Ministry of Interior, they asked 
to see me and said, “The difficulty for your children is you.”….  Yes, [my family has 
even] less rights than other Gazans.  People from Gaza have a temporary passport for 2 
years, but anyone who has political attachment is not allowed to have this passport.  
When I went for an interview they told me that I am a guest here and can’t have political 
attachments in this country because “you’re a guest”.  Even though it’s the right of 
anyone in the world to have political attachments in any country, this is a human right.  
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[What political attachment do you have?]  To the Muslim Brotherhood. (Male, 53) 
There is little evidence available for the impact of these restrictions in the first 
few years of the Gazans’ residence in Jordan, but in the next chapter I will discuss their 
impact on Gazans’ current attitudes. 
Institutions to address grievances through the host state 
The degree of democracy or authoritarianism in the Jordanian regime did not 
change in any meaningful way during the period 1964-1970. (Marshall & Jaggers 2011)  
Even though they maintained the ability to elect representatives to Parliament, the 
Palestinians continued to have no means to achieve policy change except in accordance 
with the monarchy’s will.  Theoretically, this could lead to increased motivation for self-
help, and perhaps it did.  However, even if Jordan had been democratic, it is doubtful that 
the refugees would have sought representation of their cause through the Jordanian state, 
following the humiliation of Jordan in the 1967 War, which had led to the loss of the last 
Palestinian territory to their enemy, including the holy city of Jerusalem. 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
For most of the Palestinian refugees, their employment opportunities and standard 
of living continued to gradually improve over the 1960s.  The 1948 refugees, particularly 
those not living in camps, were less directly affected by the 1967 War: 
We didn’t have anything [left in Palestine] to be affected by the war…  They had left 
everything behind, they didn’t have anything [there]. (Male, 26) 
However, like the refugees who lived in tents in 1948, those who arrived to camps in 
1967 experienced many of the same hardships
160
: 
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they didn’t live in a camp.” (Female, 20) 
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This camp, we were kids, we were living in tents.  There were dirt [floors].  And in the 
winter there were muddy areas because of the rain.  You had to wear boots, and shared 
bathrooms, and there was no [running] water.  My mother would carry water three 
kilometers. (Male, 48) 
The suffering….  To live in a tent, and having many kids and only one person who 
works. When we lived in the tents, the snow was around us. (Female, 70) 
Of course, the Gazans experienced even fewer employment opportunities as a result of 
the unique restrictions of their residency regime. 
Not only the new arrivals were economically affected by the war, but also those 
who had arrived in 1948 and were still living in camps.  They suddenly found their camps 
and schools overcrowded and overwhelmed: 
We were affected, we suffered….  We saw how the camps were full again of tents, and… 
when I was in school, they stopped school, and the school was full of people.  I was in a 
school next to my house and we used to give them food and our own clothes, water, and 
when we went and saw how messy was the situation, we were really disappointed. 
(Female, 54) 
Really, it affected us a lot because it was a big burden on us…. So many people left 
Palestine to come here to Jordan, so we had to split everything again, even the bread. 
(Male, 57) 
Resources were stretched thin, and employment opportunities in the East Bank became 
more scarce after the war, as hundreds of thousands of new residents sought employment. 
In the aggregate, however, Jordan was more developed in the late 1960s than it 
had been in 1948, and there were more, and more varied, employment opportunities 
available to Palestinians, including industrial and professional positions, especially for 
the younger generation who were achieving higher levels of education than their parents. 
ETHNIC CONSANGUINITY 
This variable did not change from the 1948-63 period. 
 
The economic segmentation of the refugee group continued, with many of those 
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arriving during and after 1967 refreshing the ranks of the socioeconomically 
marginalized in camps.  A significant minority of them, the Gazans, were subjected to a 
different residency regime with substantially less rights.  Hundreds of thousands of 
refugees, including both those who had arrived in 1948 and 1967, were living in camps 
by the end of the 1960s, although as Amman grew it began to subsume the two largest 
suburban camps, Hussein and Wihdat – inhabited primarily by those who had arrived in 
1948 – and slowly transforming them from standalone refugee camps into urban slums.  
Most of the camps built from 1967-1969 were intentionally placed farther away from city 
centers, which further reinforced the socioeconomic marginalization of the 1967 arrivals. 
On the other hand, many of the Palestinians who arrived in 1948 had experienced 
a degree of upward social mobility over the prior two decades, as continued rights and 
citizenship had facilitated their economic development, transition and integration into the 
Jordanian economy and polity.  For those living outside of camps, political objections to 
buying land and building a house in Jordan had mostly subsided.  Recollections of life in 
Palestine pre-1948 grew even more romanticized while a practical hope of return was 
pushed farther out of reach by Israel’s sweeping victory in 1967. 
Militancy entrepreneurs 
PRE-EXISTING 
It is not quite accurate to call the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) a “pre-
existing” militancy organization, since it was founded in Jerusalem at a meeting of Arab 
states under Nasser’s leadership with the agreement of King Hussein
161
 in 1964 – long 
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after the arrival of Palestinians in Jordan.  Nonetheless, that leadership did enter Jordan as 
an external group, separate from the masses of civilians, so it is more reasonable to 
classify them in the “pre-existing” category than as one emerging in exile. 
Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) were the two 
largest groups within the PLO umbrella, but the PLO’s original conservative leadership 
never imagined guerrilla activity, independent of the Arab states, as its primary means; 
the most active military role they expected was as a Palestinian army fighting alongside, 
and under the leadership of, Arab armies. (Brand 1988; cf. Sicker 1989)  Increasingly 
disillusioned by the failure of Arab states to fulfill their promise of redeeming the 
Palestinian homeland, and especially following the humiliating defeat of Arab armies by 
Israel in 1967, Fatah became emboldened in taking resistance against Israel into its own 
hands.  It gained status and legitimacy following their claimed victory
162
 against an 
Israeli incursion into Jordan in the 1968 Karameh War, and recruitment in Jordan soared 
(Brand 1988; Lischer 2005; Al Abed 2004; Dumper 2008) “as the Palestinians 
recognized that the Arab states would not solve their problems for them.” (Schiff 1995, p. 
69)  Yasser Arafat said after the battle: 
What we have done is to make the world... realize that the Palestinian is no longer 
refugee number so and so, but the member of a people who hold the reins of their own 
destiny and are in a position to determine their own future….  Now that they carry rifles 
the situation has changed. (Quoted in Hirst 2003, p. 428) 
Their alleged success at Karameh helped them gain control over the PLO in 1969, under 
the leadership of Arafat, freeing the PLO of control by Arab governments.  As a result, 
from 1967 to 1987, the center of gravity of Palestinian resistance was outside the CoO. 
(Sayigh 1997) 
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The dominant Palestinian parties in Jordan in the 1960s and 1970s, including 
Fatah and PFLP, were secular, leftist and even Marxist-Leninist, and they mobilized at 
the grassroots level.163  The Fatah leadership, many of whom had lower-middle class and 
camp backgrounds themselves, used ideological frames to reject the legitimacy of their 
enemy in the CoO and mobilize the refugees by using language which tapped into their 
feelings of injustice, identity and longing for the homeland.  They promoted the idea that 
the Palestinians could no longer rely on Arab states to provide their redemption, but must 
rely only on themselves. (Matar 2011)  These were powerful and effective devices which 
“provided a vicarious release for the frustration of the masses in face of the disaster they 
were led into by the Arab governments.” (Sicker 1989, p. 128)  I will demonstrate the use 
of these frames with the PLO’s 1964 Charter
164
.  First of all, it defines (and constructs) 
the Palestinian people: 
The Palestinians are those Arab citizens who were living normally in Palestine up to 
1947, whether they remained or were expelled. Every child who was born to a Palestinian 
Arab father after this date, whether in Palestine or outside, is a Palestinian. 
Next, it binds the Palestinian people to the disputed territory using ethnosymbology to 
stake their primordial claim to it: 
We, the Palestinian Arab people, who waged fierce and continuous battles to safeguard 
its homeland, to defend its dignity and honor, and who offered all through the years 
continuous caravans of immortal martyrs…. has the legitimate right to its homeland…. 
It promotes in-group unity by espousing a dominant ethnonationalist identity and 
rejecting sub-national identities… 
Article 8: Bringing up Palestinian youth in an Arab and nationalist manner is a 
fundamental national duty. All means of guidance, education and enlightenment should 
be utilized to introduce the youth to its homeland in a deep spiritual way that will 
constantly and firmly bind them together. 
                                                          
163
 Geraldine Chatelard, social anthropologist, personal interview, 12/9/10 
164
 The succeeding quotes are taken from the website of the Permanent Observer Mission of 
Palestine to the United Nations. 
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Article 9: Ideological doctrines, whether political, social, or economic, shall not distract 
the people of Palestine from the primary duty of liberating their homeland. All 
Palestinian[s] constitute one national front and work with all their feelings and material 
potentialities to free their homeland. 
… and supra-national identities: 
Article 11: The Palestinian people firmly believe in Arab unity, and in order to play its 
role in realizing this goal, it must, at this stage of its struggle, preserve its Palestinian 
personality and all its constituents. It must strengthen the consciousness of its existence 
and stance and stand against any attempt or plan that may weaken or disintegrate its 
personality. 
It identifies, delegitimizes and demonizes the enemy “other” against whom the 
Palestinian people are locked in struggle: 
We, the Palestinian Arab people, who faced the forces of evil, injustice and aggression, 
against whom the forces of international Zionism and colonialism conspire and worked to 
displace it, dispossess it from its homeland and property, abused what is holy in it and 
who in spite of all this refused to weaken or submit. 
… 
Article 18: The Balfour Declaration, the Palestine Mandate System, and all that has been 
based on them are considered null and void. The claims of historic and spiritual ties 
between Jews and Palestine are not in agreement with the facts of history or with the true 
basis of sound statehood. Judaism, because it is a divine religion, is not a nationality with 
independent existence. Furthermore, the Jews are not one people with an independent 
personality because they are citizens to their states. 
Article 19: Zionism is a colonialist movement in its inception, aggressive and 
expansionist in its goal, racist in its configurations, and fascist in its means and aims…. 
It argues that the Palestinian national cause is grounded in justice: 
We, the Palestinian Arab people, based on our right of self-defense and the complete 
restoration of our lost homeland – a right that has been recognized by international 
covenants and common practices including the Charter of the United Nations – and in 
implementation of the principles of human rights…. 
Finally, it offers Palestinians the chance to claim agency and redeem their homeland 
through militarization: 
We, the Palestinian Arab people, who believe in its Arabism and in its right to regain its 
homeland, to realize its freedom and dignity, and who have determined to amass its 
forces and mobilize its efforts and capabilities in order to continue its struggle and to 




However, since the Charter was drawn up under the auspices of Arab states, led 
by Nasser and his pan-Arabist ideology – and since, in 1964, most Palestinians still 
maintained some hope that the Arab states would help them redeem their homeland, 
which was at that time a more logical idea than expecting to accomplish it alone –
references to “Arabism” and the “Arab nation”, rather than only Palestinians, were 
included.  Article 14 offered an explicit appeal for external assistance, with “the 
Palestinian peoples being in the forefront”, from the broader Arab nation: 
The liberation of Palestine, from an Arab viewpoint, is a national duty. Its responsibilities 
fall upon the entire Arab nation, governments and peoples, the Palestinian peoples being 
in the forefront. For this purpose, the Arab nation must mobilize its military, spiritual and 
material potentialities; specifically, it must give to the Palestinian Arab people all 
possible support and backing and place at its disposal all opportunities and means to 
enable them to perform their role in liberating their homeland. 
When the official discourse of the PLO was combined with their first militant 
strikes against Israel in 1965, the refugees in Jordan gradually began to see the PLO as 
their agent and representative.
165
  The PLO achieved the right to speak at the United 
Nations in 1965, though it did not receive formal recognition as the representative of the 
Palestinian people by Arab states and the UN until nearly a decade later.  Nonetheless, in 
the late 1960s and the 1970s, the fedayeen became a symbol of the Palestinian nation and 
identity, “the centre of a constructed heroic national narrative of steadfastness, struggle 
and resistance.  Armed struggle became the central element of the ‘imagined community’ 
of the Palestinians.” (Matar 2011, p. 94)  
The PLO deliberately chose not to interfere in the internal politics of Jordan – in 
fact, it explicitly stated in Article 26 of its 1964 Charter that it will not interfere in the 
internal politics of any Arab state – and as a result did not attempt to form linkages with 
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East Bank Jordanian political forces.  While this may have helped the PLO avoid 
accusations of overstepping its bounds, it also “made it easier for the King's army to 
defeat them” in 1970. (Hudson 1997, p. 253)  However, there were some individual East 
Bank Jordanians who joined the PLO.
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In addition to the PLO leadership, some Palestinian combatant refugees arrived 
from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967: 
My father came here to Jordan two weeks before us.  He escaped from the [Israeli] 
soldiers….  [He was fighting in Gaza and came] here with the Fatah party…. (Palestinian 
activist, male, 49) 
NO LONGER WAITING FOR POWERFUL STATES 
After the 1967 War, the sentiment regarding the Palestinian refugees throughout 
the Arab world, including among the refugees themselves, underwent a dramatic 
reorientation.  The Arab states “gradually accepted Israel and began to search for ways of 
disengaging from the conflict” (Abu-Odeh 1999, p. 152), while the idea quickly took 
hold that the Palestinian people are responsible for their own redemption: 
They stayed here in the camps and after the Arab armies lost the war… those refugees 
started to make some resistance.  In order to defend [themselves] and fight Israel…. The 
Palestinians felt disappointed, so they started to do something for themselves.... (Female, 
21) 
The dismal performance of the Arab states in the war, including Jordan, sparked anger 
and indignation among the refugees, who felt betrayed: 
The Arab governments and armies gave up in six hours, not six days…. It’s treason, the 
Arab armies are traitors, they didn’t fight in 1967, the Arab leaders gave it to Israel 
without even fighting. (Male, 65) 
Jordan’s loss of control over the West Bank also opened up for discussion the question of 
Palestinian secession from the East Bank, which was vigorously opposed by Jordan. 
(Abu-Odeh 1999)  This was one element of the conscious politicization of the refugee 
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public after the war: 
[Because of] the '67 War we became politically educated, my parents and uncles, from a 
really young age they started to analyze politics, and they knew about the peace process, 
so they were really older than their age when it comes to these matters, so I think it gave 
them a better education when it comes to politics. (Female, 21) 
In contrast to the spectacular failure of the Arab states in the 1967 War, which 
was the final blow to the hopes that had been pinned on state-led pan-Arabism, the 
fedayeen offered renewed hope of redemption, even of a pan-Arabist cooperation, this 
time under the leadership of Palestinians: 
Fedayeen gave us hope, ninety-five percent certainty that we’re going to liberate 
Palestine… The 1970 War made us disappointed.  [Before 1970] there were so many 
fighters: Syrians, Jordanians, Lebanese, Egyptians.  They gave us hope that Arabs are all 
united….  Yes, even Jordanians were helping the fedayeen… against Israel. (Male, 63) 
For naazihiin, of course, the duration of their refugee situation was new, and 
many experienced the same early expectations of quick return as had those who arrived in 
1948: 
We got married before 1967 and lived in Nablus.  When the war started, we fled to the 
mountains, then when things got easier we went to Amman.  We left everything in 
Nablus, thinking we’ll be back soon…. (Female, 60) 
For the laaji’in (those who fled their homes in 1948), who were the vast majority 
of the Palestinian population, by 1964 the duration of stay in Jordan had become a 
protracted situation.  The second generation had already grown to teenagers in exile.  
There was an increasing perception that their cause had dropped off the international 
agenda, and was no longer seen as an urgent issue demanding resolution: In fact, the 
years of 1948-64 later became known as the “lost years” because “Palestine seemed to 
have disappeared from the regional political map and from international public discourse, 
as an independent actor and as a people….” (Matar 2011, p. 59)  This was compounded 
by the failures of the Arab states in the 1967 War and the widespread feeling of self-help, 
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as discussed above. 
The 1967 War led many refugees to conclude that they would not be able to 
return to Palestine in the foreseeable future, which marked a significant shift from the 
practical hope that had been maintained throughout the 1950s and early 1960s: 
It was a great disaster.  It affected us more than what happened in 1948.  Before that, I 
had hoped to go back 70%, but after that it went down to 5%. (Male, 70) 
They stopped dreaming of going back – it was really hard [to think of] going back.  
Before 1967 they could go to the West Bank and buy stuff, but afterwards they couldn’t. 
(Male, 37) 
They were more depressed and more hopeless.  It’s like saying, “You will never go 
back.” (Female, 20) 
 
The loss of practical hope of return among the 1948 refugees, combined with the 
arrival of the PLO, the wholesale failure of the Arab states in the 1967 War, and the 
alleged success of the fedayeen in the 1968 Karameh War, led to a profound shift in the 
attitudes of Palestinians in Jordan.  In short, they largely turned away from reliance on 
powerful Arab states to redeem the homeland on their behalf, and instead adopted a 
widespread belief in self-help, the necessity of taking their own independent action to 
achieve their collective project. 
Political opportunities 
As in the first period of their exile, the political opportunities for militarization 
were mostly still present from 1964 to 1970.  There was little securitization of refugee 
camps and communities.  UNRWA’s immunity from host state laws regarding labor 
organizations made it a source of political space for organization. (Brand 1988)  Militant 
organizations such as Fatah and the PFLP were able to train, organize, move, 
communicate, and store weapons, particularly after 1967.  The only exception was a 
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period from summer 1966 to just before the 1967 War, when the government shut down 
the PLO’s offices in response to their escalating attacks on Israel, which were attracting 
damaging reprisals from the Israeli military, but the government was unable to stop cross-
border attacks by Fatah. (Brand 1988; Sicker 1989)  Earlier, King Hussein had also 
vetoed a PLO plan to establish bases along the border with Israel and levy taxes on 
refugees in camps; but he allowed attacks by Fatah, which he saw at that time as a 
counterweight to the Nasser-supported PLO. (Sicker 1989) 
The 1967 War had a devastating impact on Jordan’s military and economy, which 
severely weakened the government’s coercive capacity, and it also severely damaged the 
perceived legitimacy of such methods. (Brand 1988)  As one ex-guerrilla interviewee 
stated, after 1967, there were no police, no mukhabarat and no border control.  Fedayeen, 
loaded with weapons, were able to travel easily between countries, barely even bothering 
to conceal the weapons they were smuggling into Jordan.
167
  Whether for lack of will or 
capacity, Jordan did not interfere with the militarization of the fedayeen after the war. 
(Abu-Odeh 1999; Sicker 1989) 
In the late 1960s, East Bank Jordanians were still more supportive of the fedayeen 
than Israel (some even joined the fedayeen); Israel and Jordan were still officially in a 
state of war; and the international community remained focused on state actors rather 
than non-state actors like the PLO.  The only political opportunity which decreased from 
the earlier period was the defense capability of their CoO.  By gaining control over the 
West Bank in the 1967 War, Israel improved its defensive capacities, as the Jordan River, 
including nearby high ground and a shortened defensive perimeter, is easier to monitor 
and defend than an arbitrary line. (Schiff 1995) 
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There was not much change in the availability of conflict resources from the 
earlier period.  The Palestinian militant organizations were able to obtain supplies of 
money, arms and support from the revolutionary states of Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Algeria, 
as well as China and the USSR, and money from the wealthy Gulf states. (Sayigh 1997; 
Abu-Odeh 1999; Brand 1988; Bourne 2007)  Humanitarian aid and care for dependents 
from UNRWA continued to be available.  However, donor states continued to watch 
UNRWA’s activities carefully, and the US “strongly protested suspected provision of 
food to the Palestinian army and the Congress passed legislation forbidding contribution 
to agencies supporting terrorist groups.” (Schiff 1995, p. 103) 
Jordan opposed the PLO’s activities, and in 1965 had supplied weapons to towns 
and villages in the West Bank bordering Israel in order to counter the influence of the 
PLO.  Jordan, which was part of a conservative regional coalition facing a revolutionary 
alliance of Egypt, Syria and the PLO, certainly did not supply the PLO, except for some 
assistance and sympathy they received from local Jordanian army officers along the 
Jordan River.  However, whether the government of Jordan wanted to or not, it provided 
the training grounds, staging grounds and safe havens for them. (Abu-Odeh 1999) 
Militarization 
The new wave of refugees in 1967 were more inclined toward militancy than had 
been those who arrived in 1948 upon their arrival.  They “gravitated toward the Palestine 
Liberation Organization as an outlet for their political frustrations.  They created enclaves 
in the Jordan Valley and in the Amman area in which they sought to create authority 
independent of the Jordanian government.” (Schiff 1995, p. 69)  When households who 
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arrived in 1967 were asked what they or their ancestors believed at that time was the best 
way to address their grievances, 38% said armed conflict.
168
  Only 5% of households 
arriving in 1967 replied that they believed it was impossible to address their grievances, 
which is significantly less than the 23% of households which had said that in regard to 
their family’s arrival in 1948 (p < 0.1).  Just under a quarter of refugees, 1948 and 1967 
combined, mentioned that a relative was involved with the fedayeen; this is probably an 
underestimate of the actual proportion, due to the political sensitivity of the admission. 
Fatah and the PFLP began conducting border raids on Israel in 1965 without 
authorization by the Jordanian leadership
169
, and attacks escalated sharply after the 1967 
War.  The fedayeen were based in, and recruited from, the refugee camps, especially 
Wihdat and Baqa’a camps
170
: 
They lived in a refugee camp, the area and the period of the fedayeen.  If there were 
problems or troubles, the fedayeen solved all the problems of the people in the refugee 
camp, in the 1960s, before the 1970 war. (Male, 28) 
 [I lived in ____ Camp] until university.  It is the origin of the Palestinian revolution….  I 
consider it a part of Palestine. (laughing)….  It was the place of political parties through 
the 1960s and 70s and 80s….  I have been brought up with the fedayeen – the Fatah party 
called [us] “the flowers of the fedayeen”.  I was a kid, seven or eight years old, and I was 
playing with guns….  I did not know my childhood actually….  Our teachers were 
fedayeen also, so I was brought up with these ideas, so… that’s why I have this mentality 
now, I cannot leave it at all.  I don’t know [my family's village in Palestine] at all but I 
have to go back to [it].  I will die… still fighting for these ideas.  I will put it in my 
kids… I cannot abandon the idea. (Palestinian activist, male, 49) 
This sometimes drew attacks on the camps from Israeli forces: 
So of course the Jews were coming to Jordan at night and going back in the morning, 
looking for armed people.  One year, when I was living in ____ Camp, the hill east of the 
camp, there were planes, the [Israeli] soldiers came and searched people for weapons and 
went back.  Some people were fedayeen, attacking Israelis and coming back.  They 
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 Only 29% of households had indicated that in regard to their attitudes in 1948 (p < .05) – and, 
as described in the previous chapter, in 1948 they had mostly been referring to armed conflict by 
the Arab states, not militarized Palestinian refugees. 
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 Salehyan & Gleditsch 2006 
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 Due to the highly sensitive nature of this topic, names of camps have been redacted from the 
individual quotes to further ensure their anonymity. 
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[Israel] thought there were military bases there. (Male, 48) 
Not everybody in the camp welcomed the guerrillas, and not all recruitment was 
voluntary: 
[We] were in ____ [Camp]… Even the fedayeen [did not help] Palestinians [much].  It 
was unfair.  Like after 8:00 PM nobody could leave the house.  And the kids were taken 
from school and forced to train as soldiers.  And forced them to register as Fatah.  And 
parents were refusing…. [We] resented fedayeen dominance in the camp. (Male, 50) 
My dad was born in 1957, so he was young.  The fedayeen took him with them, they 
trained him, taught him how to fight, but once my grandmother was able to catch him she 
just hid him in the house.  He wasn’t involved in the fighting, he was young. (Male, 27) 
By 1970 the Palestinians had established a state within a state, based in the 
refugee camps but recruiting heavily in the cities, moving freely about Jordan while 
armed, and challenging the domestic sovereignty and security of their host government.  
Fatah had a troop strength of about 7,000 fedayeen and could draw on a reserve of many 
thousands more supporters and trainees; PFLP and other militant groups fielded an 
additional 2,000-3,000 fedayeen. (CIA 1970)  The Palestinians had their own external 
sources of revenue, which they used to purchase weaponry independently of Jordanian 
control.  Fedayeen controlled the public areas in Amman, including most streets and 
hotels, and even manned their own border checkpoints. (Abu-Odeh 1999; Sicker 1989; 
Salehyan & Gleditsch 2006; Bacik 2008; Sayigh 1997)  However, the goal of the PLO at 
this time was not the East Bank Jordanians’ nightmare scenario of al-watan al-badil, or 
an alternative homeland for the Palestinians, but rather “to replace the regime with a 
government more accommodating to Palestinian demands in order to secure for itself a 
base from which to launch military operations against Israeli targets without Jordanian 
government interference.” (Brand 1988, p. 11) 
Events climaxed in September 1970, now memorialized by Palestinians as Black 
September.  Following the landing of hijacked airliners by Palestinians in Jordan, weeks 
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of sporadic clashes with the fedayeen, an assassination attempt against King Hussein 
(Sicker 1989) and an order by Yasser Arafat to overthrow King Hussein’s “Fascist 
government” (BBC, 9/17/70 [2009]), the Jordanian king decided to shut down PLO 
operations in his country.  For ten days the Jordanian army unleashed relentless force 
against the Palestinians, not bothering to differentiate between militants and civilians as 
they bombed the Amman refugee camps and hounded guerrillas throughout the country, 
while the fedayeen fought back.  The number of deaths is unknown but is estimated in the 
tens of thousands. (Farsoun & Aruri 2006) 
Interviewees related some of the ways in which they were directly affected.  Not 
surprisingly, households which still live in camps or are camp-centered were more 
affected than non-camp households.  Camp and camp-centered households stated three 
times more frequently (28%) than non-camp households (9%) (p < .05) that the Jordanian 
military attacked their camp or neighborhood, including the use of rape as a torture tactic: 
Every person used to kill each other, we didn’t know if this was a Palestinian or 
Jordanian.  It was a civil war….  There were a lot of bombs, just like rain.  I didn’t know 
any member of my family who was involved in this, but my friend was feda’ee, he 
brought a gun for me, but I refused….  More than forty years ago and I still remember 
this....  Nobody was secure.  The majority of houses were destroyed.  A lot of people 
died, were shot….  And all that I built in ten years was destroyed in one second.... (Male, 
75) 
In the camp there were no men, just women, and they used to rape the women here to 
find out where the men are…. They were in underground caves near here. (Male, 36) 
[The military] would knock on the door and ask where are the men, and if they don’t 
answer they take them and rape them to find out where the men are. (Female, 45) 
They told me that they were searching houses, and any house in which they found 
weapons, they took all the men living in that house. (Male, 29) 
Nearly one-fifth of camp and camp-centered households stated that the military searched 
or attacked their home: 
They entered our house, they were looking for guns everywhere, even in furniture.  Even 
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toy guns, they used to think it was real, they used to take it and say, “We don’t need any 
kids with guns.”  They destroyed the furniture and the doors and looked under the beds, 
and if they found anything you don’t know what’s going to happen with [that person].  I 
saw this with my own eyes. (Female, 47) 
There was a missile that hit our house.  It made a hole in the roof.  My uncle was a 
feda’ee.  They were living in caves, underground, to hide from the fighting.  My family 
and all my neighbors…. (Male, 28) 
I was arrested with [many] other civilians and stayed ten days in jail….  They said, “All 
fedayeen come with us, we will take you to Syria.”  I started to stand up, [even though] I 
was not fedayeen, but my neighbor just told me, “Sit down!”.  The fedayeen were taken 
to… the worst jail in Jordan, in the desert, where they were [tortured], beaten, killed, and 
after one month were [buried].… (Male, 65) 
Camp and camp-centered households were also more than twice as likely to state that 
they fled their home and hid or lived in underground caves (23%) than non-camp 
households (9%) (p < 0.1).
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They killed a lot of us.  Yes, we were sad, it was war.  Our houses were destroyed and we 
ran away for 14 days… to our relatives’ house.  Because here our mosque was a base [for 
the fedayeen]. (Male, 49) 
The fedayeen war.  We were here in the camp.  It was a very difficult situation for us…. 
They dug holes in the ground to hide when there was an attack.  We were kids, but I 
remember.  They hid us in these holes and the older people stayed above…. Many people 
were killed and injured. (Female, unknown age) 
Non-camp households were more likely to report that they experienced a general sense of 
fear (23%) than camp households (5%) (p < 0.01).  Overall, 17% of households reported 
that a relative was hurt or killed as a result of the war: 
My brother was killed….  He was a civilian, not a feda’ee nor in the army….  He was 
killed in front of the door of the house.  It was unbelievable for us.  How the Jordanians 
and Palestinians… how this could happen between them.  It’s unbelievable.  In our 
neighborhood, at the beginning of it there was a Fatah office.  And we used to see the 
militants, and we were dealing with them as brothers….  I was 13 years old.  There was 
no water.  So [my brother] took a vessel to go to the building near us to fill it from the 
tanks… because we were really thirsty, but unfortunately they killed him.... We were in 
[____ Camp] at that time. (Female, 54) 
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 This was an open-ended question, and interviewees were allowed to indicate more than one 
response.  These statistics probably underestimate actual incidence due to the highly sensitive 
nature of the 1970 War in Palestinian-Jordanian relations, which likely caused some interviewees 
to deny that their family was affected, or claim ignorance. 
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Two [of my] brothers died.  I saw them when they were killed.  One was named ____, 
they shot him.  My two-year-old brother, they shot him through the eye and the bullet 
went through my arm. There was shooting everywhere and it was like we were between 
two fires, the fedayeen and Jordanians.  So I don’t know who killed them, the Jordanians 
or Palestinians. (Male, 68) 
My uncle was killed in this.  He was a leader in Fatah at that time….  They had weapons 
and everything… My older uncle was in the Jordanian army, and opposite him was my 
younger uncle… (Male, 25) 
As a result of the civil war, the PLO signed an agreement in which they 
recognized the Jordanian king’s sovereignty over all the state’s territory, and moved their 
organization and operations to southern Lebanon.  However, intermittent clashes of lower 
intensity between Palestinians and the Jordanian military continued for years after the 
departure of the PLO. (Bacik 2008, p. 156) 
Conclusion 
The second period of the Palestinians’ stay in Jordan, from 1964 to 1970, was a 
tumultuous one.  As summarized in Figure 4 below, a collective project to redeem the 
homeland was present as the Palestinian ethnonationalist project rose quickly in 
popularity, while pan-Arabism lost influence.  Organized militancy entrepreneurs framed 
their arguments in the language of injustice and primordial ties to the land of Palestine, 
mobilizing refugees with the chance to utilize their own efforts to redeem the homeland 
through militarization – a claim which would have been unlikely a decade earlier, but 
was plausible after the Arab states’ humiliating defeat in the 1967 War and the claimed 
victory by fedayeen in 1968.  Political opportunities and conflict resources remained 
available since the 1948-1963 period, and even increased after the 1967 War.  As a result, 
mass engagement in militarization occurred among the refugees, with camps utilized as 
bases and sources of support and recruitment for the fedayeen.  While some recruitment 
in urban areas did occur, those Palestinians who were more socioeconomically integrated 
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were less likely to personally take up arms, even though many did support the fedayeen 
both in attitude and in material support. 
 
Figure 4. Summary: Palestinians in Jordan, 1964-70 
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CHAPTER 7: Palestinians in Jordan, 1971 to 2011 
 
 
The 1970 War led to some significant changes in Jordan, with implications 
particularly for Palestinians’ political opportunities for militarization.  In this chapter I 
will demonstrate that, even with the passage of time and the rise of two new generations, 
the group’s collective project has not abated.  There are still militancy entrepreneurs who 
are willing and able to take the reins of organizing armed activity, and conflict resources 
are available.  In this period, the only factor which is clearly preventing militarization is 
the lack of political opportunity. 
Collective project 
The collective project has been passed down to the third and fourth generations, 
as even young people today continue to express support for armed conflict against Israel 
in hopes of redeeming the homeland. 
WAR OF EXCLUSION WITH A CLEAR ENEMY 
It is clear that both the 1948 and 1967 Wars remain categorized as a war of 
exclusion in the perception of the vast majority of the Palestinian refugee community.  
Memories of the expulsions in 1948 and 1967 merged into a dominant community 
narrative in which Israel (“the Jews” pre-1948) engaged in an active policy of ethnic 
cleansing against Palestinians for the purpose of controlling and expanding the territory 
of the Jewish state.  The enemy remained clear: Israel and Zionists, and sometimes Jews 
more broadly, became the boogeyman of Palestinian politics, the covert culprit 
responsible for every major negative event, including the 1970 War.  The exclusion is 







Even without the presence of the PLO in Jordan, the Palestinian ethnonationalist 
movement has grown and strengthened since 1971.  The 1970 War itself led to a 
“stronger, though hushed, sense of Palestinian nationalism,” as the Palestinians in Jordan 
felt both guilt for the actions of the fedayeen and resentment of the Jordanian 
government. (Abu-Odeh 1999, p. 190)  Combined with the rise of East Bank Jordanian 
nationalism, which sought to politically exclude Palestinians from the Jordanian state, 
over the next three decades, this led to their affective estrangement from the state and 
increased political orientation toward the ethnonational project – regionally led in the 
1970s and 1980s by the PLO. 
Salience in time of crisis 
The Palestinian identity and ethnonationalist project become especially salient in 
times of crisis and violence in Israeli-Palestinian relations.  For instance, when asked how 
the first Intifada affected them and their family, 23% of interviewees said that it revived 
their hopes in the Palestinian cause and/or the redemption of their homeland: 
We were very happy because the resistance in Palestine started to move.  The countries 
all around the world were reminded of the Palestinian cause. (Male, 57) 
It’s like a revived hope [for] the Palestinian people… like a dead tree which came back to 
life.  The new generation did not forget about their lands.  So the occupied Palestine does 
not belong to the Jews, they are just colonizers.  And we hope that the Intifada continues 
all the time.... (Male, 48) 
The first Intifada represented the first challenge from the Palestinian people to the Zionist 
forces.  Even children threw stones at the tanks.  People were not afraid of the 
“invincible” Israeli army any more.  So all the world saw that these people who are 
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refoulement on its head.  The issue is not whether the conditions are safe for repatriation, as in 




defending themselves using stones, if they have enough weapons they would have won 
and defeated their enemy. (Male, 53) 
A few interviewees indicated that it raised their political awareness: 
We started to know more information about Palestine because of the Intifada.  Our 
parents had just told us their stories.  But after the Intifada we started to read books, know 
more about it, know about the massacres, why our parents left Palestine, how many 
Palestinians are in different countries.  We started to study it, we started to be more 
connected to Palestine….  It was like, we started to think that we can have another future. 
(Palestinian activist, male, 36) 
However, many participants, particularly those in their 20s and early 30s, did not 
remember the first Intifada well; more than a quarter of interviewees said they don’t 
know. 
In regard to the second Intifada, however, almost everyone described how it 
affected them.  Camp refugees (including those who are camp-centered) reported being 
more affected, and more active in response to the events, than non-camp refugees: 22% 
of those with a camp attachment said it revived their hopes
173
; and 20% of non-camp 
refugees, but only 4% of camp refugees, said they were not affected (p < .05).  Most 
interesting for the purposes of this project, however, is that just over one-third of refugees 
overall
174
 stated, in response to this open-ended question, that the second Intifada raised 
their political awareness, mobilized them to protests… 
All the camp was affected…. They were doing broadcasts and stuff.  Even King Abdullah 
brought the family of Mohammad al-Durra [boy whose death by Israeli fire was captured 
on video] to Jordan to be part of the broadcasting.  And [the main street in the camp] was 
very small, so they just widened it to serve all the volume of protests. (Male, 23) 
When the Israeli prime minister… came to the Aqsa mosque and killed the people who 
were praying there, this is a criminal act and this what Israelis do to the people in 
Palestine.  This makes us responsible to do many things.  We have to learn the lesson: No 
negotiations, no peace; the fight with Jews is the fight for survival.  They have to know, 
the Palestinian leadership, they have to know who will survive, that it’s not a fight for 
borders.  So if you have a poll here in the camp, the Palestinian leadership with 
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 This was an open-ended question, and interviewees were allowed to indicate more than one 
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 The proportions of camp and non-camp refugees mentioning this response were similar. 
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Mahmoud Abbas should know that the negotiations with Israel are worthless and do not 
represent the Palestinian people. (Palestinian activist, male, 30) 
In 2000, I remember this.  It affected us a lot, in school we always discussed the situation 
and we felt injustice, and for the first time, as a student, I felt the injustice and suffering 
of the Palestinian people, because we saw many things on TV.  I hadn’t seen anything 
like that before because I didn’t experience war.  When we saw these things I started 
asking questions, like, “Why is this happening?”  And since that time we started to really 
understand the situation in Palestine. (Female, 22) 
… or that they would even have gone to Palestine to participate if possible (cf. Farah 
2005): 
It has affected us psychologically, especially my children…. People wanted to go back to 
resist, but we can’t.  Because we miss our land and want to go to fight with them. 
(Female, 45) 
This is the one that affected us, because we lived it.  We were in seventh grade.  We were 
very sad and depressed.  We wanted to go back to Palestine and defend Palestine.  We 
were sad because we were watching the news and weren’t able to do anything to defend 
Palestine. (Female, 21) 
Camps 
As noted throughout this text, camp and non-camp refugees often hold divergent 
attitudes about aspects of the conflict with the CoO and their life in Jordan.  The 
Palestinian camps are mostly crowded slums, but there is a pervasive sentiment that the 
camp is intertwined with the meaning of being a Palestinian refugee.  The historical 
connection, suffering and concentration of Palestinians in a small area reminds 
Palestinians, both those who live inside and outside the camps, of the injustice of their 
exile and the Palestinian national identity: 
[The thing I am most satisfied about is] that I live in a camp.  Because it’s a traditional 
life, surrounded by refugees, we all have hope of… return.  We still have hope. (Male, 
30) 
The people in the camp are very good, helpful, they live in harmony, are very close to 
each other.  If someone dies in the camp, all the mosques will call that this person died, 
and everybody should go to the funeral.  We help each other.  We are like one big 
family….  I’ve been living here for 40 years, so all the people in the camp know me.  So 
they will say salaamu aleikum to me if I go outside.  But if I go to another place, they 
won’t know me.  This is the difference between the camps and the cities….  It’s like the 
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villages in Palestine, everybody knows each other. (Male, 60) 
This camp reminds me of Palestine….  It is divided into two different neighborhoods, 
[each] from a different [part of Palestine], Rafah and Beer Seba…. (Male, 53) 
Here is the best life.  There’s no racism – such as I’m from this part and you’re from that 
part.  We are all one people and feel for each other.  And our atmosphere is different, we 
help each other.  Outside the camp there’s nothing like this. (Female, 22) 
Some interviewees drew a direct connection from living conditions inside and outside the 
camp to political attitudes: 
If you met my [two-year-old] girl, she would tell you that she is Palestinian and that is 
her land.  And all people who are in the camp feel the same.  Outside the camp… I don’t 
deal with those outside, but I guess [they don’t feel the same].  Others, in the cities, have 
a good situation, their own businesses, education is very good for them, but here we do 
not [have such a good situation]. (Male, 40) 
[There is more political activism in the camps] because they still have the suffering…. 
Yes, [it makes them more active,] 100% Palestinian.  If you see Gaza [Jerash] Camp, it’s 
a very bad situation.  Most of them don’t know about Palestine, but we have non-stop 
activities [there]. (Palestinian activist, male, 49) 
While most camp residents left the camp as they acquired the means to do so (Ramzoun 
2001; Hanssen-Bauer & Jacobsen 2007), a few households with the means to leave have 
chosen to remain there as a political statement: 
Even if I were a millionaire, I wouldn’t leave the camp….  I feel that this camp is my 
country.  I feel that when my father came here, he brought a piece of Palestine with him 
and established it here in Jordan.  When I go outside of the camp, I feel like I’m crossing 
the border from one country to another.  When I go out, I feel homesick for this 
“country”, the camp.  If I had money I would build a house here, establish a playground 
and swimming pool, all the things that children are deprived of here in the camp, I would 
establish here for them. (Palestinian activist, male, 36) 
[The camp] is a sign that we are Palestinian….  Some people in the camp don’t believe 
that we can go out of the camp and start a new life.  Either stay in the camp or go back to 
Palestine. [Why do they feel that way?]  Because they have dreams and hopes to go back 
to Palestine.  They think that if they leave the camp, they won’t be able to go back to 
Palestine….  They are living in the past….  The older generation had a good mentality 
and worked to live outside the camp, but the new generation is really bad.  They were 
born in the camp and their roots are in it.  The older generation believed in the right to 
return [and didn’t need the camp to remind them of it]. (Multiple household members) 
We had many opportunities [to buy land], but our parents were strict about it.  Because 
[the camp] is the address of the refugees.  I told you, ignorance was just controlling them.  
They didn’t know the future.  They thought the camp was the title of coming back.  They 
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were really rich, they had many opportunities.  But they thought the best way to go back 
to Palestine is to stay in the camp.... (Male, 40) 
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC BASE 
Since there was no major exodus of Palestinians from the CoO to Jordan between 
1971-2011, there is nothing new to add regarding the transferability of property and 
skills.  Second and later generations of refugees have grown up in the Jordanian 
educational system
175
 and have not endured the difficult adjustment from an agricultural 
to non-agricultural economic base.  Even adults who arrived in 1967 are now in their 60s 
and older, generally past the age when people stop working, or they have passed away.  
Very few Palestinians today continue to suffer because of economic dislocation from an 
agricultural base, although this has been a very gradual change. 
Some refugee households, particularly those who arrived in 1967, are in contact 
with relatives in the West Bank or Gaza, who can update them regularly on the economic 
situation there, but most refugee households in Jordan are not.  Relatively few (27%) 
have ever visited west of the Jordan River, and even fewer (9%) have crossed to the 
Israeli side of the Green Line, where the 1948 refugees’ property and land are located.  
Interestingly, however, a few innovative refugees have started using technology such as 
Google Earth to check on the status of their family’s village and property: 
I saw the village on the internet and it was surrounded by wires and nobody is allowed to 
go there.  In the surrounding areas the Jews live there, but the village itself is empty. 
(Male, 29) 
They wrote on the sign of this village, “Property of the absent”.  So Jews have not built 
anything there….  The village they [my family was] living in, nobody was left there.  
Israel destroyed the whole village….  The house is still there.  We can see it on the 
internet, a picture of it.  My grandfather told me, “This is our house.” (Male, 57) 
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This variable did not change from the earlier periods. 
 
In sum, over the course of the past forty years, the Palestinian collective project 
has been thriving in Jordan.  The project is no longer founded on a practical economic 
attachment to land in the CoO, but rather on a strong ethnonationalist movement which 
has a special relationship to the camps.  The dominant narrative of the collective project 
is based on the wars of 1948 and 1967, perceived to be wars of exclusion perpetuated by 
a clear enemy. 
Socioeconomic integration and marginalization 
RIGHTS IN THE HOST STATE & EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
Over the last four decades, non-Gazan Palestinians have continued to enjoy the 
citizenship and most of the rights and extensive economic integration which they had 
begun to develop in the first two decades of their stay in Jordan.  Whereas East Bank 
Jordanians have a seemingly guaranteed public sector job and pension, Palestinians grew 
to dominate the private sector, to the extent that low-skill jobs in Amman which used to 
be filled by poor Palestinians, such as construction and street sweeping, are now usually 
filled by imported laborers.  Some Palestinians have risen to become very wealthy.  As 
one foreign diplomat stated, “The East Bankers’ government jobs don’t pay well….  The 
Palestinians are very entrepreneurial, economic [elites]….  Who are my neighbors in 
Derekh Bar [a wealthy neighborhood of Amman]?  Mostly Palestinians.” (Personal 
interview, 5/4/11) 
Citizenship, rights and integration to the Jordanian economy have led to economic 
195 
 
orientation toward their host state rather than the CoO for most Palestinians.  But Jordan 
is still a developing country, and most Palestinians remain in the lower-middle class.  The 
median household income of Palestinians in my sample was just under JD 4,000 
(US$5,650) per annum.  When asked what they personally would most like to change 
about their life in Jordan
176
, very few gave political answers related to their CoO or 
ethnonationalist project.  The majority (54%) said they would like to improve their 
economic situation.  Even when answering the question, “What does it mean to you now 
to be Palestinian?”
177
, more than a quarter referred to a transnational Palestinian-
Jordanian identity instead: 
My mother and father had Jordanian citizenship and used to live in Palestine.  But for me, 
we were born here and have Jordanian citizenship, so we just care about Palestine from 
the Jordanian side. (Male, 49) 
Palestine stays in our mind because it’s our house and home…. We are Jordanian, the 
reality is to Jordan because we are living in Jordan, born in Jordan, everything in 
Jordan....  I served in the army....  Just remember, we are Jordanian. but we will die 
dreaming of Palestine.  Even if I was the President of America I would just love 
Palestine. (Male, 42) 
When they ask me what nationality you are, I say, “Um… Palestinian”, but for something 
formal, I say “Jordanian”.  When it comes to work, university, something [where] I need 
to show ID, I say “Jordanian”, but informal situations, with my friends, [I say] 
“Palestinian”. (Female, 21) 
Some linked this feeling of transnationalism to their high level of economic integration in 
Jordan: 
To be honest, in Jordan we are living in a very good situation here.  Jordan is our country 
but Palestine is our home. (Male, 40) 
I am in Jordan but in my heart I am Palestinian.  I will never change my roots….  I am 
really proud of being Jordanian, too, because the government feeds us and heals our sick 
people….  I love Jordan more than Palestine.  My husband is sick, but the government 
pays everything for him, so without the government and Allah, how could I live? 
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For most Palestinians, their absolute standard of living, including social mobility, 
has continued to rise over the course of their family’s stay in Jordan.  Two-thirds of 
interviewees stated that their family’s living standard had improved from the time they 
first arrived in Jordan to today: 
My father spent all his life here in Jordan.  The same thing for me here in Jordan.  I 
studied in Jordan, I’m working in Jordan, I will die in Jordan.  We cannot compare 
between our grandfathers’ generation and now, because everything has changed.  Until I 
was twelve years old, we had no electricity in our houses.  But now we have internet, 
satellite dishes, everything. (Male, 42) 
At first it was very bad and after that it got better.  The Palestinians are just survivors, 
they just want to live, get on with their lives, they won’t give up.  My grandfather went to 
Saudi Arabia and Oman to work there.  Two of my uncles were working… in 
construction or something like that.  If they didn’t get a scholarship they wouldn’t have 
been able to get an education, so the only way was to study hard and get a scholarship.  
So I think everyone was trying to adapt to the life [here].  But now it is very good.  One 
of my uncles is very wealthy, one is in Australia.  Everything is good now, it’s getting 
better now. (Female, 22) 
Only 7% of interviewees said their family’s living standard has gotten worse since 
first arriving in Jordan.  Not surprisingly, the improvement has been less marked for 
camp refugees, of whom only 58% said that it had improved, compared to 70% of non-
camp refugees (p < .10). 
Nonetheless, the effect of their unresolved political status regarding Palestine and 
its political evolution – including the 1974 declarations by the Arab League and UN that 
the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, Jordan’s 1988 
disengagement from the West Bank and its 1994 peace treaty with Israel
178
 – has 
complicated their host state’s approach to integrating them, leading to an uneasy feeling 
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the camps and has contributed to the change in Jordanian policies toward the camps and their 
dwellers.  Many urban planning initiatives have targeted refugee camps, especially in the area 
surrounding Amman, which has raised the issue of resettlement of Palestinians in Jordan.” (p. 13) 
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of long-term uncertainty among Palestinians.
179
 (Hanafi 2010; Farah 2005)  Furthermore, 
discrimination in employment and educational opportunities, and social prejudice against 
Palestinians, increased sharply after 1970; while Gazans’ lack of rights and economic 
integration has made them a very unique subset of the Palestinian refugees in Jordan. 
Discrimination 
As a result of the 1970 War and the 1974 declarations, there was a contraction of 
Palestinians’ rights in Jordan as the monarchy, wary of the Palestinians’ loyalty, shifted 
alliances from Palestinian urban elites to East Bank tribes.
180
  Immediately after the civil 
war, the government purged fedayeen supporters – primarily Palestinians but also some 
East Bank Jordanians – from the military, intelligence services, and civil service.  This 
gradually evolved into a “de-Palestinianization process”, which, partly due to the 
Palestinian refugees’ sense of guilt for the role of the fedayeen in instigating the civil 
war, and partly due to the availability of jobs in the private sector and the Gulf, did not 
arouse protests from Palestinians.
181
 (Abu-Odeh 1999, p. 190; Al-Quds Center 2009)  
Due to the makramat malakiya (lit., “privileges of the King”) system in which admission 
quotas at universities are reserved primarily for the children of soldiers, they also found it 
difficult to gain entrance to public universities.
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  Nearly half of interviewees stated that 
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their rights decreased after 1970, and this is probably an underestimate due to the 
sensitivity of the issue.  For example: 
Because of the war, there was a lot of prejudice….  There used to be Palestinians in high 
positions of the Jordanian army, but after the war they were kicked out of these positions 
because they didn’t trust them. (Male, 37) 
[Since the war] there is discrimination… not only in job offices, but in the police, for 
example if the police pull you over and looks at your last name and sees you are 
Palestinian, the treatment is different.  Even in prisons, the treatment is different. (Male, 
28) 
In the army, there are no job opportunities – or in civil defense , or the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, or mukhabarat….  There was difficulty for Palestinians to obtain good 
jobs, even until now. (Male, 66) 
The decrease in rights led to worsening economic conditions for Palestinians: 
The work was not [available] like before the war.  Living conditions were affected, we 
didn’t have money like we used to, and it stayed like that… for years. (Female, 46) 
The problem of employment was especially acute for the thousands of ex-fedayeen who 
stayed or returned to Jordan, but were banned from all government and military service: 
My uncle went to Syria and came back, so he can’t work in the government.  And of 
course those who were fedayeen don’t have jobs in the government.  So people from my 
generation weren’t… there were no jobs for people like me in the government.  People 
who left Jordan and then came back, their names are recorded in the government, so they 
cannot be employed in the government. (Male, 48) 
In camps, however, almost one-fifth of interviewees stated in response to this 
question that they received more assistance from the Jordanian government than they had 
before 1970, which may have been an attempt by the government to subdue anger among 
the camp population after the war. 
Despite the official discourse of “One Jordan” and attempts to erase the 
distinction between Palestinians and Jordanians, the discrimination, and rumors of it, are 
rife even today.  Although I did not ask a question about it, more than half (76 out of 134) 
of the Palestinian interviewees voluntarily raised the topic.  Of those 76 interviewees, 
65% stated that there is discrimination and/or prejudice: 
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[My wife] applied for a vacancy in an UNRWA school….  She was declined and the job 
was given to a [East Bank] Jordanian….  There’s a guy who wanted to be in Parliament 
and he got 14,000 votes – all the Palestinians voted for him – but the government said he 
got only 3,000 votes….  Someone who is Jordanian got the seat. (Male, 25) 
Applying for the military or public sector jobs here, they ask, “Where are you from?”  I 
said, “Dubai.”  Then, “Your father?”  I said, “He was born in Wadi Seer, here in 
Amman.”  Then, “Your grandfather?”  I said, “He is from Jerusalem.”  Then, “Aaahhh, 
Palestinian.”  And (makes gesture of writing something down dismissively).  No 
opportunities in the public sector. (Male, 32) 
On the other hand, many other interviewees praised Jordan for its excellent 
treatment of the Palestinian refugees, claiming that they have equal rights with East Bank 
Jordanians, including the ability to serve in the military and government employment.  
When asked what they are most satisfied with about their life in Jordan
183
, 22% of 
interviewees said, “Equal rights with Jordanians”.  There are two noteworthy points about 
this result: First, only about a quarter as many camp refugees (6%) as non-camp refugees 
(25%) mentioned this satisfaction with equal treatment (p < .01).  Second, part of these 
responses should be discounted because they were probably given as the perceived 
“correct answer” due to fear of the mukhabarat.  Nonetheless, others are genuine in 
appreciation for what they perceive as equality
184
: 
Jordanian and Palestinian people are the same.  They host us and open the doors for us, 
and were very hospitable in schools, factories and jobs.  We have the same rights as 
Jordanians; there are no differences between us and Jordanians. (Male, 65) 
We have health insurance, our children [serve in] the Jordanian military….  My father 
and uncles were serving in the Jordanian army.  And we study in the university with the 
makramah.  There is no discrimination between Jordanians and Palestinians. (Female, 41) 
We are considered as being Jordanians, so we have Jordanian [ID] cards and national ID 
numbers, so we have the same rights, except for the people from Gaza.  We have 
established our lives here, so we don’t feel like strangers. (Female, 21) 
This seemingly irreconcilable contradiction from the opinions of most 
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Palestinians is probably due in part to whether the individual is comparing their rights to 
East Bank Jordanians (glass half empty), or to Palestinians in other Arab states or the low 
expectations they have of rights for refugees in general (glass half full): 
Personally I appreciate Jordanian citizenship very much, because I [was able to get] 
educated in government schools and universities, like a Jordanian citizen.  I have loyalty 
to Jordan, because when I see Lebanon…..  There is no security, [no social services].… 
So I appreciate and am proud to have this citizenship....  I have met many Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon.  We have a different mentality now.  In Lebanon, they say “We are 
Palestinian only, we have no loyalty to Lebanon, and that’s it.”  But here, we have 
citizenship here, studied here, we have many Jordanian friends.  I have loyalty to this 
country and to Palestine…. (Male, 25) 
For Palestinian people, all the rights can be taken from the Jordanian government, when 
you compare it to other countries.  I was in Saudi Arabia and Libya and Egypt, so I know 
how the conditions are for Palestinians.  In Jordan you can take all the rights but it’s a 
little bit less than Jordanians. (Male, 27) 
Camp refugees 
As in the previous periods, there remains an economic segmentation even today 
between urban refugees, who are generally more socioeconomically integrated, and camp 
refugees, who are generally less integrated.  As one interviewee stated, “Education, 
health, marriage, rights – we cannot take them 100% because we are in the camps.  The 
Palestinian takes his rights if he is outside the camp.” (Male, 40)  Despite the increased 
political attachment to the camp described by some camp residents, as discussed earlier, 
most camp refugees (61%) said that they would leave if they had the means to do so: 
I would, of course, why would I not leave?  I am thinking of leaving now, even without 
the money.   If we’re talking about the old generation, my parents, they will stay here – 
they had many opportunities to leave, but they didn’t.  But as for me, if I had an 
opportunity to leave today, I will. (Male, 32) 
The camp is like one house [where] everyone is crowded, so we want to be able to 
breathe outside the camp.  I love the camp, I was born here, I respect everyone here….  
This is our refuge, the place that provides us protection, the place that I grew up….  The 
camp is a very narrow [area], everybody knows each other, there are troubles that happen 
between us, a few people are very bad.…  We want to establish a good life for our 
children, better than this life.  So I respect the people in the camp, I won’t forget it, but 
it’s very necessary for everyone to develop.  For example, we are able to hear our 
neighbors through the wall because it’s very crowded.  I love the camp, the camp is very 
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good, but it’s necessary for us to move on, to improve. (Male, 24) 
To try to reconcile the political pull toward the camp and the economic push away from 
it, those who do leave sometimes plan to maintain a tangible link with the camp: 
There is a chance, we are planning to leave….  So if we leave the camp we will not sell 
our house here in the camp, so wherever we live, this stays in our hearts.  But if we want 
to improve our situation, we will develop, this is a natural thing…. And our children, this 
is the same thing, we will tell them about the camp. (Male, 37) 
My father wanted to move out of the camp but we refused.  Since last year I started to 
change my mind.  We should have a base here in the camp, a family house, but we can 
live in other places.  Maybe one day if I live in New York, I would come here to visit 
____ Camp, I wouldn’t forget it. (Palestinian activist, female, 29) 
For those who live in camps, their prolonged residence there “keeps the 
Palestinian community in confined spaces and reinforces the clear group boundaries.  It 
makes the Palestinians, at least those in the camps, identifiable as an alien minority to 
themselves as well as to the host society.” (Hammer 2005, p. 17) 
Gazans 
As a result of their extremely limited rights in Jordan, comparison of Gazans with 
non-Gazan Palestinians in Jordan offers a rare natural field experiment in terms of 
attitudes and behaviors.  Interviews with Gazans and local experts suggest that their lack 
of economic integration to Jordan has led to less economic and political orientation 
toward their host state and a stronger, practical intent to return: 
Either they give us official citizenship… and a national ID number, or [it is better to] go 
to our village [in Palestine]…. We, the refugees who have no citizenship, even if… we go 
to the West Bank or Gaza, we would just go to another camp.  So either to our [original] 
village, or nothing. (Male, 51) 
I feel like I’m an injury, or a bomb that will explode at any moment….  Here in Jordan, 
we die here every day because of the pain and suffering.  But in Palestine, even if they 
are killed or tortured or are unemployed, they live a good life just because they are living 
in their own land. (Palestinian activist, male, 36) 
I think the Gazans want to return to Palestine more than other Palestinians in Jordan 
because their conditions are so bad here.  They have nothing here.  They’ll live in hell[ish 
conditions] here or in Gaza, better to live in hell in your own country. (Female, 22) 
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When asked what they expect will happen in their future personally
185
, Gazans 
were more likely (33%) than non-Gazan Palestinians (12%) to state that they expect to 
return to Palestine (p < .05), even by infiltration: 
(Young man:)  If you had Palestinian citizenship, you would go to Gaza?   
(Activist:)  Yes, immediately.  They will allow me to go through Egypt to Gaza, through 
the tunnels, when I turn forty, inshallah in five years….  If Egypt allows us to go to Gaza 
we can go through the tunnels, it’s easy.  Old women are allowed to go.  They do this. 
(Young man:)  I want to go back to Gaza.  Even if I stay here for five or ten years, after 
that I will go back. 
(Activist:)  We can go all together to Gaza. 
(Male, 19; Palestinian activist, male, 36) 
In addition, their orientation toward the CoO seems to lead some Gazan refugees 
to identify more closely with Palestinian politics, and seek involvement in it, than 
Jordanian politics: 
We hope that we will get more freedom after the [recent] reconciliation between Fatah 
and Hamas, and to have representation in the PLO in refugee camps, and people will 
respect us, especially when it comes to expressing our own opinions….  I hope that we 
will have a representative from all the camps here in Jordan in the Palestinian National 
Council and the Palestinian Legislative Council. (Male, 53) 
However, a stronger practical intent to return to the CoO among Gazans must be 
understood separately from political attitudes – as I will demonstrate later in this chapter, 
Gazans appear to hold attitudes which are no more militant than those of non-Gazans and 
non-camp refugees.  Yet there seems to be more willingness among Gazans, as well as 
camp refugees more generally, to actually militarize: 
When the Lebanon war happened in 1982, many people from [this camp] ran away and 
crossed the borders illegally to go to Beirut [and fight].  And during the Intifada also, the 
people who got visas to go to Palestine participated in the Intifada. (Male, 53) 
Overall, there is substantial evidence that the Gazans’ severe restrictions and the 
failure to integrate them to the Jordanian economy has led to a significantly stronger 
                                                          
185




practical orientation toward the CoO and willingness to militarize.  The government of 
Jordan knows that the  Gazans’ lack of rights constitutes a security risk, and is probably 
willing to give them citizenship, but it is hamstrung by the lobby of East Bank 
Jordanians, which opposes permanent resettlement of Palestinians in Jordan, and which 
sees policies on Gazans as an acid test of the monarchy’s intentions for all Palestinians.
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Institutions to address grievances through the host state 
Jordan remained authoritarian throughout the 1970s and most of the 1980s.  In the 
1970s the Muslim Brotherhood was supported by the Jordanian government as a 
counterweight to leftist opposition, and it provided social services which the government 
was not able to provide.  Following the departure of the leftist movements in 1971, the 
Muslim Brotherhood gradually began to fill the political vacuum of the opposition.
187
 
In 1989 and 1992, King Hussein instituted political reforms, including the ending 
of martial law and legalizing of political parties. (Marshall & Jaggers 2011)  At the same 
time, with the fall of communism in Europe and Russia, leftist movements were losing 
credibility worldwide, including among Palestinians.  Combined with Hamas’ debut 
performance in the West Bank and Gaza during the first Intifada in 1987, the support of 
Palestinians in Jordan shifted from Marxist movements to the Muslim Brotherhood and 
its political arm, the Islamic Action Front (IAF). 
To Palestinians, the ideology of the movement did not matter as much as the final 
goal: achieving the aims of their collective project by reversing the situation in Palestine, 
creating a Palestinian state and implementing the right of return.
188
  Throughout the 
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1990s the IAF, which is led and largely comprised of Palestinians, came to represent the 
Palestinian cause. (Al-Quds Center 2009)
189
  It was an avenue for Palestinians “to express 
their political aspirations as opposition to the status quo.”
190
  Similarly, Islamic activism 
came to be seen by Palestinians as a substitute for expression of Palestinian identity
191
, 
which was politically sensitive and was even banned by royal decree in 1950 (Al 
Husseini & Bocco 2009).  Throughout the last decade, however, the Jordanian 
government has curtailed the representation of the IAF in parliament, primarily through 
manipulations of electoral design. (Marshall & Jaggers 2011) 
In sum, the Palestinians’ ability to express their political demands through the 
democratic process increased at the beginning of the 1990s, but it has waned again in 
recent years.  As one interviewee stated, “It’s easier for people from the [East Bank] 
Jordanian tribes to talk with the government.” (Male, 57) 
ETHNIC CONSANGUINITY & SOCIAL INTEGRATION 
Although the high degree of ethnic consanguinity did not change from the 
previous periods, social prejudice from East Bank Jordanians increased after the 1970 
War: 
Here, when a Palestinian-Jordanian marries a Jordanian-Jordanian… it’s difficult because 
they always have in the back of their mind that you are [second class].  They are raised in 
this situation, it’s not their fault.  I won’t blame him because his family raised him like 
that.  Men especially are raised to make a separation....  That’s why I prefer not to interact 
with Jordanian-Jordanian males. (Female, 20) 
There are people here in Jordan who are a little bit racist, like [asking], “Are you 
Palestinian or Jordanian?”  Not everyone.  When I hear it from a Palestinian, it’s ok for 
me.  But when I hear it from someone who is not Palestinian, it is insulting to me, like he 
hates me. (Male, 25) 
[My mother’s] neighbors in Ghor used to say, “If my finger were Palestinian, I would cut 
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it off.”  The women were really tough….  They said, “Why are you here occupying our 
country?”  But even despite that, we were proud of being Palestinian. (Female, 47) 
Those few Palestinians who do have government jobs are careful to draw a distinction 
between official discrimination and social prejudice: 
I am Palestinian and work in the government.  There are no differences between 
Palestinians and Jordanians in the government.  But the people are prejudiced, and 
always ask where I’m from.  But His Majesty makes no distinctions; if you have the 
citizenship [then you are equal]….  If anyone told you that Palestinians can’t work in the 
government, don’t believe him.  We can all work [in the government]….  I’m Palestinian 
and I’ve been working in the government for nineteen years.  But the [Jordanian] people 
are [racist]. (Male, 49) 
The discrimination and prejudice directed at Palestinians since 1970 has 
decreased their socioeconomic integration and led some refugees to identify more 
strongly as Palestinian (Farah 2005): 
Even though I was born here and live here, Palestine is our country.  I’ve never felt like a 
Jordanian citizen.  Because the discrimination is obvious to everyone. (Male, 29) 
Even the racism from Jordanians just makes us feel more strongly Palestinian. (Female, 
unknown age) 
The distress that interviewees expressed at economic and social rejection in Jordan stands 
in sharp contrast to the distress that their ancestors expressed at integration. (Abu-Odeh 
1999)  This is evidence that the economic orientation of Palestinian refugees in Jordan 
has swung substantially toward their host state. 
INTENT TO RETURN 
With a few exceptions, most Palestinians do not know the status of their family’s 
land and property, and what the economic conditions might be if they were to actually 
return.  When addressing the practical question of return today, they do not use 
romanticized notions of the felaheen lifestyle as a basis for comparison to their current 
economic situation.  In fact, rather than eagerly anticipating actual return, many – 
especially those who are more economically integrated – fear that a peace agreement will 
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compel them against their will to leave their homes and livelihoods in Jordan and return 
to Palestine.
192
  Thus, they distinguish between an adamant right of return de jure and 
fear of physical return de facto.  Most Palestinians are settled in their “new” life and 
economically oriented to Jordan: 
There is nothing tempting us to go back.  We don’t have lands, don’t have sheep [or other 
assets there]… (Male, 24) 
We don’t have any goals in the West Bank.  All our ambitions and dreams are centered 
here [in Jordan].  So inshallah it will be here in this country.  Because we left in 1948 and 
after that we’re not going back, ever. (Male, 57) 
(Mother:)  I, for example, I won’t go back to Palestine.  If they can give us monetary 
compensation [as part of a peace settlement] to buy a house and live here, it’s fine. 
(Son:)  We don’t have anything left in Palestine. 
(Mother:)  Even if we went back, we don’t know where our land is. 
(Son:)  Because all the elder people died, and they knew Palestine, but we don’t.  We 
have nothing left in Palestine.  The life there is very difficult, you [would] have to start 
from scratch. 
(Mother:) We are comfortable here, and we are working, it’s fine, our life is good. 
(Female, 67; Male, 30) 
Two-thirds of interviewees indicated that they or their family do not have a 
practical expectation of returning
193
, even if they maintain a hope of, and adamantly insist 
on the right of, return.  In fact, when asked what they would most like to change about 
their life in Jordan
194
, only 9% said that they wish to return to Palestine. 
However, the collective project of the Palestinian refugee community, which is 
the dominant discourse, states that all Palestinians will return to their family’s ancestral 
homes in Palestine when the refugee issue is finally resolved.  This has led to a 
psychological dissonance between the socially constructed “correct” answer and what 
most individuals themselves would do: 
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We will try to do the impossible and go back, but life here is good. (Male, 32) 
I think if they’re satisfied with what they have right now – in Jordan – with their financial 
situation, and if they don’t have any problem with any Jordanian tribe or anything, they 
would just deal with it, and stay here.  As for the people who really wish to go back to 
Palestine, I think they will have a chance to go back….  As for me, I don’t see myself in 
Palestine, to be honest with you.  I see myself working here or in the States, or the Gulf.  
I’m loyal to my country, of course.  Maybe I’m not as ambitious as my father is.  I would 
stick to Jordan. (Female, 20) 
As has been noted in studies of Palestinians in the past (Al Husseini & Bocco 
2009), the number of refugees who would actually prefer to move to Israel, or even the 
new state of Palestine, in the event of a peace agreement is relatively small, and far less 
than the total population; those in Jordan are even less inclined to actually return, while 
those in Lebanon are the most inclined.  This was reinforced by interviewees’ complex 




[Among non-Gazans,] I think the old people… the ones who actually left Palestine… 
really want to return, until they die.  Among the younger generation, they grew up here, 
they don’t have anything in Palestine, they aren’t as [eager] to return.…  If given the 
opportunity, many won’t return. (Female, 22) 
Look, there’s a difference between people from '48 and those from '67….  The '67 
refugees have more hope for return than those from '48….  We are settled here.  But 
people who are from 1967, [I give my best wishes] to go back to their country….  I was 
born here, married here, my friends and relatives are here, my children were born here. 
(Female, 54) 
 (Young man:) To be honest, Palestine is not on the plan. 
(Brother:) It's a complicated issue. 
(Young man:) It’s not a matter of one person, it’s a whole nation. 
(Sister-in-law:) It’s different from family to family.  I think my family [would have] a 
problem with that [statement].  They connect more with the Palestinian issue…   
(Young man:) I mean, we can’t go to Palestine…. 
(Brother:) Personally, I will not lose hope… because it’s mentioned in the Qur’an. 
(Male, 26; Male, 25; Female, 22) 
A few interviewees (7%) speculated that, if return to the CoO became a 
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possibility, they would like to maintain a transnational existence between Jordan and 
Palestine: 
Ideally, I would like to be able to travel back and forth easily between Jordan and 
Palestine, [without border control].  But I would not move back there.  Everything is 
here, my family, friends, assets.  I don’t have anything left there.  I also speak with a 
Jordanian accent. (Male, 32) 
As for Palestine, if there is unity between Palestine and Jordan in the future, they will 
become like one people.  They want [something] like a federal unity. (Male, 72) 
When asked what they expect for the future of the Palestinian refugees
196
, almost 
half of interviewees said that they expect that there will be no change, and only 28% said 
that the group will return to Palestine.  However, camp refugees seem more pessimistic 
than non-camp residents about the future of the refugees: Almost twice as many non-
camp refugees (30%) as camp refugees (16%) expect the refugees will return to Palestine 
(p < .05).  Similarly, among those over 50, non-camp refugees stated much more 
frequently (38%) than camp refugees (7%) that they personally are too old to return, but 
they have hope for future generations (p < .05).  The younger generations (36 and under) 
were less likely to predict the group will return to Palestine (17%) than the older 
generations (31%) (p < .05). 
When asked what they expect will happen in their own future, however, an 
interesting contradiction arises among non-camp refugees: Whereas 30% had expected 
the refugees as a group will return to Palestine, only 7% expect to personally return.
197
  In 
contrast, 19% of camp refugees stated that they personally expect to return to Palestine (p 
< .05), which is similar to the proportion who expected the refugees as a group to 
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Clearly, there are significant differences between camp and non-camp refugees in 
their expectations and practical hope of return both for the refugee group as a whole and 
themselves personally.  Those who are not attached to a camp maintain a greater 
expectation that the group will return, but few of them expect to personally return, even if 
the group does. 
Interviewees were asked the following question
199
: 
If there is a peace deal with Israel in the future, and all options are possible to Palestinian 
refugees, which of the following do you believe is the best course of action for them?  
a. Go back to their original homes, but live with Israelis in Israel 
b. Move to an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza 
c. Stay permanently in Jordan 
d. Move to other countries 
Nearly equal proportions of interviewees chose an independent Palestinian state 
(30%) and staying permanently in Jordan (27%).  Only 16% chose the option which 
would place personal and economic interests above group and political interests, 
returning to their original homes but living with Israelis in Israel. (cf. Haddad 2001)  
Some (14%) rejected all of these options and offered their own alternative, to return to 
their original homes without an Israeli state and Israeli neighbors.  These results are 
nearly identical to those of a poll of Palestinians in Jordan by the Palestinian Center for 
Policy and Survey Research, directed by Dr. Khalil Shikaki, conducted in 2003.
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On this question, there were no significant differences between camp and non-
camp interviewees, except that camp refugees chose the option of returning to their 
original home (with Israelis, in Israel) more frequently (26%) than non-camp refugees 
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(13%) (p < .05).  Likewise, Gazans chose this option more frequently (38%) than non-
Gazans (17%) (p < .05).  This result deserves elaboration: 
The fear of an influx of millions of Palestinian refugees to Israel, forcing the 
Jewish democracy to choose between being Jewish and democratic, is the main reason 
why Israel has never agreed to acknowledge a Palestinian right of return. (Dumper 2008)  
Pro-Israel critics will say that the above result is a strategic calculation on the part of the 
camp and Gazan refugees to achieve precisely that outcome, which demonstrates that 
they are hold stronger political attitudes, as the conventional wisdom goes, to seek 
Israel’s destruction.  This perspective is based on a misunderstanding of the perception of 
Israel among Palestinians in Jordan.  It assumes, as Israel’s supporters inherently believe, 
that in such a scenario, the Palestinians would immediately gain the electoral advantage 
and thereby eliminate the Jewish state through the democratic process.  However, the vast 
majority of Palestinians in Jordan have no such faith in Israeli democracy.  They do not 
trust Israel to keep its promises and never imagine that, in such a scenario, the regime 
would willingly dismantle itself as a result of free and fair elections.  In fact, those 
holding the most militant opinions against Israel vehemently refused the option to “live 
with Israelis in Israel”.  When asked the reason for their choice, only 1 of the 23 
interviewees who did choose it offered the strategic reason regarding democracy.  Most 
of the others gave answers which reflected precisely the opposite trend, namely that they 
are more personally or economically motivated than politically motivated.  They place 
higher priority on living on their ancestral land than the collective political project: 
There’s no other option, because it’s my land…. (Male, 46) 
The first choice, for me personally….  Old people, because it's my country, I want to die 
there in my land. (Male, 72) 
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My dad used to tell me [he knew] Israelis, and they were really good people.  Even if we 
lived together... we believed my dad, they used to hang out together. (Male, 25) 
It’s not a problem to live with Israelis, but Israelis should comply with… not oppressing 
Palestinians, and should be honest with the people, not to delay. (Male, 46) 
Despite a degree of discrimination and social prejudice affecting Palestinians 
regardless of camp/non-camp status, the segmentation between those who are more 
socioeconomically integrated to Jordan (mostly urban refugees) and those less integrated 
(mostly camp and Gazan refugees) has important differences on Palestinians’ practical 
intent to return and even their willingness to militarize, despite similarity in the militancy 
of their attitudes, as will be demonstrated later in this chapter.  Most refugees weigh 
complex political and economic considerations when considering whether they would 
actually return to Palestine, if given the opportunity; but camp and Gazan refugees are 
more likely to prioritize personal and economic considerations in that decision over group 
and political ones. 
Militancy entrepreneurs 
Even after the departure of pre-existing militancy entrepreneurs – fedayeen and 
the PLO leadership – in 1971, there have been present in Jordan individuals who would 
be willing to take up the mantle of leading militancy against Israel if given the 
opportunity, as well as some efforts at starting clandestine militant organizations.  For 
example: 
I was a leader in the university at that time and was… inviting people to participate, 
celebrating the Intifada.  I was arrested… at that time, in 1987, because of our political 
duties….  We were underground revolutionary parties at that time… making leaflets, 
painting slogans on the walls, songs supporting Intifada….  I was in Jordan, so I couldn’t 
do anything else….  My idea is only all [of] Palestine, my historical right, one day, 
maybe by force, I will take it.  Now we don’t have the power, the weapons, but PFLP is 
one of the most “terrorist” organizations….  My party is totally different now, [it has 
moderated,] but I still believe in the old [militant] ideas….  What has been taken by force 
must be returned by force, this is Nasser’s saying…. (Palestinian activist, male, 49) 
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Jordan signed a peace treaty with the Jews.  And they don’t want anyone to join the 
resistance, even if they just want to talk about resistance.  I wanted to gather people here 
to go [fight in Palestine] but the Jordanian government prevented me.  [When was that?]  
According to the events; the last [time] was during the [2008-09] Gaza War.  But I did 
some things behind the government’s back.…  My hip here broke.  That’s why I’m not 
trying to do anything now, because I’m sick and don’t want to go to jail.  The people in 
the camp trust me and listen to me, but not [to] other people. (Palestinian activist, male, 
75) 
They interrogated me in the intelligence, and I was beaten there to prevent me from doing 
this again….  Even if I help them [in Palestine by sending assistance], that doesn’t 
prevent me from carrying a weapon and going to the border and dying.  There are many 
projects to revive the occasions which happened in Palestine… the killing of leaders in 
Palestine….  So we try to revive these occasions.  This is for us not to forget, for the next 
generation not to forget there is a country occupied by the Jews.  And when the day 
comes, we can confront them and get our lands back. (Palestinian activist, male, 30) 
Interviewees were asked the following question
201
: 
The Palestinians in Jordan have not joined the resistance against Israel for many years. In 
your opinion, why is that? 
a. They have lost hope in the Palestinian national movement 
b. They are focused on building their lives in Jordan 
c. There are no resistance organizations in Jordan 
d. People would join the resistance but the government of Jordan prevents it 
e. Another reason 
Considering the failure of any militant organization to publicly organize and 
operate in Jordan, and the high-profile expulsion of the PLO and fedayeen in 1971, it is 
surprising that only 27% of interviewees stated that one reason was the lack of resistance 
organizations in Jordan.  (I will discuss their answers to this question further in the 
section on “militant attitudes”, below.)  This may suggest that most people are aware of, 
or at least have heard of, the presence of militancy entrepreneurs in Jordan. 
NO LONGER WAITING FOR POWERFUL STATES 
By the late 1970s, even those who had arrived in 1967 had entered into a 
protracted refugee situation.  The tent camps erected following the 1967 War were 
replaced with semi-permanent shelters by 1974. (Schiff 1995)  By 2011, the great-
                                                          
201
 Interviewees were allowed to indicate more than one choice. 
213 
 
grandchildren of those who arrived in 1948 were already adults.  As in the previous 
period, this extended duration has led to a feeling that their cause has long since become 
the status quo on the international agenda, and independent action by the refugees is the 
only likely impetus which will refresh its urgency.  The feeling of self-efficacy is 
stronger now than it was forty years ago: 
We are suffering more than our parents when they first came here [after the 1967 War] 
because they didn’t have many choices, they just wanted to find work and protect their 
sons and daughters.  We have many options now, we want so many things and we want 
to implement them.  We want to achieve many things because our time is different from 
their time. (Palestinian activist, male, 36) 
The evolving pragmatic approach by Arab states to Israel also helped reify the 
shared Palestinian identity.  After the 1973 War, every major historical event in the Arab-
Israeli conflict over the next four decades reinforced the idea that the Arab states no 
longer accept responsibility for the Palestinian issue, and the Palestinians are on their 
own in the conflict against Israel.  First, the Arab states implicitly abandoned the 
Palestinian issue by formally recognizing the PLO as the legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people in 1974, negotiating separate peace treaties in 1978/79 (Egypt) and 
1994 (Jordan), and abdicating claims to the West Bank in 1988 (Jordan).  Second, 
hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, many of whom had lived in the Gulf their whole 
lives, were expelled from Kuwait in 1991 and Iraq since 2003.  Third, the 1993 signing 
by the PLO of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) with Israel “shattered the hope of 
return for Palestinian refugees….  After the DOP, Palestinian-Jordanians realized that 
their case was no longer on the PLO agenda; they would have to present and defend it 
themselves.” (Abu-Odeh 1999, p. 235)  Whereas the PLO had represented the “unifying 
nationalist umbrella” until that point, afterward the refugees felt that they had been 
forgotten (Farah 2005), sacrificed on the altar of the West Bank and Gaza. 
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The only group which has demonstrated success in putting the Palestinian issue 
back on the international agenda were the Palestinians themselves, in the West Bank and 
Gaza beginning in 1987 and 2000, and the Gaza War between Hamas and Israel in 2008-
09. 
Oslo Accords 
In the early 1990s the regional Palestinian leadership under Yasser Arafat was 
persuaded to moderate its strategy toward engaging in negotiations and adopting the two-
state solution.  At first this led to hope of a long-delayed resolution for the Palestinian 
refugees, but eventually, as the failure of the Oslo Accords became apparent by the late 
1990s, most refugees in Jordan grew cynical and pessimistic about the prospects for a 
peace accord.  Since Israel was perceived by most Palestinians as having failed to uphold 
its obligations under the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian Authority (PA) – a Fatah-
controlled institution which grew out of the Oslo Accords to establish provisional 
Palestinian control in the West Bank and Gaza – came to be seen as evidence of 
collaboration with the enemy; while expanding Israeli occupation and endemic corruption 
in Fatah and the PA undermined the perceived legitimacy of Fatah’s leadership: 
As for the PA, I don’t believe in it at all.  I think they are just a bunch of thieves.  They 
aren’t trying to help us at all. (Female, 22) 
The PA are spies for Israel, they are protecting Israel, so there is no such thing as peace 
with Israel….  Abbas doesn’t defend Palestine….  He’s a traitor and he protects the 
interests of Israel and the US, and he doesn’t deserve the leadership  of the Palestinian 
people.  The Palestinian people should lead themselves, not Abbas. (Male, 65) 
I used to be with Fatah.  When it was first established, I was supporting Fatah.  But after 
that, when they started to negotiate with the Israelis, I didn’t support it anymore. (Male, 
64) 
The release of the so-called Palestine Papers in January 2011 represented, for many 
refugees, yet another resounding blow to Fatah’s legitimacy: 
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Abbas and [the other Fatah leaders] are thieves and traitors....  They don’t think about the 
Palestinian people….  For example, we saw the documents revealed by Al-Jazeera, they 
all knew Gaza was going to be attacked but they were with the Israelis. (Male, 48) 
It’s important that… I won’t see [the Palestinian leader] on the internet sitting and having 
fun with the Jews, kissing each other on the cheek as though he’s their brother or cousin.  
Al-Jazeera revealed everything.  And based on that, Saeb Erekat resigned.  He denied 
everything at first and after that he resigned. (Male, 48) 
When these factors – corruption and perceived collaboration with an intransigent enemy 
– were viewed in contrast to apparent honest stewardship and resistance bona fides by 
Hamas, support for Fatah and its foray into moderation shifted to support of Hamas: 
Hamas is strong….  Their position is fixed, it's permanent….  And Israel didn't want to 
relinquish anything, they wanted more land, to expand.  And the PA, of course, there are 
three treaties and agreements, but Israelis do not abide by these treaties. (Male, 72) 
[Hamas] will not compromise the Palestinian issue, while Fatah compromises too much.  
They have compromised and are still compromising.  They have direct negotiations, they 
are ignoring many rights of the Palestinian refugees, [and] there is so much corruption, 
especially financial corruption.  They are looting the donations….  [With] Hamas, we 
don’t hear about this. (Female, 22) 
In short, strong international engagement in the early 1990s temporarily decreased 
hope of redemption through intervention by powerful actors, but ultimately backfired as 
it led to damaging the legitimacy of its own cultivated partner and boosting that of its 
hardline rival. 
Fatah-Hamas rivalry 
Even the Fatah-Hamas split is viewed through the lens of the Palestinian national 
project, leading some refugees to condemn the divide and hope for Palestinian unity: 
Fatah and Hamas have an internal conflict between them, so they don’t have an 
agreement….  They are supposed to be united to defend Palestine together. (Male, 51) 
They just want the position itself, not to help the people.  Because if they have the best 
interests of the Palestinians in their hearts, they would have united – Fatah and Hamas – 
like in Algeria. (Male, 68) 
Others see the shortcomings of both of these two main contenders for the title of 
Palestinian leadership as further evidence that the Palestinian refugees are on their own: 
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There is no [Palestinian] authority in Palestine….  There is fighting between us and we 
can’t decide which one to pick.  Fatah is supported by Israel and Hamas is [supported] by 
the Shi’ites in Iran.  There is no authority for the Palestinian people except the people 
themselves. (Male, 27) 
In Palestine, not Fatah, not even Hamas, they made many mistakes….  [Perhaps] we 
follow Hamas because we follow the religion, but as a sole representative of the 
Palestinian people, there is no representative.  Because people who are interested in 
keeping their positions can kill their own people to support their positions.  So they only 
represent themselves, not the people….  The Palestinian people are so powerful, they can 
handle anything. (Male, 48) 
When asked, “Which group or organization do you feel best represents the 
interests of the Palestinian refugees?”
202
, only 19% mentioned Hamas
203
 and 10% 
mentioned Fatah.  Just under a quarter said that UNRWA represents their interests, while 
37% said no organization represents them, and the only representative of the Palestinian 
refugees is the Palestinian people themselves. 
Political opportunity 
Unlike in the 1948-63 period, the main reason that Palestinian refugees have not 
militarized in Jordan since 1971 is lack of political opportunity.  Of the independent 
variables in this project, this was the only one which changed dramatically following the 
civil war in 1970. 
SECURITIZATION OF CAMPS AND COMMUNITIES 
The agreement which the PLO signed to end the civil war in Jordan in 1970 
required that they depart for Lebanon, leading to the exit of tens of thousands of 
fedayeen.  The military, civil defense and domestic intelligence services were purged of 
Palestinians.  Police clamped down on protests.  The mukhabarat became proactive in 
preventing and stopping political activism among Palestinians, including efforts to 
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organize militarization, thwarting several attempts in the early 1970s. (Abu-Odeh 1999)  
They cultivated informants in refugee camps, universities and high schools, and exercised 
broad powers of surveillance and detention.  Imams at mosques were forbidden to give 
sermons not sanctioned by the government.  The Jordanian military and border police 
began intercepting and shooting anyone attempting to cross westward illegally.  As a 
result, organization, communication, mobilization, storage of weapons and cross-border 
strikes became extremely difficult without interception by the host state authorities. 
In the question mentioned previously, why the Palestinians in Jordan have not 
engaged in “resistance” activities, 56% of interviewees chose the fourth option, that 
people would join the resistance but the government of Jordan prevents it: 
If they have participated in the resistance, they will be captured by the Jordanian 
government…. If they were in Palestine they would have participated in the Intifada. 
(Female, 45) 
We, now, here, cannot join the resistance.  This is a country [with] its own government, 
its own constitution….  If the king asked us to go, we would have gone.  But we cannot 
go by ourselves.  If the king said, yes, we’re going to help the Palestinians, we would go. 
(Male, 51) 
The mukhabarat terrified them.  They wanted to participate, all of them, but they were 
afraid….  Unfortunately, anyone who wants to say, “I am from Hamas, I want to join the 
resistance,” was arrested. (Male, 64) 
Many mentioned that the border is closed and guarded by the Jordanian military: 
Because of the treaties, it’s not allowed.  The Palestinians, to go and cross the border to 
Israel, it’s not allowed in the treaty.  But all of us hope to go and fight and die there, to go 
and set Palestine free. (Male, 48) 
If they opened the border, many people would have gone there.  There were soldiers and 
police along the border, even now.  Every two kilometers there is a checkpoint. (Male, 
32) 
As a result, protests were held in lieu of militarization by those who wished to cross the 
border: 
Imagine that someone has taken your land, your money, everything.  If you had a chance 
to fight, would you fight?  But of course, the Jordanian government prevented us.  We 
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were only capable of holding demonstrations. (Male, 48) 
However, during the two Intifadas and the Gaza War, even protests were sometimes 
repressed by the authorities: 
This was the street where there were protests during the second Intifada.  You see [the 
streets are so narrow] and we were suffering because there were so many police around, 
and they fired tear gas. (Male, 27) 
I was really happy when my sister told me that they were going out in demonstrations….  
This was great....  When I went out in demonstrations, they used the water cannons. 
(Male, 26) 
The mukhabarat are especially vigilant in the camp for Gazan refugees: 
The mukhabarat are here all the time.  They asked me now [when I stepped out of the 
interview with you] what the American wants.  I said, “I don’t know, I don’t speak 
English.” (Female, 40) 
Those whose families arrived to the East Bank in 1967 were even more likely to 
cite government intervention (69%) than those whose families arrived in 1948 (52%) (p < 
.05).  As noted previously, only 27% of interviewees said that there has not been 
militarization because there are no such organizations in Jordan; an equal proportion said 
that it is because people are focused on building their lives in Jordan; and relatively few 
(14%) said that the people have lost hope in the Palestinian national movement.  There 
were no significant differences between camp and non-camp refugees, but no Gazans – 
not surprisingly – cited building their lives in Jordan as a reason, whereas 28% of non-
Gazan refugees mentioned it (p < .05).   
COO DEFENSE CAPABILITY 
In the past 40 years, Israel’s military and defense capabilities have grown 
exponentially with their technological superiority, including along its borders.  It has 
installed multiple layers of obstacles at its borders, surveillance systems and tracking 
mechanisms to prevent infiltration.  In addition, as noted in the previous section, the 
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Jordan River is more easily defensible than an arbitrary line. 
HOST-COO RELATIONS 
From 1971 to 1994 Jordan and Israel were officially in a state of war, but the 
Hashemite Kingdom was very reluctant to initiate or support any conflict against its 
western neighbor.  They did not participate in the 1973 War against Israel by Syria and 
Egypt, except to send some forces to Syria after coming under intense political pressure 
from Arab states.  After Jordan and Israel signed the peace treaty in 1994, the Jordanian 
government’s incentive to allow militant activity against Israel from their territory 
decreased even further. 
INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT 
In 1974 the UN officially recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of 
the Palestinian people, but it was not until the late 1980s and early 1990s that the first 
Intifada caused international attention to evolve from a mostly state-centric consideration 
of the “Israeli-Arab conflict” to an “Israeli-Palestinian conflict”.  This may have 
temporarily reduced legitimacy for militancy entrepreneurs to operate in Jordan, 
reflecting the increased hope of redemption through the efforts of others, as described 
above.  However, that strong international engagement by the West is now widely 
perceived as worse than useless – many interviewees observed that twenty years of 
negotiations have produced nothing for them, while Israel continues to expand 
settlements in a perceived attempt to create new realities on the ground. 
Conflict resources 
Without political opportunities for militarization, it is impossible to know for 
certain whether conflict resources would be available.  However, some parallels can 
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provide insight.  Syria intervened in Jordan on behalf of the fedayeen in 1970. (Schiff 
1995; Sicker 1989)  Iran and Syria currently support two armed militant groups fighting 
Israel, Hizbollah and Hamas
204
, so it is not a stretch to imagine that they would be willing 
to supply another group based in Jordan.  Jordan also shares a long border with Iraq, the 
home of al-Qaeda and other Sunni militant groups who might seek to extend their 
influence by supplying Palestinian (Sunni) guerrillas in Jordan.  Clearly, the Jordanian 
government itself would not be a likely supplier. 
Diversion of humanitarian aid is unlikely.  UNRWA stopped distributing food and 
other in-kind supplies decades ago; their assistance now is limited to social services, 
primarily schools and health clinics.  As in the previous periods, UNRWA is also 
extremely sensitive to accusations by donor countries of supplying militants.  However, 
UNRWA support in refugee camps could remain a source of care for militants’ 
dependents. 
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There has been almost no militarization in Jordan since 1971, but it is not for lack 
of intent.  For instance, interviewees were asked the following question: 
During the second Intifada, which of the following best describes how you felt?
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a. Everyone must join the resistance 
b. The resistance should be maintained within Palestine, while those outside 
Palestine should send assistance 
c. All we can do is follow events closely in the news 
d. I did not follow what was happening in Palestine 
Interviewees were about equally likely to choose the first and second options (40-42%), 
with no significant differences between camp and non-camp refugees.  The most direct 
question I posed regarding current attitudes toward militancy was the following: 
What do you believe now is the best way to address the historical grievances and achieve 
the rights of the Palestinian people regarding Palestine?
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a. Peace settlement with an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and 
Gaza, and monetary compensation to Palestinian refugees 
b. Using international law and international courts to achieve the rights 
c. Nonviolent resistance like that of Gandhi in India, or the protests in Tunisia and 
Egypt 
d. Armed resistance 
One-third of interviewees chose “armed resistance”, which is about the same percentage 
(36%) that chose the two-state solution.  Some chose both: 
The first and last choices are good.  We can’t reach the first choice unless we go through 
the last.  Because Israel is selfish. (Male, 45) 
India is different.…  [And] the second choice, forget about it, nobody will help.  
International law is for the strong.…  The veto [in the UN Security Council] canceled all 
the other [resolutions].  There are two choices….  Possibly the first choice, or armed 
resistance. (Male, 48) 
Maybe armed resistance, but nobody will give us weapons….  The first choice.  So they 
will have the Palestinian government.  But people should elect who is going to rule them. 
(Female, 21) 
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International legal remedies (18%) and non-violent resistance (14%) were less 
frequently chosen.  Interestingly, there were no significant differences between camp and 
non-camp refugees on the second, third or fourth options, but camp residents were less 
likely (21%) to choose the two-state solution than non-camp refugees (39%) (p <  .05).  
However, younger camp residents (36 and under) were far more likely (32%) to choose 
the international legal route than older camp residents (1%) (p < .01), and they were less 
likely (4%) to reject all the options, and say that the Palestinian grievances are impossible 
to address, than older camp residents (17%) (p < .10).  Likewise, Gazans were more 
likely to choose the international legal option (38%) than non-Gazans (16%) (p < .05) 
As noted in the previous chapter, those who arrived in 1967 held more militant 
attitudes than those who arrived in 1948.  This distinction seems to have persisted more 
than forty years later: Refugees whose families crossed to the East Bank in 1967 were 
more than twice as likely (52%) to choose “armed resistance” as those who arrived in 
1948 (24%) (p < .01), and less likely to choose nonviolent resistance (6%) than those 
whose families had arrived earlier (19%) (p < .05). 
Finally, interviewees were asked the following question to assess their feeling of 
group efficacy in achieving the collective project: 
Do you believe the rights of the Palestinian people regarding Palestine can be best 
achieved through the efforts of the…
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a. international community led by the United Nations 
b. international community led by the United States 
c. Arab governments  
d. Palestinian people themselves 
The most popular choice was “the Palestinian people themselves” (55%); the 
other choices each received about 20%.  On this question there was significant variation 
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by age: Younger interviewees (36 and under) were less likely to choose the leadership of 
the US (8%) and Arab governments (13%) than older interviewees (21% and 28%, 
respectively) (p < .05), and they were more likely to choose the Palestinian people 
themselves (63%) than older respondents (47%) (p < .10).  This may reflect a remnant of 
the Palestinians’ political beliefs of the 1950s and early 1960s, when they saw only two 
routes for redemption: a political resolution through the United Nations, or all-out war by 
the Arab states. (Abu-Odeh 1999)  There were no significant differences for Gazans or 
camp refugees in this question.  Those who arrived in 1967 were less likely to choose the 
UN (12%) than those who arrived in 1948 (27%) (p < .05).  Out of the interviewees who 
chose “the Palestinian people themselves”, just over a quarter mentioned that it is because 
the Palestinians have tried the other options, and all have failed. 
One militant quote which seems to permeate the refugee community is borrowed 
from Gamal Abd al-Nasser.  After Israel captured the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip in 
1967, he said, “What was taken by force must be restored by force.” (Morris 1999, p. 
347)  This quote was voluntarily mentioned by nearly one-fifth of all interviewees, and it 
was more frequently stated by non-camp refugees (22%) than camp refugees (9%) (p < 
.05); and more frequently by those whose families arrived in 1967 (22%) than 1948 
(12%) (p < .10). 
The above results indicate that there is a significant support among the population 
for militarization in support of the Palestinian national project.  As in the discussion of 
intent to return above, the results also refute the conventional wisdom
208
 that camp 
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potentially, militant of the Palestinians residing in Jordan.” (1988, pp. 180-81)  Similarly, 
political analyst Rami Khouri writes: “Anger, frustration and depression are fuelling two parallel 
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refugees, Gazans and young people hold more militant attitudes than non-camp refugees, 
non-Gazans and older people.  It seems that all of those demographic groups are about 
equally likely to hold militant attitudes.  However, refugees whose families arrived to the 
East Bank in 1967 hold significantly more militant attitudes than those who arrived in 
1948.
209
  This may be due to the fact that the overwhelming majority of those households 
were double refugees, but they are also more educated: Those who arrived in 1967 were 
twice as likely (49%) to have had at least some university-level education as those whose 
families arrived in 1948 (24%) (p < .01).  With that high degree of correlation between 
these two variables, arrival year and education level, it is not possible to infer causality.  
However, whether higher education, arriving in 1967 or being a double refugee, or some 
combination thereof, is the cause of the increased militancy, it is certainly a question 
worthy of greater investigation. 
ATTEMPTS TO MILITARIZE 
In the early 1970s the mukhabarat thwarted several attempts at militarization, 
especially as the PLO then saw the Jordanian regime as an enemy.  Over the past 40 
years, there have been further attempts by Palestinians in Jordan to infiltrate their CoO or 
to fight their CoO enemy on other fronts, such as during the 1982 Israeli invasion of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
with an opportunity to live a normal life, while some politically active young men and women 
turn toward political extremism and militancy. The most troubling new phenomenon in this 
respect is the proliferation of very small groups of militants - in Gaza but also in other parts of the 
region, like Lebanon - who use the rhetoric of Al-Qaeda. In contrast, in the two others (sic) areas 
where UNRWA operates - Syria and Jordan - refugees make good use of basic UNRWA services 
like education and health and otherwise largely take care of themselves. This is because in Syria 
and Jordan… refugees are treated decently, enjoying virtually the same rights to work as citizens 
(most refugees are citizens in Jordan, despite living in refugee camps).  The juxtaposition is 
telling: when people enjoy basic rights, they focus on improving their lives and living in security 
and some hope for a better future. When they are mistreated and denied basic human rights, they 
become hopeless or desperate, and some embrace radicalism and militancy.” (The Daily Star, 
12/13/08) 
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southern Lebanon: “So great was the turnout [of volunteers at the PLO office in Amman] 
that there were not enough buses for all who wanted to go….  At the border the Syrians… 
turned back the buses, saying the fighters were not wanted in Lebanon.” (Brand 1988, pp. 
181-82)  Most recently, in January 2010 a roadside bomb was detonated as a convoy of 
Israeli diplomats passed by. (Bright/Christian Science Monitor, 1/15/10)  Over the years, 
some of the efforts were successful, most were intercepted by Jordanian border guards, 
and others were killed by the Israeli military: 
Some of my friends last year – they are youths, not old – they went to Gaza.  We told 
them that there is a war and a bad situation, but they said that it’s enough to die in 
Palestinian land. (Male, 45) 
A few years ago, some young people from the camp were trying to cross the border to 
fight in Gaza, but they were killed on the border. (Male, 19) 
[In the second Intifada] there was a gang here in [the camp] who wanted to take a bus and 
go fight Israel.  But unfortunately the Jordanian army started shooting them….  
[Thankfully] they ran away and are ok. Can you imagine the Jordanian army, which is 
Arab, how they deal with the Palestinians? (Male, 16)
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They tried to go to Palestine and join the resistance, but the Jordanian government was 
afraid the Jews would kill them, so that’s why they closed the border, because it would be 
a massacre if they crossed the border….  Even if they wanted to make nonviolent 
resistance, [the Israelis] would have killed them.... The Jordanian government just wanted 
to protect them….  This is how I see the perspective of the Jordanian government. (Male, 
68) 
People tried, they went to the borders, but the Jordanian army arrested some of them, and 
the rest left.  If it was allowed, all the Palestinians here in Jordan would have gone to 
Palestine. (Male, 46) 
Many people, young people, were trying to reach Palestine.  We went to Ghor next to the 
borders, and we confronted the Israeli army, but we weren't able to cross the borders to 
Palestine.  And some of us went to Egypt to cross into Palestine from Gaza.  And they 
were arrested in Egypt. (Male, 28) 
In the second Intifada… eight guys from this camp went to the West Bank and Gaza and 
were killed.... People here understand that it’s impossible for them to go to Palestine 
because there’s a peace treaty.  We tried to go there and eight guys were killed….  So 
people know that they cannot cross the border.  They will be killed or arrested.  We can’t 
even visit. (Palestinian activist, female, 29) 
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voluntarily spoke up during an interview with his mother, who was a participant. 
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Stifled attempts at militarization have sometimes been sublimated into other forms of 
action: 
They used to have [protests] to support making war against Israel seven years ago.  But 
[the protesters] just destroyed the camp.  They were trying to show people that they care, 
but it was for nothing.  They suppressed the feeling because they want to fight, but the 
borders and the community itself doesn’t allow them to go, so they just express it here by 
destroying and making fires. (Female, 47) 
Even weapons – if we send weapons, the Arab governments confiscate them.  People 
were trying to do that.  They actually sent weapons and were caught on the border, and 
they confiscated their weapons….  Even for a visit we can’t go, so how can we help them 
with weapons? (Male, 65) 
Some interviewees vowed that they will militarize as soon as the political opportunity is 
available: 
The refugees who are in Jordan are not trained to use weapons….  But trust me, if the 
Palestinian refugees, whether trained to use weapons or not, if he had the chance to go, he 
would go. (Male, 28) 
Maybe [armed resistance] is hard nowadays, but we are thinking of that.  We are talking 
about political actions, we are not going to stop it, we are not stopping our political 
activities.  But if we have the chance [for armed resistance], we’ll grab it.  I’m sure, what 
gives the Palestinians a good image is doing armed resistance… Maybe it was from 1968 
to the 1980s, doing these armed activities… but we have to go back to it.  It’s not easy….  
For sure, I’m against any civilian attacks, any terrorism….  If you follow our [policy on] 
armed resistance, we abandoned these things.  It’s clear, my idea, who’s against me: a 
soldier or [a person] carrying a weapon against me, for sure I will fight him. (Palestinian 
activist, male, 49) 
In sum, while militarization has not occurred in Jordan, there have been repeated 
attempts, particularly during times of crisis and violence in Israeli-Palestinian relations, 
such as the Intifadas and the Gaza War. 
SYMBOLIC ACTIONS AND EDUCATION 
Since political opportunities for militarization are not available, many refugees 
engage in symbolic and educational acts to perpetuate and defend the Palestinian identity 
and collective national project.  For example, most Palestinian homes have wall 
decorations referring to Palestine, such as maps, souvenirs, posters of Jerusalem, etc.  
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One household proudly displayed a framed certificate which states: 
The Eternal Promise / I will keep the Aqsa Mosque and all Palestine in my heart and 
serve it… even though the Jews are trying to make us forget Palestine and the holy places 
in Palestine; and I will not deal with those who support the Zionists, for all eternity; and I 
will pass on this promise to my children and grandchildren…. 
Palestinian activists resent actions by the Jordanian government which they 
perceive as attempts to erase the Palestinian identity in Jordan, such as moving away 
from the term “refugee camp” to a more ambiguous term, removing any suggestion of 
differences between Palestinians and Jordanians in the educational system
211
 (Farah 
2005), banning display of the Palestinian flag except in certain circumstances, 
withholding permission for Palestinian workshops and campaigns in camps, refusing to 
allow Palestinians in Jordan to vote in Palestinian elections, and the ubiquitous displays 
of “One Jordan” and “Jordan First” slogans.  In contrast, political entrepreneurs actively 
seek to perpetuate the Palestinian identity through educational and symbolic actions (cf. 
Farah 2005); a few interviewees mentioned that they see education as a weapon in the 
conflict against Israel. 
Everything about the right of return… has been removed from textbooks after the 1994 
peace treaty….  Now we have sessions [to teach] on the right of return to Palestine….  
There is coordination between us and the human rights center, with EU support.  We try 
to educate people, women, men and children, about the Palestinian cause, and about the 
right of return to Palestine, how we can achieve this right…. We were surprised during 
these sessions, we expected that children have forgotten….  We were shocked to find that 
they love Palestine and are attached to Palestine.  They have bracelets and pins with the 
Palestinian flag.  In every house there is a Palestinian flag.  There are photos of martyrs.  
When people are killed in Palestine, there are funerals here….  If they have a happy 
occasion there, we celebrate here. (Palestinian activist, male, 36) 
On Facebook, I speak with my family, how to resist the Jews, I try to encourage them, to 
tell them you have to have patience.  To support them in Gaza.  How I can resist, if I talk 
with you and other people, about the situations and the Palestinian cause – I can resist the 
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 The public education curriculum in Jordan essentially denies any distinction between the two 
groups, and does not teach students about the 1970 civil war.  As a result, many young East 
Banker Jordanians are not even aware that there are two groups.  Some informed me that when 
they were younger they did not even know that the famous rivalry between the Wihdat and Fasali 
soccer teams represents a Palestinian/Jordanian rivalry. 
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Jews [like this].  And if we can [make cases in the] courts....  The blind support for Israel 
in the US and all over the world, we can try to make them look at the Palestinian cause 
from a different point of view, from our perspective….  So [I do] what I’m capable of: I 
am a volunteer here [in this aid office].  I help school dropouts try to find something 
useful to do.  I wanted to help you [with] your research, but I wanted to give you the real 
image of the Palestinian refugees, not a stereotype….  [By] answering your questions, I 
am helping my community. (Palestinian activist, female, 29) 
It’s really important for me, being Palestinian, I’m really proud….  I refuse to put up any 
picture that has nothing to do with Palestine….  My parents, because of the [1970 War], 
they [tell] us, just don’t get involved in politics….  [But] I refused the way that my 
parents raised me, that when it comes to politics, don’t interfere, don’t talk about 
politics….  I wanted to be a journalist and get into politics, [and] they refused that, but I 
am planning inshallah to raise my children to just get involved, don’t just be silent and do 
nothing.  (Female, 21) 
The internet has opened up new avenues for political activism and educational activities 
to perpetuate the Palestinian national identity: 
My children are feeling that they are Palestinian more than us, because of the media and 
especially the internet. (Male, 48) 
Now we have Facebook and the internet, good media [outlets], so we have a good idea, 
better than before….  So we are trying to say objectively what’s going on in our minds. 
(Palestinian activist, male, 49) 
The group is making the most logical choice they can in order to achieve their 
collective project.  Whereas there was a credible option for attainment of the refugees’ 
political objectives in the first period (pan-Arabism) and the second (Fatah/PLO), since 
1971 there has been no such credible option.  Therefore, in this case, the most logical 
choice is to strongly maintain their collective project through educational and symbolic 
actions, impressing hardline attitudes on the younger generations and occasional attempts 
to militarize, in the hopes that political opportunity will become available and enable 
them to achieve their political goals in the future. 
Conclusion 
Results of the case of Palestinians in Jordan from 1971-2011 revealed a 
contradiction of the conventional wisdom regarding refugee camps, in which camp 
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refugees are more politically extreme in their attitudes against the CoO.  In this study, 
those who were less socioeconomically integrated, camp residents and Gazans, expressed 
greater intent to personally return, and were more likely to select an option which 
privileges their personal and economic interests over the collective project, even though 
they were equally likely to hold militant attitudes regarding Israel.  These results provide 
evidence that decreased rights and less economic integration to the host state increases 
orientation toward the CoO and desire to return, but not necessarily a militant attitude.  
Camp refugees, and particularly older camp refugees, are more pessimistic about the 
future of the Palestinian refugee situation; and young people feel more political self-
efficacy but are less likely to expect to personally return.  In general, the segmentation 
between those who are more or less socioeconomically integrated has persisted, despite 
general upward mobility (for non-Gazan refugees) from 1948 until today. 
In both the first (1948-1963) and third (1971-2011) periods of the Palestinians’ 
stay in Jordan there was a collective project to redeem the homeland, but militarization 
did not occur.  The main difference between these periods is that there was political 
opportunity in the first, but few militancy entrepreneurs primarily due to faith in a supra-
national alternative, pan-Arabism; whereas in the third period, the community has turned 
from faith in outside powers to a belief in self-help, and militancy entrepreneurs are 
present, but there is no political opportunity.  The case of Palestinians from 1971-2011 is 
summarized in Figure 5, below.  I will discuss the Arab Spring and the likely future of 




Figure 5. Summary: Palestinians in Jordan, 1971-2011 
  
Experienced war of exclusion 
with clear enemy? 
Socioeconomically 
marginalized in host state? 
Collective project, may 
support others, but little 
militarization themselves 





Economically or politically 









CHAPTER 8: Iraqis in Jordan, 2003 to 2011 
 
The preceding three chapters have applied the proposed framework to three 
observations of the case of Palestinian refugees in Jordan.  In this chapter I will expand 
the generalizability of the framework by extending it to the case of Iraqis in Jordan since 
2003.  Leenders summarizes well the failure of existing militarization literature, 
particularly Lischer (2005), when applied to this case: 
[The] generalizing prerequisites [Lischer] mentions for refugee violence to occur appear 
to be by and large in place when assessing the Iraqi refugee crisis….  [There] appears to 
be a medium to high probability of Iraqi refugees transforming into warriors and 
triggering a spill-over of the violence in Iraq….  [Yet there] is no sign of combat activity 
involving Iraqi refugees; no massive recruitment of refugee warriors; and no spill-over of 
the political violence in Iraq via refugees carrying out their presumed role as ‘carriers of 
conflict’. (2009, p. 350) 
I will demonstrate that Iraqi refugees have had little sense of group identity and collective 
project to redeem the homeland, even though there have been present militancy 
entrepreneurs, and conflict resources would be available if a political opportunity allowed 
it.  As a result, there has been no militarization by Iraqis in Jordan. 
 
The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 was expected to produce a mass exodus of 
hundreds of thousands of refugees, leading UNHCR to prepare tent encampments across 
the border in neighboring countries, including Jordan.  However, this foresight ended up 
being an embarrassment for UNHCR when relatively few refugees arrived (Loughry 
2010; Hodson 2007); in fact, there was actually an inflow of some 300,000-500,000 to 
Iraq, mostly from Iran, by those who had earlier fled the regime of Saddam Hussein 
(Jones 2010; Chatelard & Misconi 2009): 
In 2003, just days after the collapse of the Saddam Hussein, some relatives who have 
been in the US since the 1980s called us and asked, “What’s the situation?  Are there 
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opportunities?”  They wanted to come back.  People thought it will be like Germany and 
Japan after World War II.  Most of the Baghdad hotels were filled with Iraqi businessmen 
who had been living outside. (Male,  43) 
The first wave of departures from Iraq were ex-Ba’athists and their families, who fled 
following de-Ba’athification, demobilization of the Iraqi military and closing of state-
owned industries in Iraq. (de Bel-Air 2009)  Departures from 2003-2005 were mostly 
middle-class technocrats, intelligentsia and professionals who began to be targeted by 
militias. (Human Rights Watch 2006)  However, most refugees departed during the years 
of the worst civil violence, from 2005-2008, when Sunni and Shi’ite militias were 
attacking civilians daily, and especially following the 2006 bombing of the Shi’ite 
mosque in Samarra. (Fagen 2007; Sassoon 2009; Al-Tikriti 2010; Loughry 2010; Jones 
2010) 
Most Iraqi refugees entered their host countries, primarily Jordan and Syria, 
legally.  At first, Jordan was generous in allowing Iraqis to enter and stay for up to six 
months without a prior visa, and then renew their legal status by exiting the country and 
re-entering at any border crossing or the international airport.  However, an attack on 
hotels in Jordan by Iraqi terrorists in November 2005 led authorities to begin refusing 
entry to single Iraqi males 17-35 years old, and Shi’ites; next, Jordanian border 
authorities started requiring presentation of a new Iraqi passport which was difficult to 
obtain; then a surge in refugees led Jordan to mostly close the border in 2007 (Fagen 
2007; Chatelard 2010; Sassoon 2009; Loughry 2010; Hodson 2007), the same year that 
UNHCR declared those from southern and central Iraq prima facie refugees
212
.  Likewise, 
those already in Jordan began to find it difficult to renew their legal status by exiting and 
re-entering the country, particularly religious men: 
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 Senior UNHCR official, personal interview, 11/2/10; Fagen 2007 
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Before 2006 I used to go back and forth between Iraq and Jordan because I hadn’t applied 
to UNHCR to be a refugee, so we had a temporary visa and had to renew it; we had to go 
back to Baghdad to renew our visa.  But after 2006, we couldn’t.  Jordan wouldn’t allow 
us to come back, especially people [like me] with beards. (Male, 37) 
Jordan opened the border again in 2009, after the violence had decreased. 
It is unknown precisely how many Iraqis are in Jordan.  The Jordanian 
Government compels international organizations, including UNHCR and FAFO, a 
Norwegian research institute, to report the official estimate of 450,000-500,000 Iraqis.
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(Seeley 2010; de Bel-Air 2009)  FAFO’s 2007 report actually cites an estimate of 
161,000, while qualifying that number with methodological rationale to explain why it is 
lower than the official estimate.  The report estimated that almost a quarter arrived before 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq, some of whom have been in Jordan for decades.  The Iraqi 
embassy in Amman publically estimated during the 2010 parliamentary elections that 
there were 150,000-180,000 Iraqis of voting age in Jordan. (Luck/Jordan Times, 3/7/10)  
According to a foreign diplomat (not Iraqi) speaking on condition of anonymity, the Iraqi 
Embassy privately believes that there are about 70,000 Iraqis in Jordan in addition to the 
30,000-plus registered by UNHCR, for a total of around 100,000.
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No collective project 
SOME WAR OF EXCLUSION, BUT NO CLEAR ENEMY 
There have been four main groups of political/military actors in Iraq, each of 
which has perpetrated violence which led to refugee outflows since 2003.  First, the US 
military’s initial invasion led some refugees to flee due to a general fear of violence, and 
also to the departure of high-ranking Ba’ath party members and their families, who were 
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 See Schmeidl & Jenkins (2003) for a discussion of similar difficulties in obtaining reliable 
estimates of refugee populations. 
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 Seeley (2010) suggests a figure of 125,000. 
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fired from their jobs, suspected of ties to insurgent groups, interrogated and searched 
repeatedly.  Second, the Shi’ite-led Iraqi government has detained and tortured civilians, 
and is suspected by many Iraqi refugees of being a puppet of Iran (this was voluntarily 
mentioned by nearly one-quarter of interviewed households) and supporting Shi’ite 
militias.  Third, the Sunni militant groups, especially Al Qaeda’s Iraq affiliate, have 
killed and terrorized thousands of Iraqi civilians, particularly targeting Shi’ites and those 
who were employed by the American military and other international (western) 
organizations.  Finally, the Shi’ite militant groups, especially the Mahdi Army, supported 
by Iran, have also conducted campaigns of terror, murder and mayhem against primarily 
Sunni civilian targets and those they accuse of collaborating with western states and 
organizations. 
Therefore, the Iraqis who arrived since 2003 can be generally classified into three 
categories.  The first is that of wealthy transnational businessmen, whose families stay in 
a home in Amman while they continue operating their businesses via the internet, 
telecommunications and occasional trips to Iraq: 
I think [my] dad had the plan to keep us here in Amman [even before we came].…  We 
had come to Jordan as tourists in 2005, [then] my dad said it’s too dangerous to go back 
to Iraq because of bombings and kidnappings….  Ethnic targeting, and I’m Sunni….  
Around 2006 it was too dangerous even for my dad to go back home, so we went to 
Beirut for a little bit and then came back [to Jordan]. (Male, 21) 
The second group consists of political figures from post-2003 Iraqi governments, who 
keep themselves and their families safe in Amman while they engage in politics in Iraq – 
and sometimes hold meetings in Amman for reasons of safety and/or convenience 
(Hodson 2007) – as well as political figures from the deposed Ba’ath Party
215
: 
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 Geraldine Chatelard, social anthropologist, personal interview, 12/9/10; One interviewee 
stated, “I know people in the Iraqi government, living here….  Their work is in Iraq but they’re 
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It was really terrible.…. We were living in fear.…. Because I am from Tikrit and was 
working with Saddam Hussein, I had a high rank in the army, and I am Sunni.  And you 
know… the militias from Iran, some people in the [Iraqi] government support these 
militias….  They came to our house many times [looking for me, but I wasn’t there].  
They damaged everything, the furniture, and stole everything….  Some of them were 
from Mahdi Army, from Iran, some from the Badr organization, also trained in Iran.  The 
most terrible militias.  Predators. (Former general under Saddam Hussein, male, 70) 
When [the American army] came to my house they were very powerful, with airplanes 
and sound bombs, a huge army, and tanks.  They broke into my house and locked my 
children in a room.  They even took a French textbook that belongs to my daughter.  And 
two laptops.  One they broke and the other they took.  They stole all the jewelry.  And the 
money in the house.  They stole five bottles of scotch whiskey.  And they drank one of 
them.  I have a video that proves what I said….  [This] was, I think, December 2003. 
(Former minister under Saddam Hussein, Male, 55) 
A family member was abducted and we had to pay a ransom to release him.  My father 
was negotiating a ransom…  When he tried to negotiate, they threatened us, they knew all 
the [details] about us.  So we traveled to Jordan and my father [continued] negotiating the 
ransom.  It boiled down to US$60,000, and they had already stolen US$40,000 from the 
office.….  They claimed to be a Shi’ite militia, I don’t know which one….  They said 
“Your father worked for Saddam Hussein.”  My father was a surgeon and he did 
surgeries once a week for the [gendarmerie] and he was also one of Saddam Hussein’s 
physicians.  So the [militia] called him an intelligence officer and a torturer… All the 
[physicians] like him were on a hit list. (Female, 32) 
The wealthy ex-Ba’ath political figures and their families who fled to Jordan were 
dubbed “the Mercedes refugees” in diplomatic circles and the press. (Sassoon 2009, p. 
36) 
The third group consists of the general population of Iraqi refugees who fled as a 
result of direct or indirect threats to their personal safety.  Some of the businessmen and 
political figures maintaining residences in Amman had left (or partially left) Iraq as a 
result of direct or indirect threats, but most did so from a general fear of conflict.  Of the 
entire Iraqi sample, 78% of the households indicated that they left due to a direct or 
                                                                                                                                                                             
living here.  They call this the hidden class….  They are officials in the Iraqi government, one is a 
member of Iraqi parliament.  They settled here in Jordan, their villas are here, their money is here, 
but their work is in Iraq…” (Male, 38) 
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indirect threat.  General fear of conflict was the reason cited by 17% of households.
216
  
Among households reporting a direct threat, one-third stated that the most serious threat 
they received was a verbal or written threat, one-third mentioned kidnapping or attempted 
kidnapping of themselves or a relative, 20% mentioned murder or attempted murder, and 
7% mentioned imprisonment. 
Those who fled from the American military or post-2003 Iraqi governments were 
not subjected to a war of exclusion on the basis of their ethnic identity: 
The Iraqi government arrested me.  People said that I did something, so that’s why.  I was 
arrested and they….  It was for ransom.  My daughters paid the ransom and they released 
me.  But after I was released I came here. (Female, 65) 
[I left] one day before the war, in 2003….  When they told Saddam Hussein, “You have 
48 hours to leave,” when I heard that, I left….  I am afraid of air raids, I faint.…  [I 
traveled] directly to Amman, and when things calmed down I went back to Iraq.  When I 
went there I saw everyone killing each other, so I had to come back. (Female, 74) 
On the other hand, most of those who had experienced attacks by one or another 
of the militant groups usually were victims of a war of exclusion; but with the multitude 
of armed groups, and the fact that most spoke with the same Iraqi accent, many victims 
did not even know what organization their attackers represented, or if they were simply 
criminals posing as a militia.  Of households which identified the source of the threat, 
only 16% stated that it was a Shi’ite militia… 
Badr Forces… threw a paper in the house, a threat, and after that [my family] left 
Karbala….  My father went back with my brother to take the stuff from there.  [The 
militants] saw him, so they said, “We told you not to come back,” and they shot him once 
in the chest and once in the head, and my brother [is] paralyzed now. (Male, 34) 
I was threatened [by the] Mahdi Army.  I told you, I was a police officer, in Fallujah….  
They thought we were traitors and spies….  They were threatening me to [make me] quit 
my job.  They tried to kidnap my wife.  So I captured one of them and arrested him and 
sent him to prison, and after that all hell broke loose. (Male, 35) 
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be claimed to be representative of the wider Iraqi population in Jordan. 
237 
 
… 7% cited a Sunni militia… 
[My brother] left my mother’s house, carrying his son….  They were in the car and 
leaving [when] they were stopped by armed men, and they told him to step outside.  He 
was carrying his son and [his wife] was standing with the other two [kids].   The armed 
men asked him, “Are you Sunni or Shi’ite?”  He told them, “I am Shi’ite,” [and] they 
shot him four times.  Even his son, whom he was holding, was shot in the shoulder.  He 
doesn’t speak now, doesn’t go to school, doesn’t even understand when people talk to 
him.… (Female, 38) 
… and one household accused both: 
In July 2007 my cousin was hanged, and her family.  Four people.  They left the bodies in 
the street….  The area they lived in was under the control of al-Qaeda….  [After] they 
hanged them they called us and threatened us.  They knew everything about us, the color 
of our clothes, where we live, and I was living in terror because I thought they were 
going to kill me at any moment.  After this, in August, I told my mother, “If I am killed 
or kidnapped, where would my children go?”….  I went to my house and found this letter 
(shows copy of letter) thrown through the window on September 9, 2007.  It says: “To the 
filthy policewoman and stray dogs:  You have to quit your work with the Jews within two 
days or else your fate will be like those before you.” It’s signed [by] the Mahdi Army.  So 
we were threatened by al-Qaeda by phone and Mahdi Army by letter.… (Female, 35) 
Unlike the ethnic wars in the Balkans and the Great Lakes region of Africa, in 
which neighbors attacked neighbors and there were massacres and mass rapes of whole 
villages, attacks in Iraq were more anonymous and less personal.
217
  Many households 
(38%) received anonymous threatening letters or were not able to identify their attackers 
at all: 
[My husband went] missing in 2008.  He was just going to visit his mother, every [two] 
weeks or a month.  His last visit was in July 2008.  He didn’t come back.  (crying)  He 
didn’t even call.  We searched for him in every area in Iraq, in [other] governorates, 
everywhere.  We couldn’t find him….  One day we found a note on the door, a death 
threat, with a bullet, saying that we had just seven days to leave. (Female, 45) 
There is no security, there is much bloodshed, theft, vandalism.  My brother [walked out 
of] the house, just 100 meters, and he was killed in the street.  And we don’t know who 
killed him….  [We] received a threatening letter telling us to leave, so we left. (Male, 51) 
(Son:)  My brother and I left our house to buy lands.   
(Father:)  A gang came, masked, and had guns, and they took US$17,500, and four gold 
rings.   
(Son:) … They called my father from my phone and asked him for a ransom of 
US$50,000.   
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(Father:)  Or they will kill him.  So of course I paid the ransom.  I sold everything we 
owned there.  We had so many properties and we sold everything to pay the ransom. 
(Son:) … They kidnapped me, first because I am Sabean, and second because I am a 
jeweler….  I was beaten, they were telling us, “You are non-Muslims, you will not go to 
heaven when you die, we have to save Islam from your evil.”  They didn’t give us any 
food or drink, and they were always insulting us.  
(Male, 77; male, 30) 
As in the last example, even if they didn’t know what group their attackers represented, 
minority religious groups in Iraq such as Christians and Sabeans were more certain that 
they were being targeted for their religious identity. 
Several interviewees were attacked not because of their sectarian identity but 
because they worked for a western organization or the Iraqi government, or were engaged 
in a type of employment deemed unacceptable by fundamentalist religious interpretations 
(Fagen 2007): 
I worked on a [program] about children’s rights and solving conflict….  So when they 
knew that I worked with UNICEF, they threatened me.  I didn’t care that they threatened 
me, [I thought they’re not serious,] because we got used to this, fed up with this.  So I 
didn’t imagine they’re going to kidnap [my husband]….  The kidnappers were from my 
area.  Al-Qaeda infiltrated our area and took the youth from my area to work with them.  
So they know I’ve been living in the area for 27 years, I’m not a stranger….  They 
kidnapped him for two days, tortured him, no food, and kicked him from the back of his 
head to his lower back.  So now he speaks with a stutter and has pain in his legs….  So 
when I negotiated with them, they told me that you have to swear on the Qur’an that you 
will not work with UNICEF [any more], and then they released him.  I had to kiss their 
feet. (Female, 39) 
It was July 31, 2007….  There had been threats.  I don’t know the source, but it was a 
letter.  The letter came to my [salon], and after a while people with weapons came….  
And at that time I was injured.  They threw acid [on my face]….  Before ours was 
attacked, the owner of another salon next to us was attacked.  I had refused to close the 
salon because this was my livelihood. (Female, 29) 
In that period from 2004-06 I was working in a specialized institute as a lecturer.  
People’s mentality in Iraq now, anyone who tries to offer what he has, information, 
knowledge, will be killed.  So I was threatened, again and again. (Male, 53) 
Unlike in the Palestinian case, among Iraqi refugees in Jordan there is no single 
239 
 
clearly identifiable enemy who can be blamed for their suffering.
218
  The wide diversity 
of threatening experiences and groups precludes a clear “other” against whom the 
refugees can coalesce in a shared experience.  Assignment of blame for Iraq’s security 
troubles follows a similar pattern, as summarized in Table 3, below. 
Blamed actor Households (%) 
Iran 20 (42%) 
Iraqi political leaders 16 (33%) 
“Militias” 15 (31%) 
Foreign fighters 6 (13%) 
USA 6 (13%) 
al-Qaeda 6 (13%) 
Mahdi Army 6 (13%) 
Shi’ites 4 (8%) 
Saddam Hussein government 3 (6%) 
Jews/Israel 2 (4%) 
Table 3. Assignment of blame for the internal violence in Iraq.
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Even the most frequently blamed actor, Iran, was cited by only 42% of households.  As in 
the source of threat, this proportion is too low to facilitate consolidation of the refugee 
population against a clearly identifiable “other”.  Similarly, when asked, “Who is the 
enemy of the Iraqi refugees?”
220
, there was no consistent answer: 17% of households said 
there is none; 15% mentioned Iran; 9% said the Iraqi government or political leaders; and 
6% said “militias”.  “Time”, or waiting in a liminal existence, was cited by 11% of 
households. 
Finally, whereas Palestinians’ exclusion is continuously recreated by their 
inability to return to the CoO, Iraqis are allowed to return or visit Iraq whenever they 
choose
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: Almost 40% of households who left since 2003 stated that they or a family 
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member has visited Iraq at least once since they left, either for business or a family 
reason.  Visiting Iraq can also help provide closure to some refugees, and decrease 
glorification of the CoO: 
There is a difference between being forced out and choosing to leave.  When we left in 
2005, we were forced out by an Islamic militia….  I was angry….  When you are forced 
to leave, you feel nostalgic and you start to [glorify] things.  It was dangerous to go back 
in 2008, but I guess I needed closure.  I said goodbye to my girlfriends….  I saw how 
lucky I am to be one of the refugees in Jordan.  I saw that Baghdad is not the rosy picture 
that I [had created]….  I do want to go back to Iraq eventually, but [for now], I’ve 
definitely gotten it out of my system. (Female, 32) 
 
In sum, while Sunni and Shi’ite militias in Iraq have engaged in acts of violence 
with the intention to “cleanse” territory of other sectarian and religious groups, the causes 
of violence and threat against civilians have been too diverse, and perceived attribution of 
responsibility for Iraq’s internal violence too scattered, to be classified as a clear war of 
exclusion.  As a group, Iraqi refugees don’t know who their enemy is, or if they even 
have one; and their ability to enter and leave Iraq at will decreases perception of a war of 
exclusion even further. 
ETHNONATIONALIST MOVEMENT 
In contrast to the dominant portrayal of the violence in Iraq in western media, 
most interviewees vehemently denied the existence of any ethnonationalist project.  The 
only exception is the ex-Ba’athists, whom I will discuss separately, below. 
In the dominant discourse among Iraqis, their society is multicultural, united by 
their Iraqi identity.  For example, while Iraqi parents in a focus group bemoaned their 
children’s loss of Iraqi identity after living for years in Jordan, no one attached that 





, but there are very few Iraqi Kurds in Jordan (only 5% of the sample in 
this project).  The lack of an ethnonationalist movement is due in part to the strongly 
secular Ba’athist version of Iraqi nationalism which was instilled in Iraqis from the time 
of the Ba’ath takeover in 1963 until its fall in 2003. 
Interviewees were asked the following question: 
In your opinion, which of the following would be the best future for Iraq? 
a. Rule by [your sect] 
b. Democratic power-sharing agreement between all the groups  
c. A federal system in which each group mostly lives in separate areas and has 
some autonomy 
d. Breakup of Iraq into independent Sunni, Shi’ite and Kurdish countries 
e. Rule by one leader, like Saddam Hussein 
Only two interviewees (5%) preferred rule by their own sect.  Half chose democracy, 
13% preferred a strong dictator, and 8% said “anybody who puts their Iraqi identity first”.  
When asked how they feel about the other sect, more than half of interviewees 
explicitly rejected ethnic/sectarian divisions, and another 19% indicated that they feel 
neutral about the other major group or that they have no problem with them.
223
 Many 
interviewees referred to inter-sectarian marriages within their family as evidence of the 
lack of importance Iraqis attribute to sectarian identity: 
When my parents got married, they didn’t even know they were Sunni and Shi’ite.  I have 
friends, Christians, etc., we go to their house….  Here they think it’s weird if we go to 
church, but in Iraq it’s normal. (Female, 42) 
This discrimination that happens between Sunnis and Shi’ites [was instigated by] people 
who came [to Iraq] from outside.  Here in Jordan, we are friends with Sunnis….  If we go 
to take a course [at an NGO], we are all Iraqis together….  We don’t have this difference 
between Sunnis and Shi’ites. (Female, 38) 
My brother was killed by a Shi’ite militia but I don’t hate my Shi’ite colleagues or friends 
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or neighbors….  They are not guilty. (Female, 38) 
Less than a quarter of interviewees expressed a negative attitude about the other group.  
This was usually directed at Shi’ites: 
All Iraq now are Shi’ites.  We can’t go there, they will kill us….  [Shi’ite Iraqis and 
Iranians] are the same.  They pray on stones. (Female, 39) 
There are Shi’ites also who are refugees here… and [the West] helps them resettle in 
Europe.  I think this is dangerous… Sunnis are nonviolent people, they don’t do 
bombings.  I’m not biased, I’m telling the truth….  I think in the future they will kick [the 
Shi’ite refugees] out because there are so many problems between them and other people 
because they want to feel in charge, or in control all the time.  They try to convert people 
to their religion…. (Male, 72) 
To more directly assess the construct of identity, interviewees were asked the following 
question: 
There are various aspects to one's sense of self or identity. Some are more important than 





b. (If Muslim)  Sunni/Shi’ite 
c. Arab/Kurdish 
d. Iraqi 
e. Your tribe or clan 
More interviewees chose “Iraqi” (42%) than any other choice, and the second most 
common answer was “Muslim” (29%).  Not only did no one state that being Sunni or 
Shi’ite was their most important identity, but many expressed discomfort when I asked 
whether they are Sunni or Shi’ite; a few interviewees even took umbrage, complaining 
that “this is a racist question.”  Likewise, some interviewees objected to a question on 
“the civil war in Iraq” on the grounds that the perpetrators were mostly foreigners and it 
was not a civil war (harb ahleea): 
I did not consider it a civil war….  There were ethnic killings, [but when] you hear “civil 
war”, it’s [as though] all Iraq has been split into two or three [parts]…  But to me, it was 
just violence… killings… those working for foreign [entities] were threatened, that had 
nothing to do with ethnic violence….  It feels alien to me to call it a civil war….  And I 
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most certainly don’t support any extremists from any group.  There’s simply no war to 
fight, for me. (Female, 32) 
In contrast to a Palestinian national identity, which can be classified as 
ethnonational because it is defined largely on an ethnic basis, in contrast to an “other” of 
a different ethnicity, Iraqi national identity – at least in the dominant discourse – does not 
have an ethnic basis: 
According to the American concept based on this, the sect started to be considered as a 
political identity….  I am an Iraqi citizen.  When I’m an Iraqi, there are Kurds, and 
Sabeans, and Christians, and Sunnis, and Shi’ites, but if all of these groups are Iraqis, 
other sects and religions just melt away.  Do you understand?  Iraqis used to be one 
people, but after [the Americans] came…. (Male, 64) 
The sensitivity of the topic of sectarian tension may be due in part to the fact that 
a Sunni/Shi’a divide was perceived, especially by Sunnis, as nonexistent in Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq.  Therefore, its current presence represents an un-Iraqi construction
225
 – 
especially in the eyes of Sunnis who have lost power, position and wealth – which is 
partly responsible for their tragedy. 
Furthermore, among Iraqi exiles there seems to be less fervent attachment to the 
state and the homeland, and less political orientation toward the CoO, than among 
Palestinians.  When asked, “What does it means to you now to be Iraqi?”
226
 as an open-
ended question, 23% said that they feel proud of their national identity, and only 17% 
expressed longing for their homeland.  (Among Palestinians, the percentages were 35% 
and 30%, respectively.)  One out of six interviewees (17%) indicated that being Iraqi is 
just an ascribed fact of their existence or they feel little attachment to the label.  Nearly 
two-thirds of interviewees said that they don’t know what it means to them or refused to 
answer. 
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Unlike Palestinians, who can idealize a vision of statehood which has never been 
realized, Iraqi nationalism faces a failure of nation-building which dates back even earlier 
than 2003.
227
  The concept of a national political movement based on land and territory 
has competed throughout Iraq’s history with both supranational (al-qawmiyya, Arab 
nationalist) movements as well as sub-national (tribal, clan) identities
228
.  Some refugees 
blame the lack of a unifying Iraqi nationalist identity on Saddam Hussein: 
Iraq failed to spread the concept of nationalism.  I don’t hate Saddam Hussein that 
much….  But I hate him for erasing the entire idea of nationalism just so he can still be in 
charge in the country.  The idea of nationalism is sacred, at least I think [so]….  What I 
hate about Iraqi leaders is they didn’t implement nationalism as the most important 
thing….  Then we wouldn’t be seeing the problems we’re seeing today. (Male, 21) 
Furthermore, whereas the 1948 War actually improved the cohesion of the Palestinian 
community and ended most major intra-group rivalries, the 2003 war led to decreased 
cohesion among Iraqis.
229
  Ironically, Iraq’s nationalist project has arguably never been as 
successful as Palestinians’ stateless nationalism since the 1960s. 
The lack of political orientation to Iraq also seems to translate into political 
apathy: For example, in the 2005 Iraqi parliamentary elections, only about 30,000 Iraqis 
in Jordan at that time cast ballots (Luck/Jordan Times, 3/5/10), which may have 
represented only 10-20% of eligible voters.  Iraqi authorities declined to publish the 
number of votes cast in Jordan in the 2010 elections. 
One reason that there may be little nationalist sentiment is that the Iraqi 
“community” in Jordan, among those without iqama (one-year renewable residency 
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permit), is not socially cohesive.
230
  First, despite clustering in some neighborhoods, such 
as Hashmi Shmali in Amman, their pattern of emigration was scattered over time and 
space.
231
  Unlike the Palestinians, most of whom left their CoO in two major waves and 
often traveled in large groups, Iraqis left more gradually over time, and usually traveled 
in small nuclear family units.  Rather than the iconic picture of masses of weary villagers 
trudging through the wilderness, an Iraqi family typically hired a private taxi to take them 
to the border alone, or went on a bus with strangers.  Whereas 42% of Palestinian 
households stated that their family settled with their neighbors from the CoO upon initial 
arrival in Jordan (cf. Farah 2005, p. 93), only 6% of Iraqi households did.  More than half 
of Iraqi households voluntarily mentioned that their family has been scattered to different 
places as a result of the violence, for example: 
Because of all the things I’ve been though, no, I won’t go back.  Even my aunts, some are 
in Syria, Greece, Australia.  Even within Iraq, they left Baghdad to go to other 
governorates. (Female, 20) 
In contrast, only 37% of Palestinian households (28% of those in camps) mentioned such 
scattering.  However, there may be some loose self-segregation of Iraqis by sect into 
different neighborhoods of Amman
232
, and Iraqi Christians appear to be more cohesive 
within their religious group, but in general most Iraqis self-settled by class and income 
rather than sect. (Chatelard 2010) 
Another reason that the community is not cohesive is that decades of dictatorship 
under Saddam Hussein, during which it was dangerous even to mention his name for fear 
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of denouncement by one’s neighbors or even family, has left Iraqis highly suspicious of 
each other (Jones 2010; Sassoon 2009): 
In the time of Saddam Hussein, we didn’t have telephones, satellite TV….  We were even 
afraid to speak in our own house because we were afraid there would be spies among our 
neighbors.  That’s why he stayed as a leader for 35 years, because we were living in fear 
of him. (Male, 36) 
Distrust of fellow Iraqis is experienced even by former Ba’ath members, who may fear 
being recognized by the family of a victim in Jordan.
233
  Many interviewees mentioned 
that they try to avoid interacting with Iraqis in Jordan: 
We don’t like to [interact with others] because everybody has their own situation and 
circumstances.  Especially Iraqis, we don’t like to deal with Iraqis because we are afraid 
that something will happen. (Female, 45) 
There are so many Iraqis here but I don’t have any relationship with them because we are 
really scared, because Iraqis are troublemakers.  I don’t mix with them at all.  When I 
[see] people, just “hi” and “goodbye”. (Female, 39) 
Some even expressed hope of being resettled in a remote corner of a western country 
where they will never have to meet another Iraqi.  However, in the last few years this fear 
may have started to abate.
234
 
In conclusion, it is safe to say that there is no ethnonationalist movement among 
ordinary Iraqi refugees in Jordan. 
Ex-Ba’athists 
The subset of Iraqi refugees who may feel a stronger patriotic attachment are 
those who worked for the Ba’ath party for many years.  These are the only subset of Iraqi 
refugees whose discourse veers toward an ethnonationalist project – i.e., Iraq should be 
led by Sunnis, who are naturally the most qualified leaders to restore its Iraqi national 
glory – even while they vehemently deny any suggestion of social sectarian division.  
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This reflects the political reality in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, when, despite extensive 
social mixing between the groups, political power in the government and military was 
held by Sunnis, who also received disparate shares of oil wealth and water resources
235
: 
The rights that my family thought they had in Iraq were based on ethnicity.  We are 
Sunni, from the Sunni quarter of town….  We were trusted in positions in the army or 
intelligence… and there is no way to regain those privileges.  I didn’t really feel those 
privileges but my father did….  My father feels nostalgic for those days….  I don’t like it 
when people say there’s no difference  between Sunni and Shi’ite, because there is [an 
economic and political difference].  The majority of privileged Iraqis were Sunni, and it’s 
not just under Saddam Hussein, it [started long] before him. (Female, 32) 
Sunni political dominance in the region of Iraq actually dates back to the fifteenth 
century, even before the modern use of the term “Sunni” to denote an ethnic grouping.  
Many Sunnis themselves see it as more analogous to being “white” in the United States, 
including its long historical associations of privilege and dominance, than a sect or 
ethnicity. (Al-Tikriti 2010) 
NO AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC BASE 
Unlike the majority of Palestinians who arrived in 1948 and 1967, most Iraqis 
were already urban, educated, professional and middle-class when they arrived.  Of those 
who arrived since 2003, almost half indicated that the head of their household held a 
professional position in Iraq prior to departure, and another 19% said they were a 
merchant or small business owner.  Only two interviewees (6%) said that they were 
farmers prior to leaving Iraq.  More than 60% have completed at least some university 
education.
236
  Upon arriving in Jordan, all but one interviewee household settled in 
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Amman or its suburbs.
237
 
Unlike the Palestinians, no Iraqis mentioned an attachment to the land, farming, 
or even the familiarity of their homeland as a reason why life was better in their CoO.  
Similarly, whereas 77% of Palestinians had offered romanticized and/or agricultural 
descriptions of life in their CoO prior to the war, only 27% of Iraqis gave idealized 
portrayals of life in Iraq pre-2003 – but none of those descriptions were agricultural.  The 
lack of glorification may be due in part to the decades of suffering through war and 
international sanctions which Iraqis experienced almost continuously for nearly a quarter-
century prior to 2003.
238
  Other Iraqi interviewees (22%) focused on the security which 
was provided by the Saddam Hussein regime, even if it came at the cost of freedom: 
Before 2003, there was security.  But there was no freedom.  You were subject to arrest 
for any reason, for the least criticism, for the least mistake you made in your report or in 
your life.  But on the level of the family, there was security: If you leave the house, you 
will come back safe.  Security without freedom.  After 2003, freedom without [security].  
In my opinion, security without freedom is better than freedom without security, at least 
for the family, for the girls. (Male, 43) 
Others (14%) described economic difficulties, while still others (14%) described a 
comfortable upper-middle class lifestyle; finally, 24% described it as an ordinary, 
middle-class, urban life. 
The Iraqis’ economic attachments to their CoO are also substantially different 
than Palestinians’.  Since almost all were urban before leaving Iraq, very few owned land; 
their only major assets were an apartment or house and vehicle(s).  Only 35% of 
households arriving since 2003 stated that they had abandoned their house (in contrast, 
86% of Palestinian households had abandoned their land).  Nearly the same proportion 
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either sold their house, are renting it out, or left it in the care of relatives or friends.  One-
quarter had not owned real property in Iraq at all.  When asked what their primary 
concern was at the time of leaving Iraq, no one mentioned property or land.
239
  
Furthermore, in contrast to Palestinians, of whom very few had brought assets from the 
CoO, one-third of Iraqis stated that they were able to bring significant assets such as 
vehicles, jewelry and cash to Jordan. 
GREED 
Unlike Palestine, Iraq has a very large natural reserve of a rent-producing 
resource, oil.  Oil rents heavily subsidize public services in Iraq, including free education 
from primary school through the doctoral level, and free medical care.  In Jordan, by 
contrast, university education and medical care can be relatively expensive.  In that sense, 
oil as a rent-producing resource could stimulate an economic attachment to land in the 
CoO. 
However, no interviewees claimed that they were expelled in order that an enemy 
could take over oil fields.  If refugees had been expelled from their homes in oil-rich 
areas which were taken over by an enemy group, it is possible that greed could be an 
economic motivating factor for refugee militarization.  But most refugees in Jordan came 
from Baghdad, which is not an oil-rich region of the country. 
 
In short, there is no collective project to redeem the homeland among ordinary 
Iraqi refugees.  Even if they were expelled on the basis of their sectarian identity, they 
don’t know who their enemy is; and they have little economic or political attachment to 
land in the CoO.  The only exception is ex-Ba’athists, and possibly Sunni elites more 
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broadly, many of whom long for their lost power and privilege. 
Socioeconomic integration and marginalization 
RIGHTS IN THE HOST STATE 
Iraqis in Jordan experience a much more liminal condition than Palestinians.  Like 
most states in the Levant and Gulf, Jordan is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention, 
and due to the large number of Palestinian refugees in Jordan, the government is reluctant 
to officially classify the mass of Iraqis as “refugees” because they fear it will be a first 
step toward permanent resettlement in Jordan.  According to the terms of a 1998 
memorandum of understanding between the government and UNHCR, every non-citizen 
accorded refugee status in Jordan is obligated to be resettled within six months, subject to 
renewal by the Jordanian authorities. (Sassoon 2009)  As a result, although they may 
have refugee status with UNHCR, Iraqis are not granted official refugee status from the 




The Jordanian government sees Iraqis through the lens of Palestinian refugees, 
including their rocky history of integration to Jordan.  As a result, the general approach to 
Iraqis in Jordan by the government is that they are “guests”, an inherently temporary 
status, and therefore not eligible for the rights accorded to nationals. (Fagen 2007; 
Sassoon 2009; de Bel-Air 2009)  Those without iqama have no right to employment 
except for some menial labor jobs
241
; and, like Gazans, they must pay foreigners’ rates 
for higher education and medical care.  They were not allowed to enroll their children in 
public primary or secondary schools until intervention by King Abdullah in 2007 
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changed the policy. (Fagen 2007)  Those with iqama are able to use the public health care 
system and enroll in schools like Jordanians.
242
  In the sample in this study, only 30% of 
interviewees stated that they have refugee status (many of those were not sure whether 
that was with UNHCR or the Jordanian government); 19% had iqama through an investor 
visa; 9% had iqama through another means, such as marrying a Jordanian citizen; 6% 
held a visitor visa; and 32% had no legal status. 
Therefore, with the exception of the wealthy who are able to invest US$70,000-
$150,000 in a Jordanian bank and receive iqama through an investor visa, most Iraqis 
have no stable right of residence.  However, until 2005, it was relatively easy to exit the 
country at any border crossing to renew a visitor visa every 3-6 months.  After the 
bombings in Jordan by Iraqi terrorists in 2005, it became much more difficult to renew 
visitor visas, and the number of Iraqis in Jordan without legal status increased 
dramatically. (Fagen 2007; Hodson 2007; de Bel-Air 2009) 
For the most part, those with iqama are able to lead relatively normal lives in 
Jordan, and – despite some resentment by Jordanians against the spike in prices of food 
and real estate which they blamed on the influx of wealthy Iraqis in the early years 
(Fagen 2007; Sassoon 2009; Loughry 2010; Hodson 2007; de Bel-Air 2009) – enjoy 
economic and social integration.
243
  Many do not consider themselves refugees 
(Chatelard 2010) – a term often reserved in the Middle East for Palestinians – even if 
they meet the criteria defined in this project: 
Us as refugees?  We never felt that we’re refugees here.  We’re treated like Jordanians, 
especially that we speak the Jordanian slang.  Some people don’t even know that we’re 
Iraqi, so we’re not treated as refugees.  Probably because we left Iraq early, we didn’t… 
feel forced to leave Iraq [or] lose our rights….  We chose to leave, we chose the place to 
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live in… so we’ve never been treated as refugees.  We didn’t even feel inside that we’re 
refugees….  Some people actually feel it, they got kidnapped or a relative was kidnapped, 
or the way they traveled was very dramatic, but we never felt that.…  We have always 
lived well. (Female, 24) 
I don’t really consider myself a refugee….  In the reason of displacement, yes, I am….  I 
do need legal protection because there is no guarantee that my residency will be renewed.  
But in terms of salary and living standard, I am way better off [even] than most 
Jordanians….  It just feels unethical to consider myself a refugee….  If I knew of another 
way to apply to the US or UK, I would.  But my understanding is that these governments 
are funding UNHCR to do their paperwork…  So the only way to [do] it is through 
UNHCR. (Female, 32) 
The second generation, children who have spent the last 5-8 years in Jordan, are generally 
well integrated and oriented to their host state.  Their attachment to Iraq is mostly 
cultural, they speak Arabic with a Jordanian accent, and they don’t project themselves 
into any activity toward Iraq
244
: 
Two days ago there was a [soccer] match between Syria and Jordan, and we asked the 
kids who’s playing.  The kids said, “Us and Syria”.  I said, “Us Iraqis?”  They said, “No, 
it’s Jordan.”  They speak the Jordanian dialect better than the Iraqi dialect. (Male, 
unknown age) 
I expect my parents to go back to Iraq, but I expect myself to stay here for a few years, at 
least until finishing university, then go to a foreign country and get a Master’s degree….  
For me, even if that happens, I wouldn’t really want to go back.  Life here is better, and I 
imagine life in the western countries is even better. (Male, 18) 
On the other hand, lack of attachment to Iraq may be due in part to the fact that Iraqi 
children are often bullied and marginalized: 
My son is in the tenth grade.  Everybody hits him because he is Iraqi.  They tell him, “Go 
back to Iraq.” (Male, unknown age) 
This type of bullying has led children to try to hide their Iraqi identity, and some even 
dropped out of school.
245
 
Those without iqama expressed serious anxiety about their circumstances in 
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Jordan, including fear of deportation.  In fact, lack of legal status and fear of deportation 
led many Iraqis to avoid registering with UNHCR, with the idea of staying off the radar 
of all official authorities. (Sassoon 2009)  After the terrorist attack in 2005, and again 
when Jordan tightened border restrictions in 2007, officials kept up the threat of detention 
and deportation of Iraqis lacking legal status: 
After the bombing in Jordan our lives were really difficult….  Because the Jordanian 
authorities were… deporting Iraqis when they arrested them, and they did not treat us in a 
good way.  After that they did not give us residency here….  Even people with 
investments here, they refused to give them residency.  Some people I know, Iraqi men 
married to Jordanian women, they were married and living here even before the war, and 
have children, and the Jordanian government came and told them, take your children and 
go back to Iraq.  Things were really bad. (Male, 35) 
In 2009, however, Jordan relieved the Iraqi community by stating that they would no 
longer detain and deport Iraqis lacking legal status; by 2011 there were almost no 
deportations
246
.  This eased the situation for Iraqis without iqama, and made them more 
comfortable to approach UNHCR.
247
 
Nevertheless, for most Iraqis without iqama, their lack of permanent residence 
and right of employment in Jordan, as well as the months and years most refugees are 
waiting for resettlement to western countries, has led to little economic integration in 
Jordan, and a feeling of perpetual liminality: 
We are like birds who are still flying; we cannot settle here.  If [we] want to settle in our 
nests permanently, it depends on [UNHCR]….  I consider this a slow death….  We don’t 
know what will happen in the future…. So there is no future, no dreams. (Male, 47) 
When asked, “How much control do you feel you have over your own life and your own 
future now?”
248
, 55% said “none” or “little”, and only 10% said “a lot”.  Another 16% 
said that they will have control over their lives only after resettlement.  Of those who felt 
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little or no control over their life, 57% said that this is due to a feeling of liminality, and 
17% said it is because they are stuck in Jordan, unable either to return to Iraq or to be 
resettled.  When asked, “What would you most like to change about your life in 
Jordan?”
249
, answers were mixed: about equal percentages cited their economic situation 
and resettlement (26-28%); and 13% mentioned rights, especially the right to work.  Only 
one interviewee mentioned returning to Iraq.  As one UNHCR official stated, “Life is not 
comfortable in Jordan, it’s not easy….  They don’t want to return [to Iraq] because that’s 
how scared they are….” (Personal interview, 11/2/10)  However, even Iraqis who do 
have iqama are not entirely at ease with their situation.  In answer to the latter question, 
nearly a quarter of those with iqama stated that they would like a longer residency period, 
since they have to renew it every year.  They fear that a policy change will prevent 
renewal, as happened for some Iraqis after the 2005 bombings. 
Institutions to address grievances through the host state 
As noted in the previous chapters, whereas the Jordanian regime does maintain 
some democratic characteristics, there are no guarantees of freedoms of assembly, protest 
and speech.  And unlike the Palestinians, Iraqis – very few of whom have Jordanian 
citizenship – have no means of addressing their grievances through the formal institutions 
of government.  Given the lack of collective project regarding Iraq among ordinary 
Iraqis, however, it is unlikely that they would take advantage of such opportunities even 
if they were available.  I found no evidence of mass political assembly, with the 
exception of campaign visits by political candidates from Iraq during election season
250
.  
The situation is different in Syria, where a larger, poorer and more homogenous 
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Despite legal and economic restrictions, particularly on those without iqama, one-
third of households still stated that life in Jordan was better than in Iraq (compared to 
only 6% of Palestinians).  By far the most frequently cited reason for preferring Jordan 
was safety and security.  Among the two-thirds of households who stated that life in Iraq 
was better, commonly cited reasons were that they had lost a high position and wealth, 
they had better employment opportunities, and a better financial situation.  Whereas two-
thirds of Palestinians stated that their living standard had improved since their ancestors 
first arrived in Jordan, only 28% of Iraqis said that it had improved; half said it has gotten 
worse.  Not surprisingly, there was a large difference between those who had iqama, of 
whom 64% said their situation has improved, and those without, of whom the same 
proportion said it has gotten worse since arrival. 
Without iqama 
One official at the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which handles 
the logistics of transporting refugees who have been accepted for resettlement, compared 
his interactions with Iraqis to what could be expected if Americans became refugees: 
They are a technologically savvy, demanding population with complicated affairs and 
high expectations of customer service.  For instance, sometimes they ask to postpone a 
resettlement flight because they won’t be able to liquidate assets in less than a month.  
Some refugees check the price of flights on the internet, and challenge why their IOM 
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promissory notes will require them to repay more than market value.
252
 
When this population arrived to Jordan and most (without iqama) discovered that 
they would be legally allowed to work only in menial labor positions, it was a serious 
obstacle to economic orientation toward Jordan.  Most found the prospect of low-wage 
physical labor demeaning
253
, and preferred to simply wait for a solution – either 
resettlement or a change in conditions allowing return to Iraq.  Those in this position 
usually did not realize that the resettlement process could take years.
254
  Others chose to 
seek employment illegally: 
I used to work in a restaurant [here in Jordan] and every week the mukhabarat came to 
the restaurant, and every time I used to escape through the window. (Male, unknown age) 
Informal work also lacks the protection of labor laws, and several interviewees reported 
abuses by employers, including refusing to pay for months of work
255
; and rumors swirl 
of Jordanian authorities deporting Iraqis who work without authorization: 
Iraqis are not allowed to work here.  My nephew was working here in a restaurant, and 
when the government found out, they deported him, and now he is [persona non grata]. 
That was five years ago.  All his family is here and he is in Iraq. (Female, 31) 
Especially for women, there is social stigma attached to manual labor: 
To be honest, I work at wedding parties, serving.  When I get the chance to do that, I go.  
When they call me and tell me that they need servers, I go, because we need money….  If 
my brothers knew that I’m working as a waitress, they will…. (Female, 38) 
These obstacles have had several ramifications, including dwindling cash reserves 
(Fagen 2007; Tavernise/New York Times, 8/10/07), voluntarily mentioned by 17% of 
households: 
I brought money with me….  When I came to Jordan I had a lot of money, but now this 
money is almost gone.  I wonder, when my money is gone, will Jordan still love me? 
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(Female, unknown age) 
UNHCR gives registered refugees in need a cash stipend which is sufficient only to cover 
rent for a small apartment in a lower class neighborhood.  Those in the middle and upper-
middle classes in Iraq, with a large house and one or more cars, have experienced 
declining socioeconomic status without iqama, becoming lower-middle class in Jordan, 
where they may live in a small apartment with one bathroom
256
: 
I was working in Iraq. I had an excellent situation….  We had a house, car, a great 
situation, a classy life….  When we came here, the situation was very bad….  I have 29 
years of work experience….  Rent and other expenses make living here very hard. 
(Female, unknown age) 
In some cases, lack of income leads to upsetting traditional gender roles, as men stay 
home while their wife gets involved with community-based development NGOs, and is 
able to bring home a little cash from the transportation allowance given to attendees.
257
  
Some refugees are able to receive assistance from relatives overseas or even in Jordan, 
but may find it shameful to ask for it.
258
 
Due to UNHCR’s adoption of Jordan’s patriarchal rules of descent, the children 
of an Iraqi woman married to a Jordanian man are ineligible for assistance from UNHCR 
– and they are often rejected from Jordanian charities and public assistance because the 
applicant (their mother) is Iraqi – which leads to poverty and tragic circumstances when 
her Jordanian husband refuses to support them. 
As cash reserves are depleted while they await resettlement, some downsize to a 
more affordable apartment (Loughry 2010), particularly in the low-rent Hashmi Shmali 
neighborhood of Amman.  As mentioned earlier, there are no refugee camps for Iraqis.  
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Since nearly all Iraqis live in Amman or its suburbs, they have access to basic services, 
including electricity, running water, indoor plumbing and television.  Urban residence 
also offers social advantages to ease the living situations of Iraqis: It has “allowed large 
numbers of Iraqis to take advantage of their support networks, access social and financial 
resources that may be found only in the cities…, participate actively in professional and 
art spheres in Amman and more generally, work [legally or illegally]. Not easily found in 
camp settings, such elements are crucial to pursuing… livelihood potentials.” (ICMC 
2009, p. 26)  These are important factors which could potentially affect refugees’ 
socioeconomic integration, but they pale in comparison to the right of employment. 
One response by UNHCR to the urban environment of Iraqi refugees has been to 
establish community centers “where Iraqis, other refugees and members of the local 
population can come together, access services, information and counseling, participate in 
recreational activities and enjoy each other’s company.” (Crisp, Janz & Riera 2009, p. 
31)  It is unclear what effect these community centers may have on the orientations and 
motivations of Iraqis who use them.  In theory, they may encourage local integration; or 
they may reinforce a ‘refugee’ identity by concentrating an otherwise diffuse and 
fragmented refugee community; or they are not widely known, widely utilized or widely 
available to the geographically dispersed Iraqi refugee population in Amman and 
therefore have no effect.  Regardless, they are clearly far less integrative and cohesive 
institutions than refugee camps, since they bring limited numbers of refugees together 
voluntarily, and only for limited periods of time. 
With iqama 
Even elites with iqama enjoy a lower degree of luxury than they did in Iraq.  As 
259 
 
one interviewee stated, “My house in Baghdad was 1000 square meters [10,700 square 
feet]; this house is 300 square meters [3,200 square feet].  So you can see the difference.” 
(Male, 55)  Nonetheless, those with iqama often reported that current living conditions 
now are better in Jordan than Iraq, including reliable water and electricity supplies and 
the fact that “everything is available” in Jordan if a person has the ability to pay for it.  
Many continue to benefit from the income they receive from rental properties, pensions, 
investments and business interests in Iraq, even while they reside in Jordan, through 
multinational banks.  They have support networks and social and financial resources 
available.  For the most part, they find life in Jordan sustainable, and are content to stay 
as long as necessary.  They may seek resettlement to the US or Europe – most prefer the 
EU because of the generous provision of social services, which is similar to what they 
were accustomed to in Iraq
259
 – but many see resettlement more as a strategy to gain the 
safety net of American or European citizenship, which will provide them and their 
children the freedom to come and go between Iraq, Jordan and the west as conditions 
evolve in the future
260
: 
I think… a lot of Iraqis think [it’s best to] emigrate, get another passport, and you can 
always return later.  And when the Middle East erupts again, as it always will, you have 
an exit strategy….  For those outside Iraq, you definitely want a more permanent legal 
status.  If Jordan gave my family a more permanent residency, we wouldn’t think of 
leaving. (Female, 32) 
ETHNIC CONSANGUINITY 
Most Iraqi refugees who came to Jordan are Sunni Arab (54% of households who 
left since 2003 in this study
261
), which describes nearly all Jordanians, both those from 
                                                          
259
 Official working in refugee issues in the Middle East, personal interview, 12/20/10 
260
 IOM official, personal interview, 12/14/10 
261
 Sunni Kurds constituted 3% of households in this sample who arrived since 2003; Shi’ites 
11%; Christians 19%; Sabeans 5%; and inter-faith 8%. 
260 
 
Palestine and the East Bank.  However, Sunnis, including former Ba’athists, also 
preferred Jordan because the Jordanian population was sympathetic to Saddam Hussein 
and his Sunni-dominated regime.
262
  Iraq under Saddam Hussein had provided oil to 
Jordan at heavily subsidized prices, and the Jordanian government worked hard to 
maintain good relations with its wealthy neighbor.
263
  As a result, Jordan did not 
participate in either the 1991 war against Iraq (much to the consternation of its Gulf 
neighbors) nor the 2003 war.
264
  It would be difficult to disaggregate ethnic similarity 
from political alliance as the attractive factor. 
In terms of ethnic consanguinity affecting socioeconomic integration, it may have 
helped the Sunni elites – those with iqama – feel more comfortable in Jordan, and orient 
economically more toward their host state than CoO: 
Jordan is near Iraq, and I have friends here, and there are similarities in culture and social 
traditions. (Male, 55) 
The refugees have not come from far, they haven’t come into an alien culture, they 
haven’t come to an alien value system.  They speak the same language, so in that sense, 
both [Palestinian and Iraqi] refugees have not experienced their environment with the 
eyes of total strangers…. (Lex Takkenberg, personal interview, 11/10/10) 
On the other hand, as described earlier, Sunnis especially were reluctant to contemplate 
social sectarian differences, so this may be a spurious connection.  In fact, class – which 
largely overlapped with sect in Iraq – may have been more of a consideration in selecting 
a host state than sectarian similarity, since those who came to Jordan were generally 
wealthier, more educated and more professional than those who went to Syria.
265
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As for Shi’ite refugees, most fled to Syria, especially after 2005.
266
 (Fagen 2007; 
Chatelard 2010)  The lack of ethnic consanguinity with locals has led those who came to 
Jordan to often hide their sectarian identity from Jordanians, who are less welcoming to 
Shi’ites (Sassoon 2009; de Bel-Air 2009), even though they may be open about their 
sectarian identity with other Iraqis.
267
  Rumors circulate of Shi’ites who proselytize to 
youth and build mosques in Jordan.
268
  Consider, for example, this exchange between a 
Jordanian worker in a government office for development with her Iraqi Sunni colleague: 
(Jordanian woman:) Sunnis are more compassionate than Shi’ites. They are afraid of 
Allah more.  Shi’ites are cruel.  Right? 
(Iraqi man:) Right. 
(Jordanian woman:) You see them on TV, they hit themselves.  You know Shi’ites don’t 
care, they could kill children, but Sunnis are not like that.  Because they love Allah and 
the Prophet Mohammad. 
(Personal interview, 5/2/11) 
Christians and Sabeans have expressed similar reluctance to reveal their identity to 
Jordanians.
269
  It is clear that they feel uncomfortable and harassed in Jordan, decreasing 
their social integration in their host state. 
 
In sum, there is a clear socioeconomic segmentation among Iraqi refugees in 
Jordan, even sharper than among Palestinians, between those socioeconomically 
integrated (almost all of whom are Sunni elites with iqama) and those generally 
marginalized (from all sects, without iqama).  Most Iraqis in Jordan have few economic 
ties binding them to Iraq, such as property, and no economic attachments to the land; 
relatively few glorify their pre-2003 life in Iraq.  Those without iqama have few rights in 
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Jordan, and as a result, do not see any reason to orient economically to their host state, 
either.  Even those with iqama are uneasy about their long-term future in Jordan, but they 
do often maintain transnational business ties between their host state and CoO, and are 
more likely to feel comfortable in a Jordanian social environment supportive of the Sunni 
Arab elite which dominated Iraq under Saddam Hussein.  In general, however, is not 
surprising that most Iraqi refugees who arrived since 2003, and especially those without 
iqama, are economically oriented toward resettlement in a third country where they 
expect to receive full rights and eventually citizenship.
270
  They are trying to make the 
best economic decision they can, including consideration of where they will obtain legal 





There are two pre-existing groups of potential militancy entrepreneurs residing in 
Jordan.  The potential leadership are the deposed Ba’athists, who are deeply resentful of 
their lost positions, power and wealth, and especially of the de-Ba’athification process 
instituted by occupation administrator Paul Bremmer in 2003-04.  They seek to recover 
what they lost in Iraq, framing their arguments around claims of injustice and “natural” 
ethnic privilege: 
The bastard Bremmer passed a law, a very bad law, really awful, dreadful, all the people 
who were Ba’ath were kicked out.  Even professors at the universities, doctors, engineers. 
They were exiled….  The American government came to Iraq with a bunch of animals 
and strange faces.  Iranian-made.  Civilized humans can’t deal with these people….  The 
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big hope is that I want the people who rule Iraq to be really Iraqis, so that when I carry 
the flag on my left side….  Now I have no flag….  I feel that my country is stolen, taken 
away….  (What’s the best way to get it back?)  Using the American power, if they were 
honest, they should protect Iraq from its historical enemy, the Persians….  America 
should blow the wind at these people [the Shi’ite-led government of Nouri al-Maliki] to 
remove them and bring civilized, educated people, who have real certificates, people who 
use religion to educate people, and worship [in] the right way, not to use religion for 
political and financial objectives.  When you bring these kinds of people, they would be 
able to rule the country. (Former minister under Saddam Hussein, male, 55) 
I’ve had the opportunity to meet with a number of senior former Iraqi regime elements in 
Amman, many of whom are now in their 60s and 70s.  Their consistent message to me 
was a disappointment in and even hatred of [Ambassador Paul] Bremmer’s tenure and, in 
particular, the de-Ba’athification measures he instituted.  But then they would 
acknowledge that they made a mistake in 2003: “We should have known that linking with 
[the United States] would have been better for us.  Instead, many of us opposed [the US] 
and therefore found ourselves on the same side as al-Qaeda.  This is what opened the 
door to Iran.  Now we see the error of our ways, and we want [the US] to empower us to 
go back and fight the Iranians.”  By that, they meant not to invade Iran, but to oppose 
Iraqi Prime Minister [Nouri al-]Maliki, who, to their reckoning, was Iran’s representative 
to Iraq.  They are demilitarized here but wouldn’t mind being militarized. (Foreign 
diplomat, personal interview, 5/4/11) 
The ex-Ba’athists were heavily involved in meetings with post-2003 political 
figures in Amman, for example at the Al-Quds Center for Political Study, as they tried to 
regain their positions in Iraq.  They have now largely lost hope in the institutional route 
to regaining power in Iraq following the disappointing outcome for Ayad Allawi, who 
had intended to re-integrate the former Ba’athists, in the 2010 parliamentary elections.
272
 
The second group, who could potentially constitute the foot soldiers of a militant 
organization, are the young, single males in Jordan, mostly neglected by the humanitarian 
NGOs due to their age and sex, who were low-level members of the Ba’ath party, 
mukhabarat, military and/or special forces under Saddam Hussein.  Because of their 
former activities, they are nearly impossible to resettle; and like those in the first group, 
who are “probably pretty realistic about what would happen to them if they were to go 
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, they cannot return to Iraq as civilians because they are targeted by anti-
Ba’ath militias such as those supported by the Shi’ite Dawa party; and they cannot work 
legally in Jordan: 
They hope to go back, but know that they cannot.  Their families are in Iraq….  Many 
people want revenge….  They came from a poor area, poor background, [little] 
education….   Those that are still here, more than five years, these are my concern. 
(Director, NGO for Iraqi refugees, personal interview, 1/12/11) 
As former members of the Ba’ath party, they may maintain a collective project to redeem 
the homeland, like the exiled ex-Ba’ath leadership, while they remain socioeconomically 
marginalized in Jordan by their lack of iqama.  They are in a state of perpetual limbo, 
with little hope of resolution for their situation.  As such, they may be particularly 
susceptible to the appeal of militarization.  It is unknown how many Iraqis fall in this 
category, but if married males with dependents are included, this description may apply 




It is important to note, however, that these two groups who are stuck in Jordan, 
unable to return to Iraq or be resettled
275
, are mostly disconnected from ordinary Iraqi 
refugees, who are more transient: some return permanently to Iraq; others return, then 
come back to Jordan again; some are resettled
276
; and new refugees arrive.  When asked, 
“Which group(s) or organization(s) do you feel best represents the interests of the Iraqi 
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, half mentioned the UN (usually UNHCR) and 15% mentioned another 
humanitarian organization, while 21% said that there is no organization.  None mentioned 
the former Ba’ath party.  Unlike in Syria, where the Mahdi Army operates and recruits 
openly, and in Lebanon, where “it’s an open market for any [organization] who wants to 
operate”, there are no organizations recruiting in Jordan
278
, nor even loose political 
associations
279
 (Chatelard 2010; Sassoon 2009): 
There isn’t a strong Iraqi civil society abroad, and… I don’t think the Jordanian 
government would welcome it.  There is no strong presence like a strong tribe, or a 
charity or organization… there’s no core.  Because the Jordanian government doesn’t 
want there to be something that could eventually become political… and there is no basis 
for it [from Iraq] because there were no NGOs under Saddam Hussein. (Female, 32) 
WAITING FOR INDIVIDUAL, NOT GROUP, RESOLUTION 
Of those who have left Iraq since 2003, as of the time of interview, one-third had 
been outside their CoO for 6-8 years, 28% had been outside for 3-5 years, and 39% had 
left Iraq within the previous 2 years.  As mentioned in Chapter 2, the minimum threshold 
of a protracted stay as defined by UNHCR is five years, but in this case, even among 
those who have been in Jordan for more than five years, the situation has not yet reached 
the point at which they have lost hope for an individual resolution to their situation.  
Whereas nearly half of Palestinians said that they expect no change in the future of the 
refugees, only 16% of Iraqis said that; and while more than one-quarter of Palestinians 
said they expect the status quo to continue in their own future, only 11% of Iraqis hold 
that view. 
Unlike Palestinians, Iraqi refugees had less expectation of imminent return when 
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they arrived: 43% said they expected to never return, and 13% said they had expected to 
return “someday”.  Only 13% of interviewees stated that they had expected to return 
within less than a year from departure, and all of those had left Iraq in the early years, 
from 2003-2006.  Of course, whereas Palestinians distinguish between a right of return 
and actual return, Iraqis do not
280
; as noted earlier, they are physically and legally capable 




When asked their current expectations of return, most households stated that they 
are waiting for resettlement through UNHCR, which is at some stage of processing; half 
said they will never return to Iraq after resettling, even if there is security in the country: 
I want to go to another country….  Khalas, it’s enough, everything we have seen, and our 
[traumatic] memories, we just want to forget them.  This is my personal opinion. (Male, 
38) 
When the car crossed the border into Jordan, I can’t forget, I looked to the right and felt 
that I had been in hell and now I am in heaven.  I forget Iraq, I don’t care, I don’t think 
about Iraq, I don’t want to go back….  I will never go back. (Female, unknown age) 
This Rubicon-type sentiment may be more common among those who experienced more 
violence and trauma
282
 and those with relatives in a western country, who can be role 
models and/or a support system
283
.  In the 2007 FAFO study, 40% of Iraqi refugees stated 
that they will return to Iraq once the security situation improves, but in the sample in this 
study, only 19% of those who had left since 2003 said they expect to return in the distant 
future, if there is security in Iraq.  This large difference may be due in part to the fact that 
those who were inclined to return in 2007 have already done so, as well as those who 
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found the cost of living in Jordan prohibitive
284
; also, the FAFO study substantially over-
sampled wealthy Iraqis, who were more willing to be surveyed. (Sassoon 2009)  In 
addition, whereas 40% of the FAFO sample intended to stay in Jordan, none in the 
present study stated that they see their long-term future in Jordan. 
Just as the Palestinians had been asked their opinion on the best way to achieve 
their rights now, Iraqis were asked the following question: 
What do you believe now is the best way for people like you to address their grievances 
and achieve their rights?
285
 
a. Monetary assistance to refugees to assist in returning home to Iraq 
b. Assistance in resettling to other countries 
c. Non-violent resistance like that of Gandhi in India, or the protests in Tunisia and 
Egypt 
d. Armed resistance 
The vast majority (81%) cited assistance in resettlement; only 7% chose assistance in 
returning to Iraq.  (I will discuss the other two options in the section on militant attitudes, 
below.) 
The reasons for this pessimism regarding return may be related to the fact that the 
exodus was not compressed over a short period of time, like the Palestinians, but was 
relatively spread out.  By the time most of the current refugees had left Iraq, they knew 
relatives and friends who had already been out for several years.  Also, the fact that the 
US was not seen as the cause of the ongoing violence meant that the eventual departure 
of US troops could not be expected bring an improvement in the situation. 
 
Most ordinary Iraqi refugees, who do not have a collective project to redeem the 
homeland, are seeking individual solutions to their refugee situation: mostly resettlement 
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for those without iqama, with a possibility for return in the distant future; and either 
resettlement or integration to Jordan for those with iqama.  The only group who could 
potentially act as militancy entrepreneurs against the new Iraq are the ex-Ba’athists, 
perhaps with support from Iraqi Sunni elites; while the only group whom those leaders 
could potentially mobilize as foot soldiers are the low-level former security personnel of 
the Ba’ath regime.  Both of these sub-groups are stuck in Jordan, unable either to return 
to Iraq or be resettled due to their former roles; and the low-level former security 
personnel, most of whom do not have iqama, remain significantly socioeconomically 
marginalized in Jordan. 
Political opportunity 
As described in Chapter 7, since 1971 the Jordanian government and security 
forces have been successful at infiltrating and repressing any attempt at militant activity 
by non-state actors.  Data on activities of the mukhabarat are, of course, inaccessible, but 
the Jordanian government is very aware of being “the stable one in an unstable 
environment” and is very keen to preserve that reputation.
286
  In January 2007, King 
Abdullah II stated, “We will never allow Jordan to be used as a staging post to foment 
any problems against Iraq.” (Hodson 2007, p. 4)  The mukhabarat have paid especially 
close attention to the activities of ex-Ba’ath political figures
287
, and the government 
“dreads Sunni militants targeting US allies and westernized countries in the region.” (de 
Bel-Air 2009, p. 13) 
The mukhabarat have been proactive in foreclosing opportunities for 
militarization, including identifying and dismantling terrorist groups with Iraqi ties. 
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(Fagen 2007)  After the 2005 bombing, the state – as well as the Jordanian people – 
began to see Iraqis through the lens of national security.
288
  Surveillance of Iraqis 
increased dramatically, to the extent that it was even a strain on their capacity. 
(Schuster/CNN, 11/12/05)  Iraqis were aware of the increased attention – as one young 
Iraqi mentioned, “In 2006 and 2007 there were a lot of mukhabarat in cafes [frequented 
by Iraqis in Jordan] to keep an eye on [us]” (Male, 21) – and their reaction was to try to 
stay quiet and off the radar of the mukhabarat, a feeling which still persists today.
289
  The 
increased attention by domestic intelligence forces on Iraqis also strained relations with 
UNHCR, with which they had an agreement to provide notification of the detention and 
deportation of registered refugees.  Since the bombings, deportations in the name of 
national security have occurred without informing UNHCR.
290
 
Even though there are no refugee camps on which to concentrate instruments of 
repression, since 2006 the mukhabarat have been effective at intercepting and preventing 
movement, communication, organization and storage of weapons by any would-be Iraqi 
militants.  In 2005, despite extensive penetration of Jordanian society by the mukhabarat, 
little attention to Iraqis in the country allowed an Iraqi terrorist cell to conduct an attack. 
(ICG 2005) 
It is unclear whether humanitarian NGOs would contribute to a war economy by 
ignoring evidence of militarization among their clients if it occurred, but the mukhabarat 
do work with UNHCR to help ensure that ex-militants and current militants stay off their 
                                                          
288
 Jalal Al Husseini, personal interview, 12/6/10; Iraqi Christian clergyman, personal interview, 
1/6/11; de Bel-Air 2009 
289
 Reporter for western news agency, personal interview, 12/20/10; IOM official, personal 
interview, 12/22/10; Jordan director, NGO for Iraqi refugees, personal interview, 1/4/11 
290





.  However, other aspects of political opportunity are present: First, assuming 
that the would-be perpetrators of militarization are Sunni Arabs, ethnic relations in the 
host state are strong.  Unlike the experience of Dawa, a militant Iraqi Shi’ite party which 
found no opportunity to base itself in Jordan before 2003
292
, Jordanians would probably 
be sympathetic to efforts to dislodge the Shi’ite-dominated government of Iraq.  
Secondly, Iraq’s ability to defend itself from cross-border attacks originating in Jordan is 
probably limited, given the long, porous border through barren desert, and the even 
longer desert border that both Jordan and Iraq share with Syria. 
However, relations between the governments of Jordan and Iraq have mostly been 
strong since the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s (Terrill 2010), including in the post-2003 
period, and it is highly unlikely that the government of Jordan would turn a blind eye to 
efforts by its putative guests to destabilize its neighbor.  In addition, appeals for military 
support by exiled ex-Ba’athists to the United States government notwithstanding, the US 
government has a strong national interest in a stable and secure Iraq, especially now that 
US combat troops have withdrawn.  The US would be likely to apply significant pressure 
to oppose and shut down any serious attempt at militarization by Iraqi refugees. 
Overall, despite a few elements which appear to be present, political opportunity 
for militarization by Iraqi refugees is not available in the current circumstances. 
Conflict resources 
As discussed in the previous chapter, it is impossible to know with certainty 
whether conflict resources would be available for militarization by refugees in Jordan, 
but in the Iraqi case it is highly likely.  Iraq continues to suffer terrorist attacks by Sunni 
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and Shi’ite militias, though attacks have declined since 2005-07, and the central 
government continues to have difficulty maintaining security.  It is quite feasible that 
some of those militias, particularly al-Qaeda’s affiliate, would be capable and interested 
in funding and supplying militarization based in Jordan.  As of this writing, similar 
provision to Syrian rebels by Iraqi Sunni groups, including al-Qaeda, is occurring. 
(Arango & Adnan/New York Times, 2/12/12)  In fact, after the 2005 bombings in Jordan, 
which followed similar attacks elsewhere in the region, there was increasing awareness 
that Iraq was becoming not only a hub of terrorist attacks but a regional exporter of them 
as well. (Schuster/CNN, 11/12/05; Fagen 2007)  Amman and Baghdad are extensively 
integrated through transportation, migration, trade and a web of business and social 
networks, including via refugees
293
, so quiet movement of weapons and other conflict 
supplies to Jordan would not necessarily raise suspicion.  Jordan is already used as a 
place to launder money for Iraqi militias: 
People here who want to support Iraqis in Iraq, they are doing money laundering to help 
the militias in Iraq….  These things happen mostly in Syria.  Here there is scrutiny [on 
wire transfers]….  Everything is normal after war.  Because the Iranian government has 
interfered.  They used many people, sent many people here to invest money and support 
the militias.  So they buy things [above] market value and after that [sell it]… if they 
have US$1 million and lose $300,000, it’s fine….  They say that this is legal trade but it’s 
money laundering.  [Where do they invest it?]  The stock market, real estate, everything; 
[even] a company for electronic devices or furniture….  They’ll buy a TV for $200 and 
then sell it for $150, and it’s fine….  Yes, (laughing) if you go to Iraq, you’ll see 
wonders. (Male, 35) 
In addition, there have been some instances of resettled Iraqi refugees attempting to send 
weapons and money to militant groups in Iraq. (Schmidt & Schmitt/New York Times, 
11/5/11) 
Besides non-state actors in Iraq, wealthy Sunni states in the region, such as Saudi 
Arabia, seeking to counter Iran’s rising profile by supporting a Sunni proxy group based 
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in Jordan against the Shi’ite government of Iraq, could conceivably be another potential 
source for weapons and funding.  There are also extensive connections between Iraqis in 
Jordan and those in Syria, where many Iraqi militants are present, and where more high-
ranking Ba’ath political figures fled soon after the American invasion (Fagen 2007): 
The Iraqi community in Syria is militarized.  The Sunnis, foreign fighters, the ones going 
back and forth across the borders….  Old networks don’t die.  [Potential militancy 
entrepreneurs in Jordan] are very much in contact with the ones in Syria….  They can 
pick up the phone and [call them].…  (Foreign diplomat, personal interview, 5/4/11) 
Iranian militias, al-Qaeda, Moqtada al-Sadr….  Syria has all of these.  People who want 
to destroy Iraq, and those who want to free Iraq, are both in Syria.  I saw them there 
myself, people working with the Ba’ath party, they are really strong there….  They are all 
in one area, Said al-Zaynab. (Male, 38) 
Domestically, some of the Iraqi Sunni elites in Jordan, including ex-Ba’athists, 
are very wealthy and have substantial resources available.  However, the millionaires 
among them, some of whom moved to Jordan in the 1990s to avoid the sanctions regime 
imposed on Iraq, are businessmen rather than political figures
294
; and they generally see 
distance from politics as the price to pay for maintaining their transnational business
295
.  
Nonetheless, they could potentially be a source of funding and resources, as could 
radicalized individuals and groups in Jordan, such as the Salafists based in the cities of 
Zarqa and Salt (ICG 2005), who could be convinced to support an anti-Shi’ite 
organization.  For example, one Palestinian interviewee informed me that he had gone to 
Iraq after the American invasion to fight against the Shi’ites.  Of course, the most 
powerful domestic actor in Jordan capable of supplying conflict resources is the 
Jordanian government itself, but that would be nearly unthinkable under current political 
circumstances. 
Regarding acquisition of resources from humanitarian aid organizations, without 
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camps it would be substantially more difficult to collect those resources.  The only 
exception might be UNHCR’s assistance programs, which have changed from in-kind 
assistance to ATM cards, obviously a very fungible resource, for a variety of logistical 
and practical reasons related to the urban environment. (UNHCR, “Protecting 
refugees…”, 12/4/09)  However, relatively few Iraqi refugees even receive this assistance 
– less than half of the 30,000-plus registered with UNHCR
296
. 
In sum, it is very probable that conflict resources would be available from both 
regional and domestic actors, if political opportunities were available. 
No militarization 
FEW MILITANT ATTITUDES 
When asked what they felt was the best way to address their grievances and 
achieve their rights at the time they arrived in Jordan
297
, only 6% mentioned fighting for 
it.  The most common response was that their grievances were impossible to address at 
that time (41%), followed by resettlement (21%).  As mentioned above, interviewees 
were also asked a multiple-choice question concerning the best way to address their 
grievances now, to which only two interviewees (7%) chose “armed resistance”.  
Interviewees were also asked the following question, similar to the one asked to 
Palestinians regarding the second Intifada: 




a. Everyone must join an organization fighting to free Iraq 
b. Those outside Iraq should send assistance to organizations fighting in Iraq, but 
they should not join the organizations themselves 
c. The war should end immediately 
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d. I did not follow what was happening in Iraq 
Three-fifths of interviewees who arrived since 2003 chose “The war should end 
immediately”, and only two interviewees (6%) said “Everyone must join an organization 
fighting to free Iraq”.  As one interviewee explained, he can’t fight an unknown enemy: 
I don’t believe in resistance because you’re resisting what, exactly?  The Americans?  
The [Iraqi] government?  The twenty or thirty parties?  Or against who, your neighbors?  
You have to identify your enemy first. (Male, 26) 
Similar results were found when interviewees were asked the following question: 
After leaving Iraq, the vast majority of Iraqis in Jordan have not joined any organization 
participating in the fighting in Iraq. In your opinion, why is that?
299
 
a. They have lost hope in the Iraqi political situation 
b. They are focused on building their lives in Jordan or another country 
c. There are no such organizations in Jordan 
d. People would join these organizations but the Government of Jordan prevents it 
The most frequently cited answer was “They have lost hope in the Iraqi political 
situation” (45%), followed by “They are focused on building their lives in Jordan or 
another country” (30%).  Only 8% said it is because there are no organizations in Jordan, 
and an equally low proportion said that Iraqis would but the Jordanian government 
prevents it (for comparison, 55% of Palestinians had chosen the last option).  A quarter of 
interviewees offered an additional explanation, that the refugees were escaping violence 
and would not want to perpetuate more.
300
 
However, as one official, speaking on condition of anonymity, stated, “The 
sentiment is there – against Shi’ites, against Shi’ite organizations in Iraq.”  As noted 
earlier, nearly a quarter of interviewees expressed negative attitudes or hatred toward the 
other group, which was almost always directed at Shi’ites, and many expressed negative 
attitudes toward the Shi’ite-led government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.  But 
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prejudice toward a group and accusations of politicians does not equate to militant 
attitudes.  Only one interviewee expressed an overtly militant attitude against Shi’ites: 
The Shi’ites didn’t like Saddam Hussein, so they wanted to kill anyone [they could].  I 
don’t want [Iraq] to be destroyed or damaged.  I don’t want to be a troublemaker….  I’m 
not capable of anything.  I won’t be able to achieve anything.  If I had enough… if I had 
the power I would kill all Shi’ites. (Male, 23) 
NO ATTEMPTS TO MILITARIZE 
The 2005 attack by an Iraqi terrorist cell does not fit the scope of refugee 
militarization in this project because the attackers were not refugees – they entered 
Jordan just days earlier (Murphy & Dabu/Christian Science Monitor, 11/14/05; Leenders 
2009), apparently for the purpose of the attack – and because they targeted Jordan rather 
than their CoO.  Therefore, it can be said there has been no militarization among Iraqi 
refugees in Jordan. 
Conclusion 
The presence of potential militancy entrepreneurs, availability of conflict 
resources and lack of political opportunities are the same between Palestinians and Iraqis 
in the current period, and the outcome (lack of militarization) is the same, but the major 
difference is in the presence or absence of a collective project to redeem the homeland 
among ordinary Iraqis.  Even if the ex-Ba’athists do seek to militarize, it would more 
likely be in the manner of an isolated and self-contained terrorist group, like Fatah al-
Islam in Lebanon or the Abu Nidal organization, than an entity with mass appeal and 
support among a refugee constituency, like Fatah/PLO. 
The case of Iraqis in Jordan from 2003-2011 is summarized in Figure 6, below.  I 
will discuss the impact of the Arab Spring and the likely future of militarization by Iraqis 









CHAPTER 9: Relevance to Cases in Africa and Asia 
 
The previous four chapters presented results of field research in Jordan on 
Palestinian and Iraqi refugees.  In this chapter I will begin to demonstrate the relevance of 
the framework outside the Middle East by using secondary-source literature to apply it to 
two famous cases of refugee militarization, and comparing them to contemporaneous 
matched cases in which militarization occurred to a much lesser degree, following the 
example set by Sarah Lischer (2005): Rwandans in Zaire and Tanzania; and Afghans in 
Pakistan and Iran.  Both pairs of cases were examined by Lischer. 
Rwandans in Zaire 
Probably the most famous case of refugee militarization – the “mental template” 
for discussions of refugee militarization (Lischer 2010, p. 1) – is that of the Rwandan 
Hutus, numbering over one million, who fled to Zaire in 1994 fearing retribution 
following the genocide of Tutsis and moderate Hutus in Rwanda.  This case actually 
stems from an earlier case of refugee militarization: Tutsi Rwandan refugees and their 
descendants who had lived in Uganda since fleeing their CoO between 1959-1962 – with 
additional recruitment from Tutsi Rwandan refugees in Tanzania – formed the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF), which invaded Rwanda in 1990.  Violence continued for the next 
three years, ending with the Arusha Accords in 1993.  The following year was a period of 
regrouping and preparation for the next stage of war, which began in April 1994 with the 
assassination of Rwandan President Habyarimana.  Over the course of three months, 
around 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were slaughtered in Rwanda, while the RPF 
battled Rwandan government forces, eventually capturing Kigali in July. (Lischer 2005; 




Rwandan Hutus fled the country in two waves.  The first went to Tanzania, as will 
be discussed shortly.  The second wave consisted of about one million refugees, 
including the Rwandan government, who fled to Zaire in July and August at the urging of 
their leaders. (Lischer 2005; Salehyan 2009; Adelman 1998; Adelman 2003) 
COLLECTIVE PROJECT 
War of exclusion with a clear enemy 
Counterintuitively, the departure of Hutus from Rwanda into Zaire can be called a 
war of exclusion, despite the fact that they were mostly rounded up by their own 
government and herded into exile, even by shooting into the air to compel the civilians to 
flee.  The government’s propaganda machine instructed Hutus to flee or face certain 
death at the hands of the victorious RPF. (Adelman 2003; Lischer 2005; Mogire 2011)  
The information was not entirely fictitious, as many Hutu civilians had been killed by the 
RPF since 1990. (Prunier 1995)  As a result, even though the direct cause of expulsion 
was not committed by an enemy force, most refugees believed that they faced an 
imminent ethnic cleansing operation by the enemy, and were saved from death only by 
the quick action of their leaders.  They perceived an indirect threat and fled, which is not 
very different from the indirect threats perceived by Palestinians and Iraqis to their 
physical security which caused them to flee.  Even if the RPF was not actually engaged in 
ethnic cleansing during their march to Kigali, the refugees perceived it as such. 
Ethnonationalist movement 
Rwanda is “bicommunal”, referring to a society in which only two groups 
constitute the vast majority of the population.  Bicommunal societies are more prone to 
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ethnic radicalization than homogenous societies or those with three or more major 
groups. (Quinn 2004)  As a result of this demographic constitution and a colonial 
arrangement in the 1950s in which Tutsis and Hutus competed for authority along ethnic 
cleavages, there was a pre-existing, strongly institutionalized Rwandan Hutu 
ethnonationalist movement.
301
  This movement claimed the country for Hutus, who were 
the overwhelming majority of the population.  The northwestern provinces of Rwanda, 
where most of the refugees fled across the border to Goma, were a “bastion of Hutu 
extremism”. (Adelman 2003, p. 101)  By the end of 1994, local authority structures from 
the CoO had been recreated in exile, and the Goma camps had been organized according 
to the refugees’ préfecture, commune and section of origin in Rwanda, each led by its 
former bourgmestre (Lischer 2005; Prunier 1995), further impressing and maintaining the 
ethnonationalist project. 
Agricultural economic base 
The population of Rwanda in the early 1990s was far more rural, and arable 
territory far more densely populated, than average in sub-Saharan Africa.  Its rural 
population, mostly small farmers, constituted between 90-95% of the entire population, 
and most lived on less than two dollars per day. (Quinn 2004)  The competition for arable 
land as a resource leading to ethnic conflict was underlined by the refusal of the Hutu 
government to allow the return of exiled Tutsis on the basis that there was a land 
shortage. (Mogire 2011)  However, an agricultural base in the CoO may have been less 
attractive than usual in this case because the price of coffee, which was a major export of 
Rwandan farmers, crashed on the world market in the early 1990s, dropping from an 
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average annual price of US$0.74 per pound in Rwanda in 1990 to just $0.45 per pound in 
1993 (International Coffee Organization 2012), impoverishing many Hutu farmers. 
(Adelman 1998) 
SOME SOCIOECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
In exile, refugees enjoyed a decent standard of living and some local integration 
in eastern Zaire, besides the obstructions of militants in the camps and the “tolls” 
requested at Zairian military checkpoints in the region.  After an initially high morbidity 
and mortality rate during the summer of their arrival due to a cholera epidemic, health 
and nutrition were relatively well maintained in the camps.  Refugees were able to move 
more or less freely in the local area, as long as they were able to pay the “tolls” and did 
not try to repatriate to Rwanda against the wishes of the militants.  They came to be seen 
as a source of cheap labor for local employers. (Lischer 2005)  The area was mostly 
populated by ethnic Hutus, but there were also some Tutsi enclaves. 
MILITANCY ENTREPRENEURS 
Upon arriving in Zaire, Hutu commanders and officials acted as pre-existing 
militancy entrepreneurs to recruit and mobilize the Hutu refugees into a militant 
organization to retake control of Rwanda.  By the fall of 1994, they had formed a 
complete government-in-exile, including a prime minister and defense minister charged 
with “liberating” Rwanda. (Lischer 2005)  By early 1995 they claimed to have grown 
their army to 50,000 troops throughout the camps.  They framed their arguments around 
themes of injustice and rightful control by Hutus over Rwanda, offering an opportunity to 
achieve the refugees’ collective project through militarization.  Their propaganda in the 
camps presented Hutus as the victims of a history of Tutsi oppression, blamed the Tutsi 
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RPF for the war and suffering, and called on the refugees to “liberate” their CoO.  
Following on the heels of a genocide in Rwanda during which Hutu propaganda 
dehumanized Tutsis, calling for the inyenzi (cockroaches) to be exterminated, political 
speeches demonized the RPF and sought to frighten the refugee masses by declaring that 
the Tutsi army would slaughter any returning Hutus. (Adelman 2003) 
POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY 
The government of Zaire under President Mobutu had been allied with the Hutu 
government of Rwanda since the 1980s, and was not inclined to securitize the camps or 
borders, or to separate militants from civilians.  For example, the Zairian military 
collected weapons at the Goma border crossing in July 1994 in the presence of 
international press, but later allowed the refugees to reclaim the weapons.  When the 
refugees crossed in August at Bukavu, the international press were not observing, and 
weapons were not collected at all.  However, even if Mobutu had possessed the will to 
securitize the refugee-populated border region, the state did not even have the capacity to 
do so. (Lischer 2005; Quinn 2004)  After signing an agreement with UNHCR to provide 
security at the camps in January 1995, the Zairian government sent 1,000 soldiers to the 
camps at Goma and Bukavu, but this contingent, under the leadership of a host 
government which was allied and sympathetic to the militarized refugees, became a back-
up force for the ex-FAR and militants rather than an obstacle to them. (Adelman 2003; 
Adelman 1998) 
The conflict centered in Zaire and Rwanda drew even more international attention 
because of the role played by international NGOs and donors, who were faced with the 
quandary of assisting, feeding and sheltering both refugee combatants and civilians, 
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including tens of thousands of genocidaires, or neither.  Most international donors – 
Medecins Sans Frontieres excepted
302
 (Prunier 1995; Turner 2010) – created a permissive 
political environment by supporting aid agencies in choosing to stay.  They did so in the 
name of humanitarianism and political neutrality, and from 1994 to 1996 donors “spent 
billions of dollars to sustain that population.  These same donors refused to fund efforts to 
disarm the militants or to send peacekeeping troops to do so.” (Lischer 2005, p. 2)  They 
maintained a presence only during the day, and were encouraged by camp leadership to 
leave before military training began in the evening.  UN arms embargoes were not 
enforced.  An international outcry against supporting genocidaires later led to changes in 
the policies of aid organizations, including UNHCR. (Leenders 2009; Lischer 2005; 
Lischer 2003; Mthembu-Salter 2006; Hammerstad 2011; Milner 2011; Adelman 2003; 
Stedman 2003; Gerdes 2006; Roberts 2011) 
Consolidation of power over territory and establishing strong border defenses 
takes time, and the post-war RPF Rwandan government was still new in the latter half of 
1994 and 1995, with relatively weak border defenses.  Furthermore, the largest refugee 
camps were within walking distance of the border at Goma.  Lischer (2005) disregards 
this as an explanatory variable by comparing it to Tanzania, where camps were also near 
the border but little militarization occurred.  However, her reasoning is flawed: 
Maintaining camps near the border contributes to a permissive political opportunity 
structure, but this factor alone is not sufficient to lead to militarization. 
CONFLICT RESOURCES 
The strongest and most overt supporter of the Rwandan Hutu militants and ex-
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FAR was the government of Zaire.  Under Mobutu’s leadership, the government bought 
and delivered arms to the Rwandan militants, shared warehouses with them for the 
storage of weapons and goods, laundered money for them, and provided them with 
diplomatic cover. (Adelman 2003; Mthembu-Salter 2006; Prunier 1995)  In addition, a 
number of foreign states contributed conflict resources to the militant refugees.  These 
included France, which had long supported the Hutu government of Rwandan president 
Habyarimana: 
Under the guise of humanitarianism, France provided aid to the genocidal Hutu regime 
during and after the genocide….  In the most egregious example of the partisan stance of 
French forces, the French allowed former military and government officials to escape to 
Zaire after the RPF victory.  The French forces disarmed the departing genocidaires, but 
turned the weapons over to the Zairian army rather than to the UN peacekeepers.  Once 
the extremists had established themselves in the camps, the French reportedly facilitated 
meetings of key leaders…. (Lischer 2005, pp. 87-88; see also Snyder 2011; Quinn 2004) 
The government of France saw it as their national interest to keep Rwanda as a 
Francophone state by supporting its French-speaking Hutu majority, in contrast to the 
Anglophone RPF. (Adelman 2003; Quinn 2004) 
The refugee camps in Zaire were used as a critical source of support for militant 
action, including taxing, recruitment and diversion of humanitarian resources. (Adelman 
2003; Salehyan 2009)  In 1994 alone, humanitarian aid agencies supported by 
international donors spent $1.4 billion in the Goma area of Zaire, a sum which “provided 
a windfall for the militants, who used it to support their planned invasion of Rwanda,” 
through food for militants, care for their supporters, diversion of aid, and more broadly, 
legitimation of their leadership role in the camps. (Lischer 2005, p. 90) 
Finally, it is also worth noting that the Hutu government-in-exile brought virtually 
every portable resource of the Rwandan state with it into Zaire, including everything 
from helicopters, tanks, artillery, gasoline and hard currency to doorknobs, window 
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frames and coffee. (Lischer 2005; Adelman 2003; Quinn 2004; Prunier 1995) 
MILITARIZATION 
In the early months, Hutu militias battled each other for control of the camps.  
Observers noted the ubiquity of uniformed, armed militants throughout the camps, and 
militants set up roadblocks and patrols to further control the refugee population.  After 
consolidating control, camps were used as training grounds, for storage of weapons, and 
as a base for launching attacks on Rwanda.  Raids on the CoO began by targeting local 
officials and infrastructure on the opposite side of the border, but gradually moved 
eastward, even striking Kigali in November 1995; then they shifted to civilian targets, 
including nearby civilian Tutsi populations in Zaire, after the Rwandan Patriotic Army 
(RPA), the post-war Rwandan military, developed effective counterinsurgency 
techniques. (Lischer 2005; Adelman 2003; Mthembu-Salter 2006; Quinn 2004) 
These attacks drew interventions by the CoO, and the ex-FAR and Hutu militants 
lost control of the camps to the RPA and ADFL, a Rwandan-supported Zairian rebel 
group which continued on to take over Zaire, in 1996.  The conflict widened with the 
participation of several other countries in the region, and ultimately the militarization of 
the Rwandan refugees led to a decade of instability and international conflict, despite the 
return of 200,000 Hutu refugees in 1994 – before the militants consolidated control over 
the camps and prevented further returns – and 640,000 refugees in 1996, after the Hutu 
militants were defeated again.  An estimated three million people died as a result of the 
wider conflict, primarily from preventable diseases and malnutrition, and violent 
repercussions persisted even as late as 2009. (Salehyan 2009; Lischer 2005; Adelman 
2003; Quinn 2004; Milner 2009; Gerdes 2006; Stedman & Tanner 2003; 
285 
 
McCrummen/Washington Post, 2/1/09) 
 
Most literature on Rwandan refugee crisis in Zaire focuses on the motivations and 
actions of the militants, with hardly any mention of attitudes among civilian refugees.  
Some critics may question the importance of a collective project if the civilians were 
merely pawns herded and manipulated by the militants, and would have repatriated at the 
first available opportunity if the militants had allowed them.  To this critique I would 
respond with five observations: First, the refugees perceived that they had been subjected 
to a war of exclusion, even if objective evidence of such a war is doubtful.  Second, 
support for Rwandan Hutu nationalism was strong among the civilian population, 
especially in the northwestern part of the country, from which most refugees had fled to 
Zaire.  Third, evidence is unclear on whether the civilian refugees in Zaire actually 
wished to return to their CoO or continue to follow their militant leaders in exile.  Fourth, 
the militants grew their ranks by tens of thousands through recruiting from the civilian 
refugee population, which suggests high levels of support for the militants’ goals 
(assuming recruitment was voluntary; it is unknown how many of those who joined were 
subjected to forced recruitment).  Fifth, even if a critic finds all the prior points 
unconvincing, this case was unique in that the number of pre-existing militancy 
entrepreneurs, including the former government, ex-FAR, and militant groups such as the 
interahamwe, was so high – in the tens of thousands – that, given the broad definition of 
“refugee” used in this project, one could argue they constituted a refugee group unto 
themselves, even without the civilians.  The only apparent direct effect which a lack of 
civilians would have made in the case is that, presumably, international humanitarian aid 
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would not have been available to be diverted into conflict resources, and the militants 
would not have been able to increase their ranks with such relative ease.
303
 
Although they remained isolated in camps from the host society, the refugees 
enjoyed a decent standard of living, supported by a massive infusion of international aid 
and the possibility of local employment – despite a poor economy and hyper-inflation in 
Zaire – which was possibly even better than the devastated economic condition of their 
CoO at that time.  Militancy entrepreneurs dominated the camps, framing their arguments 
in the language of injustice and the ethnonationalist project, demonizing the “other” and 
promising redemption through militarization.  Political opportunities were abundant in 
Zaire, and conflict resources were readily available from both state actors and 
international humanitarian aid.  The combination of these factors led to one of the most 
famous cases of refugee militarization worldwide. 
Rwandans in Tanzania 
The first major wave of refugees to leave Rwanda in 1994 was on April 29, when 
a quarter million Rwandan Hutus fled into Tanzania at the behest of some 70,000 Hutu 
military and militiamen, including genocidaires, who also joined them in exile.  Most 
crossed over the Rusumo bridge into Tanzania over a period of just thirty hours. Within 
less than a year, some 700,000 Rwandans
304
 had arrived in Tanzania.  There are many 
similarities with the case of those who fled to Zaire, but the degree of militarization in 
Tanzania was much lower. (Lischer 2005; Milner 2011) 
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In general, the pre-departure factors were mostly the same as in the case of those 
who fled to Zaire: It was perceived to be a war of exclusion, and there was a strong pre-
existing Hutu ethnonational project.  As in Zaire, refugees resided according to their 
commune in Rwanda, and social structures and political leadership from the CoO were 
recreated in exile. (Prunier 1995)  CoO variables affecting the economic orientation of 
the refugees who fled to Tanzania were mostly the same as well: Most refugees were 
poor, small farmers in the CoO, and their livelihood depended on Rwandan land.  Many 
were coffee growers who were economically devastated by the plummet in coffee prices 
worldwide in the early 1990s. 
It appears that the civilian refugees, even if influenced by the propaganda of the 
militants, voluntarily supported the collective project espoused by their leaders: 
As in Zaire, the refugees in Tanzania refused to repatriate to Rwanda despite extensive 
recruitment campaigns by international agencies and the Rwandan and Tanzanian 
governments.  By refusing to return, the refugees provided support for the militant 
leaders, who could then claim that they ruled a state in exile. (Lischer 2005, p. 102) 
SOME SOCIOECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
Overall, living conditions were relatively good, as in Zaire.  Lischer (2005) notes 
that mortality and nutrition rates were better than in nearby Tanzanian villages, and camp 
residents enjoyed adequate shelter, food and health care.  Unlike Zaire, however, 
Tanzania had a long tradition of generous policies toward refugees, having allowed 
employment and even citizenship to waves of Burundian and Rwandan refugees fleeing 
their CoO from the 1960s to early 1980s. (Mogire 2011; Mogire 2006; Turner 2010)  
Although policies became more restrictive in the early 1990s and had largely switched to 
an exclusion approach by 1995-96 (Milner 2011), and despite the fact that rights to 
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employment and movement were restricted de jure, in practice the refugees were able to 
engage in productive economic activity by trading with local host communities, leading 
some UNHCR officials to suspect that refugees’ resistance to repatriation was based in 
the fact that economic conditions in the host state were better than the CoO: “Like the 
camps in Zaire, the Tanzanian camps resembled small towns with markets, shops, bars, 
and other businesses….  [More than] 10,000 hectares of land had been cultivated by 
refugees as of 1996.  Rwandan refugees also provided cheap labor for the local peasants.” 
(Lischer 2005, p. 110)  In addition, they exploited the local environment, including crop, 
forest and property destruction, for example, using doors and window frames from 
schools as firewood (Milner 2011), improving their economic security while 
demonstrating a disregard for rules which earned them a reputation for assertiveness and 
brazenness among the “shyer” Burundian Hutu refugees who were also in Tanzania 
(Turner 2010). 
In an attempt to stimulate voluntary return in 1996, the Tanzanian government 
and NGOs decreased provision of social services, including secondary education, and 
UNHCR cut food rations, but there was no noticeable effect on refugees’ desire to return.  
Lischer (2005) points to both the good living conditions and the refusal to return 
regardless of decreased assistance as evidence of the lack of importance of economic 
factors in explaining refugee militarization: 
In Tanzania, the relatively good living conditions did not blunt the political goals of the 
refugees.  Despite the existence of informal employment, markets, agricultural land, and 
social interaction, refugees continued to attempt military organization.  Statements and 
actions of refugees and their leaders indicated a desire to engage in violence, regardless 
of the material opportunities in exile. (p. 110) 
While the results of my research suggest that her overall point is correct, viz. that a 
collective project is important in explaining militarization, her conclusion is flawed: First, 
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as discussed above, the refugees were relatively well integrated to the local economy, so 
the humanitarian organizations were not the only source – and for some refugees, may 
not even have been the primary source – of food and social services.  As Lischer herself 
notes, the decrease in UNHCR rations was supplemented with sources of food elsewhere.  
Secondly, even the contractions which were implemented may not have been sufficient to 
swing their orientation toward the CoO, when considered in the context of their broader 
assessment of economic orientation.  Third, even if it was sufficient to change their 
economic orientation, they would still resist repatriation if they believed that their lives 
would be threatened upon return.  Therefore, Lischer’s conclusion, that the refugees’ lack 
of response to decreased economic benefits eliminates economic variables as an 
explanatory factor for militarization, is spurious.  This is one reason why it is necessary 
to differentiate, as demonstrated especially in the chapters on Palestinians in this work, 
between the right or idea of return (political) and the practical intent to return 
(economic). 
Finally, there was also a degree of ethnic consanguinity between Hutus and 
Tanzanian ethnic groups in the western part of the country, where the camps were 
located, leading to greater sympathy for the Hutus from the local population. (Lischer 
2005) 
MILITANCY ENTREPRENEURS 
As noted earlier, some 70,000 Hutu militants and military joined the refugees in 
Tanzania, mixing freely with the civilian refugees, and had the same goals as those in 
Zaire of recovering control of the Rwandan government from the Tutsi RPF.  They were 
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mostly politicians and militias, however, rather than ex-FAR
305
.  Militant leaders quickly 
organized and gained control over the camps with the blessing of UNHCR, which was 
completely overwhelmed by the massive influx. (Lischer 2005)   
Like the militancy entrepreneurs in Zaire, their propaganda described an altered 
version of older and more recent history
306
 to frame their arguments around themes of 
injustice, victimhood and ethnonational right, while offering the opportunity to redeem 
the homeland through militarization.  They were also the primary source of news and 
information in the camps, which made their propaganda more persuasive. (Lischer 2005; 
Milner 2011) 
POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY 
The factor which differs most from the case of Rwandans in Zaire is political 
opportunity.  Unlike Mobutu’s Zaire, the government of Tanzania considered itself 
neutral in the Hutu-Tutsi conflict.  Despite supporting anti-colonial armed movements 
and actively militarizing refugees in the past (Mogire 2006; Salehyan 2009), and despite 
initial tensions between the Tanzanian government and RPF in the first half of 1994 
(Mogire 2011), the government and most voting Tanzanians were not sympathetic to the 
Hutu militants.  The government exercised its power to securitize the refugee-populated 
areas (to an extent) and prevent cross-border raids.  In March 1995, the government 
deployed the army and closed the border with Burundi to prevent entry by some 70,000 
Rwandan Hutu refugees, a large portion of whom were likely militants, arriving from 
Zaire. (Lischer 2005)  The Tanzanian government’s lack of support for militarization by 
the Rwandan refugees, and the decision to expel them at the end of 1996, were partly an 
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effort to maintain good relations with the new government of Rwanda and “partly in 
response to threats by Rwanda… that they would attack the camps to stop them from 
being used as bases for armed subversion.” (Mogire 2011, p. 41) 
However, in other ways political opportunities were available: The host 
authorities were not successful in separating militancy entrepreneurs from civilians, 
though they made a token effort to do so; a degree of sympathy by local Tanzanian 
authorities led them to confiscate only part of the weapons in the camp; and they arrested 
only fourteen known genocide leaders upon arrival in Tanzania, releasing even those few 
without charge a few months later – an outcome resulting from the fact that Tanzanian 
law had no basis for arresting and prosecuting refugee militants.  The host government 
also had insufficient policing capacity to adequately address the large refugee population, 
and insufficient coercive resources to enable them to fully demilitarize the camps. 
(Lischer 2005; Mogire 2011; Mogire 2006) 
As in Zaire, UNHCR and humanitarian NGOs were intimidated by militants but 
continued to provide aid and services.  In most of the camps, UNHCR also reinforced the 
power of the genocidaires and militants by allowing them to organize and represent the 
camps, and effectively implementing a don’t-ask-don’t-tell policy regarding 
militarization.  In addition, as in Zaire, the largest camps were located within walking 
distance of the border with their CoO (Lischer 2005), in remote areas which obstructed 
securitization and facilitated militant activity (Mogire 2011).  Rwanda’s eastern border, 





The Hutu militancy entrepreneurs in Tanzania were in regular contact with, and 
coordinated with, their ex-FAR counterparts in Zaire, many of whom entered Tanzania 
via Burundi for the alleged purpose of finding relatives (until March 1995, as described 
above).  These militancy entrepreneurs could have brought in weapons while 
coordinating activities, and probably did; as noted previously, ample conflict resources 
were available to the militancy entrepreneurs in Zaire, especially from the Mobutu 
government.  Light weapons had also been brought in from Rwanda at the time of 
departure.  Through control over the camps and representation to international 
humanitarian aid workers, militants were also able to divert large quantities of food aid 
by inflating population numbers and selling the excess. (Lischer 2005) 
SOME MILITARIZATION 
Militants in the camps stored light weapons out of view.  Heavy weapons, which 
are larger and difficult to conceal, were not allowed in the camps; and Tanzanian 
authorities confiscated some light weapons and ammunition from the camp in 1994 and 
1995.  Despite these efforts, recruitment and regular military training were held, and 
some raids across the border to Rwanda took place, straining relations between Rwanda 
and Tanzania, but they were minimal compared to the events in Zaire. (Lischer 2005; 
Mogire 2011; Mogire 2006) 
 
Overall, most factors in Tanzania were similar to Zaire: The Rwandan Hutu 
refugees had a collective project to redeem the homeland based on a perceived war of 
exclusion perpetrated by a clear enemy, their ethnonationalist project and an agricultural 
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economic base in their CoO; there were pre-existing militancy entrepreneurs who joined 
them in exile; and conflict resources were available.  The main difference was that there 
was much less political opportunity for militarization in Tanzania than in Zaire.  The 
window of opportunity was mostly shut, so to speak, resulting in a lower degree of 
militarization. 
Afghan Refugees in Pakistan 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 came after six years of 
instability, including unpopular communist rule, following the coup which deposed King 
Zahir Shah.  Fearing the collapse of a weak communist government on its periphery, the 
Soviet Union invaded and installed another Afghan communist leader.  By that time, the 
various resistance groups had already loosely coalesced into the mujahideen, or Islamic 
warriors, with a base in Peshawar, Pakistan, located some twenty miles from the border.  
At its peak, the USSR had a troop strength of about 150,000-200,000 in Afghanistan; and 
at their peak strength, the mujahideen fielded about the same number of fighters, most 
located in Afghanistan.  By the time the Soviets departed a decade later, 1.25 million 
Afghans had died out of a prewar population of 16 million, in addition to 15,000 Soviet 
troops. The conflict led to an exodus of over three million Afghans into Pakistan – 
including the nearly 400,000 who were already there prior to December 1979 – and over 
two million to Iran.  Most of the refugees did not return after the USSR withdrew. 
(Lischer 2005; Mayotte 1992)  The number of refugees over the next two decades 
fluctuated, but due to the instability in Afghanistan in the early 1990s, the fundamentalist 
Taliban regime which took over in 1996, UN sanctions in 1999, the American invasion in 
2001 and the ongoing insurgency and violence for the most recent decade, as of 2010 
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there were still nearly two million refugees in Pakistan and over one million in Iran
307
.  In 
this section I will discuss those in Pakistan, where extensive militarization took place, 
and in the following section I will turn to those in Iran, where it did not. 
COLLECTIVE PROJECT 
Most refugees fled due to a brutal counterinsurgency campaign intended to “drain 
the sea” in which guerrilla fish lived, characterized by civilian-punishing techniques such 
as fragmentation bombs, small mines and booby-trapped toys. (Grare 2003; Mayotte 
1992)  In a survey conducted in Peshawar, two-thirds of refugees left due to a direct or 
indirect threat, including an attack on their village, imprisonment, harassment, or 
impending conscription to the communist army. (Connor 1987 [cited in Lischer 2005])  
Many also left due to the imposition of highly unpopular policies regarding land and the 
family, which they saw as undermining the pillars of rural Afghan society. (Wood 1989)  
The conflict which led to the refugees’ departure was perceived to be a war of exclusion, 
but its basis was partly ideological and partly religious (Nyers 2006; Marsden 2006): 
The refugees fled Afghanistan due to their anti-communism, their resentment of foreign 
rule, the widespread cruelty practiced by the regime, and their adherence to Islam.  The 
Soviets and their Afghan allies committed numerous massacres in villages as a warning 
against supporting the rebels.  The demonstration effect of these massacres caused 
thousands to flee.  The Soviet forces also conducted massive aerial bombing 
campaigns….  Islam provided an additional reason to flee the country….  [The] Islamic 
concept of hijrah encourages Muslims to leave territory that has been occupied by 
infidels. (Lischer 2005, p. 48) 
Likewise, the political project which helped unify and motivate the refugees was 
part religious, based on Islam, anti-atheism and Islamic/traditional values relating to 
women (Mayotte 1992); and part ideological, based on anti-communism.  The Afghan 
population consists of multiple ethnic groups, but the mujahideen, especially the seven 
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Sunni Islamist parties which were recognized and supported by the Pakistani government, 
made no such divisions.  It cannot be said that there was an Afghan nationalist project
308
; 
in fact, lack of development of a national Afghan identity, in deference to ethnic and 
tribal identities, has been a failure of successive governments in the country since the turn 
of the twentieth century. (Hoodfar 2010) 
Most of the Afghan population willingly supported the resistance, which they 
considered legitimate, and opposed the Soviet occupation.  They refused to return to their 
CoO unless their political demands – namely the withdrawal of the communists – were 
met. (Lischer 2005; Grare 2003)  Camp life indoctrinated the second generation to 
support the mujahideen, with children as young as nine or ten years old beginning 
training. (Mayotte 1992; Stevens/New York Times, 10/3/82)  Also, as in the Rwandan 
cases, the refugees recreated patterns of social authority from the CoO in their settlements 
in Pakistan; but traditional tribal authority declined over the course of the 1980s with the 
rise of Islamist authority via the resistance parties.  The refugees saw themselves not as 
individuals in need of protection, as the international aid agencies saw them, but as a 
group with a collective political grievance. (Grare 2003; Macleod 2008; Wood 1989) 
Afghans were (and still are) among the most rural populations in the world, and 
most refugees were small farmers or sharecroppers, with a smaller proportion nomadic, in 
their CoO.  The refugees were able to cross the border in both directions with relative 
ease, and often visited their CoO to protect their property and tend their farms. (Macleod 
2008; Marsden 2006; Lischer 2005; Mayotte 1992; Wood 1989) 
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SOME SOCIOECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
Despite the fact that Pakistan was not a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention and 
had no legislation to recognize refugees (Parker 2008), the Afghans had freedom of 
movement and residence – some small groups self-settled in Pakistani cities – and were 
encouraged to work by the government, which granted them exemptions from the 
Foreigners Act. (Marsden 2006; Lischer 2005; Grare 2003; Wood 1989)  They became 
economically productive through a variety of means: Some (illegally) planted crops in 
Pakistan (Mayotte 1992), and they “were active in the transportation industry and the 
arms trade, and also smuggled goods, including drugs.  Further, the refugees brought 
three million livestock with them into Pakistan.” (Lischer 2005, p. 56)  Refugees also 
sold relief food on local markets and were employed on internationally funded 
infrastructure development projects.  Some engaged in unskilled construction or seasonal 
agricultural labor, or migrated to the cities in search of work. (Macleod 2008; Grare 
2003; Mayotte 1992; Wood 1989) 
However, with the exception of the latter example, these economic activities 
involved the CoO, subsistence or serving the refugee communities, or were funded –
intentionally or not – by international agencies attracted to the region by the refugees.  
There were few opportunities for participation in the host state economy which did not 
somehow involve the refugee communities themselves.  The Afghans were offered 
neither integration to Pakistan nor resettlement as a durable solution to their situation.  
Although life in refugee camps was far from luxurious, it was well-provisioned 
and sustainable from the refugees’ point of view, and – especially considering the 
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Soviets’ destruction of crops, farms and irrigation in Afghanistan
309
 – economically better 
than life in the CoO.  Rates of nutrition and disease were better than in Afghanistan.  
Tents were replaced with mud-brick huts, and settlement patterns in refugee “villages” 
were similar to those of local Pakistani villages. (Lischer 2005; Marsden 2006; Wood 
1989) 
Although Pakistan was not a democracy, the refugees were able to express their 
political grievances through the mujahideen groups, which were technically political 
parties.  This even led to calls among local Pakistanis for the right to form opposition 
political parties. (Lischer 2005)  However, the mujahideen groups were Afghan parties, 
not Pakistani parties, and they mostly stayed out of the Pakistani political process. 
Finally, ethnic consanguinity between the Afghan refugees, 80% of whom were 
Pashtun, and Pakistanis in the Northwest Frontier Province (Grare 2003; Lischer 2005; 
Macleod 2008) generated sympathy among the locals.  
MILITANCY ENTREPRENEURS 
The mujahideen mostly developed in exile, but some degree of organization 
existed prior to departure.  Two of the resistance parties first established a presence in 
Pakistan in 1975. (Grare 2003)  However, as of 1979, the pre-existing resistance 
organizations were loose, weak and lacked military capacity.  With a clear foreign 
common enemy following the Soviet invasion, however, the wide array of resistance 
groups which had risen over the late 1970s were able to unite in defense of Islam and 
Afghan traditions – a unity which was always tenuous, however, and lasted only as long 
as the Soviet occupation. (Lischer 2005) 
The militants used discursive framing to portray their cause to civilian refugees 
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using themes of injustice, collective right based on religion, and militarization as a means 
to redeem the homeland: 
“The atheist forces invaded our country, destroyed our mosques, killed our children and 
started teaching communism in the schools,” a square-bearded leader shouted in a speech 
at the sprawling, 140,000-person Barakai refugee camp….  “For the sake of our religion 
we migrated.  We now swear that we will fight until we eliminate the very germ of 
communism from our country.” (Stevens/New York Times, 10/3/82)
310
 
Religious fundamentalism had not been common in the public sphere in 
Afghanistan prior to 1979.  As Sarah Lischer writes, the rebel leaders’ “control over 
millions of refugees provided a legitimacy to the Mujahideen parties, which might 
otherwise have been viewed as peripheral to the conflict inside Afghanistan.” (2005, p. 
51)  It was the arming of the mujahideen which led to their extraordinary empowerment  
in the refugee community and, later, the supplanting of tribal authority in Afghanistan by 
religious fundamentalist authority. (Macleod 2008) 
POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY 
The host government in Pakistan supported the efforts of the mujahideen, and did 
not securitize the refugee camps.  This decision was due in part to their ethnic ties with 
the Afghans – both populations are dominantly Sunni Muslim, the border areas have long 
traditions of ethnic and cultural ties, and President Zia al-Huq himself had justified his 
1977 military takeover of Pakistan partly on religious grounds – but more importantly for 
geostrategic reasons, as increased influence in the south-central Asia region and the 
Muslim world more broadly, as well as American weapons and technology, would help 
Pakistan balance against India.  In addition, Pakistan feared irredentist claims by Afghan 
Pashtuns over the Pashtun-populated border area of the (deliberately non-eponymous) 
Northwest Frontier Province. Pakistan had quarreled with the Afghan central government 
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prior to 1979 over Afghan Pashtuns’ ethnonationalist program, and throughout the 1980s 
the two states were antagonistic to each other. (Grare 2003; Lischer 2005) 
On the other hand, the government tried to maintain rebel activity below a 
threshold which would trigger a large-scale invasion from the Soviet Union or become a 
potentially independent force in Pakistani politics.  President Zia al-Huq had been a 
military advisor in Jordan in 1970 and personally observed the potentially destabilizing 
effect of a large, militarized refugee population.  For these two reasons, he ensured that 
the Pakistani intelligence service, ISI, controlled the flow of arms, limiting the number 
and type of weapons, and kept supply covert.  Pakistan also controlled public political 
activities, such as meetings and press conferences, held by the mujahideen parties.  When 
pressure from the Soviet Union grew too great in 1984, the government compelled the 
resistance parties to move their headquarters out of Peshawar. (Lischer 2005; Grare 2003) 
Not only did the international community not seek peaceful durable solutions for 
the refugee situation, but the mujahideen were actively supported by western countries, 
who were on the same side as the Afghan rebels in the context of the Cold War, as well 
as Muslim states, especially Saudi Arabia, and China.  The UN overwhelmingly 
condemned the occupation in the General Assembly.  Perhaps due to this widespread 
political support for the rebels’ cause, as well as the broad support for militarization 
among the Afghan refugee population in Pakistan, the ambiguous ends of international 
humanitarian aid drew little condemnation or ethical concern from aid organizations, 
academics
311
 or the media, even years later, unlike the case of Rwandans in Zaire. (Terry 
2002; Grare 2003; Lischer 2005) 
Finally, camps in Pakistan were located relatively near the border with 
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Afghanistan, though not necessarily walking distance.  The rugged, mountainous border 
terrain was very porous, and nearly impossible to defend against infiltration. (Lischer 
2005; Marsden 2006) 
CONFLICT RESOURCES 
One of the most salient characteristics of this case of refugee militarization is the 
billions of dollars’ worth of support which the mujahideen received from American, 
Pakistani, Chinese and Saudi intelligence agencies, beginning soon after the Soviet 
invasion. (Weiner 1992/93; Lischer 2005; Mayotte 1992)  In the interest of containing 
and rolling back the spread the communism, the US supplied Pakistan and the 
mujahideen with substantial military aid, including not only small arms but rockets, 
surface-to-surface and anti-aircraft missiles, and communications equipment, valued 
altogether at about $670 million annually; in addition to up to $150 million ($400 million 
from all international sources combined by the late 1980s) annually in humanitarian aid. 
(Bourne 2007; Lischer 2005)  The refugees in Pakistan were seen by the American 
government not as humanitarian cases first, but as a potent, and ultimately successful, 
political resource in the global war against Communism – especially since access to those 
in Iran was not available as a result of the anti-western Iranian revolution in 1979.  In 
addition, Pakistan selected seven of the more fundamentalist Islamist groups – those 
without Pashtun nationalist ties – to support with military assistance. (Lischer 2005; 
Grare 2003) 
Meanwhile, the humanitarian aid sent by Pakistan, the United States and other 
international donors was delivered via the resistance parties controlling the camps, 
allowing the militants to inflate population numbers, control distribution and divert aid.  
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The aid acted as the infrastructure of the Afghan resistance and relieved the mujahideen 
of providing for their dependents and supporters, in addition to providing direct 
assistance to the mujahideen in the form of food, shelter and medical supplies. (Lischer 
2005; Stedman & Tanner 2003; Nyers 2006)  The militants were able to use the refugee 
camps in Pakistan as “both sanctuary and logistical back up”. (Macleod 2008, p. 342)   
MILITARIZATION 
By 1987, the mujahideen had developed seven training camps in Pakistan and had 
trained some 80,000 fighters over the prior four years, although training was forbidden in 
the refugee camps themselves. (Grare 2003; Lischer 2005)  There are conflicting reports 
of the extent to which combatant and non-combatant refugees mingled in the case of the 
Afghans in Pakistan, with convergence on the fact that women, children and the elderly 
were not involved while the vast majority of younger men in the same families 
participated in fighting against the CoO.  The camps served as centers of recruitment, 
including of newly arriving refugees who had never before encountered the resistance 
parties.  They would register for humanitarian assistance and join one of the seven 
dominant mujahideen parties, which controlled the camps, at the same time.  Combatants 
and non-combatants “mixed freely….  Nearly all refugee men spent time with one or 
another of the resistance parties fighting in Afghanistan.” (Lischer 2005, p. 53)  On the 
other hand, one of the first groups of scholars to discuss the “refugee warrior” 
phenomenon wrote: “Most commonly, there are separate physical facilities for the armed 
wing and for the refugees….  The same obtains in Pakistan, where the Afghan mujahedin 
are training and operating from their own bases, and the old men, women and children 
are concentrated in other camps supported by the UNHCR.” (Zolberg et al. 1989, p. 276, 
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emphasis in original; see also Nyers 2006, p. 115)  Grare agreed that the camps in 
Pakistan were “a key source of recruitment of anti-Soviet fighters, [but] this did not lead 
to extensive militarization of the camps….  [Fighting] was only a part time occupation.  
A man could spend three or four months in the field and the remainder in a refugee camp 
and eventually be replaced by a relative.” (2003, p. 58-71)  Thus, even if the refugee 
camps were not directly militarized, they provided recruitment, support, supply and safe 
haven for the mujahideen. 
The refugee fighters made cross-border raids into Afghanistan, striking 
government targets not only on the opposite side of the border, but even in the interior of 
the country.  They also served as sources of resupply to mujahideen forces within the 
CoO.  The Soviet-backed Afghan government responded by shelling refugee-populated 
areas, including UNHCR-run refugee camps, killing 700 civilians in 1987 alone.  They 
conducted hundreds of attacks on Pakistani territory, but, thanks in part to careful 
management by the Pakistani government, the conflict did not widen into an international 
war. (Lischer 2005; Wood 1989)  The activities of the Afghan refugees who, with the 
support of powerful patrons, militarized against the Soviets transformed this conflict into 
one of the most important – and last – proxy battles of the Cold War, and ultimately the 
withdrawal of the Soviet Union from a poor and weak central Asian country. 
 
In conclusion, there was widespread support among civilian Afghan refugees in 
Pakistan for a collective project to redeem their homeland from a clear enemy, even 
though the project was based more on a religious than nationalist or ethnonationalist 
basis; and they were mostly small farmers tied to their land.  They experienced some 
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socioeconomic integration to the host state, especially as living conditions in western-
supported camps were better than in their CoO, access to employment was available, and 
their hosts were ethnically consanguineous.  Pre-existing militancy entrepreneurs were 
present in Pakistan, and they quickly organized, mobilized and led the refugees to 
militarize.  The host state and many other powerful states worldwide, who were opposed 
to the refugees’ enemy in the CoO, supported the militarization, and humanitarian 
organizations did not object to it.  Large amounts of military resources were available 
from those same powerful states, including the host state, and humanitarian aid was 
especially helpful in supporting the militants’ dependents. 
Afghans in Iran 
A pre-existing Afghan community, most of whom were economic migrants rather 
than refugees, was present in Iran prior to 1979.  Estimates put the population at 600,000, 
mostly located in urban areas.  In the months and years after the Soviet invasion, over 
two million more Afghans joined them in Iran. (Lischer 2005) 
COLLECTIVE PROJECT 
For the most part, CoO factors relating to the collective project of Afghans who 
fled to Iran are the same as those who went to Pakistan.  They experienced a war of 
exclusion on a religious and ideological basis, and they sought the departure of the 
Soviets and Afghan communist government before they would return. (Lischer 2005)  It 
is unclear whether the degree of violence perpetrated on those who fled westward was 
less than those who moved to Pakistan: Homa Hoodfar (2010), for example, cites 
compulsory education for girls and a new marriage law – which contradicted religious 
and traditional mores – as the main reason that most Afghans in Iran fled their CoO.  
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Ironically, many refugees’ attitudes reversed completely due to their experiences in Iran, 
where Islamic teachings emphasized the importance of education.  In fact, many of those 
who returned to Afghanistan in the early 1990s later moved back to Iran after the Taliban 
took over, primarily because of lack of educational opportunities for their daughters. 
(Hoodfar 2010)  If one of the refugees’ primary grievances against the communist 
government in their CoO was the imposition of girls’ education, a growing belief in the 
value of that education may have decreased their collective project against the CoO over 
time.  On the other hand, the Soviets and the Afghan communist government were still 
not Islamic, so a change in attitude on the single issue of girls’ education may not have 
changed their overall political motivation, especially since the education which they 
began to value in Iran was specifically based in Islamic teachings. 
Like those in Pakistan, their collective project was primarily based on religious, 
rather than national, grounds.  On the other hand, like Palestinians in Jordan, the shared 
experience of exile in Iran gradually led the refugees to develop a group identity as 
Afghans over time: 
Most Afghan refugees before coming to Iran thought of themselves as Hazara, Tajic, 
Pashtune, etc.  Few identified themselves as Afghan and had little knowledge of other 
ethnic groups.  However once in Iran they were referred to as Afghan regardless of their 
ethnicity.  This helped to develop a sense of collective Afghan supra-identity and a 
corresponding Afghan nationalism which was rare in the identity matrix of fragmented 
and diverse Afghan society. (Hoodfar 2010, p. 147) 
But this national identity did not begin to develop until relatively late in their stay, 
especially since the government emphasized shared Islamic identity until the end of the 
Iran-Iraq war led to changes in their policies toward Afghan refugees. (Hoodfar 2010) 
Like their compatriots in Pakistan, the population of refugees in Iran were rural in 
their CoO, mostly small farmers, and most were illiterate.  While their land was, of 
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course, not transferable, urban residence in Iran made their agricultural skills and lack of 
formal education even less well-suited to the host state environment than in Pakistan, 
except for those few who sought agricultural labor.  As a result, even adults began to seek 
literacy and education while in Iran, which was strongly encouraged by the new 
theocratic government. (Hoodfar 2010; Marsden 2006; Macleod 2008; Wood 1989) 
MORE SOCIOECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
Given the large population of Afghan economic migrants in Iran prior to 1979, 
and their connections with the refugees who arrived after 1979, it seems that those who 
fled westward may have been more economically motivated in general, and more 
oriented to their host state in particular, than those who moved to Pakistan.  This is 
consistent with their settlement patterns (urban), general attitude toward Persian society 
(seeking integration) and their shock and dismay in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when 
Iranian policies regarding them shifted from an integration approach to one strongly 
pressuring return. (Hoodfar 2010) 
Overall, the standard of living for refugees in Iran was at least as good, if not 
better, than in Afghanistan.  This was particularly the case for Hazaras, who were a 
minority historically oppressed and persecuted in their CoO.  The Iranian government, 
which is a signatory to the 1951 Convention, provided adequate food and shelter, and the 
refugees utilized the same medical services and schools as local Iranians.  Most Afghans 
in Iran settled in urban areas where they could find work and become self-sufficient, 
rather than border camps.  Half of the refugees moved out of the border region altogether.  
By the late 1980s, only 75,000 refugees (3% of the refugee population) resided in 
government-run camps.  The Afghans encouraged their children to adjust to Persian 
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society, and Afghan-Persian intermarriages were not uncommon.  The workforce in Iran 
had a labor shortage due to the war with Iraq, leading the refugees to be absorbed into the 
host state economy, albeit mostly in unskilled labor positions; and they were not allowed 
to open their own business except via an Iranian partner.  The refugees had freedom of 
movement and residence until 1986, when the government began directing them toward 
places in need of labor, and requiring permits for domestic travel. (Lischer 2005; Hoodfar 
2010; Marsden 2006; Macleod 2008; Strand, Suhrke & Harpviken 2004) 
The refugees, most of whom came from western parts of Afghanistan, already 
spoke Farsi; and the majority were from the Hazara ethnic group, who follow Shi’a 
Islam.  Their hosts sympathized with the refugees due to their shared religious, cultural 
and ethnic ties, but their sympathy was not as deep as in Pakistan.  Despite the 
government’s emphasis on shared Islamic identity through the 1980s and a warm 
reception by their host communities (Hoodfar 2010; Macleod 2008), there was an 
undercurrent of distrust of Afghans which pre-dated the refugee crisis, and the refugees 
were widely perceived as damaging the Iranian economy and depleting local resources, 
which led to attacks and protests in Tehran against Afghan refugees in 1983. (Lischer 
2005) 
Finally, although Iran was not democratic, in some cases the state provided 
institutionalized avenues for the Afghan refugees to address their grievances.  For 
example, the government “established Afghan refugee councils in urban areas with heavy 
Afghan populations as forums to discuss refugee issues.” (Lischer 2005, p. 70) 
MILITANCY ENTREPRENEURS 
There were few leaders among the refugees in Iran who emerged to take up the 
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mantle of resistance against Afghanistan.  Those militancy entrepreneurs who were 
present were poorly organized, consisting only of “a fractured group of Shi’a resistance 
parties” and some mujahideen fighters based in Afghanistan who would move 
temporarily to Iran for work, then return to fight in Afghanistan. (Lischer 2005, p. 65)  It 
is quite possible, however, that many more militancy entrepreneurs did exist but did not 
act on their intentions due to lack of political opportunity; or that they did not emerge 
because they maintained a reasonable hope of resolution by outside actors, namely their 
mujahideen compatriots in Afghanistan and Pakistan with assistance from powerful 
patron states. 
POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY 
The strongest obstacle to militarization by the Afghan refugees in Iran was the 
lack of political opportunity.  In 1979 the Islamic Revolution threw the state into a 
tumult, and during the following decade Iran was bogged down in a war with Iraq.  
Although it opposed the Soviet invasion of an Islamic state, it had little interest in getting 
involved in another war, especially when they were vulnerable to Soviet attack not only 
via Afghanistan but also along their northern border.  Furthermore, Iran needed Soviet 
economic assistance and trade, especially since the western states had imposed a trade 
embargo.  Domestically, it feared setting an example of non-state actors rebelling against 
their home government, which could be adopted by nationalistic minority groups such as 
the Baluchis who were pushing for more autonomy within Iran.  Additionally, the 
ideology of the Islamic Revolution was founded in large part on rejection of western 
interference and western values, particularly those of the United States, and adamant 
demands for “pure” national sovereignty. (Lischer 2005; Marsden 2006) 
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As a result, the new government refused the introduction of weapons, 
humanitarian aid and organizations from outside, especially from American sources, 
which were the primary direct and indirect supporters of the mujahideen in Pakistan.  The 
Iranian state also prevented militarization among the refugees by closely monitoring their 
movements and activities, confiscating weapons and securitizing the border.  The 
government refused to allow its territory to be used as a conduit to transport weapons into 
Afghanistan from the parties based in Pakistan. (Lischer 2005; Grare 2003; Marsden 
2006) 
Finally, Afghanistan’s western border is significantly shorter, less mountainous 
and less rugged than its eastern border, making it easier to monitor and defend.  In order 
to prevent Afghan rebel activity from Iran, which would have forced the Soviet Union to 
face two active fronts, the Soviet army built up forces along the border, establishing a 
buffer zone, and on a few occasions demonstrated its willingness to attack Iranian border 
posts if Afghan militants were present. (Lischer 2005) 
CONFLICT RESOURCES 
Even though Iran provided some limited support to rebel groups fighting in 
Afghanistan, including to the Sunni group Hizb-i-Islami in Pakistan at the beginning of 
the 1980s, and to Shi’ite groups such as Hazara Nasr, it did not provide such resources to 
Afghan refugees seeking to attack their CoO from Iranian territory.  Furthermore, 
humanitarian aid from outside Iran, which could have potentially been diverted to support 
militarization, was non-existent until 1983, when the government allowed UNHCR to 
establish a small operation.  This operation grew gradually over the next few years, but 
never made a dramatic contribution to the welfare of the refugees, as it did in Pakistan. 
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(Lischer 2005)  Nonetheless, considering the abundance of imported arms, hardware and 
other conflict resources delivered to Afghans in Pakistan in their fight against Soviets, it 
is very reasonable to expect that the same would have been available to the refugees in 
Iran – opening a second front in the war – if militancy entrepreneurs had sought it and 
their host state had allowed it. 
LITTLE MILITARIZATION 
There were some claims early in the exile that refugees in Iran were making hit-
and-run raids on Afghan government targets in the CoO, and some refugees donated 
money to the mujahideen parties.  In one instance, they occupied the Soviet embassy in 
Tehran, but Iranian authorities quickly removed them. (Lischer 2005)  Near the end of the 
war, there may have been an uptick in cross-border resistance against the CoO (Macleod 
2008), but evidence is scant.  Either way, militarization of the refugees was minimal 
throughout their stay in Iran. 
 
In sum, the refugees in Iran maintained a collective project for redemption of the 
CoO from a clear enemy which was mostly the same as that held by their brethren in 
Pakistan, but they were more socioeconomically integrated to their host state.  Few 
militancy entrepreneurs made themselves known; however, given the circumstances, it is 
possible that more would-be leaders were present among the refugees but chose not, or 
were not able, to act on their political inclinations; or they were waiting for external 
actors to achieve their collective project.  For a variety of foreign policy and domestic 
reasons, the host state foreclosed any possibility of political opportunity for 
militarization, and strong defenses in the CoO reinforced it.  Finally, conflict resources 
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would probably have been readily available to the refugees in Iran, as they were available 
in Pakistan, had the Iranian government allowed it.  As a result of these factors, 
militarization of the refugees in Iran did not occur. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, the proposed framework of refugee militarization which was seen 
to explain well the presence and absence of militarization in Jordan was applied to two 
pairs of cases outside the region, in order to begin to investigate its relevance worldwide.  
Whereas Rwandans in Zaire militarized, those in Tanzania did so to a much lesser 
degree; and whereas Afghans in Pakistan militarized, those in Iran did not.  Existing 
literature on refugee militarization suggests that the main reason for these differences is 
the presence or absence of political opportunity, namely the will and capability of the 
host state to prevent it.  However, the case of Afghans in Iran, where they were mostly 
socioeconomically integrated to the host state, suggests that even if political opportunity 
had been present, the majority of refugees may have been ambivalent at most about 
engaging in militarization.  Figure 7, below, summarizes the four external cases reviewed 




Figure 7. Summary: Rwandans, 1994-96, and Afghans, 1979-1989.   
 
Note: Due to the fact that these four cases were reviewed using secondary-source 
literature rather than in-depth case studies, the indications above are only preliminary 
categorizations.  For example, as discussed in this chapter, although Afghan refugees 
were relatively well socioeconomically integrated to Iran, they may also have been 
waiting for resolution through the efforts of powerful patrons.  In-depth studies are 




CHAPTER 10: Lessons from the Past and Directions for the Future 
 
The previous chapters in this work have: established the necessity and urgency of 
understanding refugee militarization; revealed the lacuna in the academic literature which 
fails to give adequate consideration to collective projects and socioeconomic integration, 
in the context of structural factors, leading to militarization; proposed a framework 
outlining conditions which are necessary and sufficient to cause refugees to take up arms; 
justified the use of case studies and interviews in field research in the Middle East as 
initial applications of the framework; demonstrated the value of the framework to 
increasing understanding of four in-depth observations of Palestinian and Iraqi refugee 
situations in Jordan; and began to demonstrate its relevance outside the Middle East by 
applying it to four additional cases of refugee situations in Africa and central Asia. 
In this concluding chapter I will: summarize the results of those case studies; offer 
suggestions for future research on refugee militarization and related fields; apply the 
proposed framework to forecast the likely future of refugee militarization in Jordan in the 
context of the new Middle East; and conclude with policy recommendations to host 
states, international humanitarian organizations and donor states for reducing the 
likelihood of militarization. 
Summary of results 
The eight observations are summarized in Figure 8, below.  The three cases which 
resulted in large-scale militarization – Palestinians in Jordan from 1964-70, Rwandans in 
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Zaire, and Afghans in Pakistan
312
 – had the same values on all independent variables: a 
(perceived) war of exclusion with a clear enemy, socioeconomic marginalization (at least 
among the part of the refugee group who were mostly responsible for actual 
 
Figure 8. Summary of all eight observations/cases reviewed in this project 
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 As noted in Chapter 9, some Afghans migrated to urban areas in Pakistan for work.  Despite 
their greater socioeconomic integration, they are not listed separately in this summary due to their 
relatively small number. 
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militarization), the presence of militancy entrepreneurs, and a permissive political 
opportunity structure which allowed acquisition of conflict resources.  In the cases which 
resulted in little or no militarization, values on the independent variables varied: lack of 
political opportunity was the main obstacle to militarization by Palestinians from 1971-
2011, Rwandans in Tanzania and probably ex-Ba’ath Iraqis in Jordan; while Palestinians 
in Jordan from 1948-1963 were waiting for powerful external actors to redeem the 
homeland on their behalf; socioeconomic integration dissuaded actual attempts at 
militarization by wealthy, urban Palestinians since 1948 and Afghans in Iran; and 
ordinary (non-ex-Ba’ath) Iraqis in Jordan since 2003 have had little collective project.  
With the exception of the latter case, all of the others maintained a collective project 
toward redemption of the homeland. 
In only one observation besides those which actually resulted in militarization 
was political opportunity available: Palestinians in Jordan from 1948-63.  Despite the 
opportunity to militarize, few militancy entrepreneurs emerged, due to most Palestinians’ 
belief at that time in an alternative route to redemption.  This framework suggests 
counterfactuals regarding the other selected cases.  For instance, among Iraqis in Jordan 
and Afghans in Iran, mass militarization probably would not have occurred even if a 
permissive political opportunity structure had been available: in the first case because of 
a lack of collective project, and in the second due to their relatively high level of 
socioeconomic integration.  Finally, in two cases (plus one subset of a case, ex-Ba’ath 
Iraqis), mass militarization probably would have occurred if political opportunities were 
available: Palestinians in Jordan since 1971 and Rwandans in Tanzania. 
In the aggregate, these eight observations/cases are all consistent with the 
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necessity and sufficiency of the proposed independent variables in leading to mass 
mobilization and militarization by refugees: a collective project, socioeconomic 
marginalization (for at least a significant portion of the group, if not the whole group), 
militancy entrepreneurs and political opportunity.  In no case in which these variables 
were present did militarization fail to occur; and in no case in which at least one 
independent variable was absent did militarization occur. 
CAMPS, SOCIOECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND MILITANCY 
The conventional wisdom is that refugee camps are hotbeds of political 
extremism and militant attitudes while urban refugee populations are economically 
motivated and detached from the political cause.  This perception is widespread among 
both scholars and practitioners, and even among Palestinians themselves.  By contrast, 
the results of this study revealed a more complex picture.  First, it showed that camps are 
seen, both by Palestinians who live in the camps and those who do not, as a tangible 
symbol and locus of the Palestinian identity.  Some even compared the camp to Palestine 
itself.  However, there were no measurable differences in their attitudes regarding 
militancy. 
But there were other differences: Camp residents are more pessimistic that the 
group will return, but have higher expectation of actual return personally; and camp 
residents and Gazans are more likely to place higher priority on private economic 
interests than collective political interests, as demonstrated by the fact that they are more 
willing to live side-by-side with Israelis in an Israeli state as long as they can return to 
their ancestral homes – an option flatly refused by most interviewees.  In short, less 
economic integration to the host state increases economic orientation toward the CoO and 
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intent to actually return, but not necessarily attachment to the collective project or 
militant attitudes. 
If camp residents are not more extreme or militant in their attitudes regarding the 
CoO than non-camp residents, how can we explain the fact that the camps have been 
centers for actual militarization (1965-1970) and attempts to militarize (1971-2011)?  The 
explanation appears to be related not to differences in attitude but differences in 
economic orientation.  First, those who are less integrated to the host state have fewer and 
shallower economic and affective ties to the host state, so they are more free to act on the 
political attitudes which they share with their non-camp or non-Gazan compatriots.  As 
one Palestinian ex-guerrilla stated, “They had nothing to lose but their tents.” (Personal 
interview, 12/8/10)  This is an exaggeration, but the basic idea has merit. 
Second, decreased socioeconomic integration in the host state means that they 
remain more economically oriented toward the CoO, which explains both the increased 
willingness to live with Israelis in Israel, and the higher levels of actual militarization.  In 
other words, those who are less economically integrated to the host state are more likely 
to seek practical return to their ancestral homes, and are more willing to achieve it either 
peacefully or violently.
313
  Finally, camps are logical places for militancy entrepreneurs to 
base their operations because they are less integrated to the host state – they are, even 
more so in Lebanon than Jordan, a “zone of exception” – and the residents are nearly all 
Palestinian.  When combined with the fact that these Palestinians are themselves more 
willing to actually militarize, even though their attitudes are no more militant than their 
urban brethren, it is not surprising that militant groups would base their operations there. 
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 Note, however, that this does not mean that camp residents are more willing to accept a 
peaceful diplomatic route such as the two-state solution.  In fact, they were less likely than non-
camp residents to choose that option. 
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PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATION 
As discussed in Chapter 2, significant attention has been paid in the literature on 
refugee militarization to protracted refugee situations.  Among the three cases in this 
study which did result in large-scale militarization, a protracted refugee situation was 
present in the case of Palestinians, but not those of Rwandans in Zaire or Afghans in 
Pakistan.  Among Palestinians, the protracted duration of their refugee situation by 1964 
contributed to their belief that they could no longer expect powerful external actors such 
as Arab states or the UN to address their grievances and bring them home; they could rely 
only on themselves.  From this point, a Palestinian identity and ethnonationalist project 
began to become widespread and popular, and the number of fedayeen started to increase 
rapidly – especially after their alleged success against Israel in 1968 – from the civilian 
refugee population.  In the other two cases, militancy entrepreneurs and a collective 
project were present prior to departure, and they grew their ranks and continued their 
efforts in exile.  These results suggest that a protracted refugee situation may be 
necessary for the development of militancy entrepreneurs in exile, but it is not a 
necessary condition when pre-existing militancy entrepreneurs are present. 
MILITANCY ENTREPRENEURS AND THE COLLECTIVE PROJECT 
Some critics may argue that the causality in the proposed framework is reversed, 
i.e., that political and militancy entrepreneurs can stimulate and generate political 
motivation where it did not exist previously.  However, this line of reasoning grants too 
much power to the persuasiveness of such leaders.  It is far less plausible that a powerful 
orator will be able to mobilize a population by framing an argument around grievances 
which have little relation to their own experiences and perceptions, ex nihilo, than 
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political grievances which resonate with the audience because they draw from 
experiences and symbols which are already familiar and widespread. 
Directions for future research 
COLLECTIVE PROJECT BASED ON ECONOMIC ATTACHMENT TO COO 
One area which calls for further investigation is construction of the collective 
project on the basis of economic attachment to the CoO.  In the three cases reviewed in 
this project in which militarization occurred, a strong political attachment was present – 
ethnonationalist projects in two cases and a religious/traditional project in the third – 
which appeared to overshadow the economic attachment, even though two (and all three, 
if naazihiin are included) also had a practical economic attachment to the CoO due to 
their agricultural base.  This raises the question of whether economic attachment as a 
basis for a collective project is a sufficiently strong motivator to lead to militarization. 
One way to begin investigating the latter possibility is to find cases in which there 
was relatively little political attachment to the CoO but economic attachment was strong, 
while the rest of the variables were present.  An illustrative case would be one in which 
refugees were expelled due to a conflict over arable land or rent-producing resources, but 
there is little nationalism or ethnonationalism among the refugees.  An in-depth study of 
refugees from Sierra Leone – where diamonds were an important element in the civil war 
– may be a relevant case to begin investigating this question further. 
A CALL FOR MORE CASE STUDIES AND QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT 
Future research on the topic should conduct additional case studies across diverse 
geographies and groups to extend further its global relevance.  Some possibilities, using 
the same matched-case comparative design as that used in this project, are: Burmese 
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(Keren) refugees in Thailand from 1970 to the present vs. Burmese (Rohingya) refugees 
in Bangladesh from 1991 to the present; both Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees in 
Guinea from 1999-2002 vs. the same refugees from 2003 to the present; Burundians in 
Tanzania in the mid-1990s vs. Rwandans in Tanzania from 1994-96; and Iraqis in Syria 
since 2003 vs. Iraqis in Jordan since 2003.
314
  These are just some initial suggestions; 
there are many other potentially valuable comparisons.  In fact, it would be particularly 
useful to compare every case that has resulted in militarization in specific years with the 
same case during years in the which those refugees did not take up arms. 
While case studies have certain strengths, including strong internal validity, a 
global database of all situations worldwide (above a certain population threshold) in 
which refugees resided in a host state bordering their CoO, could be used to assess 
quantitatively the framework proposed in this project.  This would provide a more 
convincing assessment of the framework’s global generalizability.  Salehyan and 
Gleditsch (2006) tested quantitatively the contribution of refugees to engagement in war 
by the host state, so their data might be utilized as a starting point. 
EXPANDING THE SCOPE 
This project has provided strong initial empirical evidence for a new approach to 
the study of refugee militarization which incorporates a collective project and 
socioeconomic integration among the group with structural factors.  It has shown – while 
acknowledging that humanitarian needs are real, legitimate and worthy of urgent 
humanitarian action – that refugees can be important political actors, and their political 
attitudes matter. 
The first logical extension would be to internally displaced persons (IDPs), those 
                                                          
314
 The first case listed in each pair resulted in militarization, while the second did not. 
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who have fled their homes but not crossed an international border, but the proposed 
framework also has potentially important implications for a variety of related research 
areas.  For example, with the exception of studies of the classic peasant revolutions, those 
scholars who attempt to study agency among the severely disenfranchised have often 
done so in the context of Scott’s (1985) “everyday forms of peasant resistance”, behavior 
that is passive-aggressive in improving the living conditions of the poor while avoiding 
punishment by the authorities
315
.  By contrast, this project suggests that further attention 
to the political will of marginalized groups is warranted.  Demonstrating the importance 
of studying collective projects among those who have been excluded not only from the 
polity but even further, from the physical state, suggests the necessity of studying such 
projects among all groups who have been severely disenfranchised. 
Furthermore, this work can be fruitfully applied to the study of armed rebellion by 
populations who have not migrated.  Although some of the factors discussed in this study 
are unique to refugee situations, the main elements of the proposed framework, which are 
drawn primarily from the study of contentious politics, may be just as applicable to 
mobilization and militarization by a non-refugee population.  Scholars studying civil war, 
for example, may find the framework a parsimonious way to integrate a rebel group, its 
population constituency, and structural constraints. 
Finally, the project has the potential to help illuminate processes at work in other 
situations of group conflict.  For instance, it could help scholars studying ethnic and 
ethnonationalist violence better understand group political projects and social 
construction of attachment to a homeland. 
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Palestinian and Iraqi refugees in the new Middle East 
As of this writing in March 2012, the events of the “Arab Spring” which began 
fifteen months ago with the self-immolation of a Tunisian street vendor have now led to 
the toppling of three Arab dictatorships (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya), with the fates of at least 
two more still uncertain (Yemen, Syria).  Jordan experienced weekly protests in the first 
half of 2011, some attracting thousands of participants and at least one, at Dakhliyya 
Circle, turning violent.  There are several reasons for the decline of protests later in the 
year, most notably quick action and promises of future reform by King Abdullah, and the 
fear of chaos and civil war which could result from an uncertain transition period.  That 
fear is prevalent among both Palestinians and East Bank Jordanians, who see the 
Hashemite monarchy – which has neither Palestinian nor East Bank tribal provenance – 
as the lynchpin which holds the country together. 
Nonetheless, turmoil in the region continues to churn and there are still occasional 
protests in Jordan, most recently in the East Bank tribal town of Karak. (Farrell/New 
York Times, 2/9/12)  What would happen with regard to refugee militarization if the 
Jordanian regime were to enter a chaotic transition period like those seen elsewhere in the 
region?  What is the likelihood that either Palestinians or Iraqis would militarize? 
PALESTINIANS 
Although I did not ask questions specifically about the Arab Spring, during the 
course of the interviews nearly a quarter of Palestinian interviewees voluntarily referred 
to it or strongly implied a reference to it.  The events of the Arab Spring breathed new 
life into the hopes of Palestinian political and militancy entrepreneurs, both through the 
advent of democratic Arab governments more supportive of the Palestinian cause and 
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expectations of a Palestinian Arab Spring: 
The revolutions that happened in other Arab countries, they were able to achieve and take 
their freedom back.  So we hope that this will happen [for the Palestinians].  The 
Palestinians have to suffer two things: the Palestinian Authority and the enemy [Israel]….  
The destiny of every young man here is unknown.  As I said, we are motivated and 
provoked by anything… not just what happens in Palestine, but in Libya, Tunisia….  
Young people have energy and are more active, they have more power to do something.  
You know, because of Facebook and the internet, there are more connections between 
people around the world. (Male, 30) 
It’s good for my heart nowadays, what happened in Egypt, [it offers us] a new future….  
From 1991 to 2011 we were disappointed with what’s going on in the Arab world.  
Lebanon, Gaza….  It was a black picture.  But this year, what’s going on in the Arab 
world, the Arab Spring….  These young people gave us [older leaders] some good 
lessons.   We are not the leaders now giving the youth the opportunity.  Even the 
Facebook guys, they are good guys, we are following them nowadays. (Male, 49) 
I believe that if there is democracy in all Arab countries, the Palestinians [will be] 
allowed to go back to Palestine with the support of all Arabs with nonviolent resistance, 
like demonstrations, to go to Palestine together, with nonviolent demonstrations.  I 
believe in the next five years all the refugees will go back to Palestine in peace.  Five 
million in Tahrir Square made Hosni Mubarak leave.  Now five million Palestinians in 
addition to five million Egyptians, if they cross the borders to Palestine -- I don’t think 
anyone will be able to stop them if they are not using any weapons. (Male, 53) 
These sentiments were expressed by political and militancy entrepreneurs even into May 
(when I completed the field research).  Among ordinary refugees, the initial days and 
weeks after the fall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak brought similar optimism 
concerning the implications of the Arab Spring for the Palestinian cause: 
What happened in Tunisia and Egypt recently….  The new governments will help [the 
Palestinians] achieve their rights.  The Arab governments had made [the Palestinian] 
people suffer.  [For example] Hosni Mubarak stopped aid from reaching Gaza. (Male, 28, 
2/17/11) 
We want a revolution like what’s happened in Tunisia and Egypt so we can get our land 
back. (Female, 41, 3/2/11) 
Now we put our faith in a people’s revolution to get Palestine back, so the Jews will leave 
like Mubarak and like [Ben Ali in] Tunisia.  Inshallah we can get rid of Israel in that 
way. (Male, 64, 3/8/11) 
Maybe the situation is going to be better, maybe the revolutions in the Arab world are 
going to be very effective and do something about Palestine.  Maybe new governments 
are going to do something….  What’s happened in Egypt, I immediately link it with 
Palestine, so if the situation in Egypt is going to be better, then the situation in Palestine 
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is going to be better because of Gaza…. (Female, 21, 3/16/11) 
However, in the following months, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, Syria and other states 
experienced turmoil and upheaval, experiencing severe repression and even war, while 
Jordan had been experiencing weekly protests.  The extended repression of protesters 
throughout the region and the long drought of good news, after the euphoric reaction and 
soaring hopes which had followed the resignation of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak 
on February 11 – as well as the growing divide between East Bank Jordanians, who 
mostly supported the Jordanian regime, and Palestinians, who were widely perceived as 
the instigators of the protests in Jordan – led to a growing feeling of pessimism and 
discontent with life in Jordan, and the protests in particular: 
We don’t want to participate in the resistance.  They won’t change anything, even if they 
joined the resistance, nothing will change.  I think all the demonstrations are a mistake. 
(In Jordan?)  In any place, I think it’s wrong.  They only make the situation worse if they 
do that.  They won’t be able to liberate Palestine if they do that. (Female, 47, 5/5/11) 
When asked, “When you think about your life in Jordan, what aspects are you 
most satisfied with?”, interviewees in later interviews became less likely to say “equal 
rights with East Bank Jordanians” (p < .05), after controlling for demographic and other 
relevant variables.
316
  In response to the question I posed regarding options for refugees 
following a peace deal, they became less likely to choose “stay permanently in Jordan” (p 
< .05).  And when asked what they expect of the future of the Palestinian refugees, they 
became more likely to say that there will be no change (p < .05), which from the 
perspective of most Palestinians is a pessimistic answer, and less likely to say that the 
refugees’ economic situation will improve (p < .001), which were the primary demands 
of the protests in Jordan. 
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The Arab Spring also appeared to increase Palestinians’ allegiance to affiliates of 
the Muslim Brotherhood.  When asked, “Which group(s) or organization(s) do you feel 
best represents the interests of the Palestinian refugees?”, participants became less likely 
over time to say “No organization” (p < .05) and more likely to mention Hamas (p < .05).  
This result may be related to – or even a veiled reference to – the leading role of the 
Islamic Action Front (IAF), the Jordanian political party of the Muslim Brotherhood 
which is dominated by Palestinians, in organizing protests in Jordan.  In other words, 
among Palestinians in Jordan, the events of the Arab Spring appear to have increased 
support for affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Palestinian territories, which may 
reflect an increase in support for the Brotherhood’s affiliate in Jordan. 
However, the increased pessimism over those four months also led to decreasing 
faith in their own self-efficacy: When given choices on who will best help them achieve 
their rights, they became less likely to choose “the Palestinian people themselves” (p < 




As noted in Chapter 7, the only variable in the proposed framework which is 
known to be absent in the case of Palestinians in Jordan today is political opportunity.  
The Jordanian security forces, especially the mukhabarat, are proactive and effective in 
repressing occasional efforts at militarization by Palestinian refugees.  If the regime were 
to fall or enter a transitional phase, it is likely that the organization and repressive 
capacity of the security forces would likewise falter.  Since those forces are almost 
entirely comprised of East Bank Jordanians, the tribes’ political allegiances, rather than 
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holding demographic and all other relevant variables constant.  See Appendix II for details. 
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the will of the Hashemite-led state, would become a crucial factor affecting the degree of 
political opportunity for militarization by Palestinians.  There are three possible paths at 
that point:  
1) The East Bank tribes allow and support Palestinian militarization, as it  
reinforces their nationalist claim that Jordan is for the tribes while Palestine is for 
Palestinians. 
2) The East Bank tribes, wary of Palestinians as they recall 1970, largely maintain 
the integrity of the security forces.  The tribes cooperate with each other to continue and 
even increase their surveillance and repression of Palestinians, and their securitization of 
the borders, to ensure that the refugees do not arm during this period, regardless of the 
Palestinians’ intended target. 
3) Jordan dissolves into civil war along national and tribal lines, pitting the 
various tribes against Palestinians and each other.  In this scenario, there is essentially no 
state authority, or only a powerless interim government.  The tribes arm primarily from 
the stores of the Jordanian government, as well as other states, while Palestinians arm 
primarily from outside the country – the West Bank, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, Iran and 
Iraq are all possible sources, if the East Bank tribes are unable to cooperate with each 
other to secure the borders.  In this scenario it is again likely that Palestinians would 
militarize against Israel, a project which would be seen as more legitimate among 
Palestinians themselves, and in the region, than fighting East Bankers.  Attacks on Israel, 
which would attract violent reprisals, would constitute a powerful tactic for stimulating 
recruitment, fundraising and arms acquisition to the Palestinian militant groups. 
In the first and third scenarios above, political opportunity would be available, 
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either with or without the support of the East Bankers, and militarization by Palestinians 
would occur.  In the second scenario, political opportunity would continue to remain 




As shown in Chapter 8, the masses of Iraqi refugees have little collective project 
to redeem their CoO, even though it is highly likely that conflict resources would be 
available.  However, ex-Ba’athists, both former leaders and low-level potential foot 
soldiers, do constitute a group of highly motivated pre-existing militancy entrepreneurs.  
Without political motivation among the larger group, the militancy entrepreneurs could 
still engage in attacks on the CoO, though they would be more akin to an isolated terrorist 
group than large-scale refugee militarization. 
Until now, the main obstacle preventing them from conducting such attacks has 
been lack of political opportunity.  If the Jordanian regime were to enter an uncertain 
transition period, it is possible that political opportunity would become available.  This is 
especially the case if Jordan were to fall into civil war, as in the third outcome described 
in the Palestinian section, above.  In such a scenario, there would be an abundance of 
unsecured arms in the country and decreased repressive capacity.  Neither the East Bank 
Jordanians nor Palestinians would have an inherent stake in the ex-Ba’athists’ political 
project, but they would surely become party to the conflict as alliances evolved over time.  
Therefore, with political opportunity, it is likely that the ex-Ba’athists would obtain the 
capacity to conduct terrorist strikes on the Shi’ite-led government of Iraq from Jordan, 
but not large-scale refugee militarization. 
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month after the fall of Mubarak. 
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TURKEY IN THE NEW MIDDLE EAST 
The new and evolving constellation of power and alliances in the Middle East, 
including the growing Sunni/Shi’ite political polarization, has changed the calculus for 
powerful regional players.  In particular, Turkey’s turn eastward in the past several years 
has raised its profile among Sunni populations, especially in its frosty relations with 
Israel and recent opposition to the Iranian-supported Assad regime in Syria.  Turkey 
harbors and supports the Free Syrian Army, a group of army defectors in refugee camps 
on the Syrian border who seek to overthrow the Syrian regime.  Turkey’s recent 
international activity gives it a stake in both the Palestinian and Iraqi conflicts, on the side 
of the refugees in both cases. 
Although Turkey and Israel still officially maintain diplomatic relations and 
military ties, they have cooled considerably since the Gaza War of 2008-09.  Turkey is 
still allied with the West and a longstanding member of NATO, so it is unlikely to 
directly attack Israel.  If inclined to support Palestinian militants, it is far more likely that 
Turkey would supply covert military assistance and diplomatic cover to the Palestinian 
rebels.  On the Iraqi front, given that Iraq’s government is Shi’ite-led and also supported 
by Iran, it is entirely conceivable that Turkey would likewise be willing to covertly 
support and arm the aggrieved Sunni ex-Ba’athists. 
In 2004, King Abdullah of Jordan expressed fear of a rising “Shi’ite crescent”
319
, 
but is firmly committed, as noted in Chapter 8, to maintaining security and stability in his 
country.  Therefore, Jordan under the current regime would probably attempt to prevent 
such provision of conflict resources, despite a degree of convergent interests. 
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Reducing the risk of refugee militarization 
I began this work by explaining the dangers of refugee militarization and the 
urgency of gaining greater understanding of the phenomenon.  In this section of the 
concluding chapter, I will apply the lessons learned to make policy recommendations for 
stakeholders, including host states, international humanitarian organizations and donor 
states.  Applying the theoretical framework developed in this project to better understand 
the factors leading to refugee militarization could help practitioners and policymakers 
decrease the risk of engagement in conflict by refugee groups. 
First, while it is certainly legitimate for host states to seek security and sovereign 
control over their borders, they must not refuse entry or asylum to groups of refugees due 
to a fear that they will militarize, which would be discriminatory and a violation of their 
human rights as well as international law, and could result in refugees’ injury or death in 
a situation of ongoing conflict.  As I will emphasize below, they must also take care to 
honor the human rights of refugees.  With that said, host states, aid organizations and 
interested third-party states, such as donors, may be able to reduce the risk that a refugee 
group will militarize by taking certain actions, including the following: 
COLLECTIVE PROJECT 
The war has already occurred; if it was (perceived to be) a war of exclusion, no 
action can change that ex post facto.  The best action that can be taken to avoid this factor 
is to proactively intervene early in a crisis to prevent violence against civilians.  After the 
fact, it may be possible to reduce motivation for violent reprisal by offering culturally 
sensitive counseling to refugees, including children, who have experienced trauma in the 
CoO or in the course of their expulsion. 
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Likewise, there is little that a host state or external actor can do to suppress an 
ethnonationalist movement relating to the CoO.  Normatively, it is also questionable 
whether it is even appropriate to try to thwart such a movement; clearly, it depends on the 
individual case.  That is a question which will be answered by political leaders on the 
basis of political calculations.  In some cases, such as the Rwandans, a project existed 
prior to departure; in others, like the Palestinians, it develops in exile.  Either way, there 
is little that outsiders can do to avoid that powerful motivating factor.  Sometimes, as in 
the case of Palestinians from 1948-1963, a nascent ethnonational project can be averted 
by an alternate ideology, such as pan-Arabism, which credibly offers redemption.  
However, that was a unique set of circumstances and it is unlikely that a host state could 
intentionally create a competing ideological movement for the purpose of thwarting an 
ethnonationalist project. 
It would be all but impossible to address the “greed” variable.  Either rent-
producing natural resources in the CoO were a basis for the conflict, or they were not.  
The best recommendation that can be made to reduce this economic motivation is, again, 
to be assertive and proactive in politically intervening in the crisis in the CoO. 
SOCIOECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE HOST STATE 
It would be more feasible for a host state and other stakeholders to reduce the 
likelihood of militarization by increasing refugees’ rights and socioeconomic integration 
to the host state.  First, this can be accomplished by improving their living conditions, 
employment and educational opportunities and legal rights to meet the terms of the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, regardless of whether the host state is a 
signatory.  Secondly, both host states and international agencies can improve both the 
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relative and absolute standard of living of refugees by: accommodating them in urban 
settings – for example, giving them vouchers for apartment rental, which landlords can 
redeem for cash, rather than in camps; offering skill training, especially when the 
economic bases of the CoO and host are substantially different (this is especially relevant 
for refugees with an agricultural base in the CoO); and decreasing barriers to 
employment, for example by accepting professional certifications and work experience 
from the CoO to allow refugees to engage in the same professions in the host state.
320
  
Unfortunately, whether or not these recommendations – as well as even greater 
integration, such as citizenship – are implemented will depend in large part on domestic 
political calculations by the host state, but humanitarian aid organizations and 
international donor states could take steps to ease the economic and political pain which a 
host state government could face from their domestic constituencies as a result of such 
policies. 
Secondly, host states can create formal and informal avenues for refugees to 
address their political grievances through the host state.  Examples of formal avenues 
include Iran’s refugee councils for Afghans and Jordan’s allowance for Palestinians to 
vote in parliamentary elections.  Informal avenues include allowing refugees freedom of 
speech, press and assembly.  For example, they can establish alternative routes for 
expression of grievances such as town hall forums in camps and communities, 
engagement in media outlets, polling, civil society groups, ethnic/national cultural 
centers, and other traditional forms of political engagement unique to each group. Host 
states can allow peaceful protests.  Such opportunities could constitute not only an outlet 
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for political engagement and expression, but valuable skill training and additional 
employment opportunities as well.  In practice, such allowances will depend on the 
regime type and political interests of the host state. 
Finally, in most cases ethnic consanguinity will be impossible to address, unless 
there are two areas in the host state where a refugee population could be housed with 
equal ease, one of which contains a co-ethnic host population while the other does not – 
in which case the refugees would probably feel more welcome and integrate better with 
the co-ethnic population.  However, even when refugees and host nationals are of 
different ethnic groups, stakeholders could make efforts to reduce social estrangement 
through public awareness campaigns and bridge-building efforts such as those of 
UNHCR-supported community centers in Amman, which primarily serve Iraqi refugees 
but are also open to Jordanians. 
DETERRING MILITANCY ENTREPRENEURS 
Host states can deter pre-existing militancy entrepreneurs by separating them 
from civilians at the border – to the extent possible in what is often chaos – or as soon as 
possible after arrival, and extraditing any who are suspected of having committed war 
crimes or crimes against humanity to the International Criminal Court.  Host states also 
have the right, under the terms of the 1951 Convention, to refuse asylum to active 
combatants.  Host states’ implementation of such recommendations will depend on both 
their capacity and political will to do so. 
Deterring the emergence of militancy entrepreneurs in exile from a civilian 
population without violating their human rights is more difficult, but the 
recommendations above for addressing the collective project and increasing 
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socioeconomic integration may help.  Since a protracted stay appears to be necessary for 
the emergence of militancy entrepreneurs in exile, interested states can reduce the 
duration of stay of refugees by quickly and actively engaging in the political conflict in 
the CoO to reach a lasting peace agreement which will enable refugees to return home.  
Once the situation has become protracted and the second generation has grown up in 
exile, it may become more difficult and complicated to convince a refugee group to 
accept a political compromise. 
PREVENTING POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES 
The presence or absence of political opportunities for militarization, including 
acquisition of conflict resources, is the factor which is most directly controllable by host 
states.  Like the other factors, it will depend in large part on the political will and capacity 
of the host state, including the nature of its relationship with the CoO.  However, a 
government which seeks to prevent militarization must tread a fine line in order not to 
violate the refugees’ human rights.
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  With that in mind, the following steps can be 
taken: First, the government can train and employ refugees themselves as police and 
intelligence forces to maintain security, and to identify and report the presence of small 
arms and light weapons within their camps and communities.  Second, the government 
can confiscate small arms and light weapons through a process of search and seizure 
which is consistent with international legal standards.  Third, it can monitor and minimize 
political space in refugee camps and communities for militant organizations to organize, 
train, recruit and operate; while continuing to allow nonviolent avenues for political 
expression, as described above.  Finally, the host government can increase border 
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security to prevent uncontrolled cross-border activity. 
International humanitarian organizations, including the two UN refugee agencies, 
can reduce political opportunity by withdrawing their assistance to militarized camps and 
communities, or making it contingent on a clear separation of civilians from militants.  
When there is serious concern about diversion of aid, they can choose to provide that aid 
only in person, for example by giving antibiotics – a potential conflict resource – one 
dose at a time, in a clinic.  (Since the Zaire case, UNHCR and many other international 
organizations have adopted such policy changes to prevent a repeat of their complicity in 
future refugee situations.) 
Finally, host states and interested third-party states can reduce political 
opportunity by using diplomatic tools to attempt to shut down international sources of 
funding, weapons and other conflict resources to the militant group(s). 
THE BIGGER PICTURE 
While humanitarian concerns must continue to be met, the implications of this 
framework for understanding refugee groups’ collective projects, in the context of 
structural factors, could help raise awareness among policymakers of the multifaceted 
roles held by those who qualify for refugee status.  It can help build capacity among 
refugees by leading decision-makers to acknowledge and address their personal and 
group aspirations, which has often been lacking. That lacuna has constituted a blind spot 
which, in some cases, militancy entrepreneurs have been able to exploit for mobilization 
and militarization. By acknowledging and expecting that refugees are important actors 
who take independent political action, practitioners and policymakers might reconsider 
policies which seek to deter all political activity by refugees, and offer access to 
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nonviolent formal and informal institutions of political engagement, as described above. 
 
This work has proposed a new analytical framework to explain refugee 
militarization which accords the collective project its due weight in motivating the 
actions of refugee groups.  Refugee militarization is a global phenomenon which 
warrants greater understanding among scholars, policymakers and humanitarian 
practitioners, especially as it continues around the world today, and is likely to emerge in 
new locations in the future.   I hope that this scholarly effort will contribute in a small 
way to improving the chances for peace and security for all affected people; and durable 
solutions for refugees, especially those whose situations are protracted, in order that they 




APPENDIX I. Demographic Characteristics of Refugee Samples 
 
Table I-1.  Sex 
 
* In one early interview the respondent changed repeatedly: First a young man spoke, then he left and his mother 
took his place, then she left and his brother took her place, etc.  In later interviews I handled this problem by 
recording each speaker as a separate individual in the household, but I did not do that the first time. 
 




Male 88 66% 30 55% 66 69% 28 58%
Female 45 34% 25 45% 29 31% 20 42%
TOTAL 133 100% 55 100% 95 100% 48 100%






<18 3 2% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
18-24 25 19% 6 11% 15 16% 6 13%
25-34 36 27% 12 22% 22 23% 10 21%
35-44 13 10% 17 31% 12 13% 16 33%
45-54 29 22% 8 15% 24 26% 7 15%
55-64 9 7% 5 9% 8 9% 4 8%
>64 16 12% 7 13% 13 14% 5 10%
TOTAL 131 100% 55 100% 94 100% 48 100%
Data missing 3 2% 0 0% 2 2% 0 0%








Table I-3.  Marital status 
 
 
Table I-4.  Number of children 
 
* No interviewee who was single had a child 
 




Single 21 16% 9 17% 11 12% 9 20%
Married 96 74% 31 58% 71 76% 27 59%
Separated/Divorced 2 2% 9 17% 2 2% 7 15%
Widowed 8 6% 4 8% 7 8% 3 7%
2 or more wives 2 2% 0 0% 2 2% 0 0%
TOTAL 129 100% 53 100% 93 100% 46 100%






CHILDREN (if married or previously married*)
n 107 45 81 38







Arab 134 100% 52 95% 96 100% 45 94%
Kurd 0 0% 3 5% 0 0% 3 6%















Sunni 130 98% 28 51% 92 97% 27 56%
Shi'ite 0 0% 13 24% 0 0% 9 19%
Christian 2 2% 7 13% 2 2% 7 15%
Asabiyya 0 0% 3 5% 0 0% 2 4%
Other 1 1% 0 0% 1 1% 0 0%
Inter-faith 0 0% 4 7% 0 0% 3 6%
TOTAL 133 100% 55 100% 95 100% 48 100%







< 6th 10 8% 3 6% 4 4% 3 7%
Completed 6-9 28 21% 10 19% 27 28% 8 17%
Completed 10-12 35 27% 7 13% 19 20% 6 13%
Vocational 12 9% 1 2% 8 8% 1 2%
Some univ 19 15% 11 21% 15 16% 10 22%
Completed Bach 22 17% 17 33% 17 18% 15 33%
Some grad 1 1% 0 0% 1 1% 0 0%
Adv. Degree 4 3% 3 6% 4 4% 3 7%
TOTAL 131 100% 52 100% 95 100% 46 100%














No 18 14% 19 35% 16 17% 17 36%
Yes 61 47% 17 31% 45 48% 16 34%
Occasional 1 1% 4 7% 1 1% 4 9%
Retired 10 8% 5 9% 10 11% 3 6%
Housewife 24 18% 6 11% 14 15% 4 9%
Student 16 12% 3 6% 8 9% 3 6%
TOTAL 130 100% 54 100% 94 100% 47 100%
Data missing 4 3% 1 2% 2 2% 1 2%
EMPLOYED (males only)
No 13 15% 13 45% 12 18% 12 44%
Yes 58 67% 11 38% 43 66% 11 41%
Occasional 1 1% 1 3% 1 2% 1 4%
Retired 9 10% 2 7% 9 14% 1 4%
Student 5 6% 2 7% 0 0% 2 7%
TOTAL 86 100% 29 100% 65 100% 27 100%







Table I-9.  Household income 
 
 





HOUSEHOLD INCOME (JD per month)
0 6 5% 6 12% 4 4% 5 12%
1-200 32 25% 20 41% 22 24% 16 38%
201-400 48 38% 11 22% 33 36% 10 24%
401-600 14 11% 6 12% 12 13% 5 12%
601-800 11 9% 0 0% 8 9% 0 0%
801-1000 4 3% 1 2% 2 2% 1 2%
1001-10000 10 8% 4 8% 8 9% 4 10%
>10000 2 2% 1 2% 2 2% 1 2%
TOTAL 127 100% 49 100% 91 100% 42 100%
n 127 49 91 42
Data missing 7 5% 6 11% 5 5% 6 13%







Own 70 54% 6 11% 51 55% 6 13%
Rent 59 45% 48 87% 41 44% 41 85%
Other 1 1% 1 2% 1 1% 1 2%
TOTAL 130 100% 55 100% 93 100% 48 100%







Table I-11.  Internet access 
 
 





No 69 53% 30 55% 49 52% 25 52%
No, recently or soon 12 9% 5 9% 8 8% 5 10%
No, use it elsewhere 8 6% 1 2% 7 7% 1 2%
Yes 42 32% 19 35% 31 33% 17 35%
TOTAL 131 100% 55 100% 95 100% 48 100%







No 56 42% 18 34% 43 45% 16 34%
Some 52 39% 23 43% 34 35% 19 40%
Yes 24 18% 12 23% 19 20% 12 26%
TOTAL 132 100% 53 100% 96 100% 47 100%
Data missing 2 1% 2 4% 0 0% 1 2%
SPEAKS ANOTHER LANGUAGE
No 109 83% 47 89% 77 81% 41 87%
Some 14 11% 2 4% 11 12% 2 4%
Yes 8 6% 4 8% 7 7% 4 9%
TOTAL 131 100% 53 100% 95 100% 47 100%


















1-2 22 18% 12 22% 15 17% 10 21%
3-4 31 26% 19 35% 20 23% 17 36%
5-6 35 29% 19 35% 28 32% 16 34%
7-8 16 13% 4 7% 12 14% 4 9%
>8 15 13% 0 0% 12 14% 0 0%
TOTAL 119 100% 54 100% 87 100% 47 100%
Data missing 15 11% 1 2% 9 9% 1 2%






HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS EMPLOYED (% of household size)
n 118 53 87 46
Data missing 16 12% 2 4% 9 9% 2 4%













Jaffa 19 15% 16 17%
Jerusalem 18 14% 13 14%
Ramle 21 16% 12 13%
Khalil 9 7% 8 8%
Beer Seba 12 9% 8 8%
Lid 9 7% 7 7%
Haifa 8 6% 6 6%
Tulkarm 10 8% 6 6%
Nablus 5 4% 5 5%
Bethlehem 4 3% 3 3%
Bisan 3 2% 3 3%
Near Gaza 3 2% 2 2%
Ramallah 2 2% 1 1%
Tulbas 1 1% 1 1%
Falujah 1 1% 1 1%
Hebron 2 2% 1 1%
Qalqilya 1 1% 0 0%
DK / refused 2 2% 2 2%
TOTAL 130 100% 95 100%
















No 87 65% 64 67%
Yes 47 35% 32 33%




Baghdad 41 76% 36 77%
Mosul 4 7% 4 9%
Basra 2 4% 2 4%
Babel 2 4% 1 2%
Karbala 1 2% 1 2%
Meisan 1 2% 0 0%
Simawa 1 2% 1 2%
Nasriyya 1 2% 1 2%
Qadasiyya 1 2% 1 2%
TOTAL 54 100% 47 100%













IRAQIS: YEAR DEPARTED IRAQ
1992-2002 12 22% 11 23%
2003-04 9 17% 7 15%
2005-06 11 20% 10 21%
2007-09 8 15% 7 15%
2010-11 14 26% 12 26%
TOTAL 54 100% 47 100%
Data missing 1 2% 1 2%
ALL TALKED MOST
JOB IN COUNTRY OF ORIGIN 
Farmer 69 64% 2 6% 52 64% 2 6% 
Shepherd (Bedouin) 11 10% 1 3% 8 10% 1 3% 
Merchant/Small business owner 8 7% 7 20% 6 7% 6 19% 
Professional 4 4% 16 46% 3 4% 14 45% 
Manual 2 2% 5 14% 2 2% 4 13% 
Other 6 6% 4 11% 4 5% 4 13% 
DK / refused 8 7% 0 0% 6 7% 0 0% 
TOTAL 108 100% 35 100% 81 100% 31 100% 




PALESTINIANS PALESTINIANS IRAQIS 
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Citizen 120 90% 1 2% 87 91% 1 2%
Gazan 13 10% 0 0% 8 8% 0 0%
Refugee 0 0% 14 30% 0 0% 11 27%
Investor 0 0% 9 19% 0 0% 9 22%
Iqama - other 0 0% 4 9% 0 0% 4 10%
Visitor 0 0% 3 6% 0 0% 3 7%
None/Illegal 0 0% 15 32% 0 0% 12 29%
Other 1 1% 0 0% 1 1% 0 0%
Answer irrelevant 0 0% 1 2% 0 0% 1 2%
TOTAL 134 100% 47 100% 96 100% 41 100%







APPENDIX II. Effect of the Arab Spring on Palestinian Interviews 
 
 
In order to assess the impact of the Arab Spring on Palestinian interviewees’ 
responses (see Chapter 10), logistic regression was run on each of the following 






Table II-1.  Question: “When you think about your life in Jordan, what aspects are you most 
satisfied with?” (open-ended)  Answer: “Equal rights with East Bank Jordanians” 
    Coefficient Std. Error z value  p value 
Independent Variable 
Interview date - 0.03 .01 - 2.13 0.033 
 
Control Variables 
Camp/non-camp - 3.15 1.07 - 2.95 0.003 
Household income    0.00 0.00   0.27 0.788 
Region    0.96 0.64   1.50 0.133 
Age - 0.08 0.04 - 2.12 0.034 
Sex - 0.47 0.78 - 0.60 0.552 
Marital status    0.89 0.70   1.27 0.203 
Education    0.24 0.86   0.28 0.781 
Internet access    0.74 0.77   0.96 0.335 
Double refugee    0.00 0.82 - 0.01 0.996 
Trust level - 1.10 0.57 - 1.92 0.055 
 
Constant  578.8 271.5   2.13 0.033 
 
N = 91 
Log likelihood = -30.86 
Pseduo-R
2






Table II-2.  Question: “If there is a peace deal with Israel in the future, and all options are 
possible to Palestinian refugees, which of the following do you believe is the best course of action 
for them?” (choices given)  Answer: “Stay permanently in Jordan” 
    Coefficient Std. Error z value  p value 
Independent Variable 
Interview date - 0.02 0.01 - 2.15 0.031 
 
Control Variables 
Camp/non-camp   0.09 0.57    0.16 0.872 
Household income   0.00 0.00    0.03 0.979 
Region - 0.02 0.40 - 0.06 0.953 
Age - 0.03 0.02 - 1.61 0.106 
Sex - 0.45 0.57 - 0.80 0.425 
Marital status - 0.32 0.54 - 0.60 0.551 
Education - 0.57 0.64 - 0.89 0.372 
Internet access - 0.33 0.58 - 0.56 0.575 
Double refugee   0.67 0.57   1.18 0.238 
Gazan - 1.02 1.01 - 1.01 0.314 
Trust level - 1.06 0.39 - 2.74 0.006 
 
Constant  402.4 185.4    2.17 0.030 
 
N = 113 
Log likelihood = -55.44 
Pseduo-R
2
 = 0.188 
 
Table II- 3.  Question: “What do you think is the future of the Palestinian refugees?” (open-
ended)  Answer: “No change” 
    Coefficient Std. Error z value  p value 
Independent Variable 
Interview date 0.0201056 0.01  2.26 0.024 
 
Control Variables 
Camp/non-camp   0.84 0.54   1.55 0.120 
Household income - 0.00 0.00 - 0.51 0.607 
Region   0.74 0.42   1.74 0.081 
Age - 0.02 0.02 - 1.14 0.252 
Sex   1.07 0.55   1.94 0.053 
Marital status   0.16 0.38   0.43 0.668 
Education - 0.36 0.55 - 0.65 0.518 
Internet access   0.06 0.53   0.11 0.911 
Double refugee - 1.22 0.57 - 2.13 0.033 
Gazan - 0.99 0.86 - 1.15 0.248 
Trust level - 0.15 0.33 - 0.45 0.654 
 
Constant - 377.1 166.4 - 2.27 0.023 
 
N = 102 
Log likelihood = -60.74 
Pseduo-R
2




Table II- 4.  Question: “What do you think is the future of the Palestinian refugees?” (open-
ended)  Answer: “Their economic situation will improve” 
    Coefficient Std. Error z value  p value 
Independent Variable 
Interview date -   1.95 0.06 - 34.50 0.000 
 
Control Variables 
Camp/non-camp    131.81 1123.88       0.12 0.907 
Household income        0.00       0.05     - 0.09 0.928 
Region - 190.26   804.37     - 0.24 0.813 
Age        0.18       0.34       0.53 0.598 
Sex    168.31   658.55       0.26 0.798 
Marital status      20.72   492.19       0.04 0.966 
Education    257.88 1038.79       0.25 0.804 
Internet access  - 158.25 1084.48     - 0.15 0.884 
Double refugee  - 134.80   871.35     - 0.15 0.877 
Gazan    295.33   952.33       0.31 0.756 




N = 102 
Log likelihood = - 1.57 
Pseduo-R
2
 = 0.944 
 
Table II- 5.  Question: “Which group(s) or organization(s) do you feel best represents the interests 
of the Palestinian refugees?” (open-ended)  Answer: “No organization” 
    Coefficient Std. Error z value  p value 
Independent Variable 
Interview date - 0.02   0.01 - 2.11 0.034 
 
Control Variables 
Camp/non-camp - 0.21   0.53 - 0.40 0.689 
Household income   0.00   0.00    1.16 0.247 
Region   0.62   0.39    1.58 0.114 
Age   0.01   0.02    0.61 0.540 
Sex - 0.30   0.56 - 0.55 0.585 
Marital status - 0.93   0.46 - 2.03 0.042 
Education - 0.69   0.59 - 1.16 0.246 
Internet access   0.72   0.58    1.23 0.218 
Double refugee - 1.62   0.64 - 2.54 0.011 
Gazan   1.79   0.87    2.05 0.040 
Trust level   0.03   0.33    0.08 0.937 
 
Constant 355.8 167.9    2.12 0.034 
 
N = 108 
Log likelihood = -60.07 
Pseduo-R
2
 = 0.156 
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Table II- 6.  Question: “Which group(s) or organization(s) do you feel best represents the interests 
of the Palestinian refugees?” (open-ended)  Answer: “Hamas” 
    Coefficient Std. Error z value  p value 
Independent Variable 
Interview date    0.02 0.01  2.05 0.040 
 
Control Variables 
Camp/non-camp    0.33 0.73   0.45 0.652 
Household income - 0.00 0.00 - 1.01 0.313 
Region    0.19 0.50   0.37 0.708 
Age - 0.02 0.02 - 0.89 0.373 
Sex - 0.92 0.75 - 1.23 0.220 
Marital status - 0.22 0.56 - 0.40 0.691 
Education    1.69 0.67   2.52 0.012 
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Log likelihood = -42.77 
Pseduo-R
2
 = 0.196 
 
Table II- 7.  Question: “Do you believe the rights of the Palestinian people regarding Palestine 
can be best achieved through the efforts of the…?” (choices given)  Answer: “Palestinian people 
themselves” 
    Coefficient Std. Error z value  p value 
Independent Variable 
Interview date - 0.02 0.01 - 2.08 0.037 
 
Control Variables 
Camp/non-camp - 0.34 0.54 - 0.63 0.526 
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Sex - 0.11 0.60 - 0.19 0.850 
Marital status   1.18 0.50    2.36 0.018 
Education   0.94 0.60    1.56 0.120 
Internet access   1.47 0.62    2.37 0.018 
Double refugee   0.12 0.58    0.21 0.833 
Gazan   0.22 0.84    0.26 0.797 
Trust level   0.11 0.32    0.36 0.722 
 
Constant 347.8 168.0    2.07 0.038 
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